John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I thank our colleague. I also note the Senator from Maine was present on the floor in the course of the colloquy between the distinguished Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid, and our distinguished leader, Mr. McConnell. I think they are both working toward trying to find the basis on which this matter can be treated as a resolution, which has been my desire from the first. I believe the Senator shares that view very strongly.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. I am glad she, once again, pointed out that if it were to go into bill status, there is a point in time when I--and I presume you would join me--and others would move to try and have that bill status once again returned to the resolution status before any final action on this or other measures that may come before the Senate in this debate. Senator McConnell all along to all his colleagues has said, me included, that he wanted to try to provide an opportunity for as many viewpoints to be heard, either by resolution or by amendment, as possible. I also note the Presiding Officer was an original cosponsor on the resolution that I and Senator Nelson and Senator Collins put forward.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do not in any way want to interrupt the proceeding, but I wonder if I might be recognized, following the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, to address the nomination.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I compliment my distinguished colleague for his remarks. I am proud to follow and likewise indicate my unqualified support for General Petraeus, to wish him well, and I hope he succeeds. We had a thorough hearing in the Armed Services Committee. I wish to compliment our new chairman, Senator Levin, and the ranking member, Senator McCain, for the speed and efficiency with which they managed to get this nomination before the Senate for confirmation. We have also pending resolutions to address the situation in Iraq, most specifically our new strategy. I simply say to our leadership, I hope we can address those resolutions at the earliest possible date because our forces are engaged in combat as we speak here this morning, and we certainly do not wish to have debate any way construed as less than full support for what they are endeavoring to achieve. We wish them well, and their beloved families here at home, in these perilous days. I have concurred steadily, steadfastly in the President's decision-- and it is an absolutely correct position. We cannot let Iraq fail, fail in the sense to lose the sovereignty they have gained through hard- earned elections and the opportunity for this Nation to emerge as a constructive partner toward world peace. Therefore, we must press on. But I think it is incumbent upon the Congress to provide its views. The President specifically asked, if there were suggestions, forward them, speak them, and I and others, in a matter of clear conscience, have done just that. We shall see what evolves from the resolutions now pending and possibly other suggestions that could be brought forth by colleagues in the days to come in the Senate. I do once again urge that we address it as expeditiously as the joint leadership can determine. Yesterday, the Armed Services Committee had a hearing. We had the distinguished former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry; Ambassador Ross, who is a renowned expert on that region of the world, the Middle East; and the former Vice Chief of the U.S. Army, now retired, General Keane. It was excellent testimony. I wish to pick up on one thing General Keane addressed. I go back to the President's remarks when he spoke to the Nation on January 10. He said: Now let me explain the main elements of this effort: The Iraq government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to the effort, along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations--conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints and going door-to-door to gain the trust of the Baghdad residents. This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority--five brigades--will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs. I say most respectfully, this poses a command structure, a dual one, of Iraqi commanders and U.S. commanders, which is unique. Traditionally, American forces operating in military campaigns have a unified command. There is the commander, and it goes right on down to the lieutenant, the head of the patrols, and the platoons. I think this will require further definition, further study. I bring to the attention of our distinguished nominee, General Petraeus, the testimony of General Keane yesterday where, in the course of a colloquy with me and I think Senator Levin and Senator McCain-- and, indeed, I remember the Senator from Rhode Island--we were quite concerned about how this unique command and control would work. General Keane concluded his testimony, in response to a question I posed, by urging General Petraeus early on to devote some attention to this question of how this sort of joint command and control is going to operate. On the battlefield, decisions must be made in a matter of seconds, from the platoon level often right up the chain of command. We cannot have finger-pointing. We cannot have a mission where the Iraqi lieutenant says we should go left, the American embedded officer or whatever command America has in that situation says go right, and the mission not achieve its goal and then the finger-pointing as to which officer was correct and who was right and who was wrong. We cannot have that in this situation. It is going to be an extremely complex mission. Yes, I have put forward, along with other colleagues, recommendations of how possibly this operation could be conducted with few American forces, and specifically our resolution says the rules of engagement of the forces--that is standard military technology--should have some specificity, hopefully saying: Wherever possible, the Iraqis will bear the brunt of the sectarian violence. I am very concerned about the American GI being thrust in the middle of the violence that really has root causes that go back 1,000 years to the divisions of thought between Iraqis as to whether they are Sunnis or Shias. It seems to me that Iraqi forces who have the language capability, who understand the cultural differences, are far better qualified than the American GI to do this. Also, we have another document which was put out which explains the operations. It lists the President's priorities. It clearly says Iraqis will be in the lead and on the point. This is a White House document issued here in the last few days: The President's New Strategy is Rooted in Six Fundamental Elements: Let the Iraqis take the lead. That has to be well defined and well understood. I commend the President for putting the emphasis on having the Iraqis do that. So I hope we can go about our debate in an orderly way at the earliest possible time. I urge Members to be cautious as we proceed. The feelings on this are quite intense, as they should be, because this is one of the most pivotal, one of the most important decisions I have seen come before this body in my now 29th year in the Senate. I hope we conduct it with sincerity and dignity and huge respect among colleagues with regard to our differences. I speak for myself and I think those other nine individuals who worked with me--Senator Bill Nelson, Senator Susan Collins--this is a truly bipartisan effort. Whatever we conclude here in the Senate, it is my fervent hope that it reflects a feeling of bipartisanship because therein is how best we can help the American public understand this complex situation, to give their public support. They are strongly behind the troops now. We want to get them to have a better understanding and a greater confidence in this new revised strategy going forward. This can best be achieved at the highest level of bipartisanship we can obtain here on these serious issues. I see the distinguished chairman here. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today in support, once again, of America's teachers by joining with Senator Collins in introducing an amendment regarding the Teacher Tax Relief Act. Senator Collins and I have worked closely for some time now in support of legislation to provide our teachers with tax relief in recognition of the many out-of-pocket expenses they incur as part of their profession. In the 107th Congress, we were successful in providing much needed tax relief for our Nations teachers with passage of H.R. 3090, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002. This legislation, which was signed into law by President Bush, included the Collins/Warner Teacher Tax Relief Act of 2001 provisions that provided a $250 above the line deduction for educators who incur out-of-pocket expenses for supplies they bring into the classroom to better the education of their students. These important provisions provided almost half a billion dollars worth of tax relief to teachers all across America in 2002 and 2003. In the 108th Congress, we were able to successfully extend the provisions of the Teacher Tax Relief Act for 2004 and 2005. In the 109th Congress we were able to successfully extend the provisions for 2006 and 2007. While these provisions will provide substantial relief to America's teachers, our work is not yet complete. It is now estimated that the average teacher spends $826 out of their own pocket each year on classroom materials--materials such as pens, pencils and books. First-year teachers spend even more. Why do they do this? Simply because school budgets are not adequate to meet the costs of education. Our teachers dip into their own pocket to better the education of America's youth. Moreover, in addition to spending substantial money on classroom supplies, many teachers spend even more money out of their own pocket on professional development. Such expenses include tuition, fees, books, and supplies associated with courses that help our teachers become even better instructors. The fact is that these out-of-pocket costs place lasting financial burdens on our teachers. This is one reason our teachers are leaving the profession. Little wonder that our country is in the midst of a teacher shortage. Without a doubt the Teacher Tax Relief Act of 2001 took a step forward in helping to alleviate the Nation's teaching shortage by providing a $250 above the line deduction for classroom expenses. However, it is clear that our teachers are spending much more than $250 a year out of their own pocket to better the education of our children. Accordingly, Senator Collins and I have joined together to take another step forward by introducing this amendment. This amendment will build upon current law in three ways. The amendment will: (1) Increase the above-the-line deduction, as President Bush has called for, from $250 allowed under current law to $400; (2) Allow educators to include professional development costs within that $400 deduction. Under current law, up to $250 is deductible but only for classroom expenses; and (3) Make the teacher tax relief provisions in the law permanent. Current law sunsets the Collins/Warner provisions after 2007. I will ask to have printed in the Record at the end of my statement a letter from the National Education Association endorsing the Collins- Warner amendment, and also a letter from the Virginia Education Association endorsing the Collins-Warner amendment. Mr. President, our teachers have made a personal commitment to educate the next generation and to strengthen America. And, in my view, the Federal Government should recognize the many sacrifices our teachers make in their career. This teacher tax relief amendment is another step forward in providing our educators with the recognition they deserve. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the aforementioned materials be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I wish to proceed as in morning business.

Mr. WARNER. I hope there would not be any objection. Madam President, may I suggest the Senator from Idaho be recognized and I be recognized following his remarks.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we now proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I desire to address the Senate at this time. It would be my hope that my colleague, the Senator from Nebraska, could follow me and, indeed, following the Senator from Nebraska, the Senator from Maine. I put that in the form of a unanimous consent request at this time.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, Senator Nelson of Nebraska and Senator Collins and I have worked for some time to put forward a resolution embracing the very serious, heartfelt sentiments of Senators with regard to the President's plan that he enunciated on January 10. That plan--and I credit the President for the in-depth study and preparation that went into it, the consultations; I was privileged to be a part of three consultations with the President in that period--it is that plan about which a number of us here in the Senate have some thoughts. The President, in his statement on January 10, laid down the invitation for Members of Congress to come forward and provide their thoughts. And that is the vein in which the three of us, together with a series of cosponsors, have adopted this first draft, which is identical to the draft we put into the Record some nights ago. We purposely have not changed a comma or a period or any other word in it because a number of colleagues, in a very thoughtful and proper way, have come to us with suggestions and ideas. But at this time, we believe we should lay this down, such that other Senators who might wish to be cosponsors may do so. The Senate works its will each day, and we are always here to consider ideas from other colleagues, but at the present time this is the format. We purposely waited until after the Foreign Relations Committee worked on its resolution, which I understand will soon be working its way to the calendar. So for that purpose, we put in ours. We find some differences--very significant, in my judgment--between ours and the resolution offered by the distinguished Senator, Mr. Biden, and others--Senator Levin, indeed, Senator Hagel. We believe we have put a greater emphasis on urging the President to consider other options, given that we have a general disagreement with the very significant level of troops that are specifically set forth in the President's plan. We also feel very strongly about the issue of sectarian violence and how that must be the primary mission of the Iraqi forces. The American GI simply should not be, in my judgment--whenever possible, the rules of engagement should provide that the Iraqi forces should deal with the sectarian violence issue. They understand the language. They understand the cultural differences, which precipitate the animosity between the Sunni and the Shia and, indeed, the most distressing aspects of it: the Shia upon Shia and Sunni upon Sunni. We recognize that sectarian violence is undermining, in many ways--the level of it--the efforts of this Government under Prime Minister Maliki to go forward and exercise the full reins of sovereignty and that it is in those interests that sectarian violence has to be dealt with. It is an important mission, but I believe strongly it is a mission that should be given primarily to the Iraqi forces. We concur with the President, who said many times, including in his statement on January 10, that to allow this Government to fail and to allow the accomplishments toward sovereignty through free elections by the Iraqi people to be lost and this country to simply be plunged into chaotic situations is not in the interests of peace in that region and, indeed, peace in the world. Our resolution does not provide for a reduction in any way or suggest the level of U.S. forces there now. It does not provide a timetable. It simply urges the President to consider all options and sets forth in there the primary missions as we interpret them to be in the interests of our country. Those primary missions track in large measure the Baker-Hamilton report. We also stress the need for benchmarks to be spelled out with clarity. And should the operations in Baghdad go forward under the Commander in Chief--and we recognize fully and in no way try to contravene the authority of the President to act under the Constitution as Commander in Chief--should that go forward, it will be done in an incremental fashion, as we have been told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others. So when the first operation takes place, we should carefully set forth the benchmarks and see if the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi armed forces fulfill those benchmarks; namely, do they all come in the numbers that they were supposed to under that plan? They failed to do that when a similar augmentation for the Baghdad operation was initiated this summer. Will the political structure in Iraq resist, refrain, and in every other way allow the military commanders, both U.S. and Iraqi, to carry out the missions as they see fit and employ such tactics as they deem necessary to achieve those missions without being called by the Government and told: Stop this, withdraw here, or do not take that prisoner, but if you have him, then release him. We cannot go in under that guise. Thirdly and most importantly, we have to see how the Iraqis perform. Will they take the point? Will they take the lead? And in such tactics, will they then be the primary--the primary--if not the essential force that deals with sectarian violence, such that the rules of engagement spell out: Whenever necessary, the coalition forces and namely the United States shall not be utilized. At this time, I would invite my colleagues to express their views, and I will ask each to name those cosponsors whom we have gotten from each side of the aisle. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I certainly will not object. I wonder if I might have 2 minutes following Senator Collins to summarize before we receive the distinguished Senator from Colorado for his remarks. I ask unanimous consent that the unanimous consent agreement be modified so I can have about 2 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. WARNER. Did not the CENTCOM commander, who is still the CENTCOM commander, General Abizaid, testify before our committee and, in the precise words, said he felt that at this time added troops were not necessary, more troops would lessen the incentive of the Iraqis to pick up the burdens which we are trying to have them assume under sovereignty?

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleagues, the Senator from Nebraska and Senator Collins. It is important that we have taken this initiative because a number of colleagues--10 now--wish to be recognized. But believe me, there are 10 more and 10 more who will soon come forward, hopefully, and support this resolution. I also want to stress, as both of my colleagues did, I hope as this debate progresses, it will not be a question of who is the most patriotic, who is the strongest supporter of the American troops. I pride myself with having had a relationship with the Armed Forces of the United States, modest though it may be, since late 1944-1945. I had the privilege of working and learning. I often feel the Armed Forces did far more for me than I have done for them. In my years, now 29 years, here in the Senate on the Armed Services Committee, I have done everything I could to repay the Armed Forces for what they did for this humble person, to provide for them in a way that meets the sincerity of their commitments and that of their families. So it is not a question of who is the most patriotic or a question of who is trying to be confrontational with the President. These are heartfelt, closely held views we have about one of the most serious episodes in contemporary American history. I think the President has shown a measure of courage in this matter. But as has been acknowledged, we have made mistakes. And what we have tried to do is conscientiously say how we feel about the immediate future. I asked for a change in strategy, I guess it was October, when I came back and said the situation, as I saw it, in Iraq was going sideways. That has been done. This is a change in strategy. I acknowledge that. We were invited by the President to make suggestions. We have done that in a courteous, respectful manner. I thank my colleagues. I stress also the need for bipartisanship. I am not certain anyone can predict how this debate will go and what the outcome will be or how many resolutions come forward. I think it should be a healthy, strong debate and one in which the American public, which is very much attuned to this situation and has strong views of its own-- and we should respect those views--I hope that what debate and actions follow, whatever they may be by this Chamber on such final resolutions that may be voted on, earn the respect and the trust and the confidence not only of the Armed Forces but of the American public. Because we can only be successful in this operation to save the Government of Iraq, whether it is this one or a successor one, to save the people of Iraq so they can exercise sovereignty if there is strong public support and a strong and accurate bipartisan level of participation by the Congress of the United States. To have a vote all on one side and a vote all on the other side will not help this very situation at this time. So one of the main goals--and we have achieved it--is bipartisanship, truly. I thank my colleagues. I yield the floor. And I wish to, in so yielding, thank the distinguished Senator from Colorado for joining us in this matter.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to thank our colleague from Colorado and pick up on the theme that he closed and talked on earlier--unity. Yes, there is great unity among the American people and a depth of concern about the loss of our forces and the wounding and suffering of the families. We have not lost our resolve. Our President has been firm. But this institution, the great Congress of the United States, a coequal branch of the Government, now must rise and show our commitment to fulfill the wishes and hopes and prayers of the American people, and do so in a bipartisan manner. That is the very heart of the effort of our 10 colleagues who thus far have come forward and put their names into the public domain as supporting the provisions of this resolution. They do resemble, in many respects, the provisions in the Biden- Levin-Hagel resolution. When that first came out, so much of the rhetoric surrounding that resolution was disturbing to many people. That gave rise to the efforts that we have put forth, culminating in placing this document into the Record tonight. I hope others will consider joining us because it is important to show unity and bipartisanship in the Congress in saying that we, in fact, understand the hopes, wishes, and prayers of the American people and the Armed Forces of the United States. I thank my colleague and yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I first thank the Presiding Officer for addressing the Senate earlier this evening with regard to the proposed resolution which you and our distinguished colleague from Maine, Senator Collins, have been working on now for several days and throughout the weekend, placing it into the Record for all Senators to have an opportunity to study it. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record following my statement.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as I said when I was joined by you and Senator Collins in our brief press conference this afternoon, the resolution we currently anticipate will not be filed formally at the desk until the State of the Union is completed tomorrow and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee works its will on a resolution which is pending before it, authored by the chairman, Senator Biden, and Senator Hagel of Nebraska and other Senators who have joined in that resolution. As that resolution works its way through the Foreign Relations Committee, we, the three of us who have worked on this resolution, will take an examination of what is sent to the floor for purposes of floor consideration, and at that time I anticipate we could indicate to the Senate a desire that our resolution be considered as a substitute resolution and therefore an alternative to the resolution that will be reported out from the Foreign Relations Committee. That is what we stated today, and it is my intention to continue to work along in that vein because my motivation solely is to do what is in the best interests of the United States of America, and most particularly the men and women of the Armed Forces at this very pivotal time in the history of our Nation's commitment to Iraq, considering the President's plan. As I said earlier, America's contribution to try to bring about a settlement of so many of the controversies in the Middle East is done in the spirit only of trying to bring peace and freedom to that very troubled region. Iraq, at this moment, is very much before the Congress because the President has, on the 10th of this month, laid down a plan. I say it is very much before us at this time, but also there are the very serious questions relating to Iran and their desire to go ahead and develop certain aspects of nuclear energy which could at some point in time undertake a program that would lead to the development of nuclear weapons. That is a very serious question. The question of Lebanon is before this body, as is the question of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian people. So what we do in the context of Iraq is not isolated from all of these serious problems. But for the moment, we have before us the plan laid down by the President on the 10th of this month. We go back and we trace the evolution of this problem from, say, early last fall when clearly, in the minds of many of us, the situation was not measuring up to our expectations. Our strategy at that time was not bringing about clear benchmarks with positive results. We had an extraordinary chapter of history when our military campaign, together with our coalition partners, enabled the Iraqi people to have free and open elections, to elect a government, and for that government to take office. They were enabled to begin the fundamental steps to create, No. 1, a sovereign nation with the full exercise of sovereignty in the hands of the government and the Iraqi people, and No. 2, an improved security situation in Iraq which would reflect throughout the region. Those were all very positive accomplishments. It is owing to the commitment of the nations forming the coalition of forces--to some extent the United Nations and the Security Council, so many institutions and commitments, and the bravery of the men and women of the Armed Forces--that they brought about a nation now that is a sovereign nation, Iraq, whose government was elected by a free people. But the security situation has deteriorated, and it deteriorated in the fall to the point that I and others began to express our concern publicly. Senator Levin and I returned from a trip to that region-- specifically Iraq--and in the context of reporting back to this body, the Senate, I indicated that, in my judgment, the situation was drifting sideways. We were simply not seeing the improvements in security. The reins of sovereignty which we put into the hands of the Iraqi people and their elected government were not bringing about the results we wished. The level of attacks was quite significant, and a measure of total distrust was beginning to evolve between the various factions--the Sunnis distrusting the Shias, the Shias distrusting the Sunnis--and this has led to where the sectarian violence is now the predominant problem, bringing back instability into Iraq. Following comments by leaders of our administration, leaders here in the Congress and, indeed, very respected experts in the private sector, the President--and I commend him--instituted a total analysis of the situation. I had specifically said, when I mentioned it was drifting sideways, that we ought to consider all aspects of changing this strategy we were currently employing at that time. I am not suggesting my remarks were the motivation, but the President took the initiative and the leadership, and he is to be commended. Every entity within the Federal system, from the Departments of State and Defense to all other entities, made contributions to what should be done to change his strategy. The Joint Chiefs did a very significant study on their own initiative, and I commend Chairman Pace. I think the Baker-Hamilton commission did a remarkably fine study and of value, certainly, in my judgment, to this institution and all those who are concentrating on how to resolve the problems in Iraq. So the President's plan presumably was his analysis of all of this extraordinary input into a change of strategy, and he laid down his proposal. At the same time he addressed the country, he said--and I would like to quote him. He said very clearly that ``he would welcome and encourage others to make contributions.'' So what we did by way of putting this together was not to contravene in any way the constitutional authorities of our President which are expressed, his role as Commander in Chief, but to accept the offer to the Congress and others made by the President on January 10, 2007, and I quote: If Members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust. Now, I commend the President for that, and it is in that vein that the three of us came together and began our concentrated effort shortly after January 10, and this is the work product. It is clear to us that the U.S. strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with the support of the American people and with a level of bipartisanship in the Congress. On that note, indulge me to reflect a little bit on the Vietnam era where I was privileged to serve as Under Secretary, Secretary of the Navy for 5 years and some months during that extraordinary chapter of American history. I can say unequivocally that my heart goes out to the men and women in the Armed Forces in that chapter of our history. There was a great deal of public misunderstanding about their role and what they were trying to do individually and collectively in the cause of freedom. Eventually, that public opinion began to infuse itself here in the two bodies of the Congress, and the rest is history. The Congress began to pull back and, as I say, the rest is history. I do not suggest there is a parallel between the combat situations, although there was enormous suffering and a tremendous level of casualties--over 50,000 men and women killed, wounded and missing in Vietnam--a great sacrifice for our country in the cause of freedom. But today I see an absolute magnificent response all across this Nation among the American citizens to that brave individual in uniform, both men and women. And the same for our many dedicated civilians who are also taking risks in connection with carrying out the instructions our President has laid down for the military, as well as all branches of this Government, to achieve our goals in Iraq. Our group agreed with the President that a loss, a failed state in Iraq will affect peace in the region and indeed possibly peace elsewhere in the world. The stakes are very high, and we weighed that always, as the three of us prepared these documents. But that is why I say during the Vietnam chapter the support of the American people and a level of bipartisanship in this institution were essential, and that is the purpose of this resolution: to hopefully achieve that. The purpose of this resolution is not to cut our forces at their present level, nor to institute and force a timetable for withdrawal. That is a matter--those are both matters that have to be left to the President--but, rather, to express the genuine concerns of a number of Senators from both parties about the President's plan and to set forth a strategy. Unlike some of the other resolutions that have been before the body, we detail a change in strategy which offers to the President the possibility of modification of his plan. We do not mean to be confrontational with our President but instead to provide a sense of bipartisan resolve on recommendations, alternatives, modifications, we should say, to the plan that he laid down. Our thoughts were in many respects guided by the Baker-Hamilton report. As I say, I personally, and I think the Presiding Officer and others, attach a great deal of significance to that report. Now, the primary objective we see of our strategy in Iraq should be the following: First, to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity of government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation. Further, our resolution states the military part of this strategy should focus on the following. Now, let me address the military part. I think the President very wisely--and this reflects on the strength of his proposal. It is really three parts. It is diplomacy. It is economic support in the nature of reconstruction, a greater emphasis on helping the civilian infrastructure, whether it be their electricity, their sanitation, their water, or many things that are very much lacking, regrettably. Irrespective of the enormity of the contributions we have made thus far to improve those situations, they just haven't improved. So this plan of the President's is really three parts, but I address now the military part. But I caution that a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. All three of these vital parts of the President's program, in order to have any measure of success, have to work together. Our committee, the Armed Services Committee on which the Presiding Officer, Senator Collins and I serve, a year or so ago put in specific legislation to encourage the Secretaries of the Cabinet positions here, the Cabinet Secretaries and the administrators of our Government--we put into law giving them flexibility to encourage more of their people to get into the mainstream to support the economic and reconstruction parts of the President's program. That part has to be every bit as strong as whatever the final military components will be, and the same with the diplomacy. But our military strategies should focus on the following: First, maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq; second, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security. Further, our resolution states that the U.S. military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals and charges the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence. That has been a matter of intense interest for this particular Senator, and I drew up this paragraph accordingly, with the Presiding Officer's help and concurrence. That is, I said, charges--it says to the Iraqi military: We have invested in this military, over years and years, of training, 2 full years, plus--equipment. Now, this sectarian violence is something that you should be out on the point to handle. That is your primary responsibility. The coalition GI, be it American or British or the others, should not be cast into situations--whenever possible, trying not to let them be cast into situations--or firefights, to be more precise--where Sunni is shooting at Shia, or vice versa, and for them to try and make the decisions of how to solve that. That, to me, we should charge the Iraqis as their responsibility, with their armed forces which we have trained, and which number over 200,000 because they understand the language, they understand the culture, and they understand the complexity of this deep-rooted distrust, this hatred which propels the Sunni versus the Shia, or the Shia versus the Sunni. This results in these wanton killings, the horrible tortures every day. The bodies are in the streets. I will not describe how those bodies have been desecrated as a symbol of this hatred and distrust. That is not for us to solve. That is for the Iraqis to solve. As such, our resolution states that the Senate disagrees with the President's plan to augment our forces by 21,500 and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals outlined above. Take a look at 21,500. That sends a difficult signal, a tough signal. We have discussed Anbar Province, the province where the Marines are fighting. There we recognize that an augmentation of forces is necessary; namely, because we are engaged directly with al-Qaida. I say respectfully to the President, we urge him to consider other options, to use a lesser number of troops. Particularly, we have had briefings recently about the growing sentiment among the Iraqi people, the rank and file, that they do not want more troops on their soil. They are anxious to have them leave now. Leaving precipitously could topple that situation into an all-out civil war, an imploding which has disastrous consequences, as we all know. Again, the signal we are sending 21,500 is, in our judgment, not a wise strategy. We are looking at Baghdad, which is the central focus of sectarian violence, the central focus of the majority of the insecurity, the failure of security in that sovereign country. There are nine different districts, as I understand the President's plan. Sequentially, we will take a district, go into it, and see whether we can lower the level of violence, provide some stability and confidence for their people so they can look forward to some quality of life and personal safety. However, as we take the initial section of Baghdad and do that, we should lay down clear and precise benchmarks that the Iraqi forces must follow. First, the commitment of their troop level, together with the troop level of the United States, should be all present and accounted for on the day before that operation starts. Unlike the failure of the previous surge efforts in Baghdad, where the United States showed up and a far less number of Iraqis--although committed--showed up. That is the first thing. The second thing is, it is imperative the political leadership in that Government, which has tried to reach down and make decisions affecting the tactics of the Armed Forces--both Iraqi Armed Forces and the coalition forces, principally the American forces--that comes to an absolute end. The military commanders should be entrusted to make the tactical decisions, to take the missions they see fit for each of the nine districts--the missions can be different in the nine districts-- and carry them out halfway through, after perhaps sacrificing life and limb to accomplish some measure of success, will not be reversed by a political decision made somewhere in the Iraqi Government. That is important. We had the benchmarks. Before we go to a second location in Baghdad, we will have, hopefully, a clearly documented case of this operation going according to plan. It will document the Iraqis taking the point, as we say in military work, with regard to incidents of sectarian violence. Before we go to another sequenced operation in Baghdad, we better be sure. Words will not do it. Statements will not do it. Only deeds will be convincing that there is a full and unqualified commitment to the Iraqi Government. Our resolution is worthy of consideration by our colleagues. There is a great deal of concern in the Senate and adversity of opinion. I respect that. I hope it will be considered. The three of us will be glad to work with colleagues individually, collectively, and most respectfully of our own leadership, as to what guidance they might wish to give us. I thank the Presiding Officer. I thank Senator Collins. I wish to thank staff who worked throughout the weekend and over the past few days: Tim Becker, from the staff of the Presiding Officer; Christiana Gallagher, also of your staff; Jane Alonso, of Senator Collins' staff; John Ullyot, of my staff; Bill Caniano and Ann Loomis and Sandy Luff, of my staff. We have had quite a team working. They all made possible the completion of this resolution today. Exhibit 1 Language Sponsored by Mr. Warner (for himself, Mr. Nelson of Nebraska, and Ms. Collins) Resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the new strategy in Iraq. Whereas, we respect the Constitutional authorities given a President in Article II, Section 2, which states that ``The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States;'' it is not the intent of this resolution to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007 that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust;'' Whereas, the United States' strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of bipartisanship; Whereas, over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces, and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they have strongly; Whereas, many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their families; Whereas, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with components of the other branches of the military, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan; Whereas, these deployments, and those that will follow, will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and readiness of our nation's all volunteer force; Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq;'' Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security;'' Whereas, a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war against extremists; Whereas, Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating an ever- widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims; Whereas, Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq; Whereas, the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces; Whereas, U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future;'' Whereas, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006 that ``The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians;'' Whereas, there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much less increasing the troop level; Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, comprehensive review of the Iraq strategy, by all components of the Executive branch; Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly;'' Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan,'') the central element of which is an augmentation of the present U.S. military force structure through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq; Whereas, this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the various options for a new strategy, and led many members to express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 21,500; Whereas, the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite those promises, little has been achieved; Whereas, the President said on January 10, 2007 that ``I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; Whereas, the recommendations in this resolution should not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now therefore, be it Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth below with reduced force levels than proposed; (2) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation; (3) the military part of this strategy should focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security; (4) United States military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals, and charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence; (5) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should reflect this delineation of responsibilities; (6) the United States Government should transfer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as is necessary; (7) the Senate believes the United States should continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven; (8) the United States Government should engage selected nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for Iraq; (9) the Administration should provide regular updates to the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end. (10) our overall military, diplomatic and economic strategy should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting benchmarks that must be specified by the Administration. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to reintroduce the Minority Serving Institution Digital and Wireless Technology Opportunity Act. This legislation, which was crafted by Senator Allen and I in years past, will provide vital resources to address the technology gap that exists at many Minority Serving Institutions, MSIs. In the past, Senator Allen took the role of lead sponsor on this important bill. With his leadership, this exact legislation has passed twice unanimously. Unfortunately, the 109th Congress adjourned before the House of Representatives considered the bill. Accordingly, today I am privileged to serve as the lead sponsor of this legislation in the 110th Congress. I am pleased to have my Virginia colleague Senator Jim Webb as an original cosponsor of this bill. I hope this important bill will soon become law. Over 60 percent of all jobs require information technology skills. Jobs in the information technology field pay significantly higher salaries than jobs in non-information technology fields. At the same time, many of our Minority Serving Institutions lack the capital to offer assistance to their students to bridge the ``Digital Divide'' between students who are able to develop the skills necessary to succeed in a technology based economy and those who are not. This legislation will establish a grant program for these institutions of higher education to bring increased access to computers, technology, and the Internet to their student populations. Specifically, this legislation authorizes $250 million in Federal grants for Minority Serving Institutions to acquire equipment, instrumentation, networking capability, hardware and software, digital network technology and wireless technology and infrastructure to develop and provide educational services. In addition, the grants could be used for such activities as campus wiring, equipment upgrades, and technology training. Finally, Minority Serving Institutions could use these funds to offer their students universal access to campus networks, increase connectivity rates, or make infrastructure improvements. I am proud to say that Virginia is home to five Historically Black Colleges and Universities, HBCUs--Norfolk State University, St. Paul's College, Virginia Union University, Hampton University, and Virginia State University--that are eligible for these technology grants. There are over 200 Hispanic Serving Institutions, over 100 Historically Black Colleges and Universities and over 30 Tribal Colleges throughout the United States. Again, in 2005, this bill passed in the Senate by unanimous consent. In 2003, this bill passed in the Senate with a roll call vote of 97-0. I am pleased to support this legislation, as I have done in the past, and I look forward to strengthening the technology provided to students at Minority Serving Institutions.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to reintroduce the Minority Serving Institution Digital and Wireless Technology Opportunity Act. This legislation, which was crafted by Senator Allen and I in years past, will provide vital resources to address the technology gap that exists at many Minority Serving Institutions, MSIs. In the past, Senator Allen took the role of lead sponsor on this important bill. With his leadership, this exact legislation has passed twice unanimously. Unfortunately, the 109th Congress adjourned before the House of Representatives considered the bill. Accordingly, today I am privileged to serve as the lead sponsor of this legislation in the 110th Congress. I am pleased to have my Virginia colleague Senator Jim Webb as an original cosponsor of this bill. I hope this important bill will soon become law. Over 60 percent of all jobs require information technology skills. Jobs in the information technology field pay significantly higher salaries than jobs in non-information technology fields. At the same time, many of our Minority Serving Institutions lack the capital to offer assistance to their students to bridge the ``Digital Divide'' between students who are able to develop the skills necessary to succeed in a technology based economy and those who are not. This legislation will establish a grant program for these institutions of higher education to bring increased access to computers, technology, and the Internet to their student populations. Specifically, this legislation authorizes $250 million in Federal grants for Minority Serving Institutions to acquire equipment, instrumentation, networking capability, hardware and software, digital network technology and wireless technology and infrastructure to develop and provide educational services. In addition, the grants could be used for such activities as campus wiring, equipment upgrades, and technology training. Finally, Minority Serving Institutions could use these funds to offer their students universal access to campus networks, increase connectivity rates, or make infrastructure improvements. I am proud to say that Virginia is home to five Historically Black Colleges and Universities, HBCUs--Norfolk State University, St. Paul's College, Virginia Union University, Hampton University, and Virginia State University--that are eligible for these technology grants. There are over 200 Hispanic Serving Institutions, over 100 Historically Black Colleges and Universities and over 30 Tribal Colleges throughout the United States. Again, in 2005, this bill passed in the Senate by unanimous consent. In 2003, this bill passed in the Senate with a roll call vote of 97-0. I am pleased to support this legislation, as I have done in the past, and I look forward to strengthening the technology provided to students at Minority Serving Institutions.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Journey Through Hallowed Ground National Heritage Area Act, S. 289, a piece of legislation that seeks to designate some of Virginia's, indeed America's, most historic and beautiful lands as a national heritage area. As I am sure my colleagues are aware, national heritage areas are intended to encourage residents, government agencies, nonprofit groups, and private partners to collaboratively plan and implement programs and projects to recognize, preserve, and celebrate many of America's defining landscapes. Today, there are 37 national heritage areas spread out across the United States. In Virginia, we are lucky enough to have a landscape that is worthy of the recognition and celebration that a national heritage area designation would afford it. Stretching through four states, and generally following the path of the Old Carolina Road, today's Route 15, the Journey Through Hallowed Ground is home to some of our Nation's greatest historic, cultural, and natural treasures. The region's riches read like a star-studded list of American History: Monticello, Montpelier, Manassas, Gettysburg. The list goes on. In all, there are eight presidential homes, 15 National Historic Landmarks, 47 historic districts, and the largest collection of Revolutionary and Civil War battlefields in the country. It is an area, literally, where America happened. With the help and tutelage of the National Park Service, this proposed heritage area would be managed by the Journey Through Hallowed Ground Partnership, a nonprofit entity whose sole purpose is to trumpet the magnificence of the hallowed ground's offerings. I am confident that the Partnership will be tremendous promoters and wonderful stewards of the resources within the Route 15 corridor. Already, the partnership has spent years heralding the Region's spectacular natural and historical resources, and they have worked hard to get this area the designation and recognition it deserves. Mr. President, no area in America could possibly be more deserving of the national heritage area designation than the region affectionately known as the Journey Through Hallowed Ground. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this legislation, and I thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of the Journey Through Hallowed Ground National Heritage Area Act.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Journey Through Hallowed Ground National Heritage Area Act, S. 289, a piece of legislation that seeks to designate some of Virginia's, indeed America's, most historic and beautiful lands as a national heritage area. As I am sure my colleagues are aware, national heritage areas are intended to encourage residents, government agencies, nonprofit groups, and private partners to collaboratively plan and implement programs and projects to recognize, preserve, and celebrate many of America's defining landscapes. Today, there are 37 national heritage areas spread out across the United States. In Virginia, we are lucky enough to have a landscape that is worthy of the recognition and celebration that a national heritage area designation would afford it. Stretching through four states, and generally following the path of the Old Carolina Road, today's Route 15, the Journey Through Hallowed Ground is home to some of our Nation's greatest historic, cultural, and natural treasures. The region's riches read like a star-studded list of American History: Monticello, Montpelier, Manassas, Gettysburg. The list goes on. In all, there are eight presidential homes, 15 National Historic Landmarks, 47 historic districts, and the largest collection of Revolutionary and Civil War battlefields in the country. It is an area, literally, where America happened. With the help and tutelage of the National Park Service, this proposed heritage area would be managed by the Journey Through Hallowed Ground Partnership, a nonprofit entity whose sole purpose is to trumpet the magnificence of the hallowed ground's offerings. I am confident that the Partnership will be tremendous promoters and wonderful stewards of the resources within the Route 15 corridor. Already, the partnership has spent years heralding the Region's spectacular natural and historical resources, and they have worked hard to get this area the designation and recognition it deserves. Mr. President, no area in America could possibly be more deserving of the national heritage area designation than the region affectionately known as the Journey Through Hallowed Ground. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this legislation, and I thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of the Journey Through Hallowed Ground National Heritage Area Act.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished majority leader and minority leader for their initiative in putting this resolution together. I, also, thank both of our distinguished leaders for including in the resolution a reference to the action by the Senate, an initiative we took in the Senate Armed Services Committee at the time that I was privileged to be chairman and the distinguished Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, was the ranking member, to name one of America's future aircraft carriers, now under construction, the USS Gerald R. Ford. This initiative then was taken into consideration by the Department of Defense, the Secretary at that time, and, indeed, the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy has, traditionally, responsibility for the naming of ships. And whereas the Armed Services Committee recommended during floor consideration of the annual defense authorization bill that the naming be written in law, in conference, at the request of the Secretary of the Navy, we made it a sense of the Congress. The Department of Defense will host a ceremony on January 16th, with the Ford family and others to formally name the ship in honor of President Ford. I, also, thank Jack Marsh, former Secretary of the Army and former counselor to President Ford, for his participation in the effort by the Senate to take this initiative, as well as former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. I collaborated with both of those distinguished gentlemen. Secretary Laird was a lifetime friend and served in Congress with, then, Gerald Ford. As we go forth in our careers, we always should look back to acknowledge those who made it possible for us to achieve our goals. I am always very humbled by the many people who helped inspire me to run for the Senate and who helped me win election. Gerald Ford was right there at the beginning of my first race with sound, practical advice. I ask the indulgence of my colleagues where I recount some of that advice: It started, I remember, in the summer of 1960. I was an advance man for then Vice President Nixon. We were on a campaign train trip through the Middle Western States, that included a stop in Michigan. This was the old-fashioned train with the observation car, where the candidate would go out on the rear platform and give a speech to the crowds that gathered in all the little towns and communities along the route. But we had one very memorable stop, I remember the town was Muskegon, Michigan. My job was to get the candidate, the Vice President, and some of his senior staff off the train and to the auditorium in town. In performing these tasks, I was joined by an elected Michigan official. In a moment, I will provide his name. As we entered the building, we went into a holding area. I was awaiting a cue from the master of ceremonies on stage to bring on the Vice President. He was escorted by this local official. As we were waiting, unbeknownst to us, in the balcony, some mischievous people--I don't think it was evil, but it was mischievous-- suddenly pelted us all with raw eggs. There we were, the Vice President with eggs streaming down off him. I took out my handkerchief and did the best I could to polish him up a bit, and the local official did the same. The Vice President went on the stage, fully composed, and gave an excellent speech. I went back to the train thinking that I would be severely reprimanded and my first job in politics terminated. Well, it turns out that the local official who helped me get him up to the stage and who also helped to polish-up the Vice President joined me in the observation car, where they were serving beer. As he came in, I thanked him, but said: You know, I think this is the end of my political career. And he said: Why so? And I described my responsibility. And he then said: Well, of course, I am a local Congressman and I should bear the responsibility. And we joined each other with a beer, he said to me: You know, I think both of us will survive. That was Gerald Ford, showing the magnanimity of that marvelous man and his understanding of those types of situations. I want to thank that wonderful American for his contribution to inspire me later in years to try for the Senate. He was then Vice President, and he used to counsel me on how to get started in public life. I was then Secretary of the Navy, having succeeded John Chafee, a former Member of this body, the much revered Senator from Rhode Island. And John Chafee had left the Navy Secretary's Office and ran for the Senate and was defeated in his first bid. And I was ready to plunge in and try my first race when Ford said to me: No, you want to kind of get behind you this career in the Department of Defense, because it was a highly controversial period of history. There was much concern among the citizenry, not unlike what we see today. I took his advice. And he said: Go run the Bicentennial. I will get you appointed to that Presidential Office. I said: Mr. President, I don't even know how to spell the word. He said: Study up on it. Not only did he do that, but he came down as Vice President and administered the oath to me on the steps of his beloved House of Representatives. The Bicentennial was a marvelous career opportunity to learn the fundamentals of public office. I worked with him closely, took an enormous interest, as he knew the Bicentennial would become a healing mechanism for the country in the aftermath of Watergate. He was right. I traveled with him on July 4, 1976, in his helicopter, and we made stops along the way. I will never forget going to New York Harbor on the final day of the two year celebration. And there we were on the deck of a carrier. And he struck the ship's bell such that it triggered church bells all across the United States to celebrate that day in American history. While we were standing there, he told me about his trip to sea in 1944. I read from his biography: His closest call with death came not as a result of enemy fire, however, but during a vicious typhoon in the Philippine Sea in December 1944. He came within inches of being swept overboard while the storm raged. The ship, which was severely damaged by the storm and the resulting fire, had to be taken out of service. Ford spent the remainder of the war ashore and was discharged as a lieutenant commander in February 1946. During the course of the war, he was awarded the Bronze Star, and other decorations for his valiant service. But I remember when I went overseas in 1951, as a communications officer for a Marine Corps squadron. We were aboard the same class of ship. It was a small carrier. We also went through a typhoon in the South Pacific en route to Korea. It was 72 hours of memory that will never be erased, but I know what he went through because I think that typhoon was far more severe than the one our ship experienced. So I take my hat off to this magnificent American, who was among those who made it possible for me, in many respects, to eventually be privileged to represent the State of Virginia in the Senate. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the sense of Congress naming the CVN-78 aircraft carrier as the USS Gerald R. Ford be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.