John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, what record does the Senator speak of, that shows only two? Is there any record that shows only two officers in the U.S. military were ever penalized?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we do not know. You make an assumption that others were allowed to rise to their highest rank. I do not know that. There is no evidence before the Senate tonight. This is but one of, what? How many volumes here? The hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor, U.S. Congress, 1945, I count, what, 15 volumes here? To me, that is thoroughness of an investigation. I mean, document after document, page after page in which--let's see, how many Members of Congress, if they list the committee here? I do not see on this volume, but perhaps it is in others, how many Members of Congress were involved. Usually they list them. How many Members were involved, does the Senator know?

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, could I interrupt the Senator. I ask unanimous consent that at 5:30 today--I beg the forgiveness of the Chair and our distinguished colleague.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are going to have that series of hearings. I do not want to have a hearing or a series of hearings on the Armed Services Committee until the men and women of the NATO forces are, hopefully, in a very limited situation with regard to personal risk.

Mr. WARNER. I think that is a very important point.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. I assure the Senate that we will deliberate this amendment tomorrow again, I say to the Senator. We are not able to complete it today due to the absence of several colleagues and the fact that right now the Nation's capital is engulfed in a series of storms preventing a number of our Members from returning. Also, I think it is important that every Member of the Senate hear the words of the Senator from Kansas and others about this very important amendment.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am primarily concerned with the junior officers in the command of the Army in Hawaii, the command of the Navy in Hawaii. There may have been a number of officers and, indeed, enlisted men--say an intelligence officer. There was a good deal of intelligence out there that the situation was getting very serious, and I will refer to that momentarily. But how do I know their careers were not impeded? They may not have been general officers or flag officers of the U.S. Navy. But whether they were lieutenants or commanders, their careers may well have been blocked. There may be relatives out here and descendants of those officers who feel just as strongly as to the punishment that was meted out to their grandparents or whatever the case may be. If you are going to open up a case like this, it seems to me it is in the nature of a class action: Let everybody come forward.

Mr. WARNER. I commend the Senator. We have been working on parallel tracks on this issue for some months now. I cannot think of a more important amendment that will be added to this bill than the one of which my distinguished colleague from Kansas is the principal sponsor. At this very moment, well over half of the tactical aircraft are being operated by U.S. air men and women; well over 70 percent of the support aircraft, the tankers, the intelligence aircraft and all of those, the spotters and the like, are being operated by U.S. airpersons. It is the Strategic Airlift Command which is heroically--together with the Air Guard, I add, which, of course, is part of that command-- carrying out the vast preponderance of the missions associated with airlift in this operation in Kosovo. If there is one thing this operation tells us, it is that future conflicts are becoming more and more dependent on modern technology. The weapons being employed in this air-only campaign are guided missiles, again predominantly provided by the United States. The other nations of NATO, for whatever reasons, simply have not equipped themselves or trained their personnel in sufficient numbers to conduct an operation of this magnitude. That is not in any way to detract from their courage in flying their missions, and approximately eight other nations are joining in this air operation. Whether they are single aircraft, or two aircraft or one mission a day--whatever it is-- they are an integral part. I salute them, and I respect them, but statistically, it is the taxpayers of the United States and it is the young men and women wearing the uniform of the United States who are carrying the brunt of this operation. The Senator brings to the attention of the Senate that at this 50th anniversary summit conference, this document, to which he has referred several times, was adopted. In any reading of this document by this Senator, and I think any other Senator, it will clearly show that it is the intention of the summit to push beyond the horizon of the original NATO of 1949, to push beyond the horizon of the 1991 Strategic Concept the potential missions of this historic organization. It is the absolute fundamental right of the Senate, under the treaty clause of the Constitution, to review in detail, and I say carefully, what is proposed--I repeat, proposed--by the 50th anniversary summit. The Senate Armed Services Committee will conduct a series of hearings once the hostilities and the risk of NATO forces is in one way or another--I hesitate to use the word ``terminated'' because I am not certain if that word is applicable to this situation which in itself is so filled with uncertainty, but whenever the hostilities are contained to the point where the Armed Services Committee can begin to look at what went right and what went wrong in the conduct of the military operations and, most particularly--most particularly--this consensus by the 19-nation doctrine by which this operation has been, is, and will be conducted for an indefinite period of time. I first became concerned about this new doctrine early this spring. I wrote to the President on April 7 urging him not to allow the summit to ``finalize''--that is the word I used--or write in stone, I said at that time, a new Strategic Concept. Why not just wait until the Kosovo operation gets to that point where hopefully hostilities have subsided and you sit down and study that operation, and from that study you would be better able to devise what NATO should do in the future regarding comparable operations. I said: The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view that a final decision by NATO on the Strategic Concept should not be taken--risked--against the uncertainties emanating from the Kosovo situation. The United States and our allies will have many lessons learned to assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept. Bosnia and Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into aggressive military operations. As of this writing---- That is April 7-- the Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect on the few gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation must be carefully assessed and evaluated before the United States and our allies sign on to a new Strategic Concept for the next decade of NATO. Unfortunately, the President disagreed with my assessment, and on April 24, NATO went on to finalize a new Strategic Concept, and that document has been discussed in length by my colleague. The main difference in the security tasks identified in the 1991--Mr. President, about every decade, NATO seems to get down to revising its future missions, and the 1991 document was clearly out of date. It still referred to the threat from the Soviet Union. So time had come, of course, to revise it. All I said is let's just wait a reasonable period of time and assess the lessons learned and let the American people give direction to the President and give direction to the Congress if, in fact, they want to be part of a military alliance where certainly in this operation well over half of it is being conducted by their own sons and daughters, and the price to be paid is still unknown. It will be heavy and it will be paid by the American taxpayers. I recently had a very distinguished former Secretary of Defense write and tell me: Assess the costs being borne by the United States and the other NATO nations and that will be, I say to my former friend, the Secretary of Defense many years ago, that will be a central focal point of the hearings by this committee in the future. But those costs are going to be enormous to the American taxpayers. We first have the risk to the men and women of our country, the disproportionate contribution by our military assets, and the costs that will be allocated to the American taxpayer. Back to my letter to the President. I said that we can wait another 2 or 3 months. We have waited since 1991. Why do we have to rush into another one? But the President, in his letter, declined to do it. The main difference in the security tasks identified in the 1991 Strategic Concept and the document adopted this April is the addition of a ``crisis management'' task, and an emphasis on non-article 5 crisis operations. Non-article 5 operations were not even mentioned in the 1991 Strategic Concept. I say to my colleague from Kansas, they were not even mentioned, but they are written throughout this new one which was promulgated this April. I will read one paragraph: The security of all allies is indivisible. An attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defense under article 5 of the Washington Treaty-- Of course, that is the 1949 treaty-- the combined military forces of the alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur and assuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states. Here is the key sentence: They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct a non-article 5 crisis response operation. That means going beyond the territorial boundary of the 19 nations. The vote of the American people through its elected Members of the Senate is absolutely essential before we sign on to such a mission. I commend my colleague for bringing that to the attention of the Senate in the form of this amendment. According to the new Strategic Concept, the alliance is tasked ``to stand ready, case-by-case by consensus . . . to contribute to effective conflict prevention, and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. Kosovo is an example of a non-article 5 crisis response operation. Exhibit 1 Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, April 7, 1999. The President, The White House, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President: The Administration, in consultation with our NATO allies, is now finalizing various documents to be submitted to the Heads of State for ratification at the upcoming 50th anniversary NATO Summit to be held in Washington later this month. A key decision, in my view the most important one, is the revision of the Strategic Concept for the future--perhaps a decade--that will guide NATO in its decision making process regarding the deployment of military forces. I am recommending, Mr. President, that a draft form of this document be reviewed by the principals, but not finalized, at this 50th anniversary Summit. Given the events in Kosovo, a new Strategic Concept for NATO--the document that spells out the future strategy and mission of the Alliance--should not be written `in stone' at this time. Instead, NATO leaders should issue a draft Strategic Concept at the Summit, which would be subject to further comment and study for a period of approximately six months. Thereafter, a final document should be adopted. NATO is by far the most successful military alliance in contemporary history. It was the deciding factor in avoiding widespread conflict in Europe throughout the Cold War. Subsequent to that tense period of history, NATO was, again, the deciding factor in bringing about an end to hostilities in Bosnia, and thereafter providing the security essential to allow Bosnia to achieve the modest gains we have seen in the reconstruction of the economic, political and security base of that nation. Now NATO is engaged in combating the widespread evils of Milosevic and his Serbian followers in Kosovo. I visited Kosovo and Macedonia last September and witnessed Milosevic's repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Thereafter, I spoke in the Senate on the essential need for a stabilizing military force in Kosovo to allow the various international humanitarian organizations to assist the people of Kosovo-- many then refugees in their own land, forced into the hills and mountains by brutal Serb attacks. Since then, I have consistently been supportive of NATO military action against Milosevic. Unfortunately, it is now likely that the NATO Summit will take place against the background of continuing, unfolding events relating to Kosovo. At this time, no predictions can be made as to a resolution. We are just beginning to learn important lessons from the Kosovo conflict. Each day is a new chapter. For example, NATO planners and many in the Administration, and in Congress, have long been aware of the disparities in military capabilities and equipment between the United States and our allies. Now, the military operation against Yugoslavia has made the American people equally aware and concerned about these disparities. The U.S. has been providing the greatest proportion of attack aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. Further, the United States is providing the preponderance of airlift to deliver both military assets (such as the critically needed Apache helicopters and support equipment) and humanitarian relief supplies, the delivery of which are now in competition with each other. Until other NATO nations acquire, or at least have in place firm commitments to acquire, comparable military capabilities, the United States will continually be called on to carry the greatest share of the military responsibilities for such `out of area' operations in the future. This issue must be addressed, and the Congress consulted and the American people informed. It is my understanding that the draft Strategic Concept currently under consideration by NATO specifically addresses NATO strategy for non-Article 5, `out of area' threats to our common interests--threats such as Bosnia and Kosovo. According to Secretary Albright in a December 8, 1998 statement to the North Atlantic Council, `The new Strategic Concept must find the right balance between affirming the centrality of Article V collective defense missions and ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are intimately related to the broader defense of our common interests.' Is this the type of broad commitment to be accepted in final form, just weeks away at the 50th anniversary Summit? During the Senate's debate on the Resolution of Ratification regarding NATO expansion, the Senate addressed this issue by adopting a very important amendment put forth by Senator Kyl. But this was before the events in Kosovo. The lessons of Kosovo could even change this position. The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view that a `final' decision by NATO on the Strategic concept should not be taken--risked--against the uncertainties emanating from the Kosovo situation. The U.S. and our allies will have many ``lessons learned'' to assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept. Bosnia and Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into aggressive military operations. As of this writing, the Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect of the few gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation must be carefully assessed and evaluated before the U.S. and our allies sign on a new Strategic Concept for the next decade of

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, with great reluctance, I oppose this amendment. I do so based on some independent study that I have made, and indeed, I guess, throughout my lifetime. I had a very, very modest period of active service at the end of World War II in 1945 for a period of about 15 or 18 months. I can't remember now. Anyway, I lived my lifetime through this period of history. Therefore, all of my active service in that period was here in the United States, preparing to join others of my generation for the invasion of Japan, which I thank the Dear Lord did not take place. I have gone through enough of this material to satisfy me that what we are faced with here is one generation trying to provide revisionist history upon another. That is, in my judgment, unwise, and it could well promote many other meritorious cases during that period of history--and who knows, going way back in history--to be brought to this Congress for similar rectification or whatever the petition may say. The records show that the request by my two distinguished esteemed colleagues initiated correspondence beginning in 1994--that is roughly 5 years ago. Secretary Perry on 7, September, 1994; again on 22 November, 1994; President Reagan, 1, December, 1994; Deputy Secretary John Deutch, 10, December, 1994; Perry, 5 March, 1995; Deutch, 24 March of 1995; the Dorn Report on 6, October, 1995; Deputy Secretary Defense John White, December of 1995; Secretary Cohen here in 18, November, 1997; and P&R de Leon, on 20, July, 1998. In other words, for 5 years the Department of Defense has devoted a good deal of time and effort to try--I presume and I certainly assume-- to make an objective analysis of all of these letters, and have turned down the various requests from my two senior colleagues. First, I ask my distinguished colleague from Delaware, because I look at this very imposing collection of documents and I reflect on the number of inquiries that have been held throughout history, these are the inquiries that have been held regarding these two officers and their association with the tragic losses of men, women, and assets of the United States on December 7, 1941. We start with the Knox Investigation, December 9 through 14, in 1941. That was followed by the Roberts Commission, December 18 through January 23, 1942; the Hart Investigation, February 12 through June 15 of 1944; the Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 through October 20, 1944; Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 through October 19, 1944; the Clark Investigation, August 4 through September 20, 1944; the Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 through July 11, 1945; the Clausen Investigation, January 24 through September 12, 1945; the Joint Congressional Committee, November 15 through May 23, 1945. Based on the results of all those investigations, Secretary of Defense Cohen wrote to Senator Thurmond and presumably Senator Roth. He said: Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your interest in exonerating the names of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In the years since the fateful events at Pearl Harbor there have been numerous formal investigations of the events leading up to the attack, including sharp debate over our state of readiness at the time. While Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. Edwin Dorn conduced a thorough review of this issue in 1995. He carefully considered the information contained in nine previous formal investigations, visited Pearl Harbor and personally met with the Kimmel and Short families. His conclusion was that responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster must be broadly shared, but that the record does not show that advancement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short on the retired list is warranted. I appreciate the fact that the overwhelming consensus of the organizations and personnel mentioned in your letter recommend exoneration of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Absent significant new information, however, I do not believe it is appropriate to order another review of this matter. Ed Dorn and I both agree that responsibility for this tragic event in American history must be broadly shared, yet I remain confident in the findings that Admiral Kimmel and General Short remain accountable in their positions as leaders. The first question to my distinguished colleague, this amendment would have the effect of no longer holding them accountable for this tragedy. If that be the case, who is to be held accountable for this tragedy?

Mr. WARNER. But the Senator said let's treat these two individuals equally with others who bear part of the responsibility--a reasonable request. But I would want to know beforehand, who are the others? How were they treated? Was their treatment commensurate with what the Senator asked for tonight?

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator allow me to interrupt to make a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. WARNER. Let me just bring up a final concluding point to my good friend here. I know others want to speak to this. Then we will have to lay it aside. I point out that during the 1994 debate on modifications to the ABM Treaty, the Armed Services Committee included a provision, and I was a cosponsor of that effort in the 1995 DOD authorization act--I ask my colleague to listen carefully--which required the President to submit to the Senate for advice and consent any international agreement which would ``substantially modify the ABM Treaty.'' I think that is a direct parallel and an exact precedent for what the Roberts-Warner amendment seeks. I yield the floor. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may procedurally address what I believe is about to take place. The good Senator from Pennsylvania and the good Senator from Louisiana have an amendment which will soon be presented to the Senate and become the pending business. However, before, as I understand it, the Senator from Minnesota will lay down three amendments and we will immediately lay them aside; then our distinguished colleague and member of the committee will address the Senate with regard to the bill for about 10 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor. Amendments Nos. 380 Through 382, En Bloc

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 5:30 today, which is just minutes away, the Senate proceed to vote on or in relation to the Specter-Landrieu amendment No. 384 with no amendments in order to the amendment.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I now ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I might draw the Senate's attention to the last paragraph, which is section 5, can the Senator read that? It says: ``NATO should not accept any diplomatic resolution to the conflict in Kosovo that would bar''--and then, my first question is, Is it conceivable that the United Nations should likewise not accept any? I mean in the final analysis, it is difficult to predict now. Certainly NATO will have a voice in the matter. But it could be that this thing would be involved before the United Nations. Is the spirit of this to include the United Nations, so to speak?

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, first I thank our distinguished colleague from Maine. She comes from a great State which has a maritime tradition that really predates the United States of America. Am I not correct in that?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time on behalf of the distinguished majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that at 9:30 on Tuesday, tomorrow, the Senate resume the DOD authorization bill and Senator Smith of New Hampshire be recognized for up to 20 minutes on a matter regarding the historic connection of the U.S.S. Indianapolis to the history of our Nation, to be immediately followed by 30 minutes for debate, equally divided, with an additional 10 minutes under the control of Senator Gramm relative to Senator Roth's amendment regarding Admiral Kimmell and General Short. I further ask consent that following that debate, the amendment be temporarily set aside and there then be 1 hour for debate equally divided relative to the Roberts-Warner amendment No. 377. I further ask that following that debate, the amendment be laid aside and then there be up to 1 hour equally divided relative to the Wellstone amendment No. 382. I finally ask consent that at 2:15 on Tuesday, the Senate proceed to a vote on or in relation to the Roth amendment and, following that vote, the Roberts-Warner amendment No. 378 be agreed to and the Senate immediately proceed to a vote on amendment No. 377, as amended, to be followed by a vote on or in relation to amendment No. 382, with 2 minutes for explanation prior to each vote. For the information of all Senators----

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment, which the Senator and I refer to as the Roberts-Warner amendment, is one which obviously I strongly support. I first ask unanimous consent that correspondence the Senator from Virginia had with the President of the United States be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Bill Adkins, a legislative fellow of Senator Abraham's staff, be granted floor privileges during the consideration of S. 1059.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, seeing no other Senator at the moment seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. WARNER. Isn't that interesting. I remember when we gathered on the steps of the west front of the Capitol to recognize the Senator for his service. He fully understands the commitments made by men and women in the Armed Forces through several generations. That historical knowledge has been brought to bear many times on the decisionmaking responsibilities of the Senate Armed Services Committee.