Henry Waxman

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to extend my best wishes to Norm as he leaves the House of Representatives to begin a new chapter in his life. I do so sadly, though, because he embodies the qualities that every American should have in their representative. Norm's integrity and tireless commitment to the public interest has served his district and our Nation extraordinarily well. I have always thought of Norm as a pragmatic idealist, and that rare combination has made possible his many legislative efforts in the House of Representatives. Norm and I both came to Congress as part of the historic Watergate class. Like our other Democratic classmates, we came to Washington with the purpose of opening the decisionmaking process to the American public and making the Federal Government more responsive to its citizens. As Californians, we often found ourselves working on issues together, and I soon discovered that he was one of the best allies one could ever hope to have. I won't list his many achievements that improved the quality of our environment now, but I do want to note that his work has been instrumental in enhancing the quality of our air, water, and natural resources. Of course, the enactment of legislation that brought compensation to Japanese-Americans uprooted and forced into internment camps during World War II was Norm's greatest personal achievement. Norm worked to rectify a grievous wrong, and it was a grievous wrong that he and his own family experienced. This law would not have been possible without the unquestionable moral authority Norm brought to the debate and his insistence that our Nation live up to its commitment to justice and equality. Norm Mineta may leave this House, but I know we will continue to have the warmth of his friendship and the benefit of his dedication and ability.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, we ask you and our colleagues to join us in paying tribute to Roz and Abner Goldstine for receiving the Jewish Vocational Service's prestigious Lifetime of Service Award. Roz and Abner Goldstine have devoted tremendous amounts of their time, energy, and creativity to the indispensable work of the Jewish Vocational Service, which is a nonsectarian, nondenominational organization that provides job training and placement services. The Goldstines have been leaders in the Jewish Vocational Service's efforts to assist scientists, engineers, and aerospace workers whose jobs have been lost due to the end of the cold war and the related Federal downsizing and reordering of national priorities. As we all know, these changes have put a disproportionately large burden on the State of California. We owe a debt of gratitude to [[Page E 1816]] Jewish Vocational Service and the Goldstines for their work in meeting a great need. At the same time, the Goldstines have helped sustain the commitment of the Jewish Vocational Service to individuals at every level of the work force who seek employment opportunities. Mr. Speaker, we ask our colleagues to join with us in saluting the Goldstines for their extraordinary service to the Los Angeles community. We wish them continued happiness and success in their endeavors.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Ackerman]. (Mr. ACKERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion to suspend the rules, and I urge my colleagues to support the bill. The bill has passed the Senate, was reported by the Commerce Committee unanimously, and it should be acted on expeditiously by the House. The Ryan White program was originally enacted in 1990 to respond to the crisis in AIDS health services in America's cities and States, and in its clinics and hospitals. This act has been a great success. Outpatient services are now available as an alternative to expensive hospital care; prescription drugs are provided to people who have no other source of coverage; early intervention treatments can be given to keep people healthy longer; and, effective service programs for mothers and children are up and running, programs which also coordinate their activities with research organizations to assure that appropriate research opportunities are available to their clients. This law has improved health care for people with AIDS and HIV all over the country. This bill renews the authorization for these successful programs and fine tunes the response to the new and changing needs of the epidemic. I'm especially pleased to say that this legislation, and the committee report that accompanies it, emphasize those basic services that people with HIV need most--the services that slow the progress of the disease, that prevent opportunistic infections, and that meet basic primary care needs--and that it targets assistance to those people least likely to be able to afford such services themselves. At a time when funding will continue to be limited, it is important that all services programs focus on the primary care of people with HIV. This legislation does contain some controversial items. The inevitable disputes over formulas among cities and States appear here, as they have done and will continue to do in so much legislation before this Congress. The formulas contained in this bill represent a good faith effort to provide basic care to all Americans with HIV, and this bill is a balanced political compromise. In addition, this legislation contains compromise provisions regarding the testing of newborns that I have worked out with the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn]. Although the so-called Coburn- Waxman amendment bears my name, I do have many reservations about this provision, as, I am sure, does the gentleman from Oklahoma. It deals with an issue about which there are profound differences in approach, which cannot be smoothed over. However, I believe the compromise approach embodied in this bill is necessary to move the Ryan White reauthorization forward and I urge Members to support it today. Let me be clear at the outset: We do not disagree about the ultimate goals here. Mr. Coburn and I both want to reduce the number of HIV infections passed from mother to infant, and we have agreed that the most effective means of achieving that goal is counseling and voluntary testing of pregnant women. This agreement is reflected in the findings of the Coburn-Waxman provisions. Mr. Coburn and I also agree that we want to reduce the rate of preventable pneumonia and other illnesses among HIV-infected infants and to improve their health care. Where we have differences is the most effective way of achieving the goal. During the committee's consideration of this bill, an amendment was offered by Mr. Coburn that would have required all States to initiate the mandatory testing of all newborns immediately. I opposed that amendment, as did a wide variety of health and medical groups. I asked the gentleman from Oklahoma to withdraw his amendment and to work with me to produce an amendment that would provide alternatives to the mandatory approach. I am gratified to say that he was willing to do so and that our staffs have worked since that time to come to some agreement. The provisions reflected in this bill are the product of that work. This provision is not perfect by any means. As I say, I have serious concerns about its possible effects. I believe that voluntary programs of HIV testing of infants would result in more infants receiving the care needed [[Page H 9058]] to prevent pneumonia and improve their health. I believe that mothers who are highly encouraged to have their babies tested will be better partners in the lifelong medical care of these children than will mothers who are required to do so. And I remain very concerned that the emphasis on newborn testing will divert attention and resources from the more important goal of encouraging pregnant women to be tested themselves in time to provide care that will reduce the chance that the baby will be infected. But I believe that the Coburn-Waxman amendment is a significant improvement over other proposals that have been considered. This provision postpones requirements that a State mandatorily test all newborns until a time when it is agreed such mandatory testing is the recommended standard of medical care. Some believe that day will inevitably come, but, at this time, virtually all medical groups oppose the practice. The provision also gives States 2 years to develop effective alternatives to mandatory testing. If, after that time, mandatory testing is determined to be the routine of practice and if the State is not reaching most of its infants, the State will have up to 18 months to enact a mandatory testing law. I support the Coburn-Waxman amendment as far preferable to the alternative of an immediately effective requirement of mandatory testing. I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma for his willingness to work with me on this more flexible approach. I also want to take this moment to remind my colleagues why this action is taking place. Over the past year, new research developments have made it possible to prevent pneumonia and other diseases in newborns. That is why the question of testing babies is being debated and legislated about. In addition, there have been research breakthroughs that are truly good news about the possibility of reducing HIV transmission from mother to child. That is what the findings of this bill are about, stating that voluntary prenatal testing should be the standard of care. This is not about testing newborns, but it has often been discussed in the same breath. But both of these possibilities--preventing HIV through prenatal services and preventing disease in infected newborns through early intervention services--require services. Testing is not the answer; medical care is. Testing without care will make no difference. Testing without treatment is a cruel hoax on everyone concerned. And, in truth, most of the care for HIV-infected pregnant women and children come from one source--Medicaid. I hope that as my colleagues move to reshape the Medicaid Program, that they will remember that there are services that we can all agree should be available to poor people. Many of my colleagues, from both sides of the aisle, support the Coburn-Waxman amendment that may require States to provide testing of newborns if it is determined to be the medical standard of care. I hope that their enthusiasm for testing will be reflected in equal enthusiasm for assuring that the health care services are paid for. Finally, the Coburn-Waxman amendment includes provisions about health insurance. These provisions repeat the protections that the Americans With Disabilities Act provides for people with any disability, in any employment setting. It was believed to be appropriate to repeat these protections here so that anyone concerned that HIV testing would be used inappropriately could see the testing provision and the protection in one place. In addition, the provision describes how insurers may respond if fraud was committed. It is my clear understanding that this provision does not override any ADA, State law, or NAIC provisions that limit what may be asked for a person seeking insurance or holding insurance. These provisions are included to provide clear consumer protection and to allow insurers to respond appropriately if there is fraud in the answering of a permissible question. For instance, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and many States have regulations restricting what can be asked of a person who is insured or seeking insurance. The insurance provisions of the Coburn-Waxman amendment provide additional protection for these consumers and are not intended to undo the NAIC and State actions. In conclusion, I would note for my colleagues that this bill was reported from the Commerce Committee unanimously. Whatever the differences among us on other issues, we have come together to reauthorize this program of AIDS health care services and to assure those who depend on it that it will continue. I urge my colleagues to do so today. Finally I would like to thank the staff involved for their diligent work on this important bill. Karen Nelson, Kay Holcombe, Melody Harned, Mark Agrast, Roland Foster, and Peter Goodloe have put in many long hours on this legislation and I want to express my appreciation to them.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. WAXMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in honoring Nat and Barbara Winters on the occasion of their receipt of the ``Golden Heal-a-Mind'' Award. This award to Nat and Barbara Winters is also a symbol of recognition of Gateways Hospital, one of the oldest and most respected mental health treatment centers in the country. Nat and Barbara Winters are paragons of achievement, compassion, and commitment. They suffered the unimaginable pain of the loss of their daughter 8 years ago. This tragedy created a bond between them and all others for whom illness has brought great suffering. The Winters are principal supporters of the city of Hope, Cedars- Sinai Heart Family, the John Wayne Cancer Research Organization, and numerous other health organizations. Nat Winter, a director of Congregation Mogen David, has also worked hard on behalf of the Jewish community. I hope my colleagues will join me in congratulating Nat and Barbara Winters for receiving the ``Golden Heal-a-Mind'' Award and for their years of selfless dedication to our community. I wish the Winters, their children and grandchildren every happiness this honor can bestow.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Kolbe amendment to restore the requirement of current law that a State must pay for abortions resulting from rape or incest for women who are eligible under the State Medicaid Program. We are dealing with a few simple facts here. Abortion is a legal medical procedure in this country. Rape and incest are illegal crimes in this country. The involuntary pregnancy resulting from one of these crimes is a terrible burden for the victim. It is wrong to make her plight more burdensome and more difficult by keeping her from the medical services that she decides she needs. Under the bill sent to this House by the Appropriations Committee, the victim of the crime of rape and the victim of the crime of incest are punished. If they are poor--and that is what women eligible for Medicaid are--and they cannot afford to pay out of their own pockets for an abortion, their access to this legal medical procedure is eliminated. In the name of morality, the Members of this House are substituting their judgment for the judgment of the unfortunate women who have been the victims of these unspeakable crimes. In denying her the choice of an abortion, this bill assaults these women a second time, and compounds the agony they already face. Women who are the victims of rape or incest have been harmed enough by their criminal assailants. We should not be party to compounding that harm. I urge Members to do the only humane thing: vote for the Kolbe amendment; retain the requirements of the current law.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Skaggs amendment. This amendment would eliminate the overly broad, confusing, and unconstitutional provisions in the bill about limiting advocacy with private money. Don't make a mistake. This is not a debate about Federal funds. This is a debate about private groups and private speech. Federal grants already contain prohibitions on using Federal money for advocacy. This bill goes far beyond that and limits what private groups do with private money. The provisions are so broad that they would limit advocacy not just by groups that relieve money, but by groups that, within the next 5 years, hope to receive money. So if you hope to get money for a soup kitchen, you better not talk about feeding the hungry for 5 years. And if you hope to get money for literacy, you better not talk about whether people should be able to read. And the provisions are so broad that they would limit a grantee from even buying things or employing a contractor who does political advocacy. So if you hope to buy soup from the Sisters of Charity, you better check to see if they advocate for the poor. If you want to contract with a visiting nurses association for a community health center, you have to see their political records for the last 5 years. And even groups that don't come anywhere close to the prohibitions of this bill will have to keep records and disclose records to prove it. If a church thinks that someday it might run a homeless shelter, it better start keeping records showing that the priest hasn't testified before a school board too much. If a synagogue is running a drug treatment program, it will have to show records of how much private money went for the rabbi's salary and whether the rabbi carried a banner in a peace march. This is ridiculous. You know and I know that for some in this body, this amendment is about pro-choice agencies getting Federal funds for family planning services and advocating with private funds for abortion rights. I support the right of these agencies to do anything they wish with their private funds. But this bill has gone so far that not only are the pro-choice groups opposed to this amendment but so is the Bishop's Conference on Pro-Life Activities. Cardinal Mahony himself has written to the Congress to ask that these provisions be deleted, saying that they will intrude into private activity that is unrelated to public funding. As Catholic Charities said to the Appropriations Committee: ``Churches and charities have a moral responsibility to stand up for the poor and vulnerable, and this plan appears designed to `muzzle' the voices of these groups. Many other groups feel this same moral responsibility. I urge Members to vote for the amendment.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, there is wide agreement in this country that violent and sexually explicit programming desensitizes children and can influence their behavior and emotional development. But changes in society and technology have made it more difficult for parents to monitor their children's exposure to television programming. The challenge we have today is to provide parents with new and better tools without involving the Government in the determination and distribution of content. If we give the Federal Government the authority to establish a ratings committee, to determine its members, and to assess the adequacy of the ratings that are established, we will be in violation of the first amendment. Such a process will inevitably become politicized by Members of Congress dissatisfied with the ratings that are established and they will want to impose their own judgment on content regulation. This approach will result in years of litigation and ultimate rejection by the Federal courts. As much as the American people resent unwanted exposure to offensive programming, they have a strong belief in protection against Government censorship. I urge my colleagues to oppose a mandatory system that would undermine the first amendment and instead work to craft a policy that balances our desire to help parents protect their children with the fundamental right of free speech.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the motion to allow Medicaid abortions in cases of rape and incest.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is about who controls medical education--the Government or the medical profession. Medical schools and professional societies have directed their own curriculum standards since the beginning of organized medical training. The Federal Government has never interfered in that effort, even after years of proposals about things that various politicians have thought would be a good idea. The political manipulation of curriculum and licensure is wrong. Congress should leave medical education to educators and should leave professional licensure to professionals. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have made a determination that while abortion is a legal procedure, medical schools should ensure that students know what is safe, ethical and legal and what is malpractice. If you want to limit abortion, you should vote to limit abortion--and there are plenty of chances in this bill to do that. But you should not vote to get the Federal Government involved in classrooms, curriculum, and school accreditation. [[Page H 8382]]

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment is about who controls medical education, the Government or the medical profession. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have made a determination that while abortion is a legal procedure, medical schools should ensure that students know what is safe, ethical, and legal and what is malpractice. I strongly support the Ganske amendment. Government should not be telling schools what they can and cannot teach.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, the choices are being taken over by the Federal Government. Just look at what we have done this evening on this bill. The Federal Government is going to tell the schools, medical schools what they can and cannot teach. The Federal Government is going to say whether a woman will really have a choice for abortion if she is raped or is pregnant because of incest. The Federal Government is going to tell nonprofit groups they cannot express their own opinion. Now we are taking away the choice from universities and campuses to allow greater speech. We have heard over and over again tonight that the Republicans seem to want to silence one particular group on the campuses. That is not the American way. You are going to silence one group you disagree with. You are also going to silence some groups with whom you may agree. Let us have a diversity of opinions. Let us have a free marketplace of ideas. Those who called for free market economics ought to be for free market ideas as well. parliamentary inquiry

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to Lew Engman. Lew died on July 12 of this year at the age of 59. His sudden and premature death saddened all of his friends and associates who knew and worked with Lew over the years. Lew was an honorable and honest man who was a pleasure to deal with. Whether or not you had a difference of views, you could depend on him to be straightforward, fair-minded, and true to his word. And a difference in view never translated into personal enmity or unpleasantness. At the time of his death, Lew was president of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association. Previously, when I first got to know him in the early 1980's, he was president of the sometimes rival Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, representing the industry's research firms. That Lew could head both associations, first one then the other, yet never be caught in contradiction or inconsistency, says a lot about the integrity with which he went about everything he did. In each case, he managed to stay totally loyal to his clients, and totally dependable as a man of his word. I got to know Lew during the negotiations that led to passage of the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. In securing support for that act, we had to balance the research-based drug companies' need for an adequate patent term with the goal of the generic drug industry to be on the market and able to compete as soon as those patents expired, with all the benefits that could bring to the public. The issue was complicated, and the players fractious. Lew Engman put his name on the line to seal the compromise, approved by his companies, that made a bill possible. And when later some of his members broke ranks, he stuck to his word. His refusal to break his promise to Senator Hatch and me cost him his job, a considerable irony in view of the fact that the patent-restoration half of the compromise which he worked so skillfully to obtain might never have occurred without his deft guidance. In the end, passage of the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act was a testament to Lew Engman's conviction that the best form of legislation can achieve the aims of private interests while serving the public interest as well. Lew of course had achieved a lot long before I knew him. An antitrust lawyer and economist by training, he had served in the Nixon and Ford administrations, as general counsel to the President's special assistant for consumer affairs, on the White House Domestic Council staff, then as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission from 1973 to 1976. In the latter position, Lew was one of the first Government officials to note that some Federal agencies had become servants of the industries they regulated, and to call for some deregulation where appropriate. I won't try to list all of Lew's achievements. Suffice it to note that two decades ago, Time magazine picked him among the country's young leaders to watch, and Lew proved the pick a good one. It saddens me that we will watch him no more; at just 59 and full of energy, he was far too young to die.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, let us be clear what the Smith-Livingston amendment is all about. It is not to improve family planning around this country. It is not for women to get better access to primary care, which they now get under the existing title X program, which, for the most part, is distributed through State funds for the States to operate. What this is is ideological; it is a payback to the religious right, who hate the idea that some people feel free to engage in sex outside of marriage because of contraception. Well, let us understand something: Many of the women who go to clinics are married and they do not want to have a child, and they want contraception for that reason. Let us understand something else: That many of the people who are going to be denied family planning services are still going to have sex. But what they are also going to have is unintended pregnancies. What is the answer we get from those who oppose this program? Well, what they suggest, those who claim they are against abortion, is end this program, which will lead to more abortion. Mr. Chairman, I urge a defeat of the Smith-Livingston amendment.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks and to insert extraneous material. I have taken out this special order to talk again about the No. 1 threat to the health of our children--tobacco. A lot has happened since I spoke to this body last week. They Justice Department has confirmed that it will impanel a grand jury in this city to consider perjury charges against tobacco company CEO's. The U.S. attorney in New York has confirmed that he will impanel a grand jury in Manhattan to investigate whether tobacco companies lied to Federal regulators about the health effects of tobacco. And the President has begun to consider how best to regulate tobacco. Almost unnoticed amid the headlines, however, is the damage cigarettes have done to the health of our Nation. In the last week alone, over 7,000 Americans have died from lung cancer, heart disease, and other illnesses caused by addiction to tobacco. Even worse, in the last 7 days, 21,000 American children have begun to smoke for the first time. One-third of these children--7,000 kids-- will become lifelong nicotine addicts and eventually die from a tobacco-related disease. Clearly, the time has come for commonsense regulation to discourage children from smoking. When I appeared before this body last week, I reported on my investigation into the research activities of Philip Morris, the Nation's largest tobacco company. This investigation revealed three important facts. First, Philip Morris conducted secret research on nicotine pharmacology for more than a decade. Second, top company officials--including the Philip Morris board of directors and at least three separate vice presidents for research and development--had knowledge of the secret nicotine research program. Third, Philip Morris conducted research for the specific purpose of determining the pharmacological effects of nicotine on children and college students. One major question remained unanswered, however. Did Philip Morris use its secret nicotine research to design cigarettes sold to the American public? We know from the documents I released last week that Philip Morris' secret research program was undertaken for commercial reasons. The document describing the plans and objectives for the behavioral research laboratory in 1979, for example, stated expressly: The rationale for the program rests on the premise that such knowledge will strengthen Philip Morris R&D capability in developing new and improved smoking products. Philip Morris, however, has consistently maintained that it never commercialized this research or manipulated nicotine. A year ago, the Philip Morris CEO, William Campbell, testified before my subcommittee that ``Philip Morris does not manipulate nor independently control the level of nicotine in our products.'' Last month, when the New York Times first reported on the secret Philip Morris research program, Philip Morris asserted that it never used the research results in creating products for the market. Today, I will present evidence that conflicts fundamentally with these Philip Morris statements. I will present evidence that appears to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Philip Morris manipulated the nicotine levels in cigarettes sold to the American public. My investigation of nicotine manipulation by Philip Morris has been hindered by two obstacles. First, Philip Morris has not cooperated with the investigation. Over a year ago, on June 29, 1994, I wrote Philip Morris to request copies of Philip Morris documents relating to nicotine manipulation. With minor exceptions, Philip Morris has refused to provide these documents. The second obstacle is that the Congress has apparently ceased its investigation of the tobacco industry. This makes it impossible for me to call Philip Morris witnesses before an investigative committee to respond to my inquiries. Because of these obstacles, I cannot yet provide a complete and final record of Philip Morris's efforts to manipulate nicotine. Nevertheless, what I have recently learned is so significant that I believe I must take the extraordinary step for reporting on it in this chamber today. I believe I have an obligation to the Members of this body, to the administration, and ultimately to the American people to tell what I know so that together we can move closer to the truth. As I did last week, I will first present a summary of my investigation. Then I will then read into the Record a chronology of excerpts from previously secret Philip Morris documents. Finally, I will present the documents themselves for publication in the Congressional Record. systematic manipulation in the laboratory The evidence of nicotine manipulation begins in the very same Philip Morris laboratories in Richmond, VA, that conducted the electric shock studies and the nicotine pharmacology research that I described last week. Throughout the 1970's, researchers in these laboratories engaged in a systematic search ``to determine optimal nicotine/tar ratios for cigarette acceptability in a low delivery cigarette.'' The nicotine/tar ratio is a ratio that compares the amount of nicotine delivered by a cigarette with the amount of tar delivered by the cigarette. Officials of the tobacco industry have long maintained that because nicotine levels follow tar levels, there is a single, fixed nicotine/tar ratio in all cigarettes. For instance, Alexander Spears, the chief operating officer of the Lorillard Tobacco Co., testified before my subcommittee on March 25, 1994, that: We do not set nicotine levels for particular brands of cigarettes. Nicotine levels follow the tar level. . . . The correlation . . . is essentially perfect correlation between tar and nicotine and shows that there is no manipulation of nicotine. The objective of the Philip Morris researchers, however, was to break this essentially perfect correlation between nicotine and tar. Their goal was to determine if an increased ratio of nicotine to tar would make low-tar cigarettes more acceptable to the smoker. The first document to discuss the secret search for the optimal nicotine/tar ratio is a December 1970 research report. In this report, Philip Morris scientists stated that they were ``initiating a study of the effect of systematic variation of the nicotine/tar ratio upon smoking rate and acceptability measures.'' In May 1974, the Philip Morris scientists described their research as involving the systematic manipulation of nicotine. Although Philip Morris CEO William Campbell testified last year that Philip Morris does not manipulate nicotine, the researchers stated that they were ``systematically manipulating tar and nicotine parameters of cigarettes * * * to predict nicotine/tar ratios for optimal cigarette acceptability.'' By November 1974, the Philip Morris scientists achieved a breakthrough. According to the researchers, the natural ratio of nicotine to tar in tobacco is 0.07--that is, 7 parts nicotine to 100 parts tar. The researchers found that by boosting this ratio in low-tar cigarettes, about 40 percent to approximately 0.10--or 10 parts nicotine to 100 parts tar--they could produce a low-tar cigarette that equaled a regular-delivery cigarette in both acceptability and strength. In other words, the researchers found that by increasing the nicotine level in a low-tar cigarette by 40 percent while leaving the tar level unchanged, they could produce a stronger and more acceptable low-tar cigarette. By October 1975, the scientists completed a follow-up study to replicate their findings. This follow-up study confirmed the initial results. The scientists found that ``the optimum nicotine to tar ratio for a 10 milligram cigarette is somewhat higher than that occurring in smoke from the natural state of tobacco.'' commercialization There is compelling evidence that not long after completing this research, Philip Morris used the research findings to manipulate nicotine levels in cigarette brands sold to the American public. [[Page H 8008]] One brand in which manipulation seems certain to have occurred is the regular-length Benson & Hedges cigarette. I have a chart that shows what happened to the nicotine/tar ratios in this cigarette between 1968 and 1985, the first and last years for which data is available for this cigarette variety. As you can see, the nicotine/tar ratio remained essentially flat at 0.07, the natural nicotine/tar ratio in tobacco, from 1968 to 1978. From 1978 to 1983, however, the ratios changed significantly. During this period, the nicotine/tar ratio did exactly what the Philip Morris researchers recommended--it increased. As the chart shows, the nicotine/tar ratio reaches a high of 0.2 in 1981. By 1983, the nicotine/tar ratio in the Benson & Hedges cigarette is 0.11--virtually the exact level recommended by the Philip Morris scientists. These increases in the nicotine/tar ratio resulted from increases in the nicotine level of the Benson & Hedges cigarette. The tar level in the cigarette in 1983 is exactly the same as it was in 1978--but the nicotine level is more than 50 percent higher. A key question arises from these facts: Were the increases in the nicotine level and the nicotine/tar ratio of the Benson & Hedges cigarette the result of the deliberate design decisions of Philip Morris? Or were they the result of chance or random variation? To answer this question, I asked Dr. Lynn Kozlowski from Penn State University, one of the Nation's leading experts on low-tar cigarettes, to perform a statistical analysis of the changes in the nicotine/tar ratio of the Benson & Hedges cigarette. His analysis shows that the increases in the nicotine/tar ratio were not the result of chance or random variation. Specifically, he found the possibility that the elevated nicotine/tar ratios could be explained by chance or random variation is less than 1 in 100,000. In other words, the possibility is virtually zero. Benson & Hedges is not the only example of commercialization I found during my investigation. In 1981, Philip Morris introduced a new cigarette brand, the Merit Ultra Light. Like the Benson & Hedges cigarette, the Merit Ultra Light had an increased nicotine/tar ratio. I have a chart that shows the nicotine/tar ratio in the Merit Ultra Light. As the chart illustrates, the nicotine/tar ratio is significantly elevated from the natural ratio of 0.07. The ratio in this cigarette is 0.11--virtually the exact level recommended by the scientists. In summary, the evidence I will present today shows three crucial points. First, Philip Morris researchers determined that the natural nicotine/tar ratio in cigarettes is 0.07. Second, Philip Morris researchers recommended that this natural nicotine/tar ratio be increased to approximately 0.10 in low-tar cigarettes to increase acceptability and strength. Third, shortly after this recommendation was made, Philip Morris raised the nicotine/tar ratio in Benson & Hedges cigarettes to the recommended level of 0.10 and above and introduced a new brand, the Merit Ultra Light, with a similar elevated nicotine/tar ratio. There appears to be only one conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence: Philip Morris deliberately increased nicotine levels in commercially marketed cigarettes. At this point, I want to begin to read excerpts from the documents. chronology of philip morris research on nicotine manipulation December 1970.--Philip Morris researchers commence a study that directly involves manipulation of the nicotine/tar ratio in cigarettes. The study involves reducing tar levels and boosting nicotine levels by adding nicotine salt, a commercial form of nicotine. Specifically, the researchers write: We are initiating a study of the effect of systematic variation of the nicotine/tar ratio upon smoking rate and acceptability measures. Using Marlboro as a base cigarette we will reduce the tar delivery incrementally by filtration and increase the nicotine delivery incrementally by adding a nicotine salt. All cigarettes will be smoked for several days each by a panel of 150 selected volunteers. Source: P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Quarterly Report of Projects 1600 and 2302''--Dec. 31, 1970. September 1971.--Philip Morris researchers describe their research objectives for 1972. They state that their goal is ``to determine optimal nicotine/tar ratios for cigarette acceptability of relatively low delivery cigarettes.'' The researchers also identify tobacco's natural nicotine/tar ratio, stating that a ratio of 0.07 is ``characteristic of a broad range of natural leaf.'' Source: Memorandum on ``Plans for 1972,'' from W. Dunn et al. to P.A. Eichorn--Sept. 8, 1971. January 1972.--Philip Morris researchers report plans to conduct a national mail-out of cigarettes with altered nicotine/tar ratios. Specifically, they write: Low delivery cigarettes with varying tar and nicotine deliveries are being made with both low nicotine tobacco and with ordinary tobacco. These cigarettes will be used in national mailouts to determine what combinations of tar and nicotine make for optimal acceptability in a low delivery cigarette. Source: T.R. Schori, ``Smoking and Low Delivery Cigarettes,'' in Consumer Psychology Monthly Report--Dec. 16, 1971, to Jan. 15, 1972. October 1972.--Philip Morris researchers develop a three-stage study for determining the optimal nicotine levels in menthol cigarettes. The researchers write: This study has a three-stage design. The first stage is designed to identify those nicotine delivery levels which we might reasonably wish to consider for menthol cigarettes. Having identified these nicotine delivery levels, in stage 2 we will determine combinations of nicotine and menthol which make for optimal acceptability. And then in stage 3, cigarettes with these combinations of nicotine and menthol will be tested against current brands of known quality and sales potential. The researchers also describe their ongoing ``tar and nicotine studies.'' They state: We have done a number of nicotine to tar ratio studies. . . . When we get successful models, we will go out to a national panel in an attempt to determine combinations of tar and nicotine for optimal acceptability. Source: P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Quarterly Report--Projects 1600 and 2302''--Oct. 5, 1972. November 1972.--Philip Morris researchers state that one of their research objectives for 1973 is to determine if ``a cigarette with a high nicotine/tar ratio has market potential.'' Source: Memorandum on ``1600 Objectives for 1973''--Nov. 11, 1972. May 1973.--Philip Morris develops a 5-year plan for research and development. This plan states explicitly the nicotine/tar ratio studies are being conducted to develop new cigarette designs. Specifically, the R&D plan states: This program comprises a number of studies expected to provide insight leading to new cigaret designs. These include studies of optimum nicotine/tar ratios [and] nicotine/menthol relationships. Source: Philip Morris, USA, ``Research and Development Five Year Plan, 1974-1978''--May 1973. October 1973.--The Director of Research at Philip Morris, Thomas Osdene, who subsequently became vice president for science and technology, circulates the company's R&D strategy for the next 5 years. The strategy makes it clear that manipulating the concentration of smoke constituents was one of the major priorities of Philip Morris's research efforts. Osdene's strategy states: R&D management will concentrate a large part of the resources at its disposal in two major long-range new product programs: a cigarette with controlled-composition mainstream smoke, and a ``full-flavor'' cigaret delivering less than ten milligrams of FTC tar. The strategy then explains that the full-flavor/low-delivery program requires developing new means of manipulating the relative concentrations of key smoke constituents. Specifically, the strategy states: This program is directed at a dramatic reduction in cigaret tar level while maintaining subjective responses equal to our present major brands. . . . The task requires . . . developing means of increasing the relative concentration of desirable constituents. Source: Memorandum on ``5-Year Plan,'' from T. S. Osdene to W. L. Dunn et al.--Oct. 29, 1973. May 1974.--Philip Morris researchers state that they are engaged in systematic manipulation of nicotine. In a monthly research report, they state: Having done a number of studies (JND-1, JND-2, TNT-3, TNT- 4) in which we have systematically manipulated tar and nicotine parameters of cigarettes, we are trying to see if we can make any overall conclusion. [[Page H 8009]] Specifically, we are trying to predict nicotine/tar ratios for optimal cigarette acceptability at differing tar deliveries. Source: T.R. Schori, ``Regression Analysis,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--May 9, 1974. November 1974.--In the 1974 annual report of research activities, Philip Morris scientists report a breakthrough in their efforts to develop ``low delivery cigarettes with increased nicotine/tar ratios.'' A low delivery cigarette with an increased nicotine/tar ratio of 0.12 was found to be ``comparable to the Marlboro in terms of both subjective acceptability and strength.'' According to the researchers: Although we previously have had cigarettes in this delivery range which achieved parity with Marlboro in acceptability, this is the first time that such a cigarette has achieved parity in both acceptability and strength. The researchers also described a follow-up study to determine whether ``the high nicotine/tar ratio was the primary determinant of the smokers' favorable perceptions of the cigarette.'' According to the researchers: In this study we will make three 10 mg tar cigarettes with N/T ratios of 0.07, .10, and .13--insuring that tar is constant over cigarettes--and a Marlboro control. From this test, we will be able to determine: (1) whether we can reliably make full flavored cigarettes in the 10 mg range; and (2) whether a relatively high N/T ratio is essential in order to do so. Top officials at Philip Morris were informed of the results of this research. The 1974 annual report was approved by the Director of Research, Thomas Osdene and distributed to the vice president for Research and Development, Helmut Wakeham. Source: ``Behavioral Research Annual Report, Part II,'' approved by T.S. Osdene and distributed to H. Wakeham et al.--November 1, 1974-- reprinted in 141 Congressional Record at H7658-62--daily edition. July 25, 1995. October 1975.--Philip Morris researchers report the results of the followup study to Helmut Wakeham, the vice president for Research and Development. The followup study successfully confirmed the original results. According to the researchers: This study provides evidence that the optimum nicotine to tar ratio for a 10 mg tar cigarette is somewhat higher than that occurring in smoke from natural state of tobacco. Specifically, the follow-up study involved boosting nicotine levels by adding a nicotine salt--nicotine citrate--to low-delivery cigarettes to raise the nicotine/tar ratio above the natural ratio of 0.07. These experimental cigarettes were then sent to a test panel of hundreds of smokers. The results showed: [T]he experimental cigarette with the moderate level of nicotine addition was rated higher in acceptability than the proportional reduction cigarette and equal to the Marlboro control. Source: ``Low Delivery Cigarettes and Increased Nicotine/Tar Ratios, A Replications,'' approved by William L. Dunn and distributed to H. Wakeham et al.--Oct. 1975. December 1978.--Philip Morris researchers analyze the nicotine levels in cigarettes produced by other manufactures. They prepare a table listing the tar and nicotine levels and the nicotine/tar ratios of competitors' brands. Then they state: The table suggests . . . that our competitors' brands . . . seem to be higher in nicotine delivery than we would otherwise expect from our own experience with low delivery cigarettes . . . We suspect that in some cigarettes the use of high alkaloid blends may . . . be an important contribution to the higher ratios. A high alkaloid blend refers to a blend of tobacco containing high concentrations alkaloids. The principal alkaloid in tobacco is nicotine. Source: Memorandum on ``Plans and Objectives--1979,'' from W.L. Dunn to T.S. Osdene--Dec. 6, 1978--reprinted in 141 Congressional Record at H7668-70--daily edition. July 25, 1995. February 1979.--Philip Morris researchers plan a study on the changes in nicotine levels detectable by smokers. This study is intended to address ``the recurring expression of concern about the relative downness of N/T ratios in PM products.'' Source: ``Notes on Program Review Presentation 2/79.''

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, it is bad enough this appropriations bill would cut the EPA budget overall expenditures by a third and its enforcement ability by one-half. It is clear they will not be able to enforce the laws adequately with that budget, but just be sure they do not really enforce the laws, there are riders on this bill which are extraordinary to keep EPA from using its resources to make sure we do not have radioactive substances in our drinking water or toxic emissions into the air. These proposals undermine existing laws that were put in place to protect the environment and public health. Toxic pollutants, for example, cause cancer and birth defects. I ask, ``Why shouldn't we have the law enforced to make sure we don't have those diseases that can be prevented?'' Mr. Chairman, there were no hearings on these riders. Usually it goes through a committee that has jurisdiction. They are all being put on this bill in order to move them through very quickly. Our constituents are not asking for these riders. Special interests are asking for them, and I think they are going to do a disservice to the American people and the progress that we have made to protect the environment, improve public health, and avoid the tragedies that occur when people suffer from these diseases. I urge support for these amendents. Let us strike the riders. Let us do an appropriations bill that does not pass laws to undermine what we have already enacted into law.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am a Member of the corrections advisory committee, and I support the idea of a Corrections Day. But that Corrections Day ought to be to correct laws or regulations that have unintended and burdensome effects. We ought to correct on a bipartisan basis. We ought to limit our corrections to those we can all support and we will ensure against abuse of that corrections calendar if we do not take up controversial issues like the San Diego provisions that is before us today. We do not want the corrections calendar to become a fast track for special interests seeking favored treatment. This is a divisive bill. It is over something that is already going to be done by the EPA. It is based largely on a false anecdote. Mr. Speaker, I hope this is an aberration as to what we are going to have on the Corrections Day calendar and is not a signal of how this calendar will work in the future. Let us correct issues that ought to be corrected, that we all agree upon, and not take up controversial issues such as this one where there is such divisiveness.

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I have taken out this special order to talk about the No. 1 threat to the health of our children--tobacco. This week, data from the National Institute on Drug Abuse shows that we are losing the battle to keep cigarettes away from children. In just 3 years, there has been a 30-percent increase in smoking among 13- and 14-year-olds. Nearly one-third of high school seniors smoke cigarettes. This is a health crisis of huge dimensions. Every day, 3,000 children start smoking. One-third of these children will eventually die from their tobacco addiction. Why is this happening? The answer is obvious. The tobacco industry spends $5 billion a year--over $10 million a day--on tobacco advertising and promotion. Much of this effort is specifically targeted at children. To keep its profits flowing, the industry has developed clever promotions like Joe Camel and the Marlboro Country Store aimed directly at children. The administration is trying to protect our children from tobacco. As reported last week, FDA Commissioner David Kessler has found that tobacco is an addictive drug. He has called for commonsense regulation to protect children--like banning cigarette vending machines. I believe the President will support these efforts. Unfortunately, when word of the administration's actions leaked out, it encountered fierce resistance on Capitol Hill. The Speaker said that Commissioner Kessler must be ``out of his mind'' to consider regulating tobacco. Other Members promised Congress would intervene to prevent regulation from going forward. It is against this backdrop that I am here today. This hour, I will be reading into the Record excerpts of dozens of previously secret documents from the Nation's largest tobacco company, Philip Morris. These documents make a compelling case for regulation of tobacco to protect children. I hope they will dissuade Members of this body from any legislative effort to block regulation. Last year, when I served as chairman of the Health and the Environment Subcommittee, we commenced an investigation of the tobacco industry. We learned more in that year than we had learned in the previous decade about tobacco industry efforts to study and manipulate nicotine, an addictive drug. The subcommittee's investigation was cut short prematurely by the elections. In particular, we were able to learn very little about the activities of the Nation's largest tobacco company, Philip Morris. Two out of every three cigarettes smoked by children are Marlboro cigaretts--a Philip Morris product. But we learned far less about Philip Morris than its much smaller rival, Brown & Williamson. Since the election, I have continued my investigation as an individual Member of Congress. I have been handicapped by the inability to hold hearings or hire an investigative staff. But nonetheless, I have learned a tremendous amount about Philip Morris. I am here today to report on what I have learned to this body. I am here to report that Philip Morris researchers administered painful electric shocks to college students to determine the influence of anxiety on student smoking habits. I am here to report that Philip Morris studies third-graders to determine if hyperactive children are a potential market for cigarettes. I am here to report that the company planned illegal experiments that involved injecting human subjects with nicotine. And I am here to report that as early as 1969, the board of directors of Philip Morris was briefed by its researchers on the addictive nature of nicotine. The board was told that people smoked to obtain ``the pharmacological effect of smoke'' and that smokers' craving for this effect is so strong that it ``preempts food in times of scarcity on the smoker's priority list.'' The documents that I will be discussing today describe the secret research activities of Philip Morris from January 1969 to November 1980. Some of these documents were described in a front-page article in the New York Times on June 8, 1995. Most of the documents, however, have never previously been discussed in public. Last month, I wrote Philip Morris to ask the company to cooperate with FDA's investigation by turning over the documents described in the New York Times to FDA. However, the company refused to cooperate. Three major points emerge from the documents I will describe today: First, Philip Morris conduced an extensive, but secret, research program into nicotine pharmacology for over a decade. Second, top Philip Morris scientists and executives have known for decades that cigarettes have powerful and addictive pharmacological effects. Third, Philip Morris conducted secret research that focussed on the pharmacological effects of cigarettes on children and college students. the secret nicotine pharmacology program The documents I will describe today cover the period from January 1969 to November 1980. They describe an intensive investigation into nicotine pharmacology, involving dozens of previously secret studies. The studies described in the document range from traditional pharmacology involving animal experiments to high-technology electroencephalography [EEG], which measures human brain waves. Some of the studies raise troubling ethical questions. And some appear to be simply illegal. Three of the documents describe experiments that were to involve injecting nicotine into human subjects. Such experiments are illegal without the approval of the federal Food and Drug Administration. In another series of five experiments described in the documents, Philip Morris administered ``painful'' electric shocks to human subjects. Experiments that inflict pain are ethically dubious unless they are being conducted for beneficial purposes. The volume of the experimentation is staggering. In one typical year--1979--at least 16 separate studies on nicotine pharmacology were conducted by three different Philip Morris laboratories: First, the Animal Behavior Group conducted six experiments on topics such as ``nicotine discrimination'' and ``nicotine self- administration.'' These are the same studies that are used by the National Institute on Drug Abuse to establish the addiction potential of drugs. Second, the Neuropsychology Laboratory conducted five experiments on topics such as ``effects of smoking on the electroencephalogram'' and ``long-term deprivation and the electrical activity of the brain.'' These studies are designated to show the pharmacological effects of cigarettes on the human brain. Third, the Smoking Behavior Group conducted five studies on topics such as the behavioral consequences of smoking low-nicotine cigarettes. These studies were used to learn how smokers respond to changes in nicotine delivery. Philip Morris conducted these studies for commercial reasons. The document describing the plans and objectives for the Behavioral Research Laboratory in 1979 states expressly that ``the rationale for the program rests on the premise that such knowledge will strengthen Philip Morris R&D capability in developing new and improved smoking products.'' There is no reason to believe that the documents provide a comprehensive summary of Philip Morris' nicotine research. As I will discuss, congressional hearings I held last year disclosed that nicotine research occurred after the period covered in this report. Moreover, most of the documents discuss the activities of Philip Morris' Richmond, VA, research center. The documents contain only fleeting references to nicotine studies being conducted by Philip Morris in Cologne, Germany, and Neuchatel, Switzerland. Virtually nothing is known about these secretive foreign research programs. top Philip Morris scientists and executives knew cigarettes have powerful and addictive pharmacological effects On April 14, 1994, Philip Morris CEO William Campbell testified before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that ``cigarette smoking is not addictive,'' that nicotine is retained in cigarettes because nicotine ``contributes to the taste of cigarettes,'' and that ``Philip Morris research does not establish that smoking is addictive.'' The documents I will describe conflict fundamentally with these statements. The documents show that top Philip Morris scientists and executives knew that cigarettes have powerful and addictive pharmacological effects. For instance, the documents show: First, during the fall of 1969, the Philip Morris Board of Directors was briefed by Philip Morris researchers on why people smoke. The researchers told the board that people smoke to obtain ``the pharmacological effect of smoke.'' The researchers further told the Board that smokers' craving for this ``pharmacological effect'' is so strong that it ``preempts food in times of scarcity on the smoker's priority list.'' Second, in November 1974, Philip Morris' Director of Research, Thomas Osdene, who subsequently became vice president for science and technology, approved and sent to the then vice president for research and development, Helmut Wakeham, and other Philip Morris officials a report stating that the consumer smokes ``to achieve his habitual quota of the pharmacologically active components of smoke'' and that stopping smoking produces ``reactions . . . not unlike those to be observed upon withdrawal from any number of habituating pharmacological agents.'' Third, in March 1980, Philip Morris researcher Jim Charles, who subsequently became vice president for research and development, wrote the than vice president for research and development, Robert Seligman, that ``nicotine is a powerful pharmacological agent with multiple sites of action and may be the most important component of cigarette smoke.'' He added that ``nicotine and an understanding of its properties are important to the continued well being of our cigarette business since this alkaloid has been cited often as `the reason for smoking.''' Contrary to Philip Morris' public statements that cigarettes are not a drug, the documents are replete with statements that describe cigarettes in explicitly drug-like terms. The documents, for instance, include many references to ``pharmacological effects,'' ``dose control,'' ``withdrawal syndrome,'' ``nicotine regulators,'' ``nicotine dose,'' ``nicotine pharmacology,'' ``nicotine administration,'' ``nicotine analogues,'' and ``blood nicotine levels.'' Philip Morris Conducted Research on the Effects of Cigarettes on Children and College Students One of the most significant revelations in the documents is that Philip Morris conducted pharmacological research specifically targeted at children and college students. One of the longest-running studies in the documents addresses the ``hyperkinetic child as a prospective smoker.'' In this study, Philip Morris collaborated with the Chesterfield County school system in Richmond, VA, to determine whether hyperkinetic and borderline hyperkinetic children will become cigarette smokers in their teenage years. The researchers explained: It has been found that amphetamines, which are strong stimulants, have the anomalous effect of quieting these children down. Many children are therefore regularly administered amphetamines throughout grade school years. . . . We wonder whether such children may not eventually become cigarette smokers in their teenage years as they discover the advantage of self-stimulation via nicotine. We have already collaborated with a local school system in identifying some such children in the third grade. This research began in 1974. It continued until 1978, when it had to be terminated prematurely because of objections from the school system and physicians. Many of the studies conducted by Philip Morris investigated the pharmacological effects of cigarettes on college students. These studies provided scientific data about the youngest segment of the cigarette market lawfully available to Philip Morris. Moreover, because there is no bright line that separates college students from underage smokers, the studies also provided Philip Morris with considerable insight into the underage market. In one series of experiments with college students--code-named ``Shock I, II, III, IV, and V''--Philip Morris administered electric shocks to the students to determine if student smoking rates increase under stressful conditions. This study began in 1969. It ultimately had to be terminated in 1972 because ``fear of shock is scaring away some of our more valuable students.'' In another study, Philip Morris gave college students low-nicotine cigarettes in an attempt to force the students ``to modify their puff volumes, inhalation volumes, and/or smoke retention times in order to obtain their usual nicotine dose.'' Philip Morris maintains publicly that it does not target children in advertising, cigarette sales, or other ways. The documents undermine this claim--at least as it applies to scientific research. They show that Philip Morris has targeted children and college students, the youngest segment of the market, for specific research projects. At this point, I want to begin to read excerpts from the documents. I have organized the documents chronologically, beginning in January 1969 and continuing to November 1980. chronology of philip morris research on nicotine pharmacology January 1969.--A Philip Morris report describes ``objectives and plans'' for its Smoker Psychology Program. These objectives and plans provide the first recognition in the documents that cigarettes have psychopharmacological effects and are smoked for need-gratification. One objective mentioned in the report is an ``attempt to teach a rat to seek the inhalation of cigarette smoke * * * through the reinforcing effect of the psychopharmacological effects of the inhaled smoke.'' This objective is noteworthy because a hallmark of an addictive substance is that the substance is reinforcing and will be self- administered by rats. As described later in this chronology, Philip Morris succeeded in 1980, well in advance of the rest of the scientific community, in showing that nicotine has this hallmark characteristic of an addictive substance. A second objective mentioned in the report is to determine whether ``there is any product that can potentially replace the cigarette in need-gratification.'' Source: P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Plans and Objectives--1600''-- January 8, 1969. August 1969.--A Philip Morris scientist, William Dunn, proposes that research techniques used to study ``drug addiction'' be applied to study ``the experiences of smokers in their efforts to discontinue the habit.'' Dunn had visited a drug addiction study being conducted by Dr. Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia University. Impressed by the study, Dunn wrote to Helmut Wakeham, the vice president for research and development at Philip Morris, to propose that Dr. Lazarsfeld study ``the experiences of smokers in their efforts to discontinue the habit.'' Dunn argued that the drug addiction methodologies would be ``highly effective'' in studying the cigarette habit: I saw this approach in operation in the drug-addiction conference. In its current application it appears highly effective. I can see no reason why it should not be as effective for the proposed study. Source: Memorandum on ``Discussions with Professor Lazarsfeld on the Study of Discontinuing Smokers,'' from W.L. Dunn to H. Wakeham--August 1, 1969. Fall 1969.--Philip Morris researchers brief the Philip Morris Board of Directors on why people smoke. The researchers tell the Board that a smoker begins to smoke at age 16 ``to enhance his image in the eyes of his peers.'' This psychosocial motive, however, is not enough to explain continued smoking. The researchers tell the board that people continue to smoke to obtain ``the pharmacological effect of smoke.'' According to the researchers, the smoker's desire for this pharmacological effect is so strong that it ``preempts food in times of scarcity on the smoker's priority list.'' Specifically, the researchers tell the Board: We are beginning to concentrate on the smoker himself. We are addressing the question, ``Why do people smoke.'' . . . First, we have to break the question into its two parts: No. 1, Why does one begin to smoke? and No. 2, Why does one continue to smoke? There is general agreement on the answer to the first part. The 16 to 20 year-old begins smoking for psychosocial reasons. The act of smoking is symbolic; it signifies adulthood, he smokes to enhance his image in the eyes of his peers. But the psychosocial motive is not enough to explain continued smoking. Some other motive force takes over to make smoking rewarding in its own right. Long after adolescent preoccupation with self-image has subsided, the cigarette will even preempt food in times of scarcity on the smoker's priority list. The questions is ``why?'' . . . We are of the conviction . . . that the ultimate explanation for the perpetuated cigarette habit resides in the pharmacological effect of smoke upon the body of the smoker, the effect being most rewarding to the individual under stress. Source: ``Ryan/Dunn Alternate--Third Version of Board Presentation''--fall 1969, delivered with only minor changes. December 1969.--Philip Morris commences the first of several series of studies of smoking by college students. The first series is called ``Shock I, II, III, IV, and V.'' In these studies, college students are given electric shocks to promote anxiety. The purpose of the studies is ``to show that cigarette smoking is more probable in stress situations than in nonstress situations.'' According to the researchers: Shock intensity will be adjusted for each subject according to the subject's pain threshold. The shock will be painful. The Shock studies run for three years. In October 1972, the scientists are finally forced to abandon the research because ``fear of shock is scaring away some of our more valuable subjects.'' Source: Memorandum on ``Proposed Research Project: Smoking and Anxiety,'' from F.J. Ryan to W.L. Dunn----Dec. 23, 1969; Frank Ryan, ``Shock I, II, III, and IV,'' in Consumer Psychology Monthly Report-- Sept. 16 to Oct. 15, 1971; Frank Ryan, ``Shock V,'' in Consumer Psychology Monthly Report--Jan. 15 to Feb. 15, 1972; P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Quarterly Report--Projects 1600 and 2302''--Oct. 5, 1972. September 1970.--Philip Morris develops a five-year plan for the Smoker Psychology Program. Two of the research goals are first, to determine whether ``the smoking habit can be sustained in the absence of nicotine'' and second, to ``elucidate the role of nicotine as a factor in determining cigarette acceptability.'' Source: P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Five-Year Objectives and Plans for Project 1600''--Sept. 25, 1970. November 1971.--Philip Morris continues its study of smoking by college students in a project titled ``Desire to Smoke.'' In this study, ``all available college students will fill out a questionnaire rating their desire to smoke'' so that Philip Morris can ``compare the rated desire to smoke with our existing personality profiles.'' Source: Frank Ryan, ``Desire to Smoke,'' in Consumer Psychology Monthly Report--Oct. 16 to Nov. 15, 1971. January 1973.--Philip Morris commences three studies to determine ``what effect, if any, smoking has upon the magnitude of shifts in arousal level, with heart rate being used as the index of this psycho- physiological state.'' Source: P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Quarterly Report--Projects 1600 and 2302''--Jan. 5, 1973. February 1973.--Philip Morris begins a study of the effect of smoking on ``alpha brain wave dominance''--that is, the effect of smoking on the electrical activity of the brain. The researchers involved in the study state: Alpha brain wave dominance is associated with states of tranquility and meditation. . . . As part of our continuing search for the motivationally relevant effects of smoking, we are investigating the influence of smoking upon the rate of acquisition of alpha wave control. Source: W.L. Dunn, ``Smoking and Rate of Learning Alpha Control,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--Jan. 1 to Jan. 31, 1973. June 1974.--Philip Morris commences a four-year study of smoking by ``hyperkinetic'' children to determine if they will ``discover the advantage of self-stimulation via nicotine'' and ``become cigarette smokers in their teenage years.'' In June 1974, the researchers conducting the study write: It has been found that amphetamines, which are strong stimulants, have the anomalous effect of quieting these children down. Many children are therefore regularly administered amphetamines throughout grade school years. . . . We wonder whether such children may not eventually become cigarette smokers in their teenage years as they discover the advantage of self-stimulation via nicotine. We have already collaborated with a local school system in identifying some such children in the third grade. . . . It would be good to show that smoking is an advantage to at least one subgroup of the population. In March 1975, the researchers describe their intention to increase the size of the study of ``hyperkinesis as a precursor to smoking'' to 60,000 children: The size of our prospective study should be increased to the base of about 60,000 children when a local school system extends its student evaluation three more grades this spring. In July 1975, the researchers report the status of their investigation of the ``hyperkinetic child as a prospective smoker'' to Helmut Wakeham, the vice president of research and development at Philip Morris, and other Philip Morris officials. Specifically, they tell the Philip Morris vice president: We hypothesize that the characteristics of smokers and hyperkinetic children so closely resemble each other that in the past hyperkinetics were almost sure to become smokers. . . . We have undertaken a long term prospective study to identify the hyperkinetic and borderline hyperkinetic youngsters in Chesterfield County school system, and to see whether they become smokers. All the children in one grade level were tested last year. In May 1977, Philip Morris continues its investigation into the smoking habits of hyperactive children by initiating two prospective studies with pediatricians treating hyperactive children. In these studies, Philip Morris will track the hyperactive children and a group of controls to see whether they have become smokers. Philip Morris will then ``help our colleagues find the variables which account for drug- responding and non-responding.'' Finally, the study of hyperkinetic children stops in March 1978, due to objections from school systems and physicians. The researchers write: Obstacles presented by school systems and physicians concerned with the various ``privacy acts'' passed by state and national legislatures have made it very difficult for us to conduct studies using school and medical records of minors. Source: F.J. Ryan, ``Relationship between Smoking and Personality,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--June 10, 1974; Frank Ryan, ``Hyperkinesis as a Precursor of Smoking,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--Mar. 10, 1975; ``Behavioral Research Annual Report,'' approved by W.L. Dunn and distributed to H. Wakeham et al.--July 18, 1975; F.J. Ryan, ``Hyperactivity,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--May 13, 1977; F.J. Ryan, ``Hyperkinetic Children,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--Mar. 10, 1978. November 1, 1974.--Philip Morris' director of research, Thomas Osdene, who later becomes vice president for science and technology, approves and sends an annual report on behavioral research to the vice president for research and development, Helmut Wakeham. The report shows that by 1974, top company officials plainly consider cigarettes to be a drug. The report analogizes smoking to drug use, stating ``dose control continues even after the puff of smoke is drawn into the mouth''; it asserts that a person smokes ``to achieve his habitual quota of the pharmacologically active components of smoke''; and it hypothesizes that stopping smoking produces ``reactions . . . not unlike those to be observed upon withdrawal from any number of habituating pharmacological agents.'' The report also summarizes the status of a number of Philip Morris studies, including a study of smoker compensation when nicotine levels in cigarettes are reduced. Compensation studies, which are repeatedly discussed in the documents, assess the attempt of smokers to increase their nicotine intake through smoking more cigarettes or taking longer puffs. Source: ``Behavioral Research Annual Report, Part II,'' approved by T.S. Osdene and distributed to H. Wakeham et al.--Nov. 1, 1974. December 1974.--A Philip Morris document discusses the company's nicotine research program in Neuchatel, Switzerland. This is the only document describing these secret activities. The Switzerland researchers, who were also heavily involved in nicotine research, report that a ``compensation mechanism seems to be in operation for a proportion of the consumer population to adjust the nicotine yield to their needs or liking.'' Source: Gustafson and Haisch, ``PME Research: 1972-74.'' March 1975.--Philip Morris continues its study of smoking by college students by examining whether smoking by college students increases following a 2-hour deprivation period. Preliminary data suggest that students compensate for deprivation by smoking more and taking more puffs. Source: Quarterly Report Memorandum, from W.L. Dunn to T.S. Osdene-- Mar. 25, 1975. July 1975.--Philip Morris commences its first study of ``the black menthol smoker.'' The researchers explain: The black menthol smoker is an important segment of the menthol market, yet all of the PM national field tests of menthol cigarettes have been conducted with virtually all white panels. What with some 500 black menthol smokers having become available with the advent of the RP3 panel, the opportunity was afforded to study the black response to menthol cigarettes. Source: ``Behavioral Research Annual Report,'' approved by W.L. Dunn and distributed to H. Wakeham et al.--July 18, 1975. September 1975.--Philip Morris scientist W.L. Dunn describes smokers' abilities to compensate for reduced nicotine in cigarettes as ``dose- regulating mechanisms of remarkable precision and sensitivity.'' He explains in detail how a smoker could compensate for a 15 percent reduction in nicotine in Marlboro cigarettes by ``more efficient extraction of the goodies.'' He writes: To accommodate to the 15% reduction in available Marlboro nicotine, the smoker who was getting 50% of the available nicotine over into his blood from the Marlboro . . . now must get 59% of what the current Marlboro offers him. He can take bigger puffs, or inhale more from the supply drawn into the mouth . . . or for more efficient extraction of the goodies, he can draw it deeper or hold it in longer. Source: Letter from W.L. Dunn to Stanley Schachter (Sept. 8, 1975). February 1976.--Philip Morris continues its study of smoking by college students by attempting to identify ``nicotine regulators'' among college students. A major goal of the study is to determine if Philip Morris can ``force'' students who are given low-nicotine cigarettes ``to modify their puff volumes, inhalation volumes, and/or smoke retention times in order to obtain their usual nicotine dose.'' Nicotine regulators are described by Philip Morris in the documents as smokers who compensate for nicotine deprivation by increasing their intake of nicotine. Source: Carolyn Levy, ``Regulator Identification Program,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--Feb. 10, 1976. June 1976.--Philip Morris researchers discuss ``why people start to smoke.'' They summarize the data indicating that most smokers begin to smoke between 10 and 18 years old. They then state that one of the reasons for continued smoking is that cigarettes serve ``as a narcotic, tranquilizer, or sedative.'' Source: Memorandum on ``Why People Start to Smoke,'' from A. Udow to J.J. Morgan--June 2, 1976. December 1976.--Philip Morris scientists report a ``consensus of investigators'' that ``the reinforcement of the smoking act is the effect of smoke component action in the central nervous system.'' They propose setting up an electroencephalographic or ``EEG'' laboratory ``to seek an ultimate explanation of cigarette smoking among the nicotine or smoke-component-related events of the central nervous system.'' The new EEG equipment would enable Philip Morris to monitor the brain waves of smokers. Source: Memorandum on ``Rationale for Investigating the Effects of Smoking Upon Electroencephalographic Phenomena,'' from W.L. Dunn to T.S. Osdene--Dec. 22, 1976. November 1977.--Philip Morris continues its study of smoking by college students. In a new experiment, Philip Morris attempts to distinguish students who smoke out of ``habit'' from those who smoke out of ``need.'' The researchers explain: Although nicotine intake appears a critical mainstay of tobacco consumption, not all people smoke for nicotine on all occasions. . . . All . . . cigarettes contribute to the total nicotine in the system, so that a cigarette smoked out of habit will delay the time until a cigarette is smoked out of need. Source: F.J. Ryan, ``Habit and Need Cigarettes,'' in Smoker Psychology Monthly Report--Nov. 11, 1977. December 1977.--Philip Morris researchers report to the Director of Research their view that ``nicotine compensation is a real phenomenon'' and that ``some people smoke for nicotine and * * * try to obtain a relatively constant amount of nicotine from their cigarettes.'' The report also states that Philip Morris has ``effected an arrangement with a university affiliated hospital for injecting nicotine in humans for discrimination studies.'' FDA approval is required before conducting nicotine injections, but in this case and the other instances of human injection mentioned in the documents, no such approval apparently was. Source: Memorandum on ``Behavioral Research Accomplishments--1977,'' from W.L. Dunn to T.S. Osdene--Dec. 19, 1977. March 1978.--Philip Morris launches its ``nicotine program.'' The program is to involve central nervous system (``CNS'') behavioral testing, studies of the ``molecular basis of nicotine pharmacology,'' and ``nicotine analogue preparation.'' On March 15, 1978, the Philip Morris researchers involved in the program write: An effective nicotine program must include both peripheral and CNS bioassay. . . . It is clear that CNS studies represent the most complex, state-of-the-art concepts. Ultimately, the isolation and characterization of the nicotine CNS receptors are the major goal. Many steps must come first. These include (1) pharmacological location of sites of nicotinic action using both cannulae and various tissue sections; (2) measurement of electrochemical activity following drug administration; (3) various techniques including photoaffinity labeling and binding studies as aids a receptor isolation (4) receptor identification and characterization. On March 31, 1978, they elaborate further, describing ``CNS behavioral testing'' that is ``needed in the immediate future'': Nicotine discrimination, self-administration and tolerance studies will enable us to examine the cuing and reinforcing properties of nicotine and nicotine analogues in rats. These are state-of-the-art bioassays for central nervous system activity which we believe will serve as useful models of human smoking behavior. These CNS studies are significant because they are the same studies used by the National Institute on Drug Abuse to determine the addiction potential of a drug. A substance that a self-administered and reinforcing has addiction potential because it induces repeated and compulsive use. The researchers also propose conducting studies into the ``molecular basis of nicotine pharmacology,'' because ``we must begin to gain expertise in experimentation dealing with nicotine receptor technology.'' Nicotine receptors are the structures in the brain to which nicotine attaches after entering the blood stream. Source: Memorandum on ``Nicotine Program,'' from J.I. Seeman to T.S. Osdene--Mar. 15, 1978; Memorandum on ``Nicotine Program: Specific Implementation,'' from J.I. Seeman et al. to T.S. Osdene--Mar. 31, 1978. September 1978.--Philip Morris develops a new five-year plan for research and development. A major component of the plan is the nicotine analog program, which is based on the recognition that ``nicotine may be the physiologically active component of smoke having the greatest consequence to the consumer.'' Specifically, the plan states: Nicotine may be the physiologically active component of smoke having the greatest consequence to the consumer. Therefore, we are studying the differences in physiological effects between nicotine and its analogues to determine the mode of nicotinic action. If acquired, this knowledge may lead to a substance which will produce the known desirable nicotinic effects and greatly diminish any physiological effects of no benefit to the consumer. Source: Philip Morris, USA, ``Research and Development Five Year Plan, 1979-1983''--Sept. 1978. December 1978.--Philip Morris presents its objectives for the Behavioral Research Laboratory for 1979. The objectives are significant for two reasons: First, they describe intense research activity, involving over 15 different investigations, into nicotine pharmacology. Second, they link the laboratory's nicotine research to the development of ``new and improved smoking products'' that capitalize on the research. The Philip Morris researchers state their overall objective as follows: All of the effort of the Behavioral Research Laboratory is aimed at achieving this objective: To understand the psychological reward the smoker gets from smoking, to understand the psychophysiology underlying this reward, and to relate this reward to the constituents in smoke. The researchers explain that to achieve this objective, three general lines of research will be pursued: 1. The effects of nicotine and nicotine-like compounds on animal behavior. 2. The effects of smoke and smoke constituents upon the electrical activity in the human brain. 3. The effects of changes in smoke composition upon puffing behavior, inhalation behavior and descriptive statements by the smoker. The ``rationale for the program'' is its potential commercial application. Specifically, the researchers state: The rationale for the program rests on the premise that such knowledge will strengthen Philip Morris R&D capability in developing new and improved smoking products. The researchers then describe six studies being conducted by the animal behavior group--``nicotine discrimination,'' ``tail flick,'' ``monitoring of motor activity,'' ``prostration syndrome,'' ``nicotine self-administration,'' and ``rat EEG''; five studies being conducted by a new neuropsychology laboratory set up ``to understand the interrelations between cigarette smoking and the human brain''-- ``effects of smoking on visually evoked response,'' ``search for other evoked responses,'' ``effects of smoking on the electroencephalogram,'' ``long-term deprivation and the electrical activity of the brain,'' and ``comparison of three routes of nicotine administration''; and five studies being conducted by the smoking behavior group--nicotine detection, masking of nicotine, nicotine's affect on cigarette acceptability, behavioral consequences of low-nicotine cigarettes, and ``mouthfeel'' factors. Three of the studies are especially noteworthy. First, the study comparing three routes of nicotine administration is significant because it again involved ``intravenous injection'' of human subjects with nicotine as one of the routes of administration. The other two routes of exposure were inhalation and ingestion. The study was designed to ``answer several important questions,'' including ``what is the relationship between blood nicotine levels and CNS activity''; ``how soon following a given method of nicotine administration are effects seen in the CNS and for how long''; and ``how are the human studies employing cigarette smoking similar to or different from animal studies employing nicotine injection.'' Second, the study of long-term deprivation and the electrical activity of the brain is important because it involved measuring the brain waves of quitters to learn whether ``brains change in some fashion following the experience with tobacco.'' According to the researchers, this study was undertaken because ``in terms of the electrical activity of the brain, there can be little doubt that smokers and nonsmokers are very different.'' Third, the study of the behavioral consequences of smoking low- nicotine cigarettes is significant because it involved designing special cigarettes ``at or near the nicotine need threshold.'' As the researchers explained: The low nicotine delivery will ensure that total nicotine in the system remains at or near the nicotine need threshold, thus maximizing the proportion of day's cigarette consumption which is smoked out of need. . . . The results may shed light on the manner by which nicotine control is achieved. Source: Memorandum on ``Plans and Objectives--1979,'' from W.L. Dunn to T.S. Osdene--Dec. 6, 1978. January 7, 1980.--Philip Morris describes its objectives for the behavioral research laboratory for 1980. Many of the objectives are a continuation of the 1979 objectives. The Philip Morris researchers make several statements that again underscore the company's knowledge of nicotine's addictiveness. The Philip Morris researchers state that ``our theorizing on the role of nicotine suggests that cigarettes will be smoked whenever body nicotine content drops below a certain (unknown) level.'' The researchers also state their view that smokers will experience withdrawal syndrome and evidence of nicotine dependence upon being given ultra-low-nicotine cigarettes. In one noteworthy study, the researchers propose to use a place preference paradigm used to study morphine to study nicotine. Specifically, they state: Mucha and Van der Kooy (1979) have reported that a place preference paradigm may be used to demonstrate the rewarding properties of morphine. We plan to use a similar paradigm to examine the rewarding properties of nicotine. A second important study described in the report involves the effect to develop an assay for measuring the nicotine level in saliva. This assay would be used to confirm that ``cigarettes will be smoked whenever body nicotine content drops below a certain (unknown) level.'' Source: Memorandum on ``Plans and Objectives--1980,'' from W.L. Dunn to T.S. Osdene--Jan. 7, 1980. January 15, 1980.--Philip Morris describes its objectives for the Biochemistry Division for 1980 in a report from the director of research, Thomas Osdene, to the vice president for research and development, Robert Seligman. As in earlier reports, the objectives for this division include a heavy emphasis on nicotine. Specifically, the report states that the objectives include: 1. To develop a fundamental understanding of the mechanisms by which nicotine and other tobacco alkaloids interact with the peripheral and central nervous system. 2. To determine if nicotine analogues can be designed which exhibit differential activity at different receptors. . . . 5. To perform . . . pharmacological testing of nicotine and its analogues. Source: T.S. Osdene, ``Plans and Objectives for 1980,'' distributed to R. Seligman et al.--Jan. 15, 1980. March 1980.--Philip Morris's vice president for research and development, Robert Seligman, sends a memo to Philip Morris scientists soliciting their views on the value of continuing Philip Morris's support for the nicotine analog research being conducted by Dr. Leo Abood at the University of Rochester. The researchers respond that the program should be continued. One researcher, Jim Charles, justifies support by explaining that ``nicotine and an understanding of its properties are important to the continued well being of our cigarette business since this alkaloid has been cited often as `the reason for smoking.''' Charles subsequently became the director of research at Philip Morris and later vice president for research and development. Specifically, Charles states: Nicotine is a powerful pharmacological agent with multiple sites of action and may be the most important component of cigarette smoke. Nicotine and an understanding of its properties are important to the continued well being of our cigarette business since this alkaloid has been cited often as ``the reason for smoking.'' . . . Nicotine is known to have effects on the central and peripheral nervous system as well as influencing memory, learning, pain perception, response to stress and level of arousal. Our ability to ascertain the structural features of the nicotine molecule which are responsible for its various pharmacological properties can lead to the design of compounds with enhanced desirable properties (central nervous system effects) and minimized suspect properties (peripheral nervous system effects). There are many opportunities for acquiring proprietary compounds which can serve as a firm foundation for new and innovative products in the future. A second researcher refers to related work being conducted by Philip Morris in Germany, stating ``for several years, we have been receiving data on peripheral screening of our nicotine analogues from Germany.'' According to the researcher, the work from Cologne, Germany, has been of the highest calibre. Source: Memorandum on ``Nicotine Receptor Program----University of Rochester,'' from R.B. Seligman to T.S. Osdene et al.--Mar. 5, 1980; Memorandum on ``Nicotine Receptor Program--University of Rochester,'' from J.L. Charles to R.B. Seligman--Mar. 18, 1980; Memorandum on ``Nicotine Receptor Program--University of Rochester,'' from E.B. Sanders to R.B. Seligman--Mar. 21, 1980. November 1980.--Philip Morris describes its research objectives for the behavioral research program for 1981. The objectives again confirm the company's extensive interest in the pharmacological effects of nicotine. The report describes the goals of the electrophysiology program as follows: It is our belief that the reinforcing properties of cigarette smoking are directly relatable to the effects that smoking has on electrical and chemical events within the central nervous system. Therefore, the goals of the electrophysiology program are to: (I) Determine how cigarette smoking affects the electrical activity of the brain, and (II) Identify, as far as possible, the neural elements which mediate cigarette smoking's reinforcing actions. The report describes the goals of a new behavioral pharmacology program as follows: Objectives: I. To develop a better understanding of the behavioral pharmacological actions of nicotine, particularly the action which reinforces smoking behavior. II. Develop the empirical evidence which differentiates nicotine from classical abuse substances. III. Use behavioral pharmacology methods for evaluating the nicotine-likeness of nicotine analogues. The report describes the goals of the experimental psychology program as follows: Objectives: 1. To gain a better understanding of the role of nicotine in smoking. 2. To study basic dimensions of the cigarette as they relate to cigarette acceptability. Two individual studies described in the report are especially important. First, the report states that Philip Morris succeeded in developing a technique for inducing rats to self-administer nicotine. This is significant because self-administration is a hallmark characteristic of an addictive drug. Independent scientists, who were not informed of this secret Philip Morris research, did not demonstrate nicotine self-administration in the laboratory until 1989, nearly a decade after Philip Morris. Second, the report describes a third planned experiment involving injecting nicotine into human subjects. The report states: There are tentative plans for one other project in which nicotine will be delivered intravenously in different sized spikes of different duration, to yield a broader picture of the role of the spike, the level, and the reinforcement characteristics of the substance. The execution of this project . . . involves the dosing of numerous subjects with nicotine. Source: Memorandum on ``Plans and Objectives--1981,'' from W.L. Dunn to T.S. Osdene--Nov. 26, 1980. subsequent research What happened in the Philip Morris research laboratories after November 1980? On April 28, 1994, two Philip Morris researchers, Victor DeNoble and Paul Mele, appeared before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to testify about their research at Philip Morris from 1980 to 1984. They described how they used experimental techniques developed by the National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA] to determine the addiction potential of nicotine. DeNoble and Mele's experiments primarily involved nicotine self- administration studies in rats. As described above, they found that rats would self-administer nicotine--one of the hallmark characteristics of an addictive drug. DeNoble and Mele's work held great interest to top Philip Morris executives. According to their testimony, in mid-1983 they were flown to New York to brief senior management on their work. Then in November 1983, the President of Philip Morris, Shep Pollack, flew to Richmond to observe rats injecting nicotine in one of DeNoble and Mele's self- administration experiments. At that time, Pollack was informed by DeNoble that the procedures he observed were ``the exact procedures NIDA would use to demonstrate abuse liability.'' Despite Philip Morris's interest in their work, DeNoble and Mele were abruptly terminated in April 1984, due to concerns that their findings could bolster product liability claims against Philip Morris. Subsequently, Philip Morris threatened the two researchers with litigation if they disclosed their research activities in journals or at public forums. DeNoble and Mele were involved in only one part of Philip Morris's intensive investigation of nicotine--the rat experimentation. Virtually nothing is known about what happened to the many other Philip Morris research initiatives after 1980. conclusion The documents I have just read make it clear that Philip Morris is in the drug business. Its laboratories have been intensively involved in unlocking the secrets of nicotine pharmacology for decades. The documents themselves state that this pharmacological research was undertaken for commercial purposes. The documents also indicate that this research was in important instances targeted specifically at children and college students. In summary, these documents make it crystal clear that we need regulation of tobacco to protect our children from becoming addicted to a life-threatening drug. Mr. Speaker, I have brought with me the documents I read from during the course of this hour. Pursuant to my earlier unanimous consent request, I am inserting the documents in the Record for publication. [Documents referred to will appear in a future issue of the Record.]

Mr. WAXMAN

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. WAXMAN. So we will go on with other amendments?

Mr. WAXMAN. And what will we debate this evening?

Mr. WAXMAN. Those are for debate for tomorrow?