Dave Weldon

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Now, the premium that we are talking about for the average senior right now I think that is at $46.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is a very simple amendment. As NASA goes through the procedures of looking into the issue of selecting a single prime contractor for the operation of our Nation's space shuttle, my amendment clarifies that their priority should be making sure that we have consistent safe operation of our space shuttle. This past August I toured Kennedy Space Center. Then again last week I had the privilege of having the chairman of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics join me at Kennedy Space Center, and talk with the people who put that space shuttle together and make sure that it will fly safely, and talk to the people who are down there at the ground level tightening the bolts, making sure that this system is going to function and function properly so that it can return our astronauts safely back to Earth. Mr. Chairman, I discovered that there are three things that they consider to be most important in this program, and, that is, safety, safety, safety. They want to make sure that as our space program continues on into the future, that our space shuttle will be safe and will continue to run safely. I feel that my amendment clarifies the language in this bill to make sure that our space program continues to be the world's leader.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from California.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill before us. No, this is not a perfect bill. In fact, I have discovered since my election to Congress, that [[Page H 9831]] there are few perfect bills. However, the bill before us is a good bill and takes some very important steps that move our country in the right direction. These are difficult budgetary times. We have already imposed upon our children a national debt of $5 trillion dollars. It is for our children and their children that we must make prudent decisions about those endeavors we can and cannot afford. Only by doing this can we ensure a brighter future for them. We must separate those endeavors that we must pursue from those that may be worthy activities but are not critical to our children's future, are too expensive for us to pursue at this time, or should be undertaken by the private sector. This bill does this. This bill makes tough decisions. It sets priorities. It will ensure a brighter future for our Nation. I would like to take this opportunity to discuss one aspect of this bill--NASA. The NASA provisions are responsible and meet our national requirements. They ensure a vibrant space program with clear direction. Overall, the bill provides $11.5 billion for NASA programs in 1996. This is $597 million under the administration's request. I am very pleased that this reduction will not impact the space station or space shuttle programs. These two programs are essential to our Nation's continued international leadership in space and they are funded at levels nearly identical to the President's request. Multiyear funding for the space station was provided in H.R. 1601, which passed the House by voice vote on September 28, 1995. It was funded at the administration's request. Thus, the bill before us does not include funding for the space station, but is fully consistent with H.R. 1601. The bill before us ensures a sound space shuttle program by fully funding space shuttle operations at the administration's budget request. The President requested $3.231 billion and H.R. 2405 provides $3.178 billion. The entire $53 million reduction from NASA's requested budget comes from completing the closure of the luka facility and will have no negative consequences on space shuttle operations. For mission support, another key component of shuttle operations, H.R. 2405 provides $2.1 billion, this is $108 million below the President's request. The administrator of NASA has said that this savings is achievable because of those who have taken advantage of buyouts offered by the agency. No additional reductions will be required to achieve this budget target. The bill includes language requested by NASA that enables NASA to explore the possibility of moving portions of the operation of the space shuttle under a single prime contract. As the Vice-Chairman of the Space Subcommittee I will closely monitor NASA's activities in this respect. I will not allow the safety of space shuttle operations to be compromised. I will make sure that any move to a single prime contract by the Clinton administration does not compromise the integrity of our space shuttle program. Finally, I am pleased that the bill includes provisions to strengthen commercial space endeavors. The bill expands the Commercial Space Launch Act to include the full range of space transportation activities. H.R. 2405 also takes significant steps in funding the development of the next reusable launch vehicle. These are very important steps in our Nation's future. The United States once held 100 percent of the world's commercial space launch market. Today, this has slipped to about 30 percent. The provisions in this bill relating to commercial space launches will help us regain a larger share of this expanding market. I want to thank Chairman Walker for his leadership in the areas of science, research and development, and space exploration. We must excel in these areas in order to continue pushing the envelop on advanced technology. This bill does this and at the same time cuts out the waste, inefficiencies, and inappropriate uses of scarce Federal dollars. H.R. 2405 is a targeted, well-focused bill. It ensures a brighter future for our children. I urge all Members of the Congress to support this bill.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin, the distinguished subcommittee chairman.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to make a couple of general comments. I am going to speak later during the discussion regarding NASA, but I have been listening this morning about how we do not want to cut, we do not want to cut, and every single time we had a bill come up on this floor where there is any reductions in spending, that is the theme, and that is why we have this tremendous problem. Mr. Chairman, we have got about a $5 trillion debt. We are going to spend $270 billion paying interest on the debt in 1996. Imagine how much we could spend on basic science research, on NASA, on other important seed corn programs, if we did not have to pay all this interest on the debt, and this minority, when it was the majority, was never able to make any of these tough decisions, and that is why they are the minority today, and, if we do not deal with this problem and make the tough decisions, as the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker], has done, then we are going to be bankrupt. Our children are going to inherit bankruptcy. Five trillion dollars of debt, $180,000 for every man, woman, and child; that is the problem we are dealing with. This bill preserves important programs. I support the bill.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time, and I rise in support of this rule and in support of H.R. 1601, the 7-year authorization of the international space station. We, here in Congress, are about the important work of the people's business, work like protecting and preserving Medicare for our senior citizens, balancing our budget and meaningful welfare reform that restores the value of hard work and family. But although those issues are very, very important, I know that those are not the issues that allow our children to dream about the future, and it is things like our space program, and I can say that not only from talking to my daughter and children in my district when I talk to them about our space program, but also I know that from experience because I one day as a young man was able to watch programs like Mercury and Apollo and dream someday of being a part of that, myself. This international space station program, I think, is the next logical step for our space program, and it is amazingly on budget and on time, which is truly a rarity for the institution that we work in. Each year, the Congress has consistently voted in support of our space station, and each year the numbers have grown and grown and grown. This year, as the distinguished gentlewoman from Ohio alluded to, the number was again very, very high, almost 2-to-1 voting in support of our space station. We now have before us a rule on a bill to authorize this so we no longer are getting in the process of redebating this over and over again. I think this is a good rule. It allows for amendments. It allows for open debate. I thoroughly support it. I think the MIR docking mission that my colleague from Utah was speaking of earlier clearly shows that the United States has the ability to proceed with this program. The question before us is: Do we have the will? From the previous votes in this body, it has been demonstrated that clearly the will is there, and I applaud my colleagues on the Committee on Science who have brought this final bill to the floor for a vote. I applaud my colleagues on the Committee on Rules on this rule. I encourage all of my colleagues to support the rule and support the final bill in passage.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Teamwork Act, and I would like to talk about a particular employee who is somebody who can benefit by this piece of legislation, a fellow by the name of Joe who worked for one of America's largest companies. It seemed one of their major customers was dissatisfied with the quality of the service and product that was sent to them and was threatening to switch vendors. The employee, Joe, was working in the manufacturing section of the company and it was discovered that Joe was responsible for 73 percent of the defects for his work crew and 50 percent for the entire department. Joe's defect rate was brought up to a team meeting, and the team agreed to support Joe completely and help him find ways of discovering defects earlier and faster. They also discovered a key reason for the high rate of Joe's defects was the amount of socialism between operators. The team was able to redesign the work area, and the result was they developed a quality ladder with five rungs depicting quality that team members may achieve, and Joe is now at the top of the ladder. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the TEAM Act and urge all my colleagues to support it.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the original TEAM Act language and in opposition to the proposal of the substitute offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Sawyer]. One of the things that has really hit home to me over recent years is things change. Things are always changing, and all aspects of our society are in a constant state of dynamic flux, and growth, and development, and one of those areas is in the area of employer-employee relations. The model of employer-employee relations that existed, that grew out of labor disputes that occurred in the 1930's in this country, is no longer applicable. We have competitors on the international scene today who do not have unions in their country, but have very, very robust work forces, and we have to, as a nation, evolve and develop methods of competing on that international landscape within the constraints of what our system is like here in the United States, and I think the original language of H.R. 743 meets that requirement in that it allows these teams to develop in the workplace that allow employees to get together, and set some standards and enable the operation that they are working in to be as efficient as possible, and I spoke on this floor this morning about a particular instance which I think is really a hallmark of how successful this can be, and I talked about a company, a major corporation in the United States, that had an employee that was accounting for 73 percent of the defects within their organization, and he was clearly the most affected one, and in the old model he probably would have been fired. But this company set up a team, and they developed ways to help him to be more efficient and to deal with the problem of the large number of defective products that he was producing in their operation, and the amazing end of the story is this guy ended up working with his employees and adjusting the work environment to ending up being their most successful employee in the organization, and it clearly shows that this act is worker-friendly, it helps our businesses to be as competitive and effective as they possibly can be, and it also, when we look at the case of Joe, how he was able to be the best that he could be. I think this is an act for the 1990's. It is the kind of legislation that we need to help us move into the next century and continue to be the world's most productive nation in the world, and with that I again reiterate my support for the original language.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the mistakes this body has made for a very long time is that they do not look at what is going on out there in the marketplace. They make a decision as to what they think would be best, and then try to force that decision on the marketplace. I know in my particular circumstances, in my district I have a very large employer that has a very long track record of having a very successful experience with teams. They have many different divisions and they have many different departments within each division. In most of these places they have teams. In some of the offices, the teams are actually elected, and some of them they are not, they are decided by acclamation. I think it would be a mistake for us to come along and say in this TEAM Act that you have to do it the way we think it is done best. In our legislation, we do not mandate it, and I personally believe it would be a mistake in this particular circumstance to make a change like this. I think the businesses that are working with this concept have devised a variety of different ways to make it work most successfully within the teams. The whole concept of this is that you get away from an adversarial environment where everybody is kind of coming together and everybody is giving their input into the process. Usually it is extremely democratic. If it is not, you do not get the level of satisfaction, the high level of satisfaction and the high level of morale that these teams have shown repeatedly in business after business that it works so well in. For us here in Washington to say no, no, no, you have got to do it a certain way, I think it would be in my opinion a real mistake. The teams that are working in the businesses in my district, it is very, very democratic. In some instances it is by election, in some instances it is the whole department working together as a team. So to have an election is kind of ludicrous, where everybody in the office is taking part in the decisionmaking process. So I respectfully rise in opposition to my good colleague's amendment, and I would encourage my colleagues to vote against the Moran amendment.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the point is basically this. In some of the teams it is everybody. So the point of having an election is unnecessary. In some of the teams it is by acclamation. To have the NLRB making sure that all of these teams are elected, considering how politicized the NLRB is, I think would be a very, very big mistake. We have businesses that are thriving using this technique. They are becoming more and more competitive. The business I am referring to would have had to have laid 1,000 people off, more than they ended up having to lay off because of the defense cutbacks, were it not for the fact they were able to dramatically expand their international sales. One of the ways they have been able to maintain a high level of productivity and efficiency is through the implementation of these team concepts. For us to interject another regulation and another level of Federal bureaucracy into the process I think would be a grave mistake. I understand the good gentleman's legitimate concern to make sure it is a Democratic process, but I respectfully rise in opposition.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I agree. You know how that would be enforced, through the NLRB.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I was very pleased to see that the series of amendments that I originally proposed to this bill were incorporated by the committee chairman into the manager's amendment. Essentially, my amendments try to achieve two very important goals: First, they ensure that parents will be involved in the design and implementation of the vocational education programs that will be developed with these funds. Second, the amendments made clear that States and localities, not the Federal Government, will decide which performance measures or certificates they will require in their career training programs. Research has clearly shown that parent participation improves all aspects of student performance. Discipline problems decrease, homework completion and quality improve, reading comprehension and time spent reading both increase. Furthermore, families are strengthened and parents develop closer relationships with their children and become more involved in their children's learning. Parent participation is particularly weak in secondary vocational education. The National Association of Vocational Education found that one-third of the sites preparing local plans under the Perkins Act did not meet with parents, not even once, leg alone built a continuing partnership with families and the community. I rise in support of the chairman's manager's amendment, which I think goes a long way to achieving these two very important goals of more parental involvement in the educational process, particularly in the area of vocational rehabilitation, as well as moving of the locus of power and authority more to the local level, where it is very much needed. I rise in support of this as well as in support of the entire bill.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the subcommittee Chair for recognizing me, and I thank him for the opportunity to speak out on this issue. Mr. Chairman, I went home to my district in August, like most of us did, and, hopefully like most of us, I very much enjoyed going back home. I not only enjoyed going back home to enjoy the beautiful beaches and weather of the space coast area of Florida, as well as the environment there, but I also very much enjoyed going back so I called hear from my constituents as to what I need to be doing up here in Washington. Indeed, I frequently find that I get some very, very good advice and very good input when I go back home, and this time was no exception. I went up to Kennedy Space Center to speak to the employees up there who have concerns about what is going to be happening in the future with NASA and what are the job prospects there. But I had a very, very pleasant surprise when I was up there at Kennedy. I was at the Orbital Processing Facility, the place where they take those shuttles and get them ready for the next flight. There are a lot of union employees there at the OFF, and I got some questions about the NASA budget and what is going to be happening in the future. But I also got a lot of questions from those union guys about Economically Targeted Investments, how they did not want their union pension funds being exploited for political purposes by the Clinton administration. They had a lot of concern about their hard-earned dollars being protected. I was very much pleased to be able to say that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Fawell], the subcommittee Chair, has a piece of legislation that will protect their hard-earned dollars, to make sure that when they are ready to retire, that the money is there for them, and that those funds have not been siphoned off for political purposes; that their hard-earned money has not been invested by the quiche- Chardonnay liberal crowd into what they think is the best thing to be done with their money, but that their money has been invested in the place where it should be, a place where their hard-earned dollars will be protected for the future of themselves and their families. Therefore, I rise in very, very strong support of this piece of legislation. [[Page H 8753]]

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the DeLauro amendment and speak in support of the Dornan amendment. Mr. Chairman, prior to coming here to the Congress I was practicing medicine in Florida, and prior to practicing medicine in Florida I was in the Army, in the Army Medical Corps. Indeed I was in the Army during the early years of the 1980's when Reagan administration policies went into effect where we were not allowed to provide abortion services in military facilities, and, as a physician, I can say that we like the policy. Most physicians do not like to get involved with the business of abortion, and that is because the vast majority of physicians become physicians because they want to be healers. They respect human life, and they recognize that performing abortion is a direct contradiction to that principle, a value that actually drew them into medicine. Indeed most physicians still take a Hippocratic Oath where they are asked to do no harm, but performing an abortion is a direct contradiction of that, as well as it is a direct contradiction of the very principle upon which our Nation was founded when Thomas Jefferson said that we are endowed by a Creator with inalienable rights to include the right to life. As a former Army physician, Mr. Chairman, I can tell my colleagues that we very much appreciated the support that we received from the Reagan administration in this area in that we did not have to involve ourselves. A significant percentage of the American people are very strongly opposed to abortion. They feel that it is morally wrong to use taxpayer funding, even if it is indirect, to support this practice I think is very wrong, and I rise in support of the gentleman from California's position and in opposition to the gentlewoman from Connecticut.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, during my campaign for the U.S. Congress last year I met a man who lived in my district. His name was Dave Exley, and he was a painter, and I got talking to Dave. I was interested in talking to him. I had an uncle, Joe Ditta, who raised a family of seven as a painter. I got to talking to him about his business and what it was like, and he got out something and gave it to me that I will never forget. It was a paint stirrer, and he told me that he had been using that same stirring stick to stir the paint for 5 years. Each time he would use it, he would wipe it carefully off, and he said he was saving himself about 5 cents a day by using that paint stirring stick over and over and over again, and he showed it to me, and he said something to me that I will never forget. He said, every time you think about spending money or raising taxes, I want you to remember me because I am trying to feed my wife and my two sons, and I have trouble making ends meet. At the end of the month I have trouble making sure I have got enough money to pay the mortgage and to pay the electric bill. That is a lot of what this debate is about. We are taking money out of the hands of a lot of hard working Americans, and we are spending it the way we see fit, on programs that we think are good, and I think this committee has worked very hard to analyze these programs and come up with what they think are some difficult decisions, but nonetheless are the appropriate decisions that need to be made in order to get us toward a balanced budget. We cannot keep spending money over and over again because we think it is the right thing to do. We have to have some real good hard objective measures. We have to make the difficult decisions because if we do not, let us face it, there will be no money for anything. We will be bankrupt. That is what has propelled us, the freshmen Republicans, into this body and led to the Republican majority this year, and why we are seriously changing the spending priorities of our Nation. The public knows that if we do not make a change there will be no money for anybody, and I think of Dave Exley, the painter, every time I am asked to vote on a spending decision, and, yes, the decisions are hard, but we are ready to make the hard decisions, and I think this bill is a good bill, it is a tough bill, it makes some tough decisions.

Mr. WELDON of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chairman, the ACGME is the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education. It is the body that makes the determination whether or not a residency program, be it in internal medicine or obstetrics and gynecology, is accredited. It has a tremendous amount of delegated power and authority because the Government of the United States has decided that it will not reimburse hospitals with tax dollars under the Medicare and Medicaid programs unless the residents serving those patients in that hospital are in an ACGME accredited program. Now, the abortion industry is facing a tremendous problem nationwide. It is called the graying of the industry. The abortion providers are all getting old. They have a serious problem with the shortage of providers. In steps the ACGME, and I will read to you the beginning part of what my colleague from Iowa left out. It says, ``Experience with induced abortions must be part of the residency.'' Yes, there is a conscience clause, but what will happen? The same thing that happened to me when I was a medical student. In the middle of the night, I did not know any better, so I went in the room and I saw it. I saw a 15-year-old girl be dragged in by her mother. She was in the late half of her second trimester. She was showing. She did not want the abortion, and her mother made her do it, a saline-induced abortion. And that is why I am pro-life. It was brutal and it was wrong and it should be illegal. And now we have got the ACGME stepping in here. Let me tell you what the Alan Guttmacher Institute says about this issue. Requiring residency programs to provide abortion training would convey the message that abortion is a core service within the ob-gyn specialty. Nobody wants to do it. I learned communism was wrong when I was a little kid because I saw on the TV that people were climbing over the walls in Berlin to get out, and I knew they were dying to get into the United States. They were voting with their feet. The doctors in this country have voted with their feet. They do not want to do this procedure and now we have the ACGME with the power of the Federal Government behind it stepping in and saying, you have got to train them. You have got to do it. Oppose the Ganske amendment. Support the language in the bill the way it is.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, last Sunday, July 23, readers of the Florida Today were treated to a classic case of misinformation by a newspaper that still has not gotten over the results of the 1994 election. The charges leveled against me in the newspaper's open letter with respect to the veteran's hospital and the space program are a gross distortion of facts. Regarding my efforts in support of the space program, the Congressional Record speaks louder than any words I could offer: Full funding for the space station; an actual increase in funding for the shuttle program; introduction of more stable, multiyear funding for space station; and an innovative, first-ever $10 million authorization in the NASA budget for investment in our Nation's developing spaceports Contrast this with the facts not reported by the Florida Today about my predecessor's record: He voted in each of his 4 years to fund the shuttle program below the President's budget request. This year the Republicans, including myself, voted to support the President's budget level for shuttle operations; less than 1 year ago, he voted to cut $400 million from the shuttle program--KSC derives two-thirds of their budget from this account; since 1992, my predecessor voted to reduce actual shuttle program dollars by $1 billion. This year Republicans are proposing to increase it. Selective reporting and journalism does little to foster a real debate on ideals and public policy and can seriously undermine morale at KSC. A July 20, Florida Today editorial, stated: ``Brevard county did pretty well in a congressional vote Tuesday on space and VA spending * * * veterans were relieved after the vote because U.S. Rep. Dave Weldon managed to salvage $17.2 million for a veterans clinic in Viera.'' I see this clinic as the first step in the process of keeping the VA hospital alive and so, apparently, did the Florida Today, until its turnabout in its open letter. So much for consistency. Florida Today mentioned being baffled these past 8 months. If by that they mean they are baffled about a vision for space that goes beyond today's paradigm of Government run programs; baffled as to why so many cherished liberal enclaves such as NEA, NEH, and countless ineffective Government programs are on a collision course with a fiscally responsible Congress; then being baffled is simply a euphemism for being desperate. Such desperate reporting takes place frequently inside the beltway. It's unfortunate to see it here in Brevard as well. I support our space program and our veterans. But balancing our budget is crucial if we are going to have funds for space and VA care in the future. In 1996 we will spend $270 billion in interest payments on the debt. Imagine the good we could do today if previous Congressmen had the will to make the tough decisions and act responsibly.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, prior to coming to this body, I was a practicing physician. So I used to see a lot of this stuff on a daily basis. I have to say this program was initiated with the intent of helping to deal with the terrible problem of unwanted pregnancies. The unwanted pregnancy rate has skyrocketed. The abortion rate has skyrocketed. Teenage pregnancy has skyrocketed. This is a dismal failure. I saw an amazing statistic yesterday: The U.S. people get more upset about wasteful government spending than they get upset about violent criminals being let out of jail prematurely. That is the thing that gets them more upset than anything else. Here we are today arguing about whether or not we should continue to fund a program that has been a dismal failure. The abortion rate is up. The teen pregnancy rate is up. The venereal disease rate is up. That is why this program was initiated, and it has not worked. Now we are asked today to continue its funding. I support the Smith-Livingston amendment. Oppose Greenwood.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the point being that we must continue to reach out to the Russian people and their leadership. As a Member of Congress, I pledge my efforts to reach out to members of their Duma. But we must also let them understand that we will not be shortsighted, that we will not allow blinders to be pulled over our eyes in terms of what is happening in their country. Mr. Speaker, it is not just talk or rhetoric that is important; it is the substance and actual extent of involvement of both countries in bringing about long-term peaceful relations. My own fear as a member of the Committee on National Security is that our two biggest security threats, as we approach the next century, involve terrorism throughout the world and in this country, and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. To that extent, we must understand what our threats are, what we can do about those threats and how we can work with our allies and countries like Russia to develop common defenses against those threats. Some in this body would have us believe that the Russians are no longer putting money into sophisticated weapons systems. Mr. Speaker, that is just not true. Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Record an article taken from the FBIS reports, which I scan on a daily basis. This article is taken from Moscow Kommersant-Daily, printed in Russian on July 20 of this year, entitled ``START II Treaty Ratification Seen Assured,'' and in it the author Aleksandr Koretskiy, goes through the determination that it is in Russia's best interest to ratify START II and, therefore, that will occur. What is interesting in the article, that we should be aware of, is that the Russians are still developing state-of-the-art military technology. A number of statements were made in the hearings, these are hearings among the Duma members, each of which, in fact, amounts to a sensation. First, Russia is developing, at the design stage so far, a new submarine missile cruiser. To all appearances, its technological performance will by far eclipse that of the American `Ohio' type subs which form the basis of the U.S. nuclear forces until the year 2020 at a minimum. In other words, Russia plans for more than one day ahead despite the unprecedented cuts in funds for military R&D. Second, a new missile for bombers is being developed which will make it possible to keep them effective also into the start of the next century at small cost. Work is in progress also in other fields. The point of this article is that Russia, while it has certainly cut back its funds for the military, is still developing state-of-the-art technologies, not just to match what America has, but to give them an edge, an edge that we have to be able to deal with through the turn of the century. Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the Record: START II Treaty Ratification Seen Assured [Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: ``START II Hearings. Cuts Are In Order Because There Are No Maintenance Funds''] [FBIS Translated Text] The ratification of the START II treaty (on further cutting and limiting strategic offensive weapons) will help Russia minimize the difference between its nuclear potential and that of the United States. As for Russia's counter-force potential, it will even grow 20 percent despite the cuts as a result of the implementation of START II owing to a marked decrease in the corresponding potential of the United States. Such is only the smaller part of the arguments by those who advocate the ratification of the treaty voiced in the course of the first open hearings in the Duma. The final conclusions on the feasibility and, perhaps, additional terms of ratification will be drawn in September--there will be separate hearings on the financial aspects of START II implementation. One can already today, however, say with confidence: despite the pessimistic forecasts of its opponents, the treaty will be ratified with no special problems by the current State Duma. The treaty was signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush in Moscow 3 January 1993. Many a lance has been broken since over the ratification problem both in Russia and the United States: some congressmen are sure that START II considerably lowers America's defense potential. A similar view, but as applied to Russia, is also voiced by a number of Russian deputies. The Russian politicians primarily doubt the feasibility of what is at first sight an abrupt change in the structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces: under the treaty, the sea-based component of Russia's nuclear forces should be upped from 30 percent to between 50 and 58 percent. And this should be done by cutting the number of ground-based missiles. Russia will in fact have to scrap the new generation SS-18 and SS-19 ground-based intercontinental missiles. Shifting the center of gravity to sea-based missiles can take place only in theory: 90 percent of the submarine missile cruisers were built before 1990, which implies that their service life will be up in the year 2015. Russia actually does not build new subs--their keels have been laid but construction has been halted by lack of funds. A relative stability will only prevail in strategic aviation--the fleet of Tu-95 MS and Tu-160 bombers will be cut under the treaty by as little as 24 bombers. By 1998, the Air Force is supposed to have not more than 113 planes whereas their number today is 137. and 53 of them are outside Russia (7 in Kazakhstan and 44 in Ukraine), for which reason no Russian planes should be scrapped. Incidentally, it came to light during the hearings that Moscow did not lose all interest in Ukrainian strategic aviation at all--the Russian Air Force is still counting on it. All the military strategy doubts of the politicians were dispelled by Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the General Staff. He thinks that by cutting the number of warheads to 3,500, START II facilitates the formation of a grouping of strategic offensive forces which is adequate to that of the United States. Indeed, reducing the number of warheads mounted on intercontinental missiles and submarine- based missiles does not call for remodeling or replacing the MRV [multiple reentry vehicle] platform and the destruction of the warheads removed from them, which gives potential advantages--this creates the danger of a quick increase in nuclear potential if the United States pulls out of the treaty. In this case, the United States will have more warheads than Russia by 55 percent. But this is still less than what it would have had under START I. This is to say, the United States is not getting a real edge, while Russia retains the effectiveness of its nuclear forces in retaliatory actions. As regards the change in the structure, Zhurbenko stated that it would have to be altered in any case--most ground- based missiles are at the end of their useful life. They are supposed to be replaced by new missiles which Russia does not have. More accurately, there is no base for building heavy missiles of the SS-18 and SS-19 type which are produced in the Ukrainian ``Yuzhmash.'' In principle, industrial cooperation could be arranged, but after Kiev joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this opportunity was lost. As a result, Russia is able today to produce on its own only one type of missile--the single warhead ``Topol,'' on whose basis its ground based forces will be developing. Plans call for production of two versions of this missile--one for the existing mobile missile systems, and the new ``Topol-M'' system. An important START II provision, the military thinks, is the fact that, in the number of warheads, the treaty brings U.S. nuclear forces down closer to a level which Russia is objectively capable of maintaining. The Russian military, one might say, dreamed of really counting in the warheads carried by bombers provided for by START II. The thing is that under START I, each Russian strategic bomber can carry 8 nuclear- tipped missiles (in reality this figure is 6), whereas a U.S. Air Force bomber can carry 10 missiles (in reality 20). Generally, the military and diplomats convinced the deputies: START II is almost manna as far as Russia is concerned. At any rate, Russia cannot afford forces that the USSR could have hardly maintained. The problem is not so much direct funding but also the industrial and technological base that ended up on the territory of independent CIS republics. when all is said and done, we should also take account of Russia's new geostrategic situation, different foreign policy priorities, and the development of military technology. Apropos of technology. A number of statements were made in the hearings, each of which, in fact, amounts to a sensation. First, Russia is developing (at the design stage so far) a new submarine missile cruiser. To all appearances, its technological performance will by far eclipse that of the American ``Ohio'' type subs which form the basis of the U.S. nuclear forces until the year 2020 at the minimum. In other words, Russia plans for more than one day ahead despite the unprecedented cuts in funds for military R&D. Second, a new missile for bombers is being developed which will make it possible to keep them effective also into the start of the next century at small cost. Work is in progress also in other fields. The deputies' reaction to the reports of military and independent experts and the nature of the questions asked make it possible to claim: the Duma is not only going to ratify START II, but it may also pass a special Russian strategic nuclear forces development program with corresponding funds. On the issue of a new superfighter, in a FBIS report summarizing a Moscow Interfax article, dated July 20 of this year, talking about the capabilities of the new Russian superfighter, and I will quote: ``The Sukhoy Design Bureau will exhibit its latest product, the superfighter Su-35, at the MAKS-95 Moscow air show in August,'' this month, ``the bureau's designer-general, Mikhail Siminov, told a solemn meeting on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Pavel Sukhoy's birthday. Siminov told Interfax that Su-35 was a dramatically modified version of the Su-27 jet. However, the new aircraft differed from the original by its exceptional maneuverability, adjustable thrust vector, new armament system to simultaneously destroy 6 ground and naval targets and artificial-intelligence computer.'' He goes on to say, ```In the West, such fighters do not yet exist,' Siminov said. `The only exception is the U.S.-made X-31, but no other analogues will appear within the next five years,' he added. ``If sufficient funds are set aside by the state, Russia's superfighter Su-27 and versions of it will occupy the first position in the world's arms market in the third millennium, Western experts say. ``At present, Russia's Air Forces have over 250 Su-27 fighters.'' Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the Record: Military, Nuclear & Space Issues Moscow, July 20.--The Sukhoy Design Bureau will exhibit its latest product, the superfighter Su-35, at the MAKS-95 Moscow air show in August, the bureau's designer-general, Mikhail Simonov, told a solemn meeting on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Pavel Sukhoy's birthday. Simonov told INTERFAX that Su-35 was a dramatically modified version of the well-known Su-27 jet. However, the new aircraft differed from the original by its exceptional maneuverability, adjustable thrust vector, new armament system to simultaneously destroy six ground and naval targets and artificial-intelligence computer. ``In the West such fighters do not yet exist,'' Simonov said. The only exception is the U.S.-made X-31, but no other analogues will appear within the next five years, he added. If sufficient funds are set aside by the state, Russia's superfighter Su-27 and versions of it will occupy the first position on the world's arms market in the third millennium, western experts say. At present, Russia's air forces have over 250 Su-27 fighters. Mr. Speaker, evidence that Russia is still continuing to develop state-of-the-art technology. Not just for its own protection, but perhaps more significantly to begin to sell these conventional arms to other nations that may not have the same peaceful intentions as Russia's current civilian leaders and we have. Mr. Speaker, we witnessed this past year the selling of three Russian submarines to Iran. We have witnessed efforts to sell technology to China. As a matter of fact, I was aghast when I read that we were, in fact, allowing proliferation to occur involving the Russians in countries where we could have imposed sanctions and yet had backed down on repeated occasions. Mr. Speaker, this is an issue that this body has got to deal with, an issue that we have got to confront. it is important for Members, as we get ready to debate the issue of defense appropriations levels for next year and the defense conference process that will unfold in the fall, that we understand what is happening, based on the facts. It is important that we understand proliferation that is occurring throughout the world, not just by Russia, but by other countries. China is a perfect example. The Clinton administration, Mr. Speaker, to my mind, seems incapable of employing a toughness in terms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A good example of that is China's sale of missiles and missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. Classified evidence of these sanctionable transactions have been on the books since the President's first day in office. What has been the President's response? First, the State Department tried to sanction China's missile maker, the Great Wall Industries, but not long after, withdrew those sanctions. Then United States officials claimed that they had secured Chinese pledges not to proliferate. Evidence of Chinese missile proliferation to Iran and Pakistan continued and was leaked in the press last month. This evidence continues to mount. So far this administration has taken no new action. And then there is Russia, Mr. Speaker. Here the administration lifted sanctions that were imposed by the Bush administration against Glavkosmos, a Russian firm that violated the MTCR, missile technology control regime, guidelines. It had exported sensitive upper-stage rocket technology to India's Indian Scientific Research Organization, including production and integration technology. This know-how could help India extend the range of its missiles to reach Bejing and improve Indian upper rocket stages in general. In exchange for Russian pledges to stop such technology transfers to India, the administration, in September 1993, offered Moscow hundreds of millions of dollars in space cooperation projects. Mr. Speaker, I am not saying that we should not cooperate, but we have got to set a tone of firmness. When countries, whether it be China or Russia, violate proliferation agreements and violate understandings that we have, this administration has got to be firm. That has not worked. What Clinton officials have chosen not to do about MTCR violations, however, is far less disturbing than what they recently announced that they are planning to do. That is to make MTCR members of the nations that are violating the regime. The Clinton administration hopes this will encourage problem proliferators to become part of the nonproliferation solution. In fact, I think it is shortsighted diplomatic public relations that will trivialize the MTCR and, worse, turn the regime into a major proliferation promotion organization. How is this possible? Simple. Both U.S. law and the missile technology control regime guidelines discourage U.S. exporters and other members of the MTCR against selling missile technology to non- MTCR members who have missile projects of concern or who have had a bad track record proliferating missile technology to other nations. Once these countries are made members of MTCR, which the Clinton administration proposes to do now, there is a legal presumption of approval for the very missile transfers that were previously barred, which means that once these countries are able to be a part of the MTCR, they can sell their missiles without any sanctions being available to the United States and other countries. Under U.S. law, a nation that becomes a member of the MTCR can no longer be sanctioned for importing the hardware or technology needed to complete dangerous rockets or missiles or export it to any MTCR member. What sort of nations might these be? Until the past few months, even the Clinton administration claimed that they included Brazil and Russia. Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record, with unanimous consent, articles where Brazil, in fact, has been working on the capability for rocket technology which they have purchased from Russia through the black market. And I will provide an article once again from the FBIS documents that Members can read. In addition, Brazil has made it known that they would like to have the capability that one of the most sophisticated Russian rockets offers in terms of a space launch capability. SS-25 is perhaps the most sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile that Russia has today. It has a range of 10,500 kilometers. It can hit any city in any part of America with that range. It is a mobile-launched system, launched off of the back of a mobile-launch tractor that can be moved around the country. Russia has somewhere less than a thousand of these launchers throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics. Each missile battery has the potential of launching three missiles, which currently have nuclear warheads on them. However, what Russia has been doing for the past 2 years is, it has been trying to sell a version, a modified version, of the SS-25 to any country that, in fact, would want to have a space launch capability. What problems does this present for us? Well, imagine, Mr. Speaker, a missile that has a range of 10,500 kilometers. Take the nuclear warhead off of that missile and modify it to become a space launch vehicle, and you can offer it for sale to anyone. Brazil has been very interested in acquiring this capability and, in fact, had a tentative deal worked out until the administration and Members of Congress, including myself, stepped up and said, ``We cannot allow this to go forward;'' and Brazil temporarily backed off. We understand Russia has had other discussions with other countries who would like to use this technology for space launch purposes. Now, you are not going to have a nuclear warhead on this missile, but, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about doing is giving other nations the capability that comes with a missile that has a range of 10,500 kilometers. Furthermore, if you believe what the Clinton administration tells us in terms of the current command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal, that all dissipates when you take the SS- 25, as modified, and you give it to a Russian profitmaking venture to market on the open market as a space launch vehicle. That is exactly what is happening today. In fact, several months ago, the world witnessed the first unsuccessful launch of an SS-25 modified rocket with an Israeli satellite on board from the Pozitiskiya Aerodrome. It was not successful, and the rocket and the satellite fell into the Sea of Okhotsk. The fact remains, Mr. Speaker, that Russia is aggressively trying to export this technology. Make no mistake about it, Mr. Speaker, I do not fear for the safety of our people from an all-out nuclear attack by Russia. That is not my concern. What I fear, Mr. Speaker, is the capability the Russians have with the SS-25 and the SS-18, which they are also currently trying to market for space launch purposes to a Third World rogue nation. You give any of the rogue nations of this world one of those missile launch systems, allow them then to put a conventional weapon on board, a conventional bomb or perhaps a chemical or biological weapon, and with the range of an SS-18 or an SS-25, our country and our people are under direct threat. Mr. Speaker, this is reality. This is not some hypothetical situation made up in some star wars movie. Mr. Speaker, this is what is occurring today inside of Russia as proliferation of these missiles is a top priority. As the Russians are looking for ways to bring in hard currency, they see one of the quickest ways as selling off this technology, like the SS-25 and the SS-18. Mr. Speaker, here is the real problem, besides the lack of attention and focus by the administration and the clear and consistent policy to call these acts when they occur, like the recent sale of rocket motors to China by the Garrett Engine Co., which are being used for fighter planes. But unless the administration takes some overt action this year, the technology will be transferred to China, which we think will allow them to increase the capability of their cruise missiles. This administration has remained silent on blocking that technology transfer. Again, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about, whether it is it is the SS-25, whether it is the SS-18, whether it is technology to help the Chinese improve their cruise missile capability, whether it is North Korea Taepo Dong-1 or -2, which has a range of 5,500 kilometers, which today could hit Guam or Alaska, Mr. Speaker, these are real situations that every Member of this body has to understand. No longer can this body vote in a vacuum. We must understand and recognize the facts as they are. The documents that I am placing in the Congressional Record today are factual statements by leaders in Russia, documented articles of situations occurring with China, North Korean developments in China. It will take only one of those systems to get in the hands of a rogue nation and then what do we do, Mr. Speaker? General O'Neill, who is the administration's point person on missile defense, has said repeatedly in our congressional hearings this year that if a nation acquires the capability of an SS-25 or SS-18, or perhaps even a Taepo Dong II with a range of 5,500 kilometers, we, as a country, have no defense against an accidental or deliberate launch of one vehicle. We have no system available today, with all the money we spend on defense, with all the money we spend on military every year, we have no system available today to protect the American people from such a launch. Mr. Speaker, to me that is outrageous, and to most of our colleagues in this body that is outrageous, and that is why this year, in our defense bills, we have plussed up missile defense accounts by about $900 million in the House. Hopefully, through the conference process, we will come somewhere in between what the Senate plussed up, about $600 or $700 million, and what we plussed up. We focused on four specific areas, Mr. Speaker. We focused on theater missile defense to give our troops protection when they are in a theater of operation against an incoming missile attack, like we saw in Desert Storm with the Scud. In the world today, 71 nations have cruise missiles, have the capability of attacking our soldiers and our allies. The only systems we have in place today are the upgrades of the Patriot, quickly becoming outmoded. We have funded theater missile defense to allow us to continue to develop and deploy the most sophisticated theater based systems that money can buy, and our funding does that in this year's defense bill. The second thing we did, Mr. Speaker, is we plussed up national missile defense spending. This will give us the eventual capability to protect the mainland of America against the kind of rogue launch that I talked about earlier. If a rogue nation were to get an SS-25 or an SS- 18, or if North Korea would sell off a version of the Taepo Dong II, that we would be able to protect our people in this country from a single launch. We would not be able to protect our country if a massive launch were to occur, but, by all practical standards, we do not think that will happen. No one can assure us, however, that a rogue nation will not get the capability of one, two, or three missiles, or, say, a battery of SS- 25's that could be threatened to be launched against an American city. Today we have no protection for that, Mr. Speaker. Not one iota of protection. Our plus-up in the national missile defense account allows for $400 million of increased funding that, even with this level of funding, will not allow us to deploy a program, in General O'Neill's estimation, until approximately 4 years. Four years of vulnerability. If the people of this country see what has been happening around the world with terrorism, and see what happens when rogue nations and people like Saddam Hussein get capabilities beyond their ability to manage, we then are threatened, and for 4 years, under the administration's plan, we will have no protection, Mr. Speaker. The third area that we plussed up funding was for a program called Brilliant Eyes. Brilliant Eyes is a space-based sensor program that will allow us to see a missile when it is launched. We do not have that capability today. If a rogue country launches a missile, and the ultimate destination is America, today we do not have a system in space that can tell us that launch has occurred. Why is that important? It is important because it gives us more time to take that missile out once it is launched, and to take it out on the rise as opposed to on the descent. We plus-up the Brilliant Eyes program to give us that technical capability. The fourth thing we do in both the authorization and the appropriation bills is we plus-up funding for ballistic missiles by about $75 million so that we can enhance our ability to protect our troops and our country against the very real threat of ballistic missiles that dominate the world today. I mentioned, Mr. Speaker, 77 countries today have cruise missile capability. Seventy-seven countries. Twenty nations can build and are building cruise missiles today. Granted, some are very crude, like the Scud system that we saw used by Iraq over in Desert Storm, but, Mr. Speaker, some of them are extremely sophisticated and present real challenges to us from a defensive posture. Mr. Speaker, all the more reason why we have to focus on the threat that is out there and what is happening in these rogue nations. We have to understand that when we make a decision as to how much money we are going to spend on defense or on missile defense or missile proliferation activities that it must be based on sound scientific evidence. Mr. Speaker, another article I want to submit for the Record is a recent publication appearing in the Brooking Review written by Bruce Blair entitled ``Lengthening the Fuse'', and, by the way, Mr. Blair has been a witness at hearings, primarily brought in by Democrats to testify on missile proliferation issues. This article is must reading for every member of this body, because Mr. Blair now makes the case that from the standpoint of operational safety, Russian's nuclear posture today is more dangerous than it was during the cold war. He goes through the scenario of the possibilities for nuclear anarchy, from unauthorized use of weapons by rebellious commanders in the field, to political breakdown in Moscow, to a spread of nuclear weaponry and material on the global black-market. Mr. Speaker, another article I will submit for publication in the Record today is an article within the Russian news media focusing on the problems of the control of the nuclear arsenal and the lack of adequate dollars to fund those military personnel who are monitoring on-site the Russian nuclear arsenal. In that article there is discussion about the fact that you can have all the safeguards you want from a technology standpoint, but if the men and women who are monitoring those systems are not being paid, if they do have the quality of life issues that are important to them, the technical considerations go out the window, and that is the kind of threat that we have to fully assess. Mr. Blair goes through that in great detail, and some of the quotes in here are the kinds of quotes that Members have to look at and understand, because they are critical to our posture in terms of defending our people in this country against what could happen in the former soviet Union. Let me quote just one piece from this article. ``The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the dangers emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of control the central problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the specter of nuclear anarchy in the former Soviet Union animates U.S. policy toward Russia.'' He goes on to say, and I quote, ``The specter of a catastrophic failure of nuclear command and control looms even larger.'' Mr. Speaker, this is not some radical right wing conservation bashing the former Soviet Union. This is a respected individual who has studied the issue of command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. In fact, he goes on to say in his article that the Pentagon itself has conducted exercises to practice United States responses to nuclear anarchy in Russian, including scenarios that feature illicit strategic sites by Russian commanders. Can you imagine that, Mr. Speaker? We now have evidence that our own Pentagon leaders have done practice sessions that, in fact, would have us assume that nuclear anarchy has broken out in Russia and that perhaps the American mainland is at threat. That is being done, Mr. Speaker, at a time where we have no capability to defend our mainland against a nuclear attack, either isolated or perhaps a multiweapon or multilaunched nuclear attack. Another quote from Mr. Blair. ``From the standpoint of operational safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today then it was during the Cold ``War.'' Again a quote. ``The Pentagon has so internalized deterrence as the essence of its mission that it simply cannot bring the two different conceptions of nuclear threat, the risk of deliberate attack and the danger of loss of control, into clear focus and perspective.'' Another quote. ``If safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear planning, it will be because public discussion and broad public support, not the Pentagon, put it there.'' Mr. Speaker, Bruce Blair has hit the nail on the head. We are not doing an adequate job of monitoring what is happening and what could happen in the former Soviet republics. Some would argue all is well. Perhaps I will submit another article for the Record with unanimous consent again, Mr. Speaker, that talks about what has recently happened in Belarus. Belarus, Mr. Speaker, is one of those former Soviet republics that happens to have nuclear weapon capability. Just in July of this year less than 1 month ago, what did the President of Belarus say about his country's agreement to put all the SS-25's back into Russia? There are 18 remaining in Belarus. He said, and this article was printed on July 6, 1995, in Moscow's Izvestiya, in Russia, he said, and this is Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the President of Belarus, that he had made a decision to stop the movement of the SS-25's back to Russia; that he was going to leave the remaining 18 SS-25's in Belarus. He stated the reasons, which are in the article, which I will put in the Record, are twofold: First of all, it harms the national prestige of Belarus to give up the remaining parts of their nuclear arsenal; and, second, one day Russia and Belarus will be united again. Now, Mr. Speaker, this is not me talking, this is the President of Belarus. I asked our State Department if we had gotten any clarification to this statement made by President Lukashenka of Belarus. They told me verbally we had; that he had denied that statement was made, even though it was printed both in Izvestiya and as well as on Moscow TV. To this date, Mr. Speaker, I have not had any statement from the State Department to refute the statement from the State Department to refute the statement by Mr. Lukashenka in terms of not complying with the agreed terms that Russia, Belarus, the United States, and the other former Soviet republics entered into to return those SS-25's back to Russia for dismantlement. Mr. Speaker, the problem continues. My bottom line concern is that the intelligence community is not giving us the full scoop and the full picture. I do not say this lightly, Mr. Speaker; and, in fact, in September of this year, we will have a full hearing on the command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. However, Mr. Speaker, we are also going to have something else in that hearing. We are going to look at what has been the posture of our intelligence community in bringing to the Members of Congress and to the American public the threat that exists. Mr. Speaker, we in this body need to base our decisions on fact. I am not an alarmist. I am not here to demagogue this issue. I am not here to call the Russian people an evil empire, because they are not. As I started my comments tonight, I am one who has devoted a significant amount of my personal time to building relations inside of Russia. I will match my efforts in those categories with any Member of this body in the area of Russian joint energy ventures, environmental cooperation, defense cooperation, economic cooperation, and I will continue that as I did on the House floor when I sided with the ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. Obey and the chairman of that committee, Mr. Livingston, in fighting back an effort to decrease Russian aid because of the importance of stabilizing their economy. However, Mr. Speaker, We cannot allow anyone to dumb down our intelligence. We cannot allow anyone to pull the cloud over our eyes to the extent that we do not know really what is happening. That would be the worst travesty that could be brought on this body, to have any administration, or the intelligence community, dumb down information that is important for us as we determine how much money to spend on the defense of the people of this country. We should not, Mr. Speaker, ever have any intelligence body think that they have to answer politically to some broader agenda of the administration of supporting the current Russian leadership. I support Boris Yeltsin. I support whoever the Russian people decide to have as their elected President. However, Mr. Speaker, we should never allow our support for the elected President of that country to downplay our understanding of the real threats that are there. That is my concern, Mr. Speaker. It is a concern that I think every American and every Member of this body has to understand and appreciate. General O'Neill came in before our subcommittee earlier this year and he said, ``Congressman, I am not satisfied with our intelligence assessment of the threat coming from Russia and other countries around the world in terms of nuclear proliferation, so I went to the intelligence community and I asked them to give me a new assessment, and that assessment is going to be published by the middle of June.'' Mr. Speaker, the middle of June came, and then the end of June came, July 1 came, the middle of July, and yesterday July ended, and now this is August 1. Mr. Speaker, we still have not gotten the upgraded intelligence assessment that General O'Neill asked for so that we can logically base our threat needs on what is out there. Mr. Speaker, that is an outrage. The intelligence community has got to get its act together. They have got to give us the focus. They have got to give us the real facts, not sensationalized numbers, the real facts in terms of what is occurring. And they have got to give us real assessments about whether or not there is a potential for a nuclear anarchy, as Mr. Blair stated in his article. Mr. Speaker, these issues go to the very core of what our Federal Government is all about, because in the end the primary purpose of a Federal Government is to protect and defend the American people, to protect and defend the American people from what I think are the two biggest threats that we are going to face in the next century: Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially missiles and nuclear missiles. Mr. Speaker, this is the first in what will be a series of discussions that we have to have in this body, and they will be based on fact. They will be based on articles published in Russian news media, reported in reports that every Member of Congress can get access to, and reported by other foundations and groups that are out there every day giving us the summaries of what is being said and what is occurring throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics. It is extremely important, Mr. Speaker, as we approach our debate tomorrow, as we approach the conference process, the ultimate debate on the ABM Treaty, that we have good intelligence, that has not been filtered, has not been whitewashed, has not been dumbed down, so that we can make intelligent decisions that in the end will allow us to protect the American people, because that is what our job is all about, protecting the American people. I hope my concerns will be shared by my colleagues in this body, and by the general public, who has to understand that today we have no protection in these areas. That is a shortcoming we are going to try to address in this budget process, which will hit the House floor tomorrow. Mr. Speaker, I will put into the Record the items I highlighted during my comments. [From the Brookings Review, Summer 1995] Lengthening the Fuse (By Bruce G. Blair) During the Cold War a massive array of opposing Soviet and U.S. nuclear forces stood ready for launch on a moment's notice. In accord with the perceived needs of deterrence, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were scattered around the globe, carried by a host of ground, sea, and airborne delivery systems, and primed to inflict instant apocalyptic devastation in retaliation against any nuclear aggressor. Today, the ideological tensions of the Cold War have dissolved, the urgency of the need for deterrence has diminished, and the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals are smaller. Yet thousands of warheads on both sides remain on hair-trigger alert. And, by a bitter irony, the geopolitical revolution that defused the Cold War confrontation has posed a chilling new nuclear danger--loss of control. In an atmosphere of political turbulence and economic duress, Russia must now oversee the far-flung nuclear weaponry of the Soviet Union, much of it still ready for instant launch. The possibilities for nuclear anarchy are many--from unauthorized use of weapons by rebellious commanders in the field, to political breakdown in Moscow, to a spread of nuclear weaponry and material onto the global black market. But dangerous as these scenarios are, an effective and realistic solution exists: an international agreement to take all nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert, remove warheads or other vital components from the weapons delivery systems, and institute monitoring arrangements to verify compliance. Such an agreement would drastically reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure of nuclear control. But it would also require nuclear planners to back away from their traditional focus on deterrence--and to make a commitment to safety instead. safety always came second The vast nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers during the Cold War were a product, of course, of deep political and ideological antagonisms. But they were also a product of the adversaries' commitment to deterrence, their faith that rational decisionmakers would refrain from striking first if they knew an opponent could retaliate with devastating effect. War was to be prevented by ensuring that each of the opposing forces was capable of retaliation destructive enough and credible enough to override any potential gain from striking first. The two defense establishments deployed forces capable of retaliating against tens of thousands of enemy targets--and to do so in the moments between enemy missile lift-off and arrival. In all this, deterrence came first. Safety came second. Not that safety's importance was lost on the rival strategic organizations. After all, neither would likely have survived the political repercussions of a major failure in safety. Much of their mundane activity revolved around safety during peacetime. They strove to prevent the accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized detonation of even a single weapon. Nuclear weapons received continuous scrutiny, augmented on occasion by high-level special investigations, to identify safety hazards and remedies. Both sides evolved sophisticated weapon design principles and operational procedures to preserve effective control. On the essential point--nuclear detonation--the record was perfect. On lesser but still critical points--notably, nuclear accidents resulting in the dispersal of toxic plutonium--it was nearly perfect. That deterrence took precedence over safety is nonetheless demonstrable. If safety had been a governing influence at the planning level, the strategic deployments would not have been so large, so dispersed, and so geared to rapid use. At the design and daily operational level, too, trade-offs between safety and deterrence were regularly resolved in favor of deterrence. For example, locks to prevent low-level U.S. weapons commanders from firing strategic forces were not installed on heavy bombers until the early 1970s, on intercontinental ballistic missiles until the late 1970s. And they were installed only after a finding that they would not impede the wartime retaliatory mission. They were never installed on ballistic missile submarines because of fears that they would jeopardize the ability of submarine crews to carry out authorized launches. And although the missile propellants used in Trident and M-X missiles, as well as the conventional explosives used in Trident warheads, are relatively susceptible to accidental detonation, safety requirements were waived for the sake of wartime performance. Changing Perspectives Despite history's abrupt change of course with the end of the Cold War, the established practice of deterrence, with all its inherent danger, remains unchanged. Despite the rollback of the nuclear arsenals set in motion by the Strategic Arms Reduction treaties, nuclear policy and force deployment on both sides are still directed toward deterring deliberate attack. The nuclear confrontation is thus being sustained by a dubious rationale that sustains hair-trigger postures that undercut safety. In key respects both the U.S. and Russian nuclear portfolios are actually being enlarged. Russia, for example, has dropped nuclear ``no-first-use'' policy from its new military doctrine and expanded the role of nuclear forces to compensate for the sharp decline in its conventional strength. The United States also appears reluctant to lower further its nuclear profile, despite the evaporation of the primary threat justifying nuclear vigilance during the Cold War: Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The United States now projects conventional superiority over all prospective adversaries and thus can rely more on conventional and less on nuclear forces. Accordingly, further reciprocal nuclear reductions would be beneficial. Yet the U.S. security establishment seems content with the numbers allowed under START II and shows little interest in another round of reductions. Prompting that reluctance are fears that Russia may revert to authoritarian rule and revive nuclear hostility toward the West. Despite the grim outlook for the rejuvenation of Russia's economy and the projected steep decline in its defense spending for the next decade or more, uncertainty about the Kremlin's attitudes toward the outside world has assumed critical importance in U.S. estimations of the future nuclear threat and in planning U.S. nuclear posture through at least 2005. The Pentagon strongly supports the traditional U.S. strategic mission as an insurance policy. As Defense Secretary William Perry put it in the 1994 Defense Department annual report, ``these Cold War tools of nuclear deterrence remain necessary to hedge against a resurgent Russian threat.'' U.S. nuclear planners also envisage new missions tied loosely to contingencies in the third world. Although the Pentagon plans to use conventional weapons in dealing with weapons of mass destruction brandished by third-world states, U.S. nuclear forces will doubtless play a major retaliatory and deterrent role. The U.S. Air Force is identifying targets in third-world nations that are developing weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, and nuclear. And the U.S. Strategic Command has assumed major responsibility for planning both nuclear and nonnuclear strikes against these targets, whose numbers could easily reach many hundreds and might approach a thousand. China will also figure more prominently in the global strategic balance as it modernizes its ballistic missile forces. Any significant increase in the nuclear threat China projects at the United States may well prompt a review of U.S. nuclear planning, particularly the decision in the early 1980s to remove China from the U.S. strategic war plan. Like the United States and Russia, other charter nuclear states are also disposed to invoke deterrence to justify aggressive alert operations. Britain and France seem committed to maintain a large portion of their nuclear forces on active alert, while China's extensive program of strategic modernization could bring its ballistic missile forces to a comparable level of combat readiness. Other states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel appear heading down the same path. In spite of strenuous international efforts to deny membership in the nuclear club, de facto and aspiring members not only have nuclear weapons programs but also surely have plans if not current capabilities for ``weaponization''--mating nuclear warheads with dispersed delivery vehicles capable of rapid use. Intentions and technical progress are difficult to gauge, but the general picture is clear enough and does not bode well. The proliferation of advanced aircraft and ballistic missiles with increasing range and accuracy certainly expands delivery options. In the name of deterrence, emerging nuclear states can be expected to equip, or prepare to equip quickly, these delivery systems with nuclear weapons from their stockpile. And the decision by the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France to preserve rapid reaction postures sets an international standard that encourages emulation. Moreover, if the history of the nuclear superpowers is a reliable guide, and the classical dilemmas of nuclear security come to bear strongly on regional dynamics, regional rivals will be induced to shorten the fuses on their arsenals. Absent effective international constraints, the standards for daily combat readiness seem destined to rise. safety first? There can no longer be any justification for putting operational safety second. Not only is deterring a deliberate nuclear attack a less demanding challenge today than it was during the Cold War; ensuring safety has become more demanding. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the dangers emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of control the central problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the specter of nuclear anarchy in the former Soviet Union animates U.S. policy toward Russia and drives U.S. support for the Yeltsin government and Russia's fledgling democratic institutions. Nor are weaknesses in nuclear control confined to the former Soviet Union. Lacking sophisticated systems for safety managing their arsenals, the aspiring nuclear weapon states also face problems of control. And while deliberate nuclear aggression growing out of regional tensions in areas like South Asia, the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, and other potential hot spots is conceivable, the specter of a catastrophic failure of nuclear command and control looms even larger. If safety is to become the paramount goal of nuclear security policy, the operational stance of the world's nuclear forces--in particular, their high combat readiness-- will have to change. The major defense establishments must lower their alert levels and coax the rest of the world to follow suit. To de-alert the bomber forces, bomber payloads would be moved to storage facilities far away from the bombers' home bases. The retrieval and uploading of the payloads would require elaborate, time-consuming, and observable procedures. Similarly, warheads (or other vital components such as guidance sets) would be removed from land-based missiles and put in storage--a standard Soviet practice for all land-based strategic forces until the late 1960s. Although warheads could also be removed from ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), an attractive alternative is to take guidance sets off the sea-based missiles and place them in storage on board attack submarines (SSNs) deployed at sea. Under routine practices, the components would remain separated at all times and invulnerable to attack. If necessary during a nuclear crisis, the SSBNs and SSNs could rendezvous and quickly transfer the guidance sets. The SSBNs could then install the components on all missiles in about 24 hours. We should strive to further lengthen the fuse on all nuclear forces, extending the time needed to bring them to launch-ready status to weeks, months, and ultimately years. Taking all nuclear weapons off alert--adopting a stance of universal ``zero alert'' in which no weapons were poised for immediate launch--would not only create a strict international standard of safety for daily alert, but also ease nuclear tensions by removing the threat of sudden deliberate attack. Certainly, a surprise or short-notice nuclear strike by any of the major nuclear powers is already implausible. But because all of them except China can mount a strike with ease, their strategic nuclear forces, particularly those of the United States and Russia, maintain a daily posture of rapid reaction to deter it. A remote, hypothetical scenario thus induces alert operations that feed on themselves. Although designed only to deter, the operations confer the ability either to strike back in retaliation or to initiate a sudden attack. The opposing forces create and perpetuate the very threat they seek to thwart. In fact, an internationally monitored agreement to remove all nuclear weapons from active alert status could serve much the same purpose as traditional deterrence. Any initial preparations to restore alert status prior to attack would be detected and disclosed by monitors, allowing for counterbalancing responses, thereby denying a decisive preemptive advantage to any side contemplating redeployment and sneak attack. Zero alert would thus eliminate the technical pretext for sustaining tense nuclear vigils in the post-Cold War era. Besides improving safety, it would relax the nuclear stances, bringing them into harmony with improved political relations. overcoming inertia Left to themselves, the nuclear establishments will never adopt a zero alert posture. The bureaucracies that created the standard practices of deterrence cannot be expected to put safety before deterrence. Typical arms negotiations, for example, have little scope for reining in aggressive alert practices. Even with the low ceilings on strategic nuclear arsenals imposed by START II at the turn of the century, the nuclear superpowers could still keep thousands of warheads poised for immediate release. The nuclear control systems that regulate force operations are still generally peripheral to mainstream arms control. If arms control were to proceed as usual, the numbers of weapons would continue to drop, but their reaction time would not change. The last weapon in the arsenal would still be cocked on hair-trigger alert. The U.S. defense establishment is aware of the danger of nuclear anarchy. Recognizing the unstable and transitional character of the Russian political center, the Pentagon has quietly initiated extensive military-to-military contacts to nurture durable cooperation between the U.S. and Russian military establishments. It has also conducted exercises to practice U.S. responses to nuclear anarchy in Russia, including scenarios that feature illicit strategic strikes by Russian commanders. Furthermore, U.S. strategic war planners are devising options that allow selective nuclear strikes against breakaway units of the Russian nuclear forces as a last resort to neutralize such units. The Pentagon is also spearheading an effort to assist Russia in dismantling its nuclear arms, an endeavor it portrays as an urgent priority of U.S. national security. Taken to its logical conclusion, this policy thrust would lead the Pentagon to make bold operational changes, including some form of zero alert, to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Yet the Pentagon's overriding commitment remains deterring Russian nuclear aggression. The review of the U.S. nuclear posture completed last September exemplifies the Pentagon's parochial perspective. The review advocates aggressive hedging against a turn for the worse in U.S.-Russian relations. It ignores the safety hazards that persist or grow as a result of aggressive hedging. It advances a U.S. nuclear force structure and operational posture that will reinforce Russia's reliance on quick launch. From the standpoint of operational safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today than it was during the Cold War. And current U.S. nuclear planning will likely induce Russia to take yet more operational risks to buttress deterrence. The Pentagon has so internalized deterrence as the essence of its mission that it simply cannot bring the two different conceptions of nuclear threat--the risk of deliberate attack and the danger of loss of control--into clear focus and perspective. At the height of the Cold War nuclear planners could argue, with some justification, that the danger of deliberate attack necessitated putting safety second. Today they cannot. Redirecting nuclear policy toward an emphasis on safety not only addresses the danger of nuclear anarchy but would also constrain the ability of any state to launch a sudden nuclear attack. But if safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear planning, it will be because public discussion and broad public support--not the Pentagon--put it there. [Russia National Affairs] Military, Nuclear & Space Issues Grachev Urges Yeltsin To Rectify Finance Problems [Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by unidenitifed correspondent; place and date not given; from the ``I Serve Russia'' progam--recorded] [FBIS Translated Text] [Grachev] In the first half of the financial year the situation is such that for the month of June we were, for the first time this year, unable to finance the personnel of the Army and the Navy. We were able to meet only forty percent of the allowance for servicemean and wages for blue and white-collar workers. We were practically totally unable to finance the military complex enterprises. Food, fuel, and lubricating materials have been financed to a very small extent. The president, therefore, as they say, ought to enter the battle now, and this active efforts we will try to rectify this problem.

Mr. WELDON of Florida

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I come before the House tonight with a tremendous amount of concern in that, as we are here tonight, a hurricane is bearing down on central Florida. In particular, Mr. Speaker, the eye of the hurricane is heading towards Vero Beach City in my district, and I would just ask that all Members would lift up the people of the State of Florida, as well as the people of my district, in prayer, that there would be no loss of life in this hurricane as it hits our Nation, and that our emergency personnel in the area, Federal and State, would be able to deal with any of the problems that arise in this crisis, and I ask that the whole body would remember our district now as we are being faced with this crisis.