Curt Weldon

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. This one sounds close here. The voluntary repatriation of refugees in Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And ours says, recognizes the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, including wide autonomy for Kosovo, a multi- ethnic population, and treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with international norms.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. We just did not use that fancy Rambouillet word, but the content of what we said is identical to what is in number six.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And we said, supports efforts to provide international assistance to rebuild destroyed refugee homes and other humanitarian assistance to victims in Kosovo.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, earlier today we had a member of the Russian Duma who held a press conference in this building; and he said something that is very insightful. He said that for years and years and decades and decades the Soviet Communist party has spent billions of dollars to convince the Russian people that America should be the enemy, and it did not work in spite of all the effort of the Communist party. He went on to say that in 45 days President Clinton has done what the Soviet Communist party could not do, he has turned the Russian people against America. Our embassy now tells Americans to not speak in English when they walk the streets. The Russians have cut off all contact with America. In 45 days this President has done what the Soviet Communist party could not do with billions of dollars in 70 years. Is this the kind of activity, is the continuation of this insane and reckless policy worth driving Russia into the hands of the ultranationalists and the Communists? I say no.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague for yielding to me, and I thank him for his efforts on behalf of the understanding of the situation in Kosovo. I would add that I think I have some pretty provocative answers to the questions he raised, and I think we have good news on the horizon, perhaps as soon as the coming days, if not tomorrow. Let me first of all start out, Mr. Speaker, by saying that we have been calling for Russia's involvement in the Balkan crisis in Kosovo for about 5 weeks. It was 5 weeks ago that I was first approached by Russian leaders from the Duma who asked me to open new channels with the administration to see if we could find some common ground for a solution to this crisis. I got information from them, I started working with the National Security Council, the White House, Leon Fuerth's office, the State Department, as well as Democrat Members of Congress so that no one could say we were doing something in a partisan way. Those discussions and faxes went back and forth for about 3 weeks, and they culminated 2 weeks ago in a request by the Russians for me to bring a delegation to Budapest and then to travel down to Belgrade to jointly meet with Milosevic to convince him that he should, in fact, come to terms with the requirements that NATO has laid down. I asked the Russians to put that request in writing, Mr. Speaker. They did that. I asked them to meet five specific requests that I had. The first was to put the request in writing for us to be involved, the second was to identify the Russian leadership that would be involved in discussions with us. The third was to give me a date and time certain for a meeting with Milosevic. The fourth was to meet with our POWs. We had not met with them yet. And the fifth was to travel with me to a refugee camp where they could see the devastation caused by Milosevic. The Russians agreed to all five points. They put it in writing. We then went to the State Department, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Steny Hoyer) and I, a week ago this past Thursday. We met for an hour and a half with Strobe Talbott. We explained the opportunity. We said we were prepared to take a bipartisan delegation to Budapest and then down to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. The State Department said, please don't go. We were rebuffed by the State Department, but they did open the door for us to meet in a neutral city with the leadership of the Russian Duma. With that being said, over the weekend I continued discussions with the Russians and suggested that they pick a city and that on Friday of last week we meet in that city and discuss the issue to see if we could find common ground. The Russians decided that Vienna would be that city. I sent a letter to all 435 Members of the House a week ago Monday outlining in three pages what we had done, and I invited Members to join with us. Eleven Members came forward, 6 Republicans and 5 Democrats, from liberals like the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Bernard Sanders) to conservatives like the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Joseph Pitts) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Roscoe Bartlett). The 11 of us left on Thursday night, Mr. Speaker, and we traveled all night by air. We arrived in Vienna on Friday morning. We immediately went into meetings with the President of the Austrian Parliament to get a feel for what he thought should occur as an independent nation. And then, Mr. Speaker, we started meeting with the Russians. We started in the afternoon, went into the evening, continued over dinner, and came back Saturday morning. And during our discussions with the Russian leadership, which included the broad basis of Russia's political spectrum, Russia has 7 major political parties and 90 percent of those political factions were represented in our discussions. The leader was Vladimir Ryshkov, who was the First Deputy Speaker and Chairman of Chernomyrdin's party. He was in direct contact with Victor Chernomyrdin throughout our discussion. We had Vladimir Luhkin, the former Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., who represents the Yabloko faction. We also had the third ranking Communist in the State Duma, Alexander Shapanov, representing Seleznyov and the Communists, as well as the region and Agrarian members of the Duma. Ninety percent of the leadership in Russia's political spectrum was represented in our discussions with the 11 Members of Congress. But also, Mr. Speaker, we had two Serbs there. We had the largest financial contributor to Milosevic, who sat through our meetings as an adviser to the Russians in our discussions. Dragomir Karic, whose family, in fact, owns a significant amount of business interests in both Serbia and Russia sat through the meetings and kept in phone contact with Milosevic himself. Now, Mr. Speaker, these meetings were not to negotiate. Our purpose in going to Vienna was to see if we could find common ground on which negotiation could take place. We prepared a document and went through that document line by line. During the time of going through that document, Mr. Speaker, both the representative of Milosevic and the Russians were asking our delegation to travel to Belgrade, because they thought there was an opportunity for us to bring at least one of the POWs out, perhaps two of the POWs, as well as to meet with Milosevic and to get him to accept the report that we were working on. Mr. Speaker, at 1 o'clock on Saturday, this past Saturday, we reached agreement with the Russians; an historical agreement. The Russians agreed to a multinational peacekeeping force that had weapons. The Russians agreed to have Milosevic remove the Serbs from Kosovo. The Russians agreed that we use the term ethnic cleansing. And even though the Russians agreed, and we still did not have the support of Milosevic, they took the document we signed and faxed it to Milosevic at 1:30 on Saturday afternoon. Milosevic responded if we were to go to Belgrade he would publicly embrace the framework of our agreement and would, in fact, support what we and the Russians came up with. We then called the State Department. I talked to the head of NIS Affairs, Russian Affairs, Steve Sestanovich, told him about the offer that was being made to us, he had Tom Pickering, the Under Secretary of State, call me back. I read our document to each of them. Pickering told me that he did not think it was advisable that we go to Belgrade, even though I told him that Milosevic's representative and the Russians were telling us that if we went we would bring out all three of our POWs; and if we went, Milosevic would publicly embrace the document that we had agreed to. Mr. Speaker, that was 2 p.m. on Saturday. When we told the Russians and Milosevic's rep that we could not go because our government did not trust Milosevic, and after one of our Democrat Members had talked to Podesta in the White House, I told the Russians and I told the representative of Milosevic that we would not travel to Belgrade. That was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker. In fact, in that telephone conversation from Pickering, he said this to me: ``Why do you think that Milosevic would be open and candid with you and live up to what he is telling you about giving you the three POWs and agreeing to the document that you have in fact signed with the Russians?'' He said, ``After all, there have been other attempts to free the hostages. In fact, the mission being held by Jesse Jackson right now has been a failure. Milosevic has decided he will not give the POWs to Jesse Jackson's mission.'' That was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker. We told them we would not go. And 2\1/2\ hours later the Milosevic government announced on CNN that they would release the hostages to the Jackson delegation within a matter of 3 or 4 hours. Mr. Speaker, those are the facts and the time lines. We have reached agreement with Russia, and that agreement with Russia is very close to what Milosevic will accept. Now we must push this document, as we are doing. We sent copies to the Pope, the head of the Muslim faith, the head of the Orthodox religion, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, the parliamentary leaders of every other country, as well as Ukraine and Russia, and tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, there will be an announcement. The announcement that I predict will occur tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, is that Russia and NATO will announce that they have reached agreement on a multinational force; the beginning of the end of the conflict, partly because of the work of this Congress and people like my colleague and people on the other side like the gentleman who is going to speak next, who have been talking about the need to end this bombing, to end this hostility that is causing us problems with Russia and look for a way to solve this crisis peacefully. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Congressional Record the document signed by the members of the Russian Duma and by the Members of Congress who were in attendance at the meetings I referred to earlier. Report of the Meetings of the U.S. Congress and Russian Duma, Vienna, Austria, 30 April-1 May, 1999 All sessions centered on the Balkan crisis. Agreement was found on the following points: I. The Balkan crisis, including ethnic cleansing and terrorism, is one of the most serious challenges to international security since World War II. II. Both sides agree that this crisis creates serious threats to global and regional security and may undermine efforts against non-proliferation. III. This crisis increases the threat of further human and ecological catastrophes, as evidenced by the growing refugee problem, and creates obstacles to further development of constructive Russian-American relations. IV. The humanitarian crisis will not be solved by bombing. A diplomatic solution to the problem is preferable to the alternative of military escalation. Taking the above into account, the sides consider it necessary to implement the following emergency measures as soon as possible, preferably within the next week. Implementation of these emergency measures will create the climate necessary to settle the political questions. 1. We call on the interested parties to find practical measures for a parallel solution to three tasks, without regard to sequence: the stopping of NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, withdrawal of Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of the military activities of the KLA. This should be accomplished through a series of confidence building measures, which should include but should not be limited to: a. The release of all prisoners of war. b. The voluntary repatriation of all refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations. NATO would be responsible for policing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders with Albania and Macedonia to ensure that weapons do not reenter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the returning refugees or at a later time. c. Agreement on the composition of the armed international forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian withdraw. The composition of the group should be decided by a consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership of Kosovo. d. The above group would be supplemented by the monitoring activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). e. The Russian Duma and U.S. Congress will use all possiblities at their disposal in order to successfully move ahead the process of resolving the situation in Yugoslavia on the basis of stopping the violence and atrocities. 2. We recognize the basic principles of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which include: a. wide autonomy for Kosovo b. a multi-ethnic population c. treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with international norms 3. We support efforts to provide international assistance to rebuild destroyed homes of refugees and other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to victims in Kosovo. 4. We, as members of the Duma and Congress, commit to active participation as follows: Issue a Joint U.S. Congress-Russian Duma report of our meetings in Vienna. Concrete suggestions for future action will be issued as soon as possible. Delegations will agree on timelines for accomplishment of above tasks. Delegations will brief their respective legislatures and governments on outcome of the Vienna meetings and agreed upon proposals. Delegations will prepare a joint resolution, based on their report, to be considered simultaneously in the Congress and Duma. Delegations agree to continue a working group dialogue between Congress and the Duma in agreed upon places. Delegations agree that Duma deputies will visit refugee camps and Members of Congress will visit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Members of Congress:

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to a longtime educator, Dr. William R. Magill. This evening, friends and family will gather to pay tribute to Dr. Magill's long and distinguished career as he retires after 46 years of service. A retired Army officer, Dr. Magill has always shown a great willingness to serve his community. Even after he put away his military uniform, Dr. Magill continued his service to the people of Pennsylvania as an assistant principal and Director of Federal programs at Steelton- Highspire School District in Steelton, PA and as principal of Annville Cleona Jr. and Sr. High Schools in Cleona, PA. Dr. Magill then joined the faculty of Cheyney University where he has played a vital role in expanding the minds of his students and introducing them to other cultures. As part of his role as Chair of the graduate school's Educational Administration and Foundation Department, Dr. Magill has hosted graduate students from China and led study groups to England to study at Cambridge University. Beyond his career in education, Dr. Magill also worked for a variety of community organizations. He serves as a board member of the Fellowship for Christian Athletes in Delaware and Chester Counties and as a precinct committeeman in West Goshen, PA. Dr. Magill has served his country as a military officer, a teacher, and a volunteer in his local community. Over his 46 year career as an educator, he has influenced and made an impact on the lives of the countless young people. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in today recognizing the accomplishments of Dr. Magill. He is a true American patriot.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished chairman for yielding time to me. I rise in strong opposition to this particular resolution, and I especially am concerned about the timing of these votes. I understand the reasons why my friend and colleague from California did what he did to maintain the integrity of the process and the responsibility that we have as parliamentarians to engage in that process. I, however, went to the leadership and asked if we could postpone these votes at least until next week, as a group of Members of this body, in fact 10 of us, travel to Austria, Vienna, Austria tomorrow evening to meet with the senior leadership of the Russian Duma and their major factions to try to find some common ground to provide leverage to convince Milosevic that it is time to come to the table and end this conflict. We have an opportunity, Mr. Speaker. We have not used that opportunity before this debate and this vote, and that is extremely unfortunate. We should not be locked into an artificial vote time frame that tells us when to come forward and have Members in such disarray as we are going to see today watch the results of this vote. And that will tell us the problem that Members have in terms of what we are doing. I understand the process is important, but I also understand the substance of what we are about is even more important, because we are talking about an issue and decisions and votes that could affect our ability to bring Russia in in a way that helps us bring this to a resolution peacefully. In my mind, Mr. Speaker, that is the top priority. Keeping our ground troops, keeping NATO ground troops from having to confront the Russian military, and from those Serbs in a confrontational way that will lead to additional bloodshed. It is unfortunate we are having these votes today. In my opinion, it is not in our country's best interests that we have these votes. I wish we could have avoided that. I think the vote results will show the concern that Members have, not necessarily with just the issue of what we are about, because anyone could argue that, in fact, we are in war today with the things that are occurring. But rather, the timing, the sequence, and the way this is being done without full consideration to what I think is one very real opportunity.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely. To get to the first point of the gentleman, the blame game has got to end. This should not be a time, with American troops in harm's way, that we pick partisan fights back and forth over who can blame the other side the most. We are where we are. And I would say to the gentleman, I would say that probably 99, if not all of our colleagues, 99 percent of them agree with us that the end game is the same for all of us. We all think that Milosevic's activities have been outrageous. In fact, many of us think he should be held for war crimes that are being committed by the Serbs. We all feel that this conflict must be ended while keeping the dignity and the coordination of NATO intact. We all want to have the reputation of the U.S. intact. Our end results that all of us want are the same. The question is, how do we get there? Do we continue this massive aerial bombing campaign? Do we allow ourselves to slide into a ground war which could pose a direct confrontation between NATO and the U.S. and Russia, which would be dangerous, or do we try to find out using whatever means we have to figure if there is an alternative? We have a means that no one else has, and that means was established 5 years ago. We did not approach the Russians. The Russians came to me 3\1/2\ weeks ago and they pleaded with me to reach out to see if we could find a new way. And in doing this, and I want to repeat this, I talked to no Member of the Republican party. Every contact I had for the 3 weeks that I was talking to the Russians in over 20 conversations and exchanges of information were with leaders from the administration, the intelligence community, the Security Council, or Members of the other side. It was not until last week that I spent 5 minutes briefing the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and then I briefed the Speaker of the House. They were the only two Republicans.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, in fact, I would tell my colleague not only is he true and correct, but when I led a delegation in December to Moscow for our part of the exchange, we were the first western Democratic parliament to be taken into the Duma chambers while they were in session, not something that would never happen in this body because of our House rules. The Speaker of the Duma who was conducting this session with the Duma members in attendance, and they seat 450 in that auditorium, saw us up in the balcony, stopped the proceedings, and announced that up in the balcony were the Democrat and Republican Members of the American Congress who were working together with the Duma deputies to find common solutions to common problems. The Duma then gave us a standing ovation and stopping their proceedings in acknowledging our presence and the importance of our work.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely. In fact, my good friend and colleague knows my reputation. I am one of Russia's strongest critics. In fact, it was not too long ago I was on this floor offering a bill strongly opposed by the administration that would in fact require us to deploy a national missile defense.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. In fact, I would say to the gentleman that not only is that the case and that that has been our mission, I can provide for the record to any Member who would so choose, statements from former Secretary of Defense Perry, current Secretary of Defense Cohen, current Ambassador for the U.S. in Moscow, Jim Collins, and a whole host of other people who have issued praise for the work that we have undertaken in building long-term, more stable relationships because of our efforts. In fact, when the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and I met with Strobe Talbott, he spent 10 minutes of that discussion praising us for the work that we have been doing, telling us how important that work is for his job at the State Department in negotiating with Russia, telling us how important it is for the President to have a supporting congressional group. In fact, during the Gore-Chernomyridin Commission of 5 years ago, when we established this, it was Vice President Gore and Victor Chernomyrdin who had us stand alongside them, and said we are proud to see the formation of a formal working relationship because it is so critically important for solving the long-term problems we face. And a further example of our efforts in the area of relations involving foreign affairs was when the Russian Duma did not support President Clinton's bombing of Baghdad and the bombing of Saddam Hussein. I agreed on behalf of the administration to travel to Moscow and to meet with Duma deputies as a citizen and as a parliamentarian to convince them of why I was supporting the President. I was not there to negotiate. I was there to convince them of the President's position. And when they came over to America, Luhkin chaired a six-member delegation from the Duma from all factions. The first stop he made after he landed at Dulles Airport was in my office. They spent 2 hours one night, where I dialogued with them, I showed them evidence, and I tried to convince them of the reason why I, as a Republican, supported the President and his position in dealing with Saddam Hussein. So anyone that would somehow misconstrue what we are doing can be totally refuted by the facts.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely, totally correct. Nothing else can be inferred from what we are doing. No one should raise the issue of armchair secretaries of State because that is not what we are about. If we reach a conclusion in our discussions over the weekend with our Russian colleagues that they feel Milosevic will accept, we then have to come back and convince our Government that this is, in fact, something that they too can live with. That is not our call as to whether or not they will accept it. That is up to our Government to decide the ultimate position of the U.S. But we do have the right as parliamentarians to negotiate with our counterparts along the lines of what we think will work but also what we think our administration would accept. If they do not accept it, that is their choice. If they do, all of us are better. In fact, when I had originally planned to go over there, I had offered to take an employee of the State Department with me. Andre Lewis works with Steve Sestanovich and he was going to go with us so we would have a State Department spokesperson there. I even went as far to say this to Strobe Talbott. I said, ``If we go ahead with this, you script out what you want us to say and we will read your words.'' There was never an attempt to try to usurp the authority of the executive branch to do its job. We are simply using contacts that we have to go a different route. And the reason why this is so important: For the past 7 years, the relationship between Russia and the U.S. has been primarily based on two people, the two presidents, Clinton and Yeltsin. And that was great when Yeltsin was strong. Yeltsin is no longer strong. And yet we did not pursue the other power centers in Russia the way we should have. We did in our relationship. And our strength is in those other power centers, in those other factions who will provide the future leadership of Russia. And that is why what we are doing is so important because it complements the discussions that are being held between the White House and the Yeltsin, Primakov, Chernomyrdin effort in Moscow.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Many of our colleagues felt that this would endanger our relationship with Russia. I am at one and the same time Russia's strongest critic on proliferation, on transparency, on strategic relationships. But I also consider myself their best friend. The Russians believe in strength, consistency, and candor. When we are strong with them, when we are consistent, and when we are candid they want to work with us. Our relationship with the Russians has been built on that. And the reason why this is so critically important gets back to that first series of phone calls that were made to me. Our Russian friends, the pro-Western leaders, were pleading with me saying, ``Curt, you have to understand what is happening here. We have not seen the hostility toward America this bad since pre-1991. We are hearing people in the Duma who have been our friends say nasty things about America and are driving us to support the nationalists who are calling for more aggressive action on Russia's part.'' They said, ``You have to understand America. We are going to have our parliamentary elections this year. If this continues, you may well drive Russia into electing an entirely communist Duma and perhaps a reactionary leader of our country. That is the worst thing you want in America.'' What they said is, ``You have to assist us, help us find a way as supporters of our western involvement, as people who want to have stronger ties with your country, help us find a way to find that middle ground that lets you have the dignity you need and comes out with the kind of effort that you want to come out of this through NATO's negotiations but also lets us have a plan that we can convince Milosevic that he must accept.'' That was the kind of message that was given to me by the Duma deputies who pleaded 3\1/2\ weeks ago for us to reach out with them and try to find this common solution.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. The gentleman is absolutely correct. In fact, as he well knows, we had our first kind of like organizational meeting this evening at 7 o'clock or 8 o'clock down in the HC-6 room. We agreed that tomorrow night, we would have a second meeting and we would welcome any of our colleagues from either party to come in and sit down with us as we strategize the way to move forward. In fact, I would ask, Madam Speaker, to insert in the Congressional Record this Dear Colleague memo that I sent to every one of the 435 House Members today which outlines in detail exactly what we have done up until now.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. In fact, the gentleman is absolutely correct. As I mentioned at the outset, this initiative was supported initially by both Speaker Gingrich and the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), and has had the highest support of the senior leadership of the Russian Duma, Speaker Seleznyov. There was an exchange of letters and a formal process established. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), is the Democrat co-chair; I am the Republican co-chair. We have met on a regular basis, twice a year, once in Russia, once in this country, and we have discussed serious issues that in some cases are really issues involving our two foreign affairs agencies in operations or issues involving the presidents. Our role has never been to try to give the impression that we were speaking for anyone other than ourselves in that relationship.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise this evening to continue the discussion on the situation that we face in Kosovo, and what I think is an historic opportunity that hopefully we have not yet missed to solve that crisis without putting our troops into further harm's way. In fact, today, Madam Speaker, the President called up 2,116 military reserve troops to active duty and authorized 33,000 reservists to be called up in the near future. The air war continues, the bombing and the destruction continues, yet the resolve of the Serbs seems to also continue with no end in sight. Many of us are concerned that we do not have a solid plan to end the conflict and that we do not have a strategy to win the conflict. Therefore, this continuing escalation of the aerial assault on the former Yugoslavia causes a great deal of concern for our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. Tomorrow, Madam Speaker, we are going to be asked to vote on one of several alternatives, including the War Powers Act resolution to withdraw our troops from the former Yugoslavia. A second alternative is to declare war against Yugoslavia, and a third option is an alternative that would have us say to the administration that no dollars can be expended for the insertion of ground troops unless the Congress has given its approval. Now, we all know, Madam Speaker, that these resolutions may or may not pass, but this administration will continue on its course. They have not consulted with the Congress in the past; I do not think that is going to change. I think we are going to continue to see a movement that is aggressively pursuing the aerial campaign and eventually, perhaps, the insertion of ground troops. If that time comes, Madam Speaker, we face some very dangerous prospects. One only has to look at history to understand how the Serbs stood up against Hitler from the period of 1941 to 1945. Even though the Germans had not only their 22 divisions but the help of 200,000 Croatians, Slovenian and Bosnian Muslim volunteer auxiliaries, they were able to repel Hitler, they were able to retain the control of their land and, in fact, in the end, they won a victory. Now, I am not saying that if we get involved in a direct confrontation with Serbia that we cannot win. Make no mistake about it, we can. We have the finest fighting force in the world, and with the help of our NATO allies, I am sure we could prevail, but it would not be without cost. Furthermore, Madam Speaker, what really concerns me is the position that perhaps we will put the Russians in. Russia has already indicated it will not honor our naval blockade that is designed to prevent additional oil supplies from getting into Serbia to resupply the military and the economy. Russia could be put into a position where it is asked to protect the resupply efforts to get food and necessary materials into Serbia. In either of those cases, we set up a situation where the United States and Russia could come into direct conflict, perhaps even hostile action, our troops against theirs, the NATO troops against the Russians and the Serbs. That would be catastrophic. Again, not because I do not think we would win that battle, because I think we would. But the toll that it would take in loss of life and the ending result of us then having to control the former Yugoslavia and partition it and the extensive amount of investment that we would have to make leads me to believe that that is not the right course for us to be taking. Madam Speaker, there is an alternative. Almost one month ago I first proposed that alternative. In fact, in the first week of April I sent out ``Dear Colleague'' letters and a press release calling for this administration to involve the leadership in Russia in a more direct way, to get the Russian government and the Russian officials to help us bring Milosevic to the table. I felt very simply that Russia owed us that, partly because we are putting almost $1 billion a year into Russia's economy, all of which I support. We are providing food supplies to the Russian people. But I also think with that aid comes a responsibility for Russia to assist us in bringing Milosevic and the Serbian leadership to the table so that we can try to find a way to end this conflict short of an all-out ground war. Interestingly enough, Madam Speaker, the Russians agree with us. In fact, Madam Speaker, Russia has made overtures to us that they would like to provide the assistance of both the government and the parliamentarians to help bring Milosevic to understand that this conflict must end and that he must agree to world opinion and the NATO guidelines that have been established to allow the Kosovar people to return to their homelands, to withdraw his troops, to agree to the ability of the Kosovar people to live without fear and intimidation and without the ethnic cleansing that has occurred, and to allow the establishment of a multinational ground force to monitor compliance with the peace agreement. In fact, Madam Speaker, I did two special orders on April 12 and 13 where I outlined in great detail my concerns about the conflict and the need to get Russia involved. Well, Madam Speaker, we have had that opportunity and I want to outline that in detail tonight. Over three weeks ago I was contacted by my friends in the Russian Duma. As my colleagues know, five years ago I asked for the support of then Speaker Gingrich to approach the Russian Speaker, Seleznyov on the day that he was sworn into the Speaker's position to propose the establishment of a new direct relationship between the parliaments of our two nations, the Russian Duma and the American Congress. The Russian side accepted and Speaker Gingrich and Minority Leader Gephardt also accepted, and for one year, working with my counterpart in the Russian Duma Vladimir Luhkin, the chairman of the International Affairs Committee and former Ambassador from the Soviet Union and Russia to the U.S., we met and established the parameters for our meetings. I made it crystal-clear that in all of our discussions with the Russians, all the factions, all of the political factions in Russia must be involved. Not just the mainstream factions like the Our Home Russia party, the Yabloko party, and the People's Power party, but also the Communists who in fact control the majority or the largest sector of the Duma in terms of votes. The regional coalition, the Agrarian faction and even the LDPR faction, which is the Liberal Democratic party of Vladimir Zhirinovskii. The Russians agreed to that. Over the past five years, we have had numerous face-to-face meetings with our Russian counterparts in Moscow and in Washington. Time and again we have discussed difficult issues, trying to find common ground. Many times we have found areas where we can agree. Sometimes we found areas that we cannot agree. But we have developed a friendship and relationships that allow us to discuss difficult issues with a feeling of mutual respect and admiration. So it was not surprising to me, Madam Speaker, that over three weeks ago senior leaders from the Russian Duma would approach me as they did, ask me to begin a dialogue of possible ways to avoid the escalation of the Kosovo conflict and to also find ways to try to bring an end to the situation on the terms established by our country and NATO. Now, I was surprised, Madam Speaker, because I said to my Russian friends, send something to me in writing, over three weeks ago. These are the three foundations that they said they thought could be the basis of further discussion to resolve the conflict in Kosovo. Number one, that Russia would guarantee that there would be no more ethnic cleansing in Kosovo or the former Yugoslavia. Number two, that Serbia must agree to all NATO conditions, including the presence of international troops in the former Yugoslavia. Russia, however, suggested that the force be comprised primarily of countries not directly involved in the bombing of the former Yugoslavia, a point that I do not disagree with. The troops would agree to stay in Kosovo for at least a period of 10 years. And number three, the Russians proposed the establishment of an interparliamentary group that would include the United States, Russia, and NATO countries to be formed to help monitor compliance with all agreements. And, working together, this group would cooperate with the offices of the United Nations. Madam Speaker, these initiatives and these ideas were proposed over three weeks ago by senior Russian parliamentarians. Immediately after I received this overture, so as not to convey the impression that I was somehow operating out of the bounds of the Government of the United States, I called the Vice President's top National Security Adviser, Leon Fuerth. I briefed him on what the Russians had proposed. In discussions with him, it was agreed that I should call Carlos Pascual from the National Security Council at the White House. I did that. I sent each of these men letters outlining what the Russians had said, what I responded, and the fact that I was going to engage the Russians to try to find some way to bring us together, to try to find a common conclusion and a successful conclusion to the hostilities in Kosovo. In fact, Madam Speaker, the following week I called the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, and in a phone conversation I briefed him about the offer made by the Russians that we begin serious discussions. Also that week, Madam Speaker, I talked to Ambassador Steve Sestanovich who works directly for Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Sistanovic has been a friend of mine for some time involved in Russian issues, and he was someone who now has the responsibility for affairs in the former Soviet States. I said to Dr. Sestanovich, I told him about our discussions between the Russians and myself, the exchange of communications, the telephone conversations we had, and I had further discussions on an ongoing basis that weekend with one of his top assistants, Andre Lewis. The whole purpose, Madam Speaker, was to let the administration know that my discussions with the Russians were meant to provide a constructive role in trying to find a way out of this conflict, a way that would allow the Russians to use their significant leverage to allow us to find a solution in terms of the Kosovo crisis. Also that week, Madam Speaker, I approached two Members of Congress. Neither of them were Republicans. They were both Democrats, and they are good friends of mine, people who I trust and admire, and people who I know are also trusted by the administration: The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha). The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Steny Hoyer) is my counterpart and colleague in the Russian Duma-Congress initiative. He and I travel to Russia together. He and I host the meetings with the Duma deputies when they come to Washington. I went into the discussion with each of them about my efforts, and asked them to make contact with the administration to let the administration know my purpose. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) said he would talk to Secretary Talbott, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) said he would try to talk to the President and/or Sandy Berger. I took each of them at their words, and I am sure they did that, even though I heard nothing from either Sandy Berger nor from Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott. The discussions with the Russians continued, however, Madam Speaker, throughout that week and the weekend until finally the first Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, a good friend of mine, Vladimir Ryshkov, contacted me by telephone and made a verbal offer. He said, Congressman, I think through our discussions that we may have an opportunity to find common ground. He said, I would like you to bring a delegation of Republicans and Democrats to meet with a delegation of Russian leaders in a neutral country. He suggested that we meet in Hungary, in Budapest. He said, in having one day of discussions, that that could be followed, assuming we were in agreement, with a prearranged trip to Belgrade, where we would meet firsthand, directly, face-to-face with Milosevic to try to convince Milosevic that Republicans and Democrats and Russians across the spectrum were united in the understanding that Milosevic must agree to NATO's terms, and that it was in Serbia's best interests to come to the table and agree with the position taken by our governments and the NATO governments. I said to first Deputy Speaker Ryshkov, I said, Vladimir, I want to you to do five things for me before I will even raise this issue with the leadership in the country and in the Congress. I said, number one, I want to you to put that request in writing. Give me a letter from you, as the First Deputy Speaker, asking me to arrange such a meeting. Number two, give me a list of the Russian delegates, the Duma deputies and party leaders who would be a part of the Russian side of this effort. Number three, give me a date certain and an exact time when we would meet as a delegation face-to-face with Milosevic in Belgrade. Number four, get me a meeting with our POWs, so that we can tell whether or not they are safe and whether or not they are in good health. And number 5, travel with me, the entire Russian delegation, and the American delegation to a refugee camp of our choice in Macedonia, under the supervision of our military, so that you can see with us the horror and the terrible atrocities that have been committed by Milosevic and the Serbs on the people of Kosovo. On Wednesday of last week, Madam Speaker, Ryshkov wrote back to me and agreed to all five requests that I made. He put the request in writing. He identified the Duma deputies that would be involved in these discussions. It was an historic group: Ryshkov himself, a member of the Nash Dom faction, the party leader for Chernomyrdin's own party. The second member was Luhkin, a leader in the Yablako faction, a mainstream pro-west faction. In fact, Luhkin said it would have been the first time ever that the Yablako faction would insert itself into the issue of Yugoslavia, but they thought it was so important that they engaged with us in the Congress on this issue that he would come himself for these meetings, both in Budapest as well as in Belgrade. The third member of the delegation would be sharp an off, a senior Communist leader who would have the ear and would have the support of the Speaker of the Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, the Communist party leader who has the largest number of votes in the Duma, and he would in fact be able to represent that faction. The fourth member of the delegation was Mr. Greshin, a member of the Peoples' Power faction, a very respected member of the Duma. The fifth member would have been Sergei Konovalenko, the chief protocol officer of the Russian Duma and a good friend of mine. That was the delegation, Madam Speaker, a solid group of progressive Russian leaders, not the hardline people that we have heard so much about in the past; not the people that Yeltsin referred to in the Duma as thugs and rogues, and not the people that we have heard in the West have been trivialized as nonplayers. These are the future of Russia, good, solid leaders that want the same thing that we want in America: a stable country, stable economic growth, free democracy, and a closer, stronger relationship with the U.S. The third request was for the date and time certain for the meeting with Milosevic. The Russians got that assurance from Milosevic's top aide. We were to have met face-to-face with Milosevic yesterday, Monday, at 1 p.m. in Belgrade. The Russians told me that they would not go into Belgrade, did they not have that commitment to meet face-to- face with Milosevic. The fourth request was to meet with our POWs. The Russians certified to me that Milosevic had agreed with that request. We would have been the first body, even prior to the Red Cross, to meet with our POWs to make sure they were okay and to let them know that we had not forgotten them. The last request was also agreed to. That was to have the five Russian leaders travel with us to a Macedonian refugee camp of our choice. In fact, I consulted with the State Department to obtain the location of the two most dramatic refugee camps, to let the Russians see the terrible problems that Milosevic has brought to bear on the people of Kosovo. The Russians agreed to all of those issues. In fact, we were set up to do this this past weekend. We would have left the theater by going back to Sofia, Bulgaria. The American side would have come back to Washington. The Russians would have gone to Moscow. The following week we would have met in Washington to continue our discussions, a good- faith effort on the part of the Russians to find common ground. Madam Speaker, all last week I could not get an answer from the administration. I called Sandy Berger three times. I told his staff what I wanted. I said I had briefed the administration, I had briefed the CIA, I had briefed the intelligence community, I had briefed the State Department, I had briefed the White House. I have not told any Republicans. This is a good-faith effort that I have gone to Democrats with to try to find a way to reach common ground. Sandy Berger never returned my phone calls, and neither did Strobe Talbott, until I went to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) again and I said to my good friend and colleague, can you help us get a face- to-face meeting with Strobe Talbott? He said, I have talked to him. You need to call him. On Thursday, after I had briefed the gentleman from Illinois (Speaker Denny Hastert) in the morning and asked for his cooperation, the response of the gentleman from Illinois (Speaker Hastert) was that he was supportive, but that I should keep working with the administration, and I told him that I was. About 12:30 on Thursday, I finally reached Strobe Talbott, and Deputy Secretary Talbott said, I will meet with you today. I said that I wanted to bring the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) with me. About 1 o'clock we traveled down to the State Department and had a sandwich with the Deputy Secretary of State, and for about 1\1/2\, Madam Speaker, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Steny Hoyer) and I met with Strobe Talbott and three of his senior staff experts on Russia to discuss the initiative in detail. I went through all the background. I talked about the purpose, that we were not going to Belgrade to negotiate because we were not representatives of the administration, we are not Secretaries of State. That was never our intent, and that would never be our desire. We were there to present a common, unified front, Russian elected officials, American elected officials, in solidarity to Milosevic saying that this must end, and he must understand that as individuals who both supported the President and opposed the President, we now felt it important to give him one last chance to find a way to peacefully resolve this situation, or we would go back to America and use our collective voices to bring every ounce of energy we had in finding ways to solve this situation militarily. After the briefing, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott responded that he did not think it was a good idea, and he gave us two reasons. He said, first of all, I am concerned for your safety. I responded, Mr. Secretary, I am concerned for my safety, as well. I would not do something that I felt inside of me was going to endanger my own life, let alone the lives of my colleagues. I felt confident, I told him, that the Russians, in going with us, along with one of the senior advisers to Milosevic on the bus ride from Hungary, from Budapest down to Belgrade, would in fact make sure we were protected. And by having the U.S. Army as our escort, we knew full well that our military would be briefed as to our whereabouts. The second issue that was raised by Deputy Secretary of State Talbott was, well, we think Milosevic may try to use you in this very laudable effort. I said to Deputy Secretary Talbott, well, how would he use us? He said, well, he may try to say things that really are not your intent. My response was, Mr. Secretary, I have been in politics for 20 years. I understand that people try to use other people in politics. We were not naive. And in fact, Milosevic only had one TV station operating. I said, how much spin can Milosevic create on our visit to Belgrade, when we were going to follow that visit by taking five of the senior leaders of the Russian political parties to a refugee camp where hundreds of western media, cameras, and reporters could photograph an interview, senior Russian officials holding the children of Kosovo refugees, speaking to the wives and daughters of husbands, fathers, sons and brothers who have been massacred by Milosevic? Far better would we have had the western media report on our effort by that visit of the senior Russian officials than to worry about somehow Milosevic misinterpreting our attempt in going to Belgrade. In fact, Madam Speaker, because Strobe Talbott saw that he could not convince me of his position, we ended our conversation after 1\1/2\ hours with him telling me that he would take the request of support to both Sandy Berger and to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; that he was about to go into a meeting with the President, and he would meet with them prior to that meeting, and would call us back Thursday evening. I had to move on this issue, Madam Speaker, because we were scheduled to leave on Saturday, if it was to come about. On Thursday night we got the word back from the State Department that it was the feeling of Secretary Albright and Strobe Talbott and Sandy Berger that we should not go to meet with the Russians, that we should not seize the opportunity to find a peaceful way to resolve this crisis. I was extremely upset and frustrated. On Friday morning I held a press conference and announced the fact that I had called the Russians and told them that we were postponing our trip, much to our dismay. The Russians were devastated. In fact, Ryshkov had a press conference, Luhkin had a press conference and talked about the initiative, and talked about the willingness of the Congress, Democrats and Republicans, to try to find common ground to end this conflict without additional American bloodshed, as well as bloodshed from other nations. It was interesting, Madam Speaker, that I was scheduled at noon on Friday in advance to host the President of Ukraine for lunch. President Kuchma was in town, and as a leader of the Ukrainian American initiative, I had agreed with eight of my colleagues to host him in the lunchroom downstairs. We did that, and following the luncheon we went to an adjacent room for a press conference. Several members of the President's party stood up and praised president Kuchma for coming to Washington for the NATO summit, to be a part of the partnership for peace effort. One of my colleagues praised president Kuchma and said this, that President Kuchma and Ukraine are to be commended because they understand the role that America is taking, and they support the effort to try to find a solution to this crisis. It is interesting, Madam Speaker, that when President Kuchma spoke, he gave his vision for a solution to the Kosovo crisis, which I will include in the Record.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague and friend for yielding. I would just say that we could have gone that route. We could have gone into Belgrade. We could have done that as other people have done and as people are doing right now. Jesse Jackson, I understand, is over there right now without the support of this government. We did not do that. We chose the constructive route. We will continue that route. I just want to say in closing, I want to thank my friend and colleague for his effort, because he has received criticism on his side as I have on mine. In the end we know we are doing the right thing.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the entire hour, but I do want to continue a discussion that I started last evening, a discussion regarding the situation in Kosovo and the involvement of our troops in the air campaign, as well as the potential involvement of our troops in a ground campaign. I thought it was especially important to continue this this evening, Mr. Speaker, because, as we both know, there are a number of our colleagues who are this evening sitting in their offices signing mail and responding to constituent concerns and at the same time keeping one eye and perhaps one ear on the discussions taking place here. I think it is important that we look at all the parameters associated with the status of our military today as we hear increased discussions in the city about committing significantly larger amounts of American troops to Kosovo, and committing a significant amount of American resources to the situation and the ultimate defeat of Milosevic. Last night, Mr. Speaker, I focused on the need to bring Russia in and to basically have Russia, which is on an ongoing basis a significant beneficiary of American tax dollars, to play a vital and direct role in helping to bring Milosevic to the table and to agree to negotiated terms to settle the ethnic unrest that has occurred in Serbia, especially with the Kosovars. As I said last night, we spend between $6 hundred million and $1 billion of taxpayer money on programs to assist Russia. From economic development to stabilization of their nuclear programs to assistance with environmental issues, we are actively engaged in Russia, and I am in the middle of many of those issues as the chairman of the Interparliamentary Commission with the Russian Duma. Now is the time for us, Mr. Speaker, to let Russia know that we expect, for the assistance that we give them, that they play a significant and vital role in bringing Milosevic, an ally and close confidante of the Russian government and certain Russian leaders, to the table to help us resolve this conflict peacefully. As I said last evening, I have had discussions with Russian Duma deputies and with leaders in Russia who want to pursue such a course. Make no mistake about it, I think these negotiations should be on our terms, not Russia's. We should set the policy based on the negotiations that we have had with the Contact Group in the past, but Russia has to be part of the process. I think in the 3 weeks or so that we have been bombing Serbia it is evident that we have not seen Milosevic move, in terms of coming our way in acquiring a peaceful settlement. What we can in fact do is, in continuing to apply pressure on the government there for the NATO alliance, is bring Russia in and give Russia a more prominent role, and basically allow Russia to play I think the kind of middle position they should be playing in bringing Milosevic and his people to somber discussions about how to resolve this situation peacefully. I encourage the administration to do that. I am heartened that some feedback I have gotten today is that the administration in fact is looking at these options. I think that is critically important for Republicans and Democrats to continue to press the administration and our allies to look at ways that we can solve this problem to our satisfaction, to the satisfaction of NATO, to the satisfaction of the stability of the Kosovars and Kosovo as a Nation, where people can live freely without ethnic intimidation, but we should do that also without having to resort to inserting ground troops and potentially involving ourselves in a major conflict that could involve the world's two major superpowers as opponents. Tonight, Mr. Speaker, I want to use this opportunity to talk about some other factors that Members must consider as we prepare to either support or not support the administration's policy on moving additional troops and operations and personnel and platforms into Kosovo and the surrounding theater. Before I do that, however, I want to reiterate two important points that I made last evening. The first is that Milosevic understand in no uncertain terms that all of us in this body are united with the President in demanding that he end his reign of terror on the Kosovars, and that he stop and be held accountable for the atrocities that are now unfolding in Kosovo and Serbia, and that we as Americans will follow through in holding him accountable personally. Let there be no mistake about that. The second key point I want to make and reemphasize from last evening is that we are solidly behind our military; that we in the Congress are doing everything in our power to give them the tools and the resources they need to allow them to continue the operations that have been outlined for them by the Commander in Chief. But let me get into the meat of what I would like to discuss this evening, Mr. Speaker. That deals with the need for Members of this body and the other body to understand that deploying our troops in Kosovo, sending our pilots in to conduct aerial campaigns, sending our helicopters, our Apaches in to provide safe ways, is not the same as sending inanimate robots into an area. These are human beings, and these human beings have need, they have wants. We have not been as supportive as a Nation in providing the backup and financial resources to protect the quality of life and stability of these troops as we should be. This is an appropriate time for us to outline these concerns, and to use this as part of our discussions as we decide whether or not to move into a phase where ground troops are entered into Kosovo. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, the people in America have been convinced that for some reason we are spending so much more money today on our military than at any point in time in the past. The facts just do not bear that out. When I talk to my constituents back in Pennsylvania, I use a simple analogy. I do not compare what we are spending on defense to Ronald Reagan, as some would perhaps do. Rather, I go back to the time of John Kennedy. When John Kennedy was president in the sixties, Mr. Speaker, we were spending 52 cents of every Federal tax dollar coming into Washington on the military. Yet, it was a time of peace. It was after Korea and before Vietnam. Fifty-two cents of every tax dollar was spent on the military. Nine percent of our gross national product was spent on defense back then. In today's budget, we are spending 15 cents of the Federal tax dollar on defense. We are spending 2.6 percent of our gross national product on the military. The numbers have dropped dramatically. In fact, by any accounting standard, we are spending a significantly smaller portion of our Federal allocation that is available on defense and security than we were back when John Kennedy was the President, even though I would argue that was a more stable time and a time of peace throughout the world. But some other factors have changed. Back when John Kennedy was president we had the draft. Young people were brought into the military. They served a period of 2 years or more. Then they went on with their lives. They were paid next to nothing. Today we have an all volunteer force. They are well educated. Many are married, they have children, so we have added health care costs, housing costs, travel costs, so a much larger portion of our smaller defense budget is being spent on the quality of life to get those troops, to get those people, to serve in the military and to keep those troops involved and to stay on beyond one tour of duty. In fact, quality of life is the overriding driving factor of our defense budget process today, to make sure our troops are happy, that they have the best possible quality of life to raise their families and to continue to serve America. That was not the case back in the sixties. With the draft, we paid the troops a meager amount of money. Most were not married. We did not have all the associated costs with housing, education, health care, and so forth. Some other things have changed. Back in John Kennedy's era when we were spending 52 cents of every Federal tax dollar on the military, we were not spending a significant portion of our defense budget on environmental mitigation. In this year's defense budget, $11 billion of the defense budget will go for what we call environmental mitigation. That is money that is not going to provide support for our troops. That is money that is not going to buy new equipment or to replace old equipment, or to repair equipment. Now $11 billion out of today's budget for defense environmental mitigation, and zero dollars spent during John Kennedy's era for the similar type of situation, a further change from the nineties as compared to the sixties. But there is even a more fundamental difference that gets at the heart of our problem in sustaining the readiness of our troops today. That is the issue that I also talked about last evening. This issue, Mr. Speaker, I think we have to drive home to Americans and to our colleagues on a daily basis. During the time from World War II's ending until 1990 and 1991, under the administration of all the presidents that served during that period, starting with Harry Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard Nixon and going on through John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and going on through Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, and even including Ronald Reagan and George Bush, during all of that time the total amount of deployments by those Commander in Chiefs was 10, 10 deployments in 40 years. Our troops were only inserted into hostile environments as a measure of last resort by our Republican and Democrat Commander in Chief. Let us look at the past 8 years, Mr. Speaker. Since 1991, 1990 and 1991, we have had 33 deployments. I had to cross them out, because Kosovo is now the 33rd. There have been 33 deployments of our troops into hostile situations. Each of these 33 deployments, 33 in 8 years, versus 10 in 40 years, each of these deployments cost hundreds of millions or billions of dollars. None of these 33 deployments were budgeted for, not one. None of these deployments were paid for with an up or down vote on the Congress in advance of the deployment of the troops. The payment of the costs associated with these deployments was made by taking dollars out of an already decreasing defense budget, out of programs of modernizing our aircraft, modernizing our naval fleet, modernizing our platforms, and giving the soldiers, sailors, marines, and corpsmen the kinds of quality of life that they deserve in an era where we have all volunteers. In fact, the Comptroller of the Pentagon has given us a figure that these 33 deployments cost us $19 billion of unanticipated expenditures. Many of them were paid with supplementals to provide the funding to pay for these operations. In fact, the irony of these 33 deployments, Mr. Speaker, is that we in the Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, joining together each year for the past 4 years, plussed up more money to try to replenish some of these funds that were being eaten away for this rapidly increasing deployment rate. In fact, 4 years ago we gave the Pentagon $10 billion more than what the President asked for. Three years ago we gave the Pentagon $6 billion more than what the Pentagon asked for. Two years ago we gave the Pentagon $3 billion more than what the President asked for. In each of those years, as we in the Congress tried to replenish the funds to replace money that was being used for these deployments, the President and the administration criticized the Congress for giving the Pentagon more money than they asked for. Finally this year, the Pentagon leaders have spoken up and said, ``We can take this no longer. The funding problem is so severe in the Pentagon that we have to tell you candidly that we need more money in next year's budget.'' The service chiefs came in and testified before the House committees and the Senate committees and said, at a minimum, they need $19 billion more than what President Clinton asked for in the fiscal year 2000 budget. The President said he would make $11 billion of new funding available. It was a great speech. But when we cut away all of the rhetoric, the actual new money put in by the President in his budget for the next fiscal year is $3 billion. In fact, one of the gimmicks they used was to take $3 billion out of R&D for defense, shift it into acquisition, and call that a $3 billion plus-up in defense spending. The problem we have today is that the readiness of our troops, the capability to perform in Kosovo, is directly dependent on how much we support our troops. The fact is, Mr. Speaker, we have undermined the capability of our military. Because of the rapidly increasing level of deploying our troops around the world and because of the rapidly decreasing defense budget, we have unfortunately encountered a mismatch that is affecting the quality of life for our troops, that is affecting the ability for our troops to serve this Nation well in Kosovo, let alone the possibility of asking ground troops to go in to fight what could be a massive war. Mr. Speaker, let me give my colleagues some examples that are very specific. One of our national defense technical media outlets is running a series of stories that, to me, are embarrassing. They have documents, one of which I will enter into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. These are internal memos of the Army where the Army is discussing the need to replace the survival radio gear that we provide the pilots and crew members on aircraft flying over hostile environments. This gear and equipment is essential because, if a plane is downed, as we saw with the F-117A, those pilots and those crew members have got to have a way to get a signal back so that we can go in and rescue them. These documents refer to those systems. Unfortunately in the internal memos of the Army, in discussing the availability of these devices to provide for our planes that are flying, not just over Kosovo, but also over Iraq in the peacekeeping role there and protecting the no-fly zone, this is what the Army is saying to those who are asking for these devices to put on these planes to protect our pilots, and I quote: ``We do not have any radios available to fill shortages.'' We do not have any radios available to fill shortages, referring to these devices that are so critically important for pilots that may be downed in either Iraq or in Kosovo from enemy fire. They go on to discuss the fact that we need to have some kind of protection for the pilots. So further on in the same memo, these are internal Army memos that I have been given by the medial outlets running these stories, this is a directive that has been issued by the Army, ``The pilot in command'' of the aircraft ``will continue to ensure that not less than one fully operational survival radio is on board the aircraft. This does not preclude crew members from carrying additional radios on board the aircraft as assets become available. In addition, the'' pilot in charge ``will ensure that crew members without radios have other means of signaling'', now listen to this, Mr. Speaker, either a ``foliage penetration flare kit and/or a signal mirror.'' Can we imagine, Mr. Speaker, that we are sending pilots and crew members into a hostile environment, whether it is over Iraq or Kosovo, and we are telling them, because we do not have enough equipment, that they should make sure that they have a signal mirror; that that is the method they are going to use to tell our rescue crews that they have been downed. In fact, Mr. Speaker, there was another story that ran a week or so ago where one of our Maryland units, I believe it is the 104th Air Reserve Squadron out of neighboring Maryland who is currently flying the missions over Iraq at this very moment, that the commanding officer has been quoted as saying that that unit had to go to local Radio Shack stores and buy GPS devices to give their pilots to carry on board these planes. Mr. Speaker, this is not some pie-in-the-sky make-believe threatening scenario. This is what is happening today with our military. How can we as the world's most powerful Nation there to provide security and leadership for NATO allow our pilots and their crews to fly combat missions without the appropriate equipment to guarantee the safety of their lives? Is it no wonder, Mr. Speaker, that the retention rate for our pilots in the Navy and the Air Force is the lowest rate today since World War II? The retention rate for Air Force and Navy pilots flying planes today over Kosovo and Iraq is below 20 percent. In one case, it is 15 percent. We wonder why these young pilots who we have invested so much money to train do not want to stay in. It is because we are not giving them the equipment they need. It is because their morale is suffering and because they are sick and tired of going from one deployment to the next. Instead of having time to come back to visit with our families, to visit with our children, they are being dispatched to Haiti, from Haiti to Somalia, from Somalia to Macedonia, from Macedonia to Bosnia, from Bosnia to Kosovo. The morale is suffering in a dramatic way, and we are seeing the result of that in a level of retention for pilots that we have not seen in the last 50 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we are seeing it in the ability to recruit new young people in the services. The Secretary of the Army just 1 month ago, because of shortages in the Army's ability to bring the new recruits, has proposed that we lower the standard of acceptance, that we now take young people in the Army who do not have high school diplomas. Here is the irony of that, Mr. Speaker, the Army's number one priority right now, which I fully support, is the digitized battlefield, to give the Army warrior of the 21st century an information technology capability second to none, a computer in the backpack so they have visual imaging, a GPS capability so in their goggles they can see what the pilots in our helicopters and our planes and our radar surveillance planes are seeing. At a time when we are making our soldiers digitized, able to be operating computers, we are having to lower the standard of acceptance in the Army to well below a high school diploma because we cannot fill the billets, because the morale in the services are suffering unlike any time, including 1970s, since World War II. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we have ships going out to sea, aircraft carriers short of 600 to 700 sailors from what the required rate of deployment and billets should be for a mission, 600 to 700 sailors short because we cannot provide the number of sailors to man the ships to do the functions that they are required to do in hostile environments. Mr. Speaker, these are facts. These are not ideas. These are not maybes. These are dependables. These things are happening today. We have a severe problem with our military. We are stretching it to the bone. Our military was not designed to become the world's police department where every time a conflict occurs, we send in the American troops. These are not robots. These are human beings with families, with loved ones. They deserve to be treated with dignity and respect. I appreciate President Clinton today or yesterday going down and speaking to the pilots who are flying our B-52s, real heroes for America and real heroes for the world that we are trying to protect. But I wish the President would have addressed one other thing when he spoke to them. I wish he would have told those pilots what we all know, that those B-52 bombers are going to be 75 years old before we can retire them, 75 years old and flying because we have undermined the base of financial support to provide new aircraft. That is what is critical to those pilots in those B-52s and those crews. It is not just enough to say they are American heroes. It also requires us to give them the new equipment, the training, the repairs, the kinds of support they need to do the job they are being asked to do. We are not doing that, Mr. Speaker. We are not modernizing the military because, over the past 6 years, we have cut program after program to put the money in to paying for these deployments because we do not have the dollars necessary to fund these deployments up front. This means that marines flying in the CH-46 workhorse helicopter that was built during the Vietnam War will be flying those helicopters when they are 55 years old. Those helicopters were designed to be flown for 20 to 25 years. The marines will have to fly the 46 when it is 55 years old because we have not replaced the 46 with the aircraft that is designed to take it out of service, because we have taken the money from that program and used it to fund these escapades around the world; and that is what they are, escapades. Critics would say to me, ``Well, wait a minute, Congressman Weldon, you are being critical of this President and this administration for all of these deployments. What about President Bush? Wasn't it President Bush back in 1991 in this 33 deployment rate who sent our troops to Desert Storm, a very large conflict?'' The answer is, yes, it was President Bush who sent our troops into Desert Storm. We did have a full and open debate in this body and the other body before those troops were committed to combat. We did one other thing, Mr. Speaker, or I should not say ``we did''. The President did. President Bush felt so strongly about the allied commitment in Desert Storm that he personally went to the major world leaders around the world, and he said something very simple to them. ``If you cannot send troops, then you must support this operation financially. But if you can send troops, we want your troops involved.'' Desert Storm was the largest multinational force that we have seen certainly in this decade. In fact, Mr. Speaker, Desert Storm cost the American taxpayer $51 billion, a huge sum of money. But, Mr. Speaker, President Bush got our allies to reimburse us $52 billion. There was no net cost to our defense budget. Each of these deployments, the reverse has occurred. Not only are the allies not reimbursing us for our costs, in places like Haiti, we are subsidizing the cost of other nations sending their troops in along with us. In fact, we are using American defense dollars to fund the support, the housing, the food, and the subsidization of other nations to bring their militaries into these deployments that we have become involved with. Mr. Speaker, the situation is getting grave. We on the Committee on Armed Services are getting ready to mark up our defense authorization bill. We have very serious problems. The Joint Chiefs have said publicly they need $19 billion more than what the President has in fact allocated. That does not include a pay raise for all the service personnel. That does not include service-wide adjustments to the retirement system that are needed. That does not include missile defenses, which are one of the fastest growing threats that we see emerging in the 21st Century. The estimate we have come up with is that we are short approximately $25 billion in the next fiscal year just to take care of our ongoing commitments. I say that, Mr. Speaker, because Kosovo has already cost us $2 billion. Where did that money come from? It came out of an already decreasing defense budget. Every major operation in the country has had to put dollars on the table to help fund the Kosovo deployment. We are going to have to pass a massive supplemental. I saw the report today where the long-term projected cost of Kosovo could exceed $10 billion to $15 billion alone. Mr. Speaker, I ask the question of our colleagues, where is that money going to come from? Where are we going to find that additional $10 billion to $15 billion when we cannot even fund the $19 billion to $25 billion shortfall that has been identified before Kosovo became an issue. We are in a massive crisis. In fact, Mr. Speaker, as I have spoken around the country, I have made the statement that this period of time, the 1990s, will go down in history as the worst decade in undermining our national security because of our increasing rate of deployment and our massive decreases in defense allocations. The two run in a diametrically opposite way, and we are feeling the crunch today. With all of these deployments, the Navy is being asked to do more and more assignments around the world. We are now dispatching another carrier over to the Kosovo theater; to the Balkan theater. The Navy at one time had 585 ships. If we listen to our Navy experts today, we are having trouble keeping our Navy at 300 ships, in spite of these massive increases in deployments around the world. Our fighter squadrons. We have fighter squadrons today, Mr. Speaker, where up to one-third of the planes are grounded because we are using them as spare parts to keep the other two-thirds in the air flying. Mr. Speaker, how long can this go on before the American people sense that something is terribly wrong? Is it going to take a massive loss of life? Are we going to have to see another case where soldiers are killed, as we saw 28 young Americans killed in 1991 when that low- complexity SCUD missile hit the barracks in Saudi Arabia that we could not defend against and we brought them home in body bags? It is a real fact, Mr. Speaker, that 8 years after that attack on our soldiers in Saudi Arabia with that SCUD missile that we have no highly effective system today to deal with the medium-range missiles that Iran and Iraq both now have, that North Korea has now deployed that threatens our troops in South Korea and threatens our troops in Japan. The growth of missile proliferation is providing threats to our troops that we do not have the money to build systems to defend against. The threat of weapons of mass destruction has caused the President to ask for billions of dollars of additional money to deal with the threats of the potential use of chemical, biological and small nuclear weapons, and I agree with his assessment of the threat. But, Mr. Speaker, we do not have the money. Mr. Speaker, perhaps the greatest threat, the threat of cyber terrorism, the use by a rogue nation or rogue group with high- performance computers to compromise our smart weapons and our civilian information systems, is requiring a massive increase in new dollars to deal with information warfare, and we do not have the money to put into that process. Mr. Speaker, I recite these facts because as we, my colleagues and I, are being asked to assess whether or not our troops should be deployed, both our helicopters which are already there and the troops that support them that are already there, and the potential follow-on of a larger group of troops going into Kosovo, we had better consider one very important thing: We had better be prepared to provide every ounce of support for those men and women that they need. That is going to require a significant new investment of money. That is going to require an effort that breaks the budget caps. It is going to require us to significantly increase the support to replace the Tomahawk cruise missiles, the guns and ammunition, the fuel, the lodging costs, and all those other associated costs that currently are in excess of $2 billion for the Kosovo deployment. Mr. Speaker, we better be prepared for one other debate as well. If we cannot sustain the level of our troop strength that we need, if we cannot reverse the decline in the retention of our pilots, especially Navy and Air Force pilots, if we cannot turn around the Army's problem of recruitment, the Navy's problem of filling its billets, if we cannot solve those problems, Mr. Speaker, I believe all my colleagues know what that means we will have to debate. That means we have to debate whether or not to consider reinstating the draft. Boy, all of a sudden does that raise eyebrows across the country. It is easy to say put the troops in. It is easy to say put American kids in harm's way. It is easy to say send planes over. But, Mr. Speaker, we need men and women to fly those planes, to fly those helicopters, to feed those troops. And if morale becomes such a problem because of our lack of support financially for our troops, what then do we do? If we cannot convince young people to voluntarily serve their country, and that is where we are heading, then, unfortunately, if we are going to see the administration keep this level of deployment up, we have got to find a way to get young people to fill those billets, to sail those ships, to man those helicopters, to fly those B-52s, to fly those F-117As. And if we cannot do that voluntarily, Mr. Speaker, that means we have to force people to serve our Nation to complete these operations that our commander-in-chief has gotten us into. These are not easy decisions. These are not easy circumstances where we can, sitting in our armchair, decide to send more robots into a theater and risk their lives. We have a problem with our military because we have not funded readiness, we have not funded modernization, we are not even giving the pilots the remote sensing gear they need if they are shot down. And if we cannot provide the support to keep those volunteers serving our country, then those Members of Congress who are standing before the national media, who are talking about putting our troops in harm's way, who are talking about sending tens of thousands of new troops into Kosovo, they better be prepared to address the issue of where do these young people come from. Because if we cannot provide the bodies, then we have to force young Americans to do what they did prior to the Vietnam War, and that is serve their country as a part of a national conscription effort. Mr. Speaker, I am not prepared to do that. I do not think we should be thinking about restoring the draft, but I also understand the reality of the situation we are in. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot deploy our troops 33 times, we cannot keep young people in Haiti, Macedonia, Somalia, the Balkans, in Bosnia, and put them in Kosovo, and have them handle floods and tornadoes and earthquakes and unrest in Central America, and rebuilding in Central America, and at the same time not have the bodies to fill those slots. It does not work that way. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have never heard this President deal with these issues. He has not talked about the need to provide additional support for our troops. He does not want to break the budget caps. He does not want to put the kind of money in that the Joint Chiefs have said publicly they need this year. And he is not willing to talk about the morale problems in the military. These are issues that we in the Congress cannot run away from. Defense is not a partisan issue. I am the first to admit publicly, Mr. Speaker, that Democrats in this body have been as supportive of defense as have Republicans, and some of our leading supporters of the military are Members of the Democrat party. An overwhelming number of our Republicans are strong supporters of our military. I want to speak to those other Members of the Congress who want to put our troops in harm's way but who want to cut the defense budget even further than what it is now. Mr. Speaker, we cannot let that happen. Every one of those Members of Congress who goes on national TV, who stands in the well of this body and talks about committing our troops, talks about humanitarian efforts, talks about saving lives and taking people out of wheelbarrows to give them homes, they better be prepared to vote for the money and the support to deal with the morale problems, the readiness problems, the modernization problems that we have in the military today. Because that is what this debate needs to focus on. This is not about undermining the leadership of our country. This is about giving those men and women asked to go into harm's way the tools they need to do their job. We need to have this debate across America, and I hope, as we get closer to a decision on how to proceed with Kosovo, we continue to understand that every day we are there is costing us, by one estimate I saw, $30 million an hour. Thirty million dollars an hour of U.S. tax money that we do not know where it is coming from. Thirty million dollars an hour that the U.S. is putting up, that we are shouldering the bulk of the responsibility for. These costs have to come from someplace, and this body needs to find a way to provide the additional resources to pay for those operational costs and not rob other accounts that force us to fly aircraft well beyond their life expectancy, that forces morale to continue to drop, that forces our pilots to want to get out and make money in the private sector, and that forces those people flying those bombing missions and those security missions over Iraq and Kosovo at this very hour to not have the necessary equipment so that if they are shot down they can alert our rescue crews to come in and know where they are to get them out quickly and safely. Mr. Speaker, the challenges before us are great. This country needs to understand all the dimensions of the Kosovo deployment. This country needs to understand that we cannot afford to be fair weather friends of the brave men and women who serve this country. It is not just enough to stand up and wave the flag and say ``I am behind the troops.'' We must be prepared to take care of all the extra costs that are associated with these 33 deployments, many of which our troops are still involved with around the world today. I ask my colleagues to consider these facts as we move further into a very nasty and dangerous situation far away from the homes and the towns where these brave Americans live.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight in what I hope will be a nightly discussion in this body on what I think is one of the most dangerous involvements of our military in recent time; that is the ongoing situation in Kosovo. It is my hope that Members on both sides of the aisle will rise on the House floor at the end of each day's session, as we saw to some extent in the 5-minute special orders today, to discuss the current situation, what our plans are, to interact and engage with the administration, not necessarily in a partisan way, but in a way to look for solutions that bring dignity to the people of Kosovo, that bring stability and sense back to the Balkans, and that provide the best possible course of action for the safety of American soldiers and those who are currently involved and those who might be involved in the Balkan Theater. Let me first of all say that this should be constructive discussion, again, and should not be based on partisan rhetoric or name calling. Now, with our troops deployed in the air assault, should not be the time for us to tear down past actions even though we may disagree with them. But I think two things are certainly clear that we should make at the beginning of each of our discussions, so that no one can misinterpret the debate or the discussion in this country about America's position in Kosovo. The first is that no one, including Milosevic, should underestimate America's resolve to stop the torture, the ethnic cleansing and the bloodshed that he has perpetrated on the people of his nation and especially the people of Kosovo. He should understand that Republicans and Democrats are united in their resolve to make sure that he is held accountable for the atrocities that he has perpetrated on innocent people. No one should underestimate our resolve in that area. The second point that we should make clear at the outset is a simple one and one that we all agree on, and that is that we unequivocally support our troops. They are in harm's way right now. They have our full prayers and blessings. Each and every one of our colleagues in this body and the other body are doing everything possible to give our men and women serving on behalf of this Nation all the support, the resources, the tools, and the equipment and protection they need to carry out their mission. Those two things are unmistakable. Those two things are not in the debate. We are committed to deal with Milosevic as a Congress and as a country, and we are behind the President in that. We are committed to support our troops in their deployment that they are currently pursuing. But, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned with some of the rhetoric that I am hearing on the talk shows. I have done appearances on the networks and today with CNN. I am listening to some of my colleagues and some of the discussion from the think tank experts inside the beltway here who are moving very rapidly toward the notion that we should prepare or, if not prepare, that we should actually deploy American troops on the ground. Mr. Speaker, this is a very dangerous decision that we must consider carefully, completely, and thoroughly. Even though I did not agree with the President's initial position to get us involved in a NATO-sponsored air campaign, I do think that we need to have a discussion about where we go from here. I think all of us listened to the White House tell us that perhaps a short period of time would transpire, when we started the aerial assault, and then Milosevic would in fact give in. Unfortunately, we are now into weeks instead of days, and there does not seem to appear to be a lessening of Milosevic's resolve. But before we move into the next phase and prepare or actually send in American ground troops, we in this body had better have some very serious discussion and debate about what our policy is and what it should be, because committing ground troops carries heavy burdens. I think we still have some other options. The ground troops from America should only be committed as a final resort, as a last resort when we have depleted and used up all other options that are available to us. I am convinced that we have not yet reached that point. In fact, I think we have some very serious things that we could be doing, which I will outline in a few moments. I also want to make the point very clearly, Mr. Speaker, that when our colleagues and when the pundits inside the beltway talk about deploying our troops, they need to understand what that means. It is too easy for Members of Congress to say ``send in the troops.'' These are not robots we are talking about. These are human beings. They are the sons and the daughters and the moms and dads of the American people. When we commit our young people and our military personnel to go into harm's way, we had better have thought through the actual activity for which they are going to be involved. We better think about the objectives. We better think about the danger to their lives. In fact, Mr. Speaker, my concern is that some of the people inside of this beltway want to commit our troops too quickly, and that has resulted in a terrible problem that we are not now trying to deal with within the military. In fact, let me show a chart here, Mr. Speaker, which I think sums up the situation very well. In the years from World War II until 1990 and 1991, all of the commanders in chief during that time period that started with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry Truman and then went on to John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan and George Bush, in all of those years, under all of those Presidents, Republicans and Democrats alike, they committed our troops just 10 times, 10 deployments in 40 years, only where it was absolutely essential to put our troops in harm's way. From 1991 until today with the Kosovo deployment, we have seen our troops deployed 33 times. Ten times in 40 years, 33 times in the last 8 years. Mr. Speaker, none of these 33 deployments were budgeted for or paid for in advance. The cost for all of these deployments came out of an already decreasing defense budget. Bosnia up until now has cost the American taxpayers $10 billion. All of that had to be eaten out of other defense requirements and priorities or had to be funded through special supplemental appropriations. Kosovo, in the short period of time we have been deployed there, has cost the American taxpayer $2 billion, and the daily price tag for Kosovo is increasing exponentially. Members of Congress and pundits in Washington who are quick to want to commit our troops to this 33rd ground deployment need to understand that we have not identified, first of all, a way to pay for this operation. But that is not the largest issue involved here, Mr. Speaker. Because we have deployed our troops 33 times in 8 years, because we have sent our troops from Macedonia, to Bosnia, to Somalia, to Haiti, to domestic situations, from Kuwait to now the deployment in Kosovo, the morale among our young people in the military is starting to suffer. Today, Mr. Speaker, the retention rate for pilots in the Navy and the Air Force is the lowest it has been since World War II. The Army is having such a difficult time recruiting young people to go into the Army that they are now resorting to lowering the threshold. Secretary Caldera has suggested that we should now allow non-high school graduates to sign up for Army service. In fact, we have Navy ships at sea today who are 600 and 700 sailors short from the required optimum strength that they should be carrying in the deployments that they are completing. These situations are not happening in a vacuum, Mr. Speaker. They are happening because of this deployment rate of committing our troops month after month around the world in a number of situations which requires these young people to be away from their families and children for much longer periods of time. In addition to morale problems, the cutbacks in our funding necessary to pay for these deployments are causing us to stretch out programs so that we are not modernizing our military the way we should. I understand that President Clinton will be, or maybe he did today deliver a speech to our B-52 pilots. I am glad he did that. It is important to let them know that we are behind them. But I wish the President would address to them the fact that those B-52s are going to be flying when they are 75 years old because we have not provided the funding to replace those aircraft in a more timely manner. That is the real tragedy of what we are doing with our rapid deployment, with our increased OPTEMPO rate, and yet not providing the support to maintain the readiness of our troops that they so desperately need. All of those factors must be considered in the equation of whether or not America should put ground troops into Kosovo. I think it is a very serious challenge that we have ahead of us, Mr. Speaker, in considering whether or not we should support the administration's efforts to move forward with a multinational ground force, especially one that involves U.S. troops. We need to understand that unless this Congress is prepared to address the issues that are causing morale problems in the services today, that are causing retention rates to be at the lowest point ever, to cause young military personnel to want to leave the service instead of reenlisting, then we have got a major problem. I would challenge our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, that are so adamant today about committing ground troops. Are they prepared to support the reinstatement of the draft if we continue to have problems with young people not signing up for the military? Are they willing to vote to reinstate the draft, as we did during the Vietnam War, to suck young people in, to force them to go into combat? That could be the need if we continue to have the problems that we are having because of the deployment of troops today around the world, troops that continue to provide cover in Haiti, continue to be in Bosnia, continue to be in Somalia, continue to be in Kuwait, continue to be in Macedonia, and now may be expected to go into Kosovo perhaps even in large numbers. Mr. Speaker, I think the Kosovo deployment that is being talked about now by the U.N., whether it is under the title of peacekeeping or a military force, is going to involve conflict, it is going to involve hostile actions, it is going to involve casualties, and it is going to involve loss of life. Before we make that commitment, this Congress needs to make sure that we have explored every other option. Mr. Speaker, I come to the House floor tonight because I do not think we have explored every other option. I want to present one and I want to challenge the administration tonight to follow through on my suggestion. Mr. Speaker, as many of our colleagues know, I focus a lot of my time on dealing with Russia. I formed and I chair the congressional initiative between our Congress and the Russian parliament, the State Duma. I have been to Russia a number of times. I host members of the Duma when they come to Washington, and I interact with Duma leaders on a regular basis. In fact, of the 450 members of the State Duma, I know over 150 members personally, including the leaders of all the seven main factions that lead the State Duma in their deliberations. In fact, I was supposed to speak at Harvard University before the end of April to the visiting class of Duma deputies that Harvard runs a training program for each year to give them the orientation of the way our Congress works in America so that the Russian Duma can learn from our experiences. Last week, the Russian Duma canceled the next visit that they were planning to make to Harvard. They canceled that visit because of the Kosovo situation. Last week, Mr. Speaker, I talked to my friend in the Duma on the phone, after having met with a couple of Russian leaders in person at a conference last week in Philadelphia. One of my friends who is a senior leader of the support of the Russian Duma told me that in the 7 years since the reforms in Russia he had never seen the hostile feelings toward America as he is seeing right now because of Kosovo. In fact, he told me that almost every Duma deputy from the radical fringe of the communist and the LDPR's Zhirinovsky faction to the moderate members of the Duma and Yabloko faction, every member of the Duma is expressing outrage, outrage not only at the continual bombing in Kosovo, the bombing of Serbia, but outrage that Russia was not brought into a fuller dialogue in trying to find a way to end this crisis. In fact, one of my friends told me that it is a dangerous situation in Russia right now. With President Yeltsin having illness problems and, I think, widely acknowledged as not being in total control of what is happening in Russia, there is more and more feeling that Russia may do things that create serious instability between the U.S. and Russia. That would be an international tragedy. If Russia were to start supplying military equipment to the Serbians or if Russia were to even think about providing support in terms of forces to the Serbs, we would have a very, very dangerous and volatile situation. We need to understand, Mr. Speaker, that there are some alternatives, and at least one that should be pursued. I understand that the President's initial action through NATO was to have the NATO countries, through a massive air campaign, bomb Milosevic into submission. Up until now, that has not worked. It may work in the future. And according to our President, we are in there for the long haul. That is going to be a terrible price we are going to pay both in terms of destruction to innocent people and buildings, also in terms of dollar investments on the part of the U.S. My concern is that if we do not think through this process, we could see a situation where Russia could enter this conflict on the other side. I have no doubt that we would be victorious and that we would win any such battle. But, Mr. Speaker, we do not want Kosovo to be the start of a world war or a major conflict involving two nations with very capable nuclear weapons. On Friday evening, Mr. Speaker, I received a telephone call from two of my friends in Russia who are involved in the State Duma. They had faxed to me earlier that day a memo asking if I would review a preliminary plan that they had put together that would perhaps provide a solution to end the hostilities in Kosovo. I read the document. I talked to the individuals on the telephone. I assessed their feelings about the Duma rallying behind this initiative. And then I called senior leaders in the administration to let them know that this had occurred and that I thought it was worthy of consideration. Over the weekend, I had additional discussions. Today I talked to Members on both sides of the aisle, senior leaders of both parties, about their thoughts on the ideas presented by the members of the Russian Duma for our consideration. The individuals who called me, Mr. Speaker, asked me to give them my response about whether or not their ideas are realistic to begin a discussion. Mr. Speaker, I think their ideas are worthy of consideration, and I encourage the administration to move in beginning negotiations which we could assist with in the Congress in terms of supporting, finding a new solution to the hostilities in Kosovo. First of all, Mr. Speaker, the Russian side proposed to me that Russia would guarantee to the international community that no more ethnic homicide or ethnic cleansing would be carried on in Kosovo. The Russian side would guarantee that to the international community. The second initiative that was proposed by the Russian side was that Russia would see that Milosevic agreed to the agreements reached at the contact working group of the NATO coalition in Rambouillet. So the Russians were proposing as their second condition that Milosevic come to the table agreeing to the Rambouillet accords, which the President has said are critical. The one caveat that they mentioned was that they thought that the international peacekeeping force that would be put into Kosovo to guarantee the security and the stability for the Kosovars to make sure that conflict ended and to guarantee the rights of those citizens would not involve the militaries of any of those nations that are today bombing Serbia, that those nations that would make up the ground forces to implement the agreement and the Rambouillet accord would come from nations that are not today involved in direct hostilities against the Serbs. In fact, the Russians even proposed some example countries. They suggested perhaps that these troops could come from Poland, the Netherlands, Greece, Albania, even Russia itself, and other European nations who have not been involved in the bombing campaign against the Serbs. Mr. Speaker, I think that makes absolute sense to have a multinational force to enforce the accords that were reached in Kosovo to protect the Kosovars, overseen by troops from countries that are not involved in the hostilities today, who would then report to NATO as to the progress of enforcing the agreed-upon arrangements that were negotiated under NATO's leadership. The third recommendation that the Russians proposed to me, Mr. Speaker, was that we establish a bilateral commission, a bilateral commission that in fact would be assembled in an informal way to monitor the Albanian Government's compliance, the Serbian Government's compliance with the agreed-upon framework established by NATO so that the parliamentarians of both nations would be involved. Not to set foreign policy, not to overrule or supersede the authority of the one leader we have in America, and that is our President, but to make sure from a parliamentary standpoint that all aspects of both governments, both parties in this country and all seven factions in Russia were, on a daily basis, monitoring the compliance to the peace accords that had been reached, which Milosevic would have agreed to. Mr. Speaker, I think these initiatives are worthy of discussion. I think these initiatives are the direction that we should be going in terms of dialoguing with Russia about the situation in Kosovo and our relationship with Serbia. I am not saying it is the end-all or the cure-all or a perfect solution. But this is far better to talk about than to talk about preparing Americans to go into a ground war campaign and to look at killing more lives. Someone at some point in time is going to have to pay to rebuild Serbia and Kosovo. We need to understand that it should be our top priority today to find a peaceful way out of this conflict that allows dignity and respect for NATO, that allows dignity and respect for the process that we use, that allows Russia to regain the dignity in their relationship in the past with Serbia, and that shows Milosevic that neither Russia nor the U.S. nor the allied nations will tolerate the kind of actions that he has perpetrated on the people of Kosovo. That is the opportunity, Mr. Speaker, that we have right now. I have offered to my Russian friends to engage them wherever that might take place. They have talked about coming here. If need be, we could go there. But we need to find a way to proactively engage Russia in this solution. I also think there is one other point that we should make, Mr. Speaker. The American taxpayers each year put approximately $600 million to $1 billion of U.S. tax money into the Russian economy. We do it through the cooperative threat reduction. We do it through economic development assistance through the Department of Commerce. We do it through the Defense Department with joint military programs and exchanges. We do it through the Environmental Protection Agency through environmental initiatives. We do it through a multitude of agencies and operations of the Federal Government. Not only do I think it is in our interest to have Russia be more involved, I think Russia has a responsibility. America has been very helpful in securing additional funding for the replenishment of the IMF so that Russia can continue to work economically. America has been very aggressive in helping Russia deal with environmental problems, nuclear stabilization. In fact, the President just proposed this year an increase of $1.4 billion over 5 years to further help Russia stabilize its nuclear arsenal. It is time that we called Russia in, not just through a long distance phone call, but in a real and substantive way, with all factions involved, from the radical left to the radical right, in helping us solve the problem of Kosovo in a way that reduces the risk of losing more lives, of damaging more property, and in a way that could lead to a further escalation of conflict. So, Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight and I challenge the administration to take up the challenge that was given to me by my Russian friends who want to see us find a peaceful way, a peaceful way out of what is becoming a terrible tragedy and yet a peaceful way that recognizes that Milosevic is dead wrong and must be dealt with in an aggressive, firm way. There is still that possibility. We must take up that effort. And we must stop the talking about a ground war operation, a ground campaign and subjecting young Americans in a way that is going to cost lives and cause serious hardship for American families.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich).

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development and a senior member of the Committee on Science, I am extremely concerned about our Nation's investment of public money into research and development and new technologies. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the R&D accounts for defense are expected to decline by about 14 percent. Part of my goal in this session of Congress is to make the need for research and technology real for all of our colleagues, for our staff, as well as for the American people. To that end, an historic event will take place on April 6 and 7 of this year in Philadelphia at the brand new convention center. Working with Mayor Ed Rendell and the entire delegations of the four States of New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland, all 41 House Members and 8 Senators, we have assembled what in fact will be the largest technology conference of its type in the history of America. For the 2 days of April 6 and 7, every Federal agency that spends research money in America will be in attendance. They will exhibit the kinds of technologies that they are buying today and will give us a look at the kinds of technologies and research that they expect to be funding over the next 10 years. This will truly be an opportunity for all of America to see where we are investing tax dollars in new technologies. It will be an opportunity for scientists and academics and young people to look at the emerging technologies that we should be funding in the future that they perhaps can compete for. For the 2 days in Philadelphia, we will have Dr. Neil Lane, the White House's top point person on science and technology; from the Department of Defense, Dr. John Hamre, Deputy Secretary; we will have Jack Gansler, in charge of acquisition and research; Frank Fernandez, who heads DARPA; Admiral Lyles, who heads missile defense; Admiral Gaffney, who heads naval research. We will have Dan Golden, the head of NASA, who will talk about NASA's investment. We will have Dr. Varmus, the head of NIH; Jim Baker, the head of NOAA. We will have the head of the National Institutes for Science and Technology and the deputy director of the National Science Foundation. Each of these individuals, the top leaders from our government who focus on research and technology, will be available to answer questions and to present a broad overview of the kinds of technology that America needs to focus on in the 21st Century. During the 2 days we will also have breakout sessions, approximately 20 of them, that will be centered around specific technology areas: information technology, environmental technology, materials technology, technology relative to oceans and outer space, so that young scientists, entrepreneurs and academics can get a feel of where we are spending America's tax money and how we can better spend that money and leverage it to create new opportunities for us to improve our quality of life. My purpose today is to invite all of our colleagues to come to Philadelphia for April 6 and 7, to invite all the staff members from the House, as well as the other body, and to invite people and companies from all over America to come and look at what we are calling Tech Trends 2000, the kind of technology that we expect to be focusing on in the next millennium. It is our opportunity to show America where their $80 billion a year of R&D investment is going and how they can take advantage of that. So I encourage our colleagues to invite their university research leaders, to invite their companies, to invite students. Students, graduate and undergraduate, can come to this entire conference for free. There is a small charge for the private companies that would come. It is a golden opportunity to see where America is going in terms of technology in the 21st Century. It is a bipartisan opportunity. It is an opportunity where the Congress is working hand-in-hand with the White House and all the various Federal agencies, so I encourage my colleagues to attend. It is called Tech Trends 2000. Contact a Member of Congress any place in America, who can get information about this conference and how one can take advantage of this golden opportunity.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the gentleman.