Curt Weldon

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 98, 105th Congress, I move that the House do now adjourn.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise to spend the last few moments before we break for the Memorial Day work period to discuss an issue that has been in the national news this week and that has occupied the minds of most of our colleagues in this body and the other body; and that is the issue of proliferation. We have seen a lot of discussion in the national media about the most recent transfer of technology from American corporations, most specifically the Loral Corporation, the Hughes Corporation, to China that may, in fact, jeopardize our national security and pose threats to us. The issue of proliferation, Mr. Speaker, is not a new one. In fact, a week and a half ago, on May 13, I did a 40-minute special order on this floor where I documented in the public record 37 specific cases over the past 6 years of proliferation by Russia and China to Iran, Iraq, to India and Pakistan. At that time, I said to our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, that we must take more aggressive action in imposing sanctions and enforcing requirements provided in our arms control agreements. This week, Mr. Speaker, we have seen some of the results of that lack of inaction in enforcing those arms control agreements. In fact, we have seen the escalation of the conflict and the rhetoric and saber rattling between India and Pakistan. Much of that technology, Mr. Speaker, that both of those Nations now have came from both Russia and China. We should have and could have stopped that proliferation. Iran and Iraq are both now developing medium range missiles. Iran will have one within 12 to 18 months. Again that technology came from Russia. Again, our action should have been able to stop it. The Congress is talking about proliferation. And the White House, through spokesman Mike McCurry, has basically said it is a knee-jerk reaction, that the Congress is now voting as we did yesterday on the defense authorization bill to limit the transfer of technology to China. I would remind the White House, Mr. Speaker, that it was back in November of last year that this Congress voted overwhelmingly with almost 400 votes to force the administration to impose sanctions on Russia because of transfers to Iran. Mr. Speaker, this is a serious issue, but I want to leave our colleagues with two important points. First of all, let us make sure that when we impanel this special task force, the select committee, after we return from the break, that we do not politicize it. The issue is national security. We must focus in a very deliberate way on what damage has been caused by the most recent transfer of technology by the Loral Corporation to China. We must not allow this special select committee to be politicized by either side of the aisle. Secondarily, Mr. Speaker, we must remember that, while we must investigate whether or not the Chinese government deliberately try to acquire this technology and circumvent our laws, we must not rush to judgment, because trade with China is critical and important. My concern is that we not overreact, overreacting then causing further isolation in our relationships with China. Mr. Speaker, we saw a situation like this occur just a few short years ago when the President initially refused to grant a waiver for a visa for Taiwan President Li Teng-hui to come speak at his alma mater at Cornell. The day after that rejection by the administration, the Congress overwhelmingly voted in both bodies to overturn the President and allow President Li Teng-hui to come here, as I think he should have been able to do. The problem is that we sent mixed signals to China. China read that as a deliberate slap in their face. That then partially led to the escalation of what could have been a very serious conflict as we sent our carrier battle groups up on the straits of Taiwan. We do not need another confrontation with China. We must get to the bottom of what happened in the Loral technology transfer. We must have Members on both sides of the aisle who are serious sit down behind closed doors and assess whether or not our security has been jeopardized. When we are done, if, in fact, it has been jeopardized, we must then determine why the administration took the actions they took. We must then take steps to deal with the results of what we have found. Until that happens, we must reserve our rhetoric; we must make sure that we base our decisions on fact. I would encourage our colleagues to think carefully about this over the break because, when we return in June, this will be the major issue that will be the focus of this body and the Nation through the rest of this summer.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I first of all thank my distinguished chairman for yielding me this time, and thank again our ranking member for his cooperation. I will speak briefly. I have four amendments, all of which are in the en bloc, or five amendments, actually. One is a noncontroversial amendment I have cosponsored with the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Pickett) clarifying our R&D section of the bill. A second clarifies our jurisdiction over next generation internet, to make sure that all the funding for next generation internet paid for by the Department of Defense is, in fact, authorized by the defense authorization bill. The third amendment, Mr. Chairman, deals with the issue of a nuclear race cooperative program with Russia, a very severe problem. It allows our military, where they desire, to in fact exchange cooperative assistance to the Russians in cleaning up what is, in fact, a very real problem with their spent nuclear fuel and with their deactivated nuclear submarines. The two major amendments I wanted to focus on, first off all is the THAAD amendment. We had, unfortunately, the fifth unsuccessful test of the THAAD program. Working with my colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), we have gone in and we have tweaked the contractor. We are giving the Department of Defense the authorization to impose liability on any further failures of the test of THAAD. We break off the missile program to allow the radar and the BMC cube to move forward. They are both very successful. And we say to the Pentagon, bring in a second contractor team to help oversee the THAAD program. And, finally, the last amendment I do with a distinguished Member, who is the ranking member, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), and that is to look at the whole issue of how we respond to terrorist incidents. The gentleman from Missouri has been a lead in the body. He has, in fact, requested four consecutive GAO reports on the problems associated with response to planning for weapons of mass destruction and terrorist activities in this country. My subcommittee has held five hearings on this issue. There are severe problems. James Lee Witt, the head of FEMA, just recently pulled FEMA out of the directorate role because of confusion. What we say to the administration is, it is time to step back and look at reorganizing this process to be more efficient and effective in responding to terrorist incidents.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding to me, and let me join in this side of the aisle in welcoming our newest Member to Congress. Bob, you represent the American dream. You are here today with your family and your friends and all those carpenters and those building trade workers around Pennsylvania and the region are here with you because they understand the fight that you have taken, the fight for jobs and better working conditions for people throughout our region. As you know, I represented at one point in time or another probably a third to a half of the district that you now have. I had southwest Philadelphia and the Delaware County waterfront area that is now a part of your district. They are all good people. They are just like you. The reason why Bob Brady is going to be such a great Member of Congress is he has never forgotten his roots. He understands that this job in the end is really about helping those people that you have walked the streets with, that you have actually helped in constructing our city and our region. We are all very happy and pleased to have you here. As a Republican with the great State of Pennsylvania, we join with you as what is a tradition in our State, bipartisan cooperation on behalf of our people. Congratulations and best wishes.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank first of all my good friend the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Stump) for his leadership and for my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) for his leadership. This is truly a bipartisan committee, and this is truly a bipartisan bill. And this effort aimed at China and our concerns on proliferation is a bipartisan concern. I, like my colleagues, will attest to the fact that Members on the other side have been equally aggressive to Members on our side in focusing on the proliferation problem. There has not been a division that is a political division. In fact, we have been very much united when it comes to proliferating activities, not just by China but also by Russia and other entities, North Korea and so forth. I also rise to say that I have been one who has supported the President on China policy. I voted for MFN. In fact, in the last session of Congress, I took two delegations to China. I was the first policymaker from this country to be asked to address a group of mid- level officers in the PLA at the National Defense University in Beijing. Twice I interacted with them. Twice I discussed with them our concerns about proliferation and our concerns about our security relationship. I plan to go back to China again this year. I believe in the policy of engagement with China. But I rise today to, in the strongest possible terms, relate to our colleagues in this body that we have a problem. The proliferation that has continually taken place by China and also by other nations, especially Russia, has got to be stopped. Mr. Chairman, the problem is over the past several years, it actually was not just under this administration, to some extent it was done in previous administrations, in looking at our arms control agreements that are the basis of our bilateral relationships with Russia and in this case China, we have not enforced those agreements when we have caught proliferators selling off and transferring technologies to other nations. Mr. Chairman, tomorrow there will be an op ed in the L.A. Times which will summarize my point in very great detail, as I did last Wednesday night on the floor of this body. Thirty-eight separate times in the past 7 years we have had documented cases of proliferating activities coming from two countries, coming from Russia and coming from China. Those proliferating activities have sent technology in the area of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons and missile technology to Iran, Iraq, India and Pakistan. Now we face the music. We face a crisis. India and Pakistan are saber rattling each other with technology that we could have stopped, if we would have taken aggressive action to stop that proliferation from occurring, which is a requirement of a number of arms control agreements, the missile technology control regime, the Arms Export Control Act and a whole host of other agreements. If we would have taken steps to impose sanctions in more than half of those 38 occasions, let alone just the three where sanctions were imposed, I would argue we would not be in the position we are in today. It is absolutely imperative that this body and this committee support the leadership on both sides of the aisle, pass these four amendments and send a signal to China that we will not tolerate any future proliferation of technology, any missile technology, any nuclear technology to Pakistan or any other Nation. Because that then causes us to have to spend more money to defeat that threat once it emerges in some other Nation's hands. So I support my chairman, I support my ranking member, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Stump), and my ranking Democrat, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), on their leadership, and I urge all of our colleagues to vote ``yes'' on each of the amendments that will be brought before us shortly.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank our distinguished committee chairman, who is one of our outstanding leaders in this body on issues involving national security and support for our troops and our veterans, and the ranking member. The two of them are a dynamic team. They work together. They both come from the same common perspective on the defense for this Nation, and they really set the right tone for the committee. It is because of their leadership that we had a 50 to 1 vote to get our bill out of committee, and most of our subcommittees likewise had very solid votes in reporting out their portions of this bill, so I want to applaud both of them and all the members of our committee who work so well together on the issue of our country's national security. Mr. Chairman, I rise for this brief period of time to say that, unfortunately, I think we are facing a train wreck unlike any that we have seen, certainly in the 12 years I have been in Congress and I think really in the history of this country, involving national security. The train wreck is being caused by, unfortunately, a number of things coming together all at one time. I think it is going to peak at around the turn of the century. I want to go through that briefly. The American people have been led to believe that we are spending so much more money on defense today than we have in the past. I use a simple comparison. When John Kennedy was President, it was a time of relative peace. It was after Korea and before Vietnam. We were spending 52 cents of every tax dollar on the military, 9 percent of our GNP. In this year's budget we are spending 16 cents of the Federal tax dollar on the military, about 2.9 percent of our GNP on defense. So, in fact, the relative percentage of total Federal dollars on the military has dwindled dramatically. This is the 14th consecutive year of real cuts in defense spending. Unfortunately, as that defense number comes down, some other things have happened. First of all, in John Kennedy's era, we had the draft. Young people were taken out of high school, they served the country for 2 years, and they were paid far below the minimum wage. They were not married. They did not have the expenses a married person would have. That is not the case today. We have an all-volunteer force, well- educated, maybe with college degrees, many married and with children, education costs, housing costs, transportation costs to move these families around the world, so a much larger percentage of that smaller amount of money goes for the quality of life of our troops. Mr. Chairman, we know we are always going to fund quality of life for our troops. But some other things have occurred since the John Kennedy era. In the last 6 years alone, Mr. Chairman, we have seen our troops deployed 25 times at home and abroad. That is a lot of deployments. Let us compare the last 6 years to the previous 40 years, where our troops were only deployed 10 times. In these 25 deployments in the last 6 years, while defense spending has gone down dramatically, none of those deployments have been budgeted for. So to pay for all those deployments, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and the domestic deployments here at home, we have had to take money out of the modernization of the next generation of equipment to support our troops. We have had to rob the R&D accounts. In fact, Bosnia alone will have cost us, by the end of this fiscal year, $9.4 billion. We are facing a crisis, Mr. Chairman. We do not have the money to put into modernization. We do not have the money for R&D. The President says, close more bases. We are not going to get around to base closing because the process was politicized 3 years ago. All of this happens at a time when, in the year 2000, we are being asked to fund a new aircraft carrier, a new attack submarine, DD-21s. We are being asked to fund three new tactical aviation programs, the F- 22, the joint strike fighter, and the F/A-18 E&F, the Commanche for the Army, the V-22 for the Marine Corps. We are being asked to fund national missile defense, theater missile defense systems, none of which are properly budgeted. For the Army after next, digitize the battlefield, and give the Navy the spy war system they need to get on the cutting edge of technology. In addition, we are being asked by the Defense Science Board to put $4 million more into information warfare, and we are being asked to put more money into antiterrorism. Mr. Chairman, all of those factors add up to disaster. By the turn of the century, if this Congress does not begin to address defense in a realistic way, this country is going to be in for a rude awakening. In fact, some of our generals are already telling us, as we had General Tilelli come in and General Prueher of the U.S. Pacific Command. U.S. Pacific Command reported deficiencies in six of the eight measured areas that they have responsibility for. The Navy's U.S. Pacific fleet has only 73 percent of the young sailors it needs. There is an almost 10 percent shortage in Navy noncommissioned officers. The Hawaii-based fleet lacks 1,900 sailors who have key technical skills. The Air Force units in the Pacific area, a serious manning shortage, which we can correct in the short term. We do not have enough spare parts. We have some air wings where one- third of the planes are not flying because we have cannibalized them to keep the other two-thirds flying. This same pattern exists for both the Army and the Marine Corps. Mr. Chairman, we are doing the best we can this year in an impossible budget situation, but this Congress had better understand that if we do not change direction and begin to put some additional dollars into the defense of this country to modernize and take care of our R&D needs, or if we do not begin to reduce the deployment level, or get our allies to put more money on the table to pay for these deployments, we are going to face I think one of the most politically damaging situations that this country will have ever faced involving national security. I urge my colleagues to pay attention to this debate tomorrow on this bill.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I do not rise to speak in the well to talk about scandals in this city. Many of my colleagues do, and many of our colleagues talk about the latest scandal of the day, whether it is in the White House or from other parts of our society. I do not like to do that, and in fact, I have not done that. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk about, first of all, an issue that I usually speak about on the floor when I get the opportunity. That is our national security, and our relationship with those countries who have been our adversary, or who may be our adversary in the future. Tonight, unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I rise to talk about both of those issues, our national security and a scandal that is currently unfolding that I think will dwarf every scandal that we have seen talked about on this floor in the past 6 years. Mr. Speaker, this scandal involves potential treason, and if in fact the facts are true as they have been outlined in media reports, which we are currently trying to investigate, I think will require articles of impeachment. Mr. Speaker, there was a story that ran in the New York Times in the early part of April that outlined a technology transfer involving American companies and institutions in China involving the Long March space launch vehicle. In February of 1996 the Long March space launch vehicle exploded, blew up, and destroyed a $200 million satellite built by the Loral Company that it was supposed to place into orbit. What happened after that explosion, Mr. Speaker, is the subject of intense investigation right now, but there are some facts that we do know. What we do know is that there was some degree of cooperation between one and perhaps two American companies and the Chinese government and their military and space agencies that allowed for a technology transfer to assist the Chinese in not just their commercial space launch program, but, more importantly, their ability to place long range missiles into the upper atmosphere and have a capability of deploying multiple warheads, posing an extremely significant threat to the U.S. and our allies. The military significance of the technology transfer that took place following this explosion was of such gravity that a criminal investigation was opened by the U.S. Justice Department, and a grand jury was empaneled. The grand jury was empaneled to consider whether indictments were warranted in this cooperative technology transfer with the Chinese. However, before any formal charges were filed, the criminal inquiry was dealt a very serious blow two months ago, in fact, this would have been in February or March of this year, when President Clinton quietly authorized the export to China of similar technology by one of the companies under investigation, the Loral Corporation. So in effect, the President's quiet authorization of this technology transfer, which up until this time was not allowed under U.S. law, basically took the entire foundation away from the Justice Department investigation. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we know the Justice Department opposed that decision by the White House, arguing that it would be much more difficult to prosecute the companies if the government gave its blessing to the deal that had occurred. In fact, it is probably now impossible to have any indictments against Loral and Hughes because of the President's actions. Why is this a scandal, Mr. Speaker? First of all, and I am going to get into this in great detail, this, perhaps, will do as much harm to our security as that situation that occurred years ago when the Russians were able to get our quieting technology that they basically illegally acquired, that allowed them to build their submarines in a quiet manner that makes it extremely difficult and in some cases impossible for our U.S. intelligence sources to monitor these submarines as they travel across the oceans of the world. This is a very egregious violation of transferring technology that directly threatens the U.S. and our people, as well as our allies. But in addition, Mr. Speaker, the American people need to understand something else about the Loral Corporation. First of all, the CEO of the Loral Corporation, Mr. Schwartz, was the largest contributor to the Democratic National Committee in the year during which this entire process occurred. That in itself raises some concerns. The questions that need to be answered are, did the CEO of Loral Corporation's involvement in contributing hundreds of thousands of dollars of personal wealth to one political party affect the President's decision to waive a requirement that basically undermined a judicial investigation, a criminal judicial investigation of this incident? We are attempting to find that out right now, Mr. Speaker. The American people and our colleagues in this institution need to know whether or not this administration basically allowed a technology to be transferred to China that was up until that point in time prohibited, and that appears not only is that in itself an outrageous act; but then on top of that, did the influence of the CEO of that corporation, and the fact that that corporation hired one of the most well-connected lobbyists in the city, whose brother in fact had been working at the White House, did that connection have an impact on the President's decision? If it did, in my opinion, Mr. Speaker, that is treason. Mr. Speaker, the whole issue of this technology transfer itself is a scandal. Newspapers across this city and across this country, through bits and pieces, have picked up the story and have attempted to piece it together. The Speaker of the House, leadership on both sides of the national security effort in this body are concerned about the technology transfer itself as well as whether or not there was an impact of this CEO's involvement with one political party and convincing the President to waive the requirement that would have allowed the criminal prosecution of Loral and possibly Hughes to move forward. We need to know the answers, and we need to have that information provided to us. To me it is an absolute outrage that this occurred even without the connection of the dollars from the CEO of Loral and his contributions to the Democratic National Committee. But, Mr. Speaker, I think even of more significance to us for the long-term security of our country is the fact that this is a continuing pattern that we have seen over the past six years of this administration, advocating an aggressive arms control policy but in fact doing the complete opposite when it comes to violations of arms control agreements or the transfer of sensitive technology. Mr. Speaker, there are those who are sitting in their offices tonight or those around the country who would say, here is another Republican just railing about this administration or railing about issues involving security, someone who wants to use China and perhaps Russia as a scapegoat for larger defense budgets. Let me state at the outset, Mr. Speaker, that I have supported this administration in many instances on this floor on security issues. In fact, just several months ago, I traveled to Moscow very quietly to make the case to members of the Russian State Duma that they should understand the reason why President Clinton was about to take on Saddam Hussein if he, in fact, did not allow the U.N. inspectors to complete their investigations throughout Iraq. I did that in support of this President because I felt that Russia should understand why Americans were concerned and why Democrats and Republicans were supportive of our President in this very difficult decision to stand down Saddam Hussein when he basically ignored the requirements of the United Nations. In addition, Mr. Speaker, I take great pride in working in a very bipartisan way with the Members of our Committee on National Security. In fact, just last week we reported our bill out of committee with a vote of 51 to 1, a strong bipartisan measure that had Democrat and Republican active involvement. And next week we will have that bill on the floor. Again, it will be a strong bipartisan effort. In terms of Russia and China, Mr. Speaker, I take great pride in leading this body in our interactive effort with Russia. In fact, next week, again, I will be hosting senior leaders of the Russian State Duma from all nine major factions as we begin again the ongoing interactive dialogue that I helped start on a formal basis between the Russian State Duma and our Congress 2 years ago. Having traveled to Moscow and Russia some 14 times and having led delegations there to discuss a broad range of issues, including helping encourage more investment in Russia, stabilizing the economy, helping create a middle class, I take great pride in proactively engaging the Russian people and their leaders. Likewise, Mr. Speaker, in the case of China, I support the policy of the President in engaging China. I think an isolationist approach advocated by some of my conservative colleagues is the wrong approach. And to that extent, last year I led two delegations of our colleagues to Beijing and Shanghai. In fact, while in Beijing, I was the first U.S. policymaker to address the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army both times I went. I gave the first lecture at Fudan University in the Lincoln lecture series, and I will go back to China this year where I will deliver lectures at two other Chinese universities where they will name me an honorary member of their faculty. I mention these facts, Mr. Speaker, because I want our colleagues and I want the American people to understand that it is not my intent to sensationalize the problems that I am going to outline here or to think that I am always critical of this administration when it comes to our relationship with other countries throughout the world. But, Mr. Speaker, this administration has a major problem in the arms control area. And this country needs to understand it, needs to think through the effect that this policy is having on us in the short-term and, more importantly, needs to understand the undermining this policy is going to have on future stability in the world in the 21st century. I have given you one specific proliferation case, an egregious case that occurred this year that involves the potential for the largest scandal I think that this administration will have encountered since it took office 6 years ago. But I want to go through some other instances, Mr. Speaker, because unfortunately we see a pattern, a pattern that I think is causing us a more destabilized relationship with the major powers of the world, with the emerging powers of the world and with rogue nations. This is extremely important because we are reading the headlines, Mr. Speaker, every day, most recently of India conducting underground nuclear tests. We were assured by this administration that arms control agreements would prevent countries like India from further proliferating nuclear weapons by conducting underground tests. Right before these underground tests by India, in fact about a month earlier, the same newspapers reported on their front pages Pakistan testing a medium range missile, which perhaps led to India's underground nuclear tests. The question then becomes, how and why are India and Pakistan becoming involved in what I think is one of the world's newest and potentially most devastating arms races? One only has to look at the arms control record of this administration to see a pattern that unfortunately has occurred over the past 6 years. The same pattern exists not just with technology involving missiles and weapons of mass destruction but involves supercomputers. Let me cite, Mr. Speaker, another example. Documents that have been made public, again by the news media show, that the Clinton administration approved the export of U.S. built supercomputers to Communist China in late December 1997, even though the Chinese officials were unwilling to allow on-site inspections of the delivery venue of those supercomputers which is required by U.S. law. Facts have shown that commerce officials for this government at our embassy in Beijing were denied permission by the Chinese government to inspect the university where these supercomputers were headed prior to the export of these digital high performance computers. In fact, according to a December 19, 1997 letter to Lee Yu Hu, director general for science and technology at China's ministry of foreign trade and economic cooperation or MFTEC, cosigned by Commerce Department officials, Amanda Bus, assistant secretary for export enforcement, and Roger Mayjack, assistant secretary for export administration, and I quote, We were disappointed at MFTEC's decision not to allow an on-site end-use check and refusal to permit an embassy representative to travel to the stated university at the university's invitation. Because we were unable to work through MFTEC, we gathered information on the end user through other sources and have approved the license through those means. A case where the administration did not even abide by the laws on the books of this country to secure a complete understanding of where these supercomputers were headed. Why is that so important? It is so important because this body and the other body passed a new law in 1997 requiring that we know where this administration is allowing supercomputers to be sold. Well, why would we pass a law like that, Mr. Speaker? We passed a law like that because in 1995 this administration allowed the export of high-speed supercomputers to Russia. Now, these supercomputers going to Russia, Mr. Speaker, were supposedly intended for a project involving wetlands analysis. When the actual determination was made as to where these supercomputers ended up, we found that these supercomputers ended up in nuclear weapons laboratories in Russia, a clear violation of the intent of the transfer and, obviously, a concern to Members' on both sides of the aisle in this institution and in the other body. Because of that transfer and the fact that this administration allowed these supercomputers that were supposed to go for Russia for an environmental project to end up going to a nuclear weapons laboratory, we passed a law. That law was violated, Mr. Speaker, earlier this year when the President did not, in fact, require the Chinese government to allow us to see the end location of where these most recent supercomputers were going in China. Mr. Speaker, this administration has maintained throughout the past 6 years that our security relationships around the world are based on arms control agreements. In fact, in many cases this administration has said that we do not need defensive military systems because arms control negotiations and deterrence and control of technology through these documents will provide the stability in the world and, therefore, we do not need defensive systems. So not only has this administration opposed defensive systems, and not only have they tried to impose limitations on the Congress' ability to deploy these systems, but even more egregiously, Mr. Speaker, this administration, which claims to base its security arrangements on arms control agreements, has failed to enforce sanctions time and time again when proliferations occur; when companies and institutes in China and in Russia are caught transferring technology illegally to other nations. Now, to back up my claim, Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert in the record for all of our colleagues and the American people to see several documents. The first involves a chronology compiled not by some Republican think tank but rather by the Congressional Research Service, an independent nonpartisan arm of the Congress, supported, I might add, by Democrats and Republicans. A chronology of Chinese weapons-related transfers since 1992. Over the past 6 years our intelligence community caught China transferring technology illegally 271 times. This administration imposed sanctions once. Twenty-one times China transferred technology. November 1992. M-11 missiles transferred to Pakistan. Violations: Missile Technology Control Regime, Arms Control Export Act, Export Administration Act. This time administration sanctions were imposed and then they were waived on November 1 of 1994. In 1994-95. Dozens and possibly hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools transferred by China to Iran. Violations of the MTCR, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. The administration's response: Nothing. No sanctions. Second quarter of 1995. Parts for the M-11 missile to Pakistan. Violations: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. The administration's response: Nothing. No sanctions. December 1994 to mid 1995. 5,000 ring magnets to be used for nuclear enrichment programs for nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Violations: The Nonproliferation Treaty, the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, the Arms Export Control Act. The administration's response: They considered the sanctions but they never imposed them. July 1995. More than 30 M-11 missiles stored in Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan. Violation: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. This administration's response: Nothing. No sanctions. September 1995. Calutron electromagnetic isotope separation system for uranium enrichment to Iran. Again, for a nuclear weapons program. Violation: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act. Response by this administration: Nothing. No sanctions. 1995 and 1997. C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and C-801 air launch cruise missiles, again to Iran. Violation: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions. February 1996. Dual-use chemical precursors and equipment to aid Iran's chemical weapons program. Violation: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Result: Sanctions were imposed. The one time in 21. Sanctions were imposed May 21, 1997. Summer 1996. 400 tons of chemicals transferred to Iran. Violation: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Administration response: Nothing. No sanctions. August 1996. A plant to manufacture M-11 missiles or missile components in Pakistan. Violation: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions. August 1996. Gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment for missile guidance systems, again to Iran. Violation: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions. September 1996. Special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment to unsafe guarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. Violation: NPT, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions imposed. July to December of 1996. The Director of Central Intelligence reports, and I quote, tremendous variety, end quote, of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. Violations of the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions. July-December of 1996. The same Director of Central Intelligence reports, and I quote, a tremendous variety, end quote, of assistance for Iran's ballistic missile program. Violations: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions. July-December 1996 again. Again this Director of Central Intelligence reports, principal supplies of nuclear equipment, material and technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Violations: NPT, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions. July-December 1996. The same director reports key supplies for technology for large nuclear projects in Iran. Violations: NPT, Iran- Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions. Again in July and December of 1996. The same Director of Central Intelligence reports, considerable chemical weapons-related transfers for production equipment and technology to Iran. Violations: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions. January of 1997. Dual use biological items to Iran. Violation: The BWC, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions. 1997 again. Chemical precursors, production equipment, and production technology for Iran's chemical weapons program including a plant for making glass-lined equipment. Violations again of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions. September-December of 1997. The China Great Wall Industry Corporation provided telemetry equipment used in flight tests to Iran for its development of the Shahab III and Shahab IV medium-range ballistic missiles. Violation: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions. And finally, November 1997 through April of 1998. We now find they may have transferred technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. No sanctions. No action taken by the administration. Mr. Speaker, this is the record that is causing us to see a scenario unfolding that will place this country and the world at the greatest possible risk of confrontation. We see the administration daily railing about Iran's capability, Iraq's capability. We see them railing about India doing underground nuclear tests, Pakistan testing medium-range missiles. When here we have 21 specific cases, all documented, where this administration, which purports to base its arms control treaty relationships, as the basis for stopping proliferation in a situation where they do not enforce any of them except in one case. And yet they wonder why, they wonder why India and Pakistan are now in a major arms control race. And they wonder why Iran and Iraq continue to develop threatening capabilities that threaten to destroy Israel, all of our allies in that region, all of our Arab friends, as well as our troops in that region. Mr. Speaker, I argue on the floor tonight, it is this administration that is causing the problem we currently see in India, in Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. It is this administration that bases its security relationships on arms control agreements but never enforces those very agreements when they are in fact violated. Let us talk about Russia, Mr. Speaker. We have documented here for the Record 16 specific violations since 1990 and 1991 by the Russians of various treaties, and only for two of those 16 did the administration impose sanctions. Early in the 1990s, we do not know the exact year, Russians sold drawings. Now listen to this, Mr. Speaker. The Russians sold drawings of a sarin plant manufacturing procedures and toxic agents to a Japanese terrorist group. The Russians sold these drawings to a Japanese terrorist group. And we all know, several years ago in Japan in a subway we had a sarin weapons attack in a subway that killed Japanese citizens. Violations, Mr. Speaker, of the Arms Export Control Act, section 81, and the Export Administration Act, section 11(c). No publicly known sanctions were administered by this administration. In 1991, Mr. Speaker, Russia transferred to China, Russian entities, 3 RD-120 rocket engines and electronic equipment to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles, a violation of the MTCR; the Arms Export Control Act, Section 73; the Export Administration Act, section 11(b). No sanctions imposed by the Administration. From 1991 and 1995, Russian entities transferred cryogenic liquid oxygen hydrorocket engines and technology to India, Mr. Speaker. Now China is supplying Pakistan. Russia is supplying India. Violations: MTCR; the Arms Export Control Act, section 73; the Export Administration Act, section 11(b). Sanctions against Russia and India under both of those cases were imposed on May 6 for 2 years and then they expired after 2 years. But they were imposed in that one instance. From 1992 to 1995, Russian transfers to Brazil of carbon fiber technology for rocket motor cases for a space launch program. Violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export Administration Act. Sanctions were reportedly secretly imposed and then waived, although we never knew that because it was all done in secret. From 1992 to 1996, Russian armed forces delivered 24 Scud-B missiles and eight launchers to Armenia, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Sanctions again were never introduced or implemented by this administration. June of 1993. Additional Russian enterprise involved in missile technology transfers to India, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Sanctions were imposed on June of 1993, but they were waived until July. No publicly known follow-up on those sanctions. 1995 to the present, Mr. Speaker. Construction of a 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran. And by the way, there was a side deal that the Ministry of Atomic Industry in Russia initially had that even Boris Yeltsin was not aware of on this nuclear power plant deal that only because inside of Russia it was exposed was that separate effort actually canceled, but the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant continued. Violations of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. The response by the administration: They refused to renew some civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. They waived sanctions on aid. Waived sanctions, Mr. Speaker. August of 1995. Russian assistance to Iran to develop biological weapons. Violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act. No known sanctions. November 1995. Russian citizens transferred to unnamed country technology for making chemical weapons, violating the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. The sanctions were imposed in this case on a Russian citizen on November 17, 1995. December of 1995. Russian gyroscopes from submarine launched ballistic missiles smuggled to Iraq through middlemen. We caught them red-handed, Mr. Speaker, red-handed, violating the United Nations sanctions, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. No sanctions were ever imposed. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we were told when I wrote to the President on this particular transfer that we would pursue this aggressively, and we did not impose sanctions, the Administration said, because Russia was pursuing a criminal investigation. We now know that last fall Russia ended the criminal investigation. No criminal levies were brought against any Russian citizen or company, and in fact, no sanctions were ever imposed. The transfer took place. In fact, we now know there were 120 sets of these guidance systems that went to Iraq from Russia three different times. July-December of 1996. The Director of Central Intelligence reported Russia transferred to Iran a variety of items related to ballistic missiles. Violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. The administration's response, no sanctions. November of 1996. Israel reported Russian assistance to Syria to build a chemical weapons plant. Violating the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. No publicly known sanctions. 1996 and 1997, Russia delivered 3 kilowatt diesel electric submarines to Iran, violations of the Iran- Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act. No sanctions imposed. January to February of 1997, Russia transferred detailed instructions to Iran on the production of the SS-4 missile, which now, within a year, will threaten all of Israel and all of our friends and our troops in that theater, violating the MTCR, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. No sanctions imposed, Mr. Speaker. April of 1997, Russia sold S-300 antiaircraft, antimissile missile systems to Iran to protect the nuclear plant that they were building, again in violation of treaties. These violations were of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. No known sanctions. Finally, in October of 1997, Israeli intelligence reported Russian technology transfers for Iranian missiles developed with ranges between 1,300 and 10,000 kilometers. The transfers included engines and guidance systems, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. No known sanctions. Mr. Speaker, I know I sound repetitious in going through all of those violations, but I think it is about time, Mr. Speaker, that we lay the cards on the table. This administration has no foreign policy. This administration maintains that arms control agreements are the basis of our security relationships. I have just cited on the Record, with documentation involving China and Russia, which I ask all of our colleagues and the American people to review, 40 separate occasions where violations of agreements have taken place and where on only three occasions has this administration imposed sanctions. We wonder why the President says Iran and Iraq have this capability. We wonder why Russian entities continue to sell technology to Iraq and to Iran. We wonder why India is doing underground nuclear tests. We wonder why Pakistan is testing medium-range missiles, all of which are destabilizing world security. Why are all these things happening? Because everyone in the world knows this administration does not enforce the laws that we place on the books, that we ask every nation that is a signatory to abide by. Mr. Speaker, time is running out. In the 12 years that I have been in this institution, I have never seen a greater lack of confidence in any administration by this body and the other body in enforcing arms control agreements. Last November, after this body found out, primarily by the actions of the leaders of Israel, Mr. Netanyahu and the Israeli intelligence community, after we found out from them that Russia had signed deals, the Russian space agency with the Iranians, to build this missile that is going to threaten Israel a year from now, the Congress was outraged. A bipartisan Iran sanctions bill was introduced by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), co-endorsed by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and supported by Democrats and Republicans. Vice President Gore, who I have the highest respect for, called a group of us down to the White House. This was in November of last year. There were 12 or 13 of us in the room, the Vice President's meeting room, along with some of his security people. We met for an hour. There were Senators, Democratic, Republican Senators, and there were Democratic, Republican House Members, chairmen of committees, and key people involved in international and defense issues. The Vice President personally pleaded with us. He said, my friends, please do not let this Iran sanctions bill pass the House, because if it passes, it will send the wrong signal. It will send the signal that the Congress has no confidence in this administration's ability to control proliferation. When he finished, every one of us in the room, Democrats and Republicans, Senators and House Members, said, Mr. Vice President, it is too late. The Congress has lost confidence. That same week, Mr. Speaker, the Record speaks for itself, the Iran missile sanctions bill came up on the House floor, and almost 400 Members of this body voted in favor of that bill in spite of the Vice President lobbying personally against it. Liberals, conservatives, southerners, northeasterners, big city representatives, and rural areas all came together and said, we have got to send a signal that this policy of the past 6 years is failing. It is destabilizing the world. The bill passed the House. Then a month and a half ago, I got a call from the White House to come back down because the Vice President again wanted to meet with a group of us. So I went back down to the White House. Again, I was with the Vice President. On one side of him was a Member of the National Security Council. On the other side was one of his key staffers. The Vice President met with the 13 or 14 of us again for 90 minutes. He went through all of the efforts being taken to assist Russia in controlling proliferation. When he finished his discussion, I said, Mr. Vice President, I agree, you are making efforts, and you are getting some results, but you have not totally stopped the proliferation. He said, I know. You are right. We have not totally cut it off. He said, but please do not pass that bill in the Senate. That bill is pending right now for a vote in the Senate. If it is brought up, my prediction is it will pass. Mr. Speaker, we have got a problem. This Congress has lost confidence in this administration's ability to stop proliferation. Why is that important, Mr. Speaker? Because every day we pick up the newspaper, we are reading more horror stories that shake this world that are eventually going to lead to a confrontation, a confrontation perhaps between India and Pakistan, and the tensions are flaring there rapidly; a confrontation between North Korea and perhaps Japan or South Korea; a confrontation between Iran and Israel or Iraq and Israel or some other nation, all of which have benefited from these technology transfers that this administration has ignored for 6 straight years, all the time saying we do not need defensive systems because our arms control negotiations are the security blanket we need to provide stability in the world. On top of all of this, Mr. Speaker, we read of a situation, front page in the New York Times, that one of our companies assisted the Chinese illegally, were under a criminal investigation with the grand jury when the President of the United States very quietly issued an executive order waiving, waiving the actual prohibition so that the entire criminal investigation of Loral Corporation was undermined by the action of the President. Then we find out that the CEO of that corporation is, in one year, the single largest contributor politically to the President's campaign and the Democratic National Committee, over $300,000 by one person, the CEO of that same company that was able to get itself out of what was an aggressive criminal investigation. Mr. Speaker, we are going to get to the bottom of this. Not because this is a scandal that would embarrass the President, not because this is some kind of a campaign fund-raising issue, but because this threatens the security of this Nation. If the facts are as they have been reported in the New York Times and the other major national media, this, in fact, Mr. Speaker, in my mind, is an act of treason, and this, in my mind, would result in a call for impeachment proceedings against this President. Mr. Speaker, I thank the staff of the House for staying through this ordeal, and I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for remaining here during this time so that I could present this special order. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the documents I referred to: Technology Scandal With Risky Portent [From the Washington Times, Apr. 7, 1998] (By Frank Gaffney, Jr.) The front page of Saturday's New York Times featured an article that should alarm every American. It reported that two of America's leading aerospace companies--Loral Space and Communications and Hughes Electronics--are suspected of having provided ``space expertise that significantly advanced Beijing's ballistic missile program.'' It will be recalled that the PRC's ballistic missile program includes missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons against cities in the United States. This is hardly an abstract threat. Not so long ago, a top Chinese official intimated to the longtime No. 2 man at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing that such an attack against Los Angeles would be in prospect if the United States interfered in China's campaign of intimidation against Taiwan. Although this is not the first time American firms are alleged to have supplied foreign governments with militarily relevant equipment and know-how that could wind up being used to harm the United States, its citizens or interests, it is a particularly egregious example of the syndrome. According to the New York Times, the two American concerns were called in to help the Chinese determine why their Long March space-launch vehicle blew up in February 1996, destroying a $200 million satellite built by Loral that it was supposed to place on-orbit. The article states that ``Those exchanges, officials believe, may have gone beyond the sharing of information that the companies had been permitted, giving the Chinese crucial assistance in improving the guidance systems of their rockets. The technology needed to put a commercial satellite in orbit is similar to that which guides a long-range nuclear missile to its target.'' In fact, the military significance of this technology transfer was of sufficient gravity that a criminal investigation was opened and a grand jury empaneled to consider indictments in the matter. Before formal charges were filed, however, ``the criminal inquiry was dealt a serious blow two months ago when President Clinton quietly authorized the export to China of similar technology by one of the companies under investigation''--namely, Loral. The chilling effect Mr. Clinton's action would have was clearly understood at the time it was taken. In the words of the New York times: ``The decision was opposed by Justice Department officials, who argued that it would be much more difficult to prosecute the companies if the government gave its blessing to the deal.'' In fact, as a practical matter, it will probably be impossible to prosecute the case against Loral and Hughes. This is a scandal on three levels. First, the Clinton administration's indifference to the arming of communist China is simply stupefying. Even the most pollyannish of experts in the field recognize that there is a chance that the massive modernization program upon which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked may produce a ``peer competitor'' to the United States in the next century. More realistic observers judge the PLA's doctrine and procurement programs as dispositive evidence of a determined effort to attain such a status. The Clinton team has nonetheless approved among other technology transfers to China: The sale of machine tools used to manufacture advanced military aircraft; jet engines suitable for use in fighter aircraft and cruise missiles; sophisticated telecommunications equipment; and 46 supercomputers that have wound up in the Chinese military-industrial complex, including its nuclear weapons program. Now, the administration has endorsed the sale of equipment and know-how that will assist Beijing in delivering its nuclear arms to American targets. This is all the more appalling given Clinton-Gore's determination to deny the American people near-term, effective defenses against ballistic missile attack. Second, even if the Chinese space-launch program were not an inherently dual-use affair (that is, a program that has both military and civilian dimensions, with technology flows between the two unavoidable), the administration's policy of abetting China's space activities would still be contrary to long-term U.S. interests. To be sure, some U.S. companies (notably, Loral and Hughes) are anxious to find inexpensive launch services for their satellites. They tend to be delighted with Mr. Clinton's easing of restraints on American use of massively subsidized space-launch operations in China and Russia, operations trying to buy into and ultimately to dominate the commercial launch market. In helping its friends in Beijing and the Kremlin to undercut an already-struggling U.S. space launch industry, however, the Clinton administration is further jeopardizing the United States' ability to assure its access to space. This is a critical national security, as well as commercial capability. Regrettably, Mr. Clinton does little more than pay lip service to the need for this and other means necessary for the United States to exercise the dominance of outer space necessitated by both military and private sector requirements. Instead, he compounds the damage done by his line-item vetoes last fall of critical U.S. space control technologies with initiatives that reward Russia and China with dual-use missile technology for merely reaffirming their commitment to non-proliferation--even as they continue to engage in it. In fact, it is a safe bet, that at least some of the missile technology sold to China by Loral and others will wind up in the weapons fielded by enemies of Israel and other American friends. Finally, it must be asked: Could the fact that Loral's CEO Bernard Schwartz, was the largest personal contributor to the Democratic National Committee last year have anything to do with the president's decision effectively to vitiate legal proceedings against his company? Or was this simply yet another instance in which a federal case involving Chinese interests was sabotaged by members of the Clinton team? (in 1996, someone--probably at the State Department--blew a sting operation as it was about to net a PRC ``princeling'' implicated in running thousands of AK-47s to U.S. agents who were posing as purchasers for drug lords and street gangs.) Any way you slice it, the administration's handling of the China account is a scandal. Will it be held accountable for the damage it is thus doing to the nation's security, to long-term U.S. commercial interests and, perhaps ultimately, even to the physical safety of individual Americans? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reported transfer by Administration's Date of transfer or report China Possible violation response ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1992........................... M-11 missiles or MTCR: Arms Export Sanctions imposed on related equipment to Control Act, Export Aug. 24, 1993, for Pakistan (The Administration Act. transfers of M-11 Administration did no related equipment (not officially confirm missiles); waived on reports that M-11 Nov. 1, 1994. missiles are in Pakistan.). Mid-1994 to mid-1995................ Dozens or hundreds of MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. missile guidance Nonproliferation Act, systems and Arms Export Control computerized machine Act, Export tools to Iran. Administration Act. 2nd quarter of 1995................. Parts for the M-11 MTCR: Arms Export No sanctions. missile to Pakistan. Control Act, Export Administration Act. Dec. 1994 to mid-1995............... 5,000 ring magnets for NPT: Export-Import Bank Considered sanctions an unsafeguarded Act, Nuclear under the Export-Import nuclear enrichment Proliferation Bank Act; but announced program in Pakistan. Prevention Act, Arms on May 10, 1996, that Export Control Act. no sanctions would be imposed. July 1995........................... More than 30 M-11 MTCR: Arms Export No sanctions. missiles stored in Control Act, Export crates at Sargodha Air Administration. Force Base in Pakistan. Sept. 1995.......................... Calutron NPT: Nuclear No sanctions. (electromagnetic Proliferation isotope separation Prevention Act, Export- system) for uranium Import Bank Act, Arms enrichment to Iran). Export Control Act. 1995-1997........................... C-802 anti-ship cruise Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. missiles and C-801 air- Nonproliferation Act. launched cruise missiles to Iran. Before Feb. 1996.................... Dual-use chemical Arms Export Control Sanctions imposed on May precursors and Act, Export 21, 1997. equipment to Iran's Administration Act. chemical weapon program. Summer 1996......................... 400 tons of chemicals Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. to Iran. Nonproliferation Act,\1\ Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Aug. 1996........................... Plant to manufacture M- MTCR: Arms Export No sanctions. 11 missiles or missile Control Act, Export components in Pakistan. Administration Act. Aug. 1996........................... Gyroscopes, MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. accelerometers, and Nonproliferation Act, test equipment for Arms Export Control missile guidance to Act, Export Iran. Administration Act. Sept. 1996.......................... Special industrial NPT: Nuclear No. sanctions. furnace and high-tech Proliferation diagnostic equipment Prevention Act, Export- to unsafeguarded Import Bank Act, Arms nuclear facilities in Export Control Act. Pakistan. July-Dec. 1996...................... Director of Central MTCR: Arms Export No sanctions. Intelligence (DCI) Control Act, Export reported ``tremendous Administration Act. variety'' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. ``tremendous variety'' Nonproliferation Act, of assistance for Arms Export Control Iran's ballistic Act, Export missile program. Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported principal NPT: Nuclear No sanctions. supplies of nuclear Proliferation equipment, material, Prevention Act, Export- and technology for Import Bank Act, Arms Pakistan's nuclear Export Administration weapon program. Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported key NPT: Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. supplies of technology Nonproliferation Act, for large nuclear Nuclear Proliferation projects in Iran. Prevention Act, Export- Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. ``considerable'' Nonproliferation Act, chemical weapon- Arms Export Control related transfers of Act, Export production equipment Administration Act. and technology to Iran. Jan. 1997........................... Dual-use biological BWC: Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. items to Iran. Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. 1997................................ Chemical precursors, Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. production equipment, Nonproliferation Act, and production Arms Export Control technology for Iran's Act, Export chemical weapon Administration Act. program, including a plant for making glass- lined equipment. Sept. to Dec. 1997.................. China Great Wall MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. Industry Corp. Nonproliferation Act, provided telemetry Arms Export Control equipment used in Act, Export flight-tests to Iran Administration Act. for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium range ballistic missiles. Nov. 1997/April 1998................ May have transferred MTCR: Arms Export No sanctions. technology for Control Act, Export Pakistan's Ghauri Administration Act. medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996. BWC: Biological Weapons Convention. MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime. NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reported Russian transfers that may have Possibly applicable Administration's Date of transfer or report violated a regime or treaties, regimes, and/ response law or U.S. laws ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Early 1990s......................... Russians sold drawings AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. No publicly known of a sarin plant, 11C. sanction. manufacturing procedures, and toxic agents to a Japanese terrorist group. 1991................................ Transferred to China MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA No publicly known three RD-120 rocket sec. 11B. sanction. engines and electronic equipment to improve accuracy of ballistic missiles. 1991-1995........................... Transferred Cryogenic MTCR: AECA sec. 73 EAA Sanctions against Russia liquid oxygen/hydrogen sec. 11B. and India under AECA rocket engines and and EAA imposed on May technology to India. 6, 1992; expired after 2 years. 1992-1995........................... Russian transfers to MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA Sanctions reportedly Brazil of carbon-fiber sec. 11B. secretly imposed and technology for rocket waived. motor cases for space launch program. 1992-1996........................... Russian armed forces MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA No publicly known delivered 24 Scud-B sec. 11B. sanction. missiles and 8 launchers to Armenia. June 1993........................... Additional Russian MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA Sanctions imposed on enterprises involved sec. 11B. June 16, 1993 and in missile technology waived until July 15, transfer to India. 1993; no publicly known follow-up sanction. 1995-present........................ Construction of 1,000 IIANPA sec. 1604 and Refused to renew some megawatt nuclear 1605, FOAA, NPPA sec. civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr in 821, FAA sec. 620G. cooperation agreements; Iran. waived sanctions on aid. Aug. 1995........................... Russian assistance to BWC, AECA sec. 81, EAA No publicly known Iran to develop sec. 11C, IIANPA sec. sanction. biological weapons. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H. Nov. 1995........................... Russian citizen AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. Sanctions imposed on transferred to unnamed 11C. Nov. 17, 1995. country technology for making chemical weapons. Dec. 1995........................... Russian gyroscopes from United Nations No publicly known submarine launched Sanctions, MTCR, AECA sanction. ballistic missiles sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, smuggled to Iraq IIANPA sec. 1604 and through middlemen. 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported Russia MTCR AECA sec. 73, EAA No publicly known transferred to Iran sec. 11B, FAA sec. sanction. ``a varity'' of items 620G and 620H, IIANPA related to ballistic sec. 1604 and 1605, missiles. FOAA. Nov. 1996........................... Israel reported Russian AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. No publicly known assistance to Syria to 11C, FAA sec. 620G and sanction. build a chemical 620H. weapon plant. 1996-1997........................... Delivered 3 Kilo diesel- IIANPA sec. 1604 and No publicly known electric submarines to 1605, FAA sec. 620G sanction. Iran. and 620H. Jan.-Feb. 1997...................... Russia transferred MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA No publicly known detailed instructions sec. 11B, IIANPA sec. sanction. to Iran on production 1604 and 1605, FOAA. of the SS-4 medium- range missile and related parts. April 1997.......................... Sale of S-300 anti- IIANPA sec. 1604 and No publicly known aircraft/anti-missile 1605 FAA sec. 620G and sanction. missile system to Iran 620H. to protect nuclear reactors at Bushehr and other strategic sites. Oct. 1997........................... Israeli intelligence MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA No publicly known reported Russian sec. 11B, IIANPA sec. sanction. technology transfers 1604 and 1605, FAA for Iranian missiles sec. 620G and 620H developed with ranges FOAA. between 1,300 and 10,000 km. Transfers include engines and guidance systems. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regimes: BWC: Biological Weapons Convention. MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime. U.S. Laws: AECA: Arms Export Control Act. EAA: Export Administration Act. FAA: Foreign Assistance Act. FOAA: Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, IIANPA: Iran-Iraq Arms Non--Proliferation Act. NPPA: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the actions of the committee and to praise the Members on both sides of the aisle for the very deliberate effort they have made in, I think, crafting the best budget we could in a very difficult budget environment. I am not a member of the committee, never have been, although one day that is something perhaps I would like to serve on behalf of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, and that is a role on the committee itself. In fact, Mr. Chairman, over the past several years I have been very critical of the agencies, both the CIA and DIA. I have reviewed their NIEs. From time to time I have disagreed. I asked for backup and I have challenged them publicly and privately. But I will say this to my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, in response to those who say that the CIA and the committee operates in a closed environment, I have been in this Congress for 12 years, I have interacted with the intelligence agencies on a regular, ongoing basis in my office. From time to time I have gone over to meet with them in this building. They have been fully accessible to answer questions that I have asked them about emerging threats around the world. So I would say to my colleagues that any Member of this body that wants to get access to what the intelligence community is doing only has to ask and they will find that they are more than happy to respond. In fact, I am very pleased with the current leadership of the Director of the CIA. I think he is putting a new era of management and control in terms of the way the agency is being operated. But why am I so interested in the intelligence budget and the intelligence agency? My job in this body, Mr. Chairman, is to oversee approximately $36 billion a year of defense spending that is being put forth to protect our people and our allies against emerging threats. I would like to be able to know that we are spending that money on threats that are real, on threats that we understand from our best intelligence sources may be those threats that our young people have to face in the future. And only through good, solid intelligence can we get that data. We heard debate on the floor; in one case I heard someone say that Russia is two-thirds less than what it was. Well, I do not know where people base their opinions, but let me give my colleagues my perception. I guess I am one of the few Members of Congress who speaks the language. I have been there 15 times. In fact, next week I will be hosting all the major members of the state Duma. I work with Russia on a regular, ongoing, weekly basis. I would make the case publicly that Russia is more destabilized today than at any point in time under Communism. I do not just make that statement radically. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I had General Lebed testify before my committee. If my colleagues do not know who General Lebed is, he is a Russian general, two star, who ran against Boris Yeltsin and then became Boris Yeltsin's chief defense advisor. Along with members on both sides of the aisle last May, in one of my visits to Moscow last year, we sat in General Lebed's office and he told us the story about one of his responsibilities to account to Boris Yeltsin for 132 suitcase-size nuclear devices that Russia built and he was able to account for only 48 of them. And we said to him, ``General, where are the rest?'' He said, ``I have no idea.'' He said, ``They could be under control or they could be in terrorists' hands.'' He said, ``They could be in somebody's basement. We just do not know where they are.'' I came back and interacted with our intelligence community and got an update on what they are doing to try to ascertain whether or not Russia does have control of these devices. Now, Russia, the government, denied they even built them for the following 4 months after General Lebed made the statement. Finally, when I met with the defense minister, General Sergeyev, in December, he admitted to me that, yes, they built them and they hoped to have them all destroyed by the year 2000. Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about some pie-in-the-sky Steven Spielberg movie plot. We are talking about real-life situations. What about the situation in January 1995, when because of Russia's deterioration and their intelligence assets, they responded to a Norwegian weather rocket by activating their all-out nuclear capabilities, which meant that Russia, which they publicly acknowledged, was within 15 minutes of an all-out nuclear response against the U.S. to a weather rocket that Norway had forewarned them of a month earlier? That is reality, Mr. Chairman. These are the kinds of threats that we have to have assets to help us understand. If we talk to the intelligence community because of the shift in focus in this country to the Far East, what are we doing in the case of Russia? To meet the declining budgets, the limitations, we are taking away assets that we used to have to understand the former Soviet Union. So at a time when Russia becomes more of a risk, where we do not understand what is happening there, we are decreasing our ability to understand the situation. Let me tell my colleagues what else General Lebed said in a public hearing here in this country. And by the way, he just is in the process of winning the governorship of one of the largest regions in Russia, Krasnoyarsk. This is what he said. He said, ``You know, Congressman, one of our biggest problems? All of those most competent admirals and generals in the Soviet military have been forced out of service because of our economic problems.'' And we have heard members talk about that. But he said, ``Here is the problem. These most competent generals and admirals have not been given housing, they have not been given pensions. So what are they doing?''

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), my friend and colleague, for yielding and I am not here to disrupt the proceedings of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as both Members know, the ranking member and the chairman. I have the highest respect for their leadership and for their commitment. Mr. Chairman, my concern is with our State Department and with our ability in this institution to get access to relevant data when it occurs in a timely manner. Mr. Chairman, because of the commitment of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the distinguished gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member, to work with me and with the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and others on this issue, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment on behalf of myself and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey). This is a bipartisan initiative and one that I think gets at the heart of our concerns involving proliferation around the world. This amendment is a very simple amendment, Mr. Chairman. It requires the Director of Central Intelligence each year to give a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence in the House and the Senate involving any proliferating activity from any entity around the world that this Congress needs to know about. Now, we have heard a lot of debate over intelligence and a lot of debate over how we should stop proliferation, but let us get to the heart of the matter. Mr. Chairman, the fact is that we have good intelligence assets that tell us when proliferation is occurring. After all, 2 years ago, working with the Jordanians and Israelis, we caught the Russians transferring accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iraq to improve their Scud missiles. In fact, we have 120 sets of those right now with Russian markings on them. Last year, last summer, we caught the Iranians being assisted again by a Russian entity to develop a medium-range missile that we think within 12 months will threaten all of Israel, all of our Arab friends, and 25,000 of our troops in that theater. We caught the Chinese transferring ring magnets to Pakistan, and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Mr. Chairman, the problem is not our ability to detect when technology is being transferred. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would at this time insert into the Record detailed examples of 21 specific cases of China transferring technology in violation of every major arms control agreement that we are a signatory to, including the MTCR, the Chemical Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Arms Control Export Act, and every other arms control agreement that is the basis of this administration's security arrangements. Mr. Chairman, I also would like to insert in the record detailed examples of 16 instances of Russia transferring technology. In each of these cases, Mr. Chairman, the problem was not the intelligence community, it was not having the assets upon which to make an intelligent decision. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Possibly applicable Date of transfer or report Reported Russian transfers that may treaties, regimes, Administration's have violated a regime or law and/or U.S. laws reponse ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Early 1990's................... Russians sold drawings of a sarin AECA sec. 81; EAA No publicly known plant, manufacturing procedures, sec. 11C. sanction. and toxic agents to a Japanese terrorist group. 1991........................... Transferred to China three RD-120 MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known rocket engines and electronic EAA sec. 11B. sanction. equipment to improve accuracy of ballistic missiles. 1991-1995...................... Transferred Cryogenic liquid oxygen/ MTCR; AECA sec. 73; Sanctions against hydrogen rocket engines and EAA sec. 11B. Russia and India technology to India. under AECA and EAA imposed on May 6, 1992; expired after 2 years. 1992-1995...................... Russian transfers to Brazil of MTCR; AECA sec. 73; Sanctions reportedly carbon fiber technology for rocket EAA sec. 11B. secretly imposed motor cases for space launch and waived. programs. 1992-1996...................... Russian armed forces delivered 24 MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known Scud B missiles and 8 launchers to EAA sec. 11B. sanction. Armenia. June 1993...................... Additional Russian enterprises MRCR; AECA sec. 73; Sanctions imposed on involved in missile technology EAA sec. 11B. June 16, 1993 and transfers to India. waived until July 15, 1993; no publicly known follow-up sanction. 1995-present................... Construction of 1,000 megawatt IIANPA sec. 1604 and Refused to renew nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran. 1605; FOAA; NPPA some civilian sec. 821; FAA sec. nuclear cooperation 620G. agreements; waived sanctions on aid. Aug. 1995...................... Russian assistance to Iran to BWC; AECA sec. 81; No publicly known develop biological weapons. EAA sec. 11C; sanctions. IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FAA sec. 620G and 620H. Nov. 1995...................... Russian citizen transferred to AECA sec. 81; EAA Sanctions imposed on unnamed country technology for sec. 11C. Nov. 17, 1995. making chemical weapons. Dec. 1995...................... Russian gyroscopes from submarine United Nations No publicly known launched ballistic missiles Sanctions; MTCR; sanction. smuggled to Iraq through middlemen. AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B; IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FAA sec. 620G and 620H. July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported Russia transferred to MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known Iran ``a variety'' of items EAA sec. 11B; FAA sanctions. related to ballistic missiles. sec. 620G and 620H; IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FOAA. Nov. 1996...................... Israel reported Russian assistance AECA sec. 81; EAA No publicly known to Syria to build a chemical sec. 11C; FAA sec. sanction. weapon plant. 620G and 620H. 1996-1997...................... Delivered 3 Kilo diesel-electric IIANPA sec. 1604 and No publicly known submarines to Iran. 1605; FAA sec. 620G sanction. and 620H. Jan.-Feb. 1997................. Russia transferred detailed MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known instructions to Iran on production EAA sec. 11B; FAA sanction. of the SS-4 medium-range missile sec. 620G and 620H; and related parts. IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FOAA. April 1997..................... Sale of S-300 anti-aircraft/anti- IIANPA sec. 1604 and No publicly known missile missile system to Iran to 1605; FAA sec. 620G sanction. protect nuclear reactors at and 620H. Bushehr and other strategic sites. Oct. 1997...................... Israeli intelligence reported MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known Russian technology transfers for EAA sec. 11B; sanction. Iranian missiles developed with IIANPA sec. 1604 ranges between 1,300 and 10,000 and 1605; FAA sec. km. Transfers include engines and 620G and 620H; FOAA. guidance systems. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regimes: BWC--Biological Weapons Convention. MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime. U.S. Laws: AECA--Arms Export Control Act. EAA--Export Administration Act. FAA--Foreign Assistance Act. FOAA--Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. IIANPA--Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act. NPPA--Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Administration's Date of transfer or report Reported transfer by China Possible violation response ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1992...................... M-11 missiles or related equipment MTCR; Arms Export Sanctions imposed on to Pakistan (The Administration Control Act; Export Aug. 24, 1993, for did not officially confirm reports Administration Act. transfer of M-11 that M-11 missiles are in related equipment Pakistan.). (not missiles); waived on Nov. 1, 1994. Mid-1994 to mid-1995........... Dozens or hundreds of missile MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. guidance systems and computerized Nonproliferation machine tools to Iran. Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. 2d quarter of 1995............. Parts for the M-11 missile to MTCR; Arms Export No Sanctions. Pakistan. Control Act; Export Administration Act. Dec. 1994 to mid-1995.......... 5,000 ring magnets for an NPT; Export-Import Considered sanctions unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment Bank Act; Nuclear under the Export- program in Pakistan. Proliferation Import Bank Act; Prevention Act; but announced on Arms Export Control May 10, 1996, that Act. no sanctions would be imposed. July 1995...................... More than 30 M-11 missiles stored MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions. in crates at Sargodha Air Force Control Act; Export Base in Pakistan. Administration Act. Sept. 1995..................... Calutron (electromagnetic isotope NPT; Nuclear No sanctions. separation system) for uranium Proliferation enrichment to Iran. Prevention Act; Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Control Act. 1995-1997...................... C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. C-801 air-launched cruise missiles Nonproliferation to Iran. Act. Before Feb. 1996............... Dual-use chemical precursors and Arms Export Control Sanctions imposed on equipment to Iran's chemical Act; Export May 21, 1997. weapon program. Administration Act. Summer 1996.................... 400 tons of chemicals to Iran...... Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. Nonproliferation Act \1\; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. Aug. 1996...................... Plant to manufacture M-11 missiles MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions. or missile components in Pakistan. Control Act; Export Administration Act. Aug. 1996...................... Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. test equipment for missile Nonproliferation guidance to Iran. Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. Sept. 1996..................... Special industrial furnace and high- NPT; Nuclear No sanctions. tech diagnostic equipment to Proliferation unsafeguarded nuclear facilities Prevention Act; in Pakistan. Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Control Act. July-Dec. 1996................. Director of Central Intelligence MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions. (DCI) reported ``tremendous Control Act; Export variety'' of technology and Administration Act. assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported ``tremendous variety'' MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. of assistance for Iran's ballistic Nonproliferation missile program. Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported principal supplies of NPT; Nuclear No sanctions. nuclear equipment, material, and Proliferation technology for Pakistan's nuclear Prevention Act; weapon program. Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported key supplies of NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. technology for large nuclear Nonproliferation projects in Iran. Act; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported ``considerable'' Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. chemical weapon-related transfers Nonproliferation of production equipment and Act; Arms Export technology to Iran. Control Act; Export Administration Act. Jan. 1997...................... Dual-use biological items to Iran.. BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. 1997........................... Chemical precursors, production Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. equipment, and production Nonproliferation technology for Iran's chemical Act; Arms Export weapon program, including a plant Control Act; Export for making glass-lined equipment. Administration Act. Sept. to Dec. 1997............. China Great Wall Industry Corp. MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions. provided telemetry equipment used Nonproliferation in flight-tests to Iran for its Act; Arms Export development of the Shahab-3 and Control Act; Export Shabab-4 medium range ballistic Administration Act. missiles. Nov. 1997/April 1998........... May have transferred technology for MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions. Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range Control Act; Export ballistic missile that was flight- Administration Act. tested on April 6, 1998. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996. BWC--Biological Weapons Convention. MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime. NPT--Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr. Chairman, the problem was, we did not have the will to impose sanctions. In fact, in only two of those 37 instances were sanctions imposed. The problem is a simple one. The Congress is not brought into the process until after the State Department has made a ruling that they are not going to impose sanctions. The Congress is not brought into the process until after the proliferating action has taken place. My amendment is simple. My amendment asks the Director of Central Intelligence, and I know they collect this data anecdotally, to each year submit to the chairmen of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence an unsanitized listing of all of those occasions that we should know about, unsanitized by the State Department, involving proliferation of technology, involving weapons of mass destruction. In that way, we can play our rightful role in saying that we want arms control agreements enforced. Mr. Chairman, we know what happened last November. This Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of a bipartisan bill to force the administration to impose sanctions on Russia because of transferring of technology to Iran. This Congress has spoken unequivocally, in fact, in that case, with 400 Members voting in the affirmative that we want arms control agreements enforced. That is the problem, Mr. Chairman. It is not the intelligence collection, it is not the analysis of the data, although I disagree from time to time with NIE, it is the use of that data by the State Department and by the administration where they have not imposed sanctions. Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to incite a conflict with Russia. I happen to believe in the Ronald Reagan philosophy: Trust, but verify. I am engaged with Russia. Next week I will host a group of senior Russian leaders in this city. I want to help Russia stabilize itself. I want to help them have a middle class. However, I understand one very important fundamental thing about Russia and China: We must be consistent, we must be candid, and we must be strong, and when we fail to follow through on any one of those three areas, we send the wrong signal to entities that cannot be controlled in those countries. That is why, after Russia transferred the accelerometers and gyroscopes 2 years ago, I was not surprised this past summer when we found they were transferring technology to Iran; because we have been sending the wrong signal. I ask my colleagues to support this very simple amendment.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I yield the last 2 minutes of the special order to our friend, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pappas).

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank our gentleman and the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Military Procurement. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer) and then I will yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pappas).

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie) for those very pertinent remarks and I would just highlight before I introduce the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) that the gentleman from Hawaii cites the need for robust missile defense programs and testing. The largest loss of military life in this decade was when 28 young Americans were killed in Desert Storm by a low-complexity Scud missile that we could not defend against. And in January 1995, for those who say we do not need national missile defense, Russia was forewarned of a weather rocket launch by Norway. When that day came for that rocket launch by Norway, the Russian intelligence is so decimated that they misread that as a deliberate launch by American nuclear powered submarine. They put their full offensive system on alert and activated the black boxes controlled by the three top Russian leaders. That gave them 15 minutes to either deactivate or allow to continue an all-out nuclear response against the U.S. With 7 minutes left, Mr. Speaker, President Yeltsin overruled General Kalashnikov and that response was called off. That is not a Steven Spielberg movie script. That is what happened in January 1995 that almost brought us to the brink of nuclear war because Russian misread a Norwegian weather rocket that they had been forewarned of. Mr. Speaker, I would like to introduce the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), my good friend and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, a tireless advocate for this Nation's military.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. The gentleman is absolutely correct.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank our colleague, an outstanding member of the Committee on National Security, for his leadership, especially in the area of nuclear material, control and security, and our stockpile stewardship. One of the items that our distinguished colleague did not mention, which is also of great concern both to him and to us, is the security of the Russian nuclear stockpile. It was last year, Mr. Speaker, in May, when I led a delegation to Moscow and we sat in the office of General Alexsander Lebed, who was at one time a key defense advisor to Boris Yeltsin. General Lebed was talking to us about his concerns relative to the security of the Russian nuclear forces, as well as the Russian military in general; and he told us some real horror stories. One of the ones that was really picked up by our national media was that when General Lebed reported to Boris Yeltsin, one of his responsibilities was to account for 132 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs, nuclear devices called Small Atomic Demolition Devices, SADDMs, that both the U.S. and Russia had built at one time, but we destroyed all of ours in the arms control process, he was charged by Yeltsin to account for the 132 devices that Russia built. And he said, Members of Congress, I could only find 48. And we said, what do you mean, General Lebed? How could you only come up with 48 of the 132? After all, these are devices that have a capacity of one kiloton, which is one-tenth of the capacity of Hiroshima; it could wipe out the entire inner-city area. He said, that is it. We do not know the status of the others. I came back to Washington and with my colleagues we debriefed the intelligence community. They said, Mr. Congressman, we have no idea about the whereabouts of these devices. Initially, the Russian Government denied they ever existed in the fall of last year, and finally in December, the defense minister, former general of the Soviet command staff, the strategic staff, General Sergeyev, told me in a meeting in Moscow, yes, Mr. Congressman, we built these devices, yes, we have not destroyed them all, but by the year 2000 we will have destroyed them. The point is, Mr. Speaker, we are just not sure whether or not one of these devices could or has gotten into the wrong hands, and we must understand that even though we would perceive Russia to be all that more stable, one could easily make the case that Russia is more destabilized today than at any point in time in the last 50 years. And unfortunately, that instability comes while they still maintain a nuclear arsenal that can hit our country and still maintain these kinds of small demolition devices that in the wrong hands could wreak havoc on any American city. That is the kind of concern that we have to address with a very limited and increasingly smaller defense budget. Mr. Speaker, joining us in this effort is the gentleman from the great State of Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie) and someone who has become a champion on security issues and a strong advocate and very knowledgeable Member on missile defense and the implications of that.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for those eloquent words and for his leadership on national security issues in this Congress. The gentleman is an example of an outstanding member dedicated, as is our chairman, to the issue of providing for the support of our troops at home and abroad. Mr. Speaker, our special order tonight goes from Pennsylvania to South Carolina to Missouri to Texas. I would now yield to our distinguished member of the Committee on National Security from the great State of Texas, who has been a champion and a leader on issues involving one of the most troublesome situations in the world, and that is the security of nuclear material, nuclear fissile material, especially those materials that are in the former Soviet states. So, with that, I would yield to our good friend and colleague, an outstanding member of the committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Thank you very much for that eloquent statement and for your tireless leadership on behalf of the men and women who serve this country. We deeply appreciate that. Mr. Speaker, continuing on with this special order, national security has been a bipartisan issue in this body, and we have had many outstanding Members from the other side who have been key leaders in our efforts to provide additional resources for the security of our country and for the support of our men and women. In fact, over the past 3 years in a bipartisan effort, we have plused-up funding over the President's request for defense by $10 billion, $6 billion, and $9 billion respectively, and one of those champions from the other side who has been at the forefront consistently on these issues and continues that role today as the ranking member of the House Committee on National Security is our good friend, our colleague, and a great American, Ike Skelton. Congressman, I yield to you.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my special order.