Curt Weldon

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I think this amendment and the one that will follow are noncontroversial amendments. I have discussed them with my colleagues on the other side. I have discussed them with the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member on the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. My colleagues, these are perfecting amendments to try to deal with the internal operations of DOD to make sure that we have in place the appropriate role for our agency personnel who are charged with the responsibility of monitoring input on potential technology transfers in licensing so that we have maximum effort available to raise the potential threats that these technologies might bring to bear on the U.S. This change would take DTSA and the Technology Security Directorate out from under the control of DTRA, which is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and allow it to operate as a separate entity. The reason why this is important is that in a reorganization that occurred in the fall of last year, DTSA was placed under the acquisition side of the Department of Defense, thereby providing undue influence on those technical people whose job it is to monitor technologies that, in fact, may be requested for licensing. It is true that the DTSA organization also reports to the policy side of the Department of Defense, but there is a conflict in that dual reporting relationship. What we simply do with this amendment is have DTSA report directly to the policy side alone so that the technical people in DTSA, who are those that are best able to make key decisions relative to technology licensing in exports to the upper levels of the Pentagon, so they can have the appropriate response for the decision- making process involving Commerce and State on technologies that in fact may be exported. It is a technical amendment, but it is one that I think is consistent with what was done by the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. It is consistent with the goals and objectives of the chairman and the ranking member, and I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to accept that.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I would say the gentleman is correct. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely. And Democrats have been on the forefront of that in this body, as have Republicans. Our battle has not been within this Congress.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, absolutely. And the gentleman and my friend was in the leadership in some of those debates.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I was not going to do this but I cannot let those comments go unanswered. Here is a chart that I prepared, starting in 1993 until 1999. This chart has been made available to every one of my colleagues; and for the past two nights, I have done one-hour special orders here each night in detail about these charts. I cannot go through all of that today, but I would encourage my colleagues to read what I said and then come on the floor and dispute what I have said. These charts were prepared by employees of the Federal Government that I have been working with from those agencies whose responsibility has been to monitor our technology, not to stop it, as the gentleman is trying to say, but to monitor it, so the DOD has at least the ability to know what it is we are selling. Now, let us look at what has happened. And why did I pick 1993? Was it because Bill Clinton was elected? No. It is because in 1993 this administration decided to end COCOM. COCOM was a process that was in place with our allied nations to monitor technology to make sure that in fact that technology, if it was going to be sold, we would understand the implications. This administration ended it. And I do not want to hear that it was started by the Bush administration. Our Select Committee on China went into detail. We called in the witnesses. The final decision and the ultimate demise was, by this administration, they replaced it with something called Wassenaar, which is a total and complete failure. It has done nothing to stop technology or to give us the ability to monitor it. Look at what happened since this administration ended COCOM. Each of these red dots are decisions that we took unilaterally to allow technology to flow overseas. Now, in the case of high-performance computers, let us take that for a moment. Because the story is, well, every nation builds them today. Wait a minute. Up until 1995, only two countries built them, Japan and the U.S. There was an unwritten understanding between Japan and the U.S. that neither country would export high-performance computers to tier-three countries. We unilaterally ended that. We did it. DTSA, the agency that I just talked about, said that is a bad decision. The administration said, we do not care. We are going to sell these computers anyplace. Within 2 years, China had acquired 350 high- performance computers. What is the industry saying today? Oh, Japan is selling these. We have to compete with them. Well, why are they selling them? Because our Government stripped away the process, stripped away the process to allow the input by defense experts on the implications of these technology transfers. Now, I cannot help it if my colleague does not believe employees of his administration. That is where I got this information from. But it goes beyond that also during this time period. These are export violations by this administration that occurred by China that this administration ignored and did not impose sanctions required under arms control regimes. Where did these technologies go? They did not go to normal countries. They went to Libya. They went to Iraq. They went to Iran. They went to North Korea. This administration ignored the violations. This administration 20 times in the last 7 years, when we caught these violations occurring, said, we are not going to do anything because we do not want to upset our relationship with China. This combination of factors, along with these numerous visits by Chinese influence peddlers. I wish my Democrat constituents could visit the President 12 times in one year like John Huang did. I wish my constituents could have personal meetings with President Clinton 12 times in one year to influence peddle. But my constituents do not have that opportunity. So when the gentleman says we are going too far, I say to the gentleman, we had a 9-0 vote in the China committee for recommendations to improve our security. It was this administration who removed the laboratory security color coding at our Federal labs in 1993. It was Hazel O'Leary who removed the FBI background checks in 1993. It was Hazel O'Leary who overruled Lawrence Livermore Laboratory when they caught a retired employee giving classified information, and she reinstated. And it was Hazel O'Leary in 1995 who gave the design for the W-87 warhead to U.S. News and World Report the same year they said we caught China. This administration has been the problem with export policy, and we are trying to make some modest changes sensitive to the concerns of business to allow us to get a control on what it is we are selling. We are not trying to hurt business. I will put my record against that of the gentleman on free market support of our business any day of the week. For him to stand up here and say we are trying to hurt our business is nothing less, in my opinion, than totally distorting our reputation and what we support. We are concerned about America's security, and we are concerned about giving our employees in the Defense Department the chance to have input into what is happening. I wish the gentleman on the Committee on International Affairs would have done more on the elimination of COCOM or the other things that occurred over the past several years that this administration gave away the complete ability of our country to monitor the kinds of technology that we are selling. Because if we would have stopped these things, we would not have had to have a China commission, we would not have had to have a Cox committee. But none of those things occurred.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished chairman for yielding me this time, and I want to thank the distinguished ranking member and the chairman for their outstanding work on this bipartisan bill. I also want to thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Pickett), who I have the pleasure of working with on the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, who is one of the tireless advocates on behalf of our Nation's national security. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to rise and state, as I have many times, the fact that defense in this body has been bipartisan. There are Democrat and Republican leaders who tirelessly fight for what is right for our troops. Our battle has not been within the House, it has actually been between the White House and the Congress. And it has been a bipartisan effort over the past several years to restore dignity and support for our troops. This year in the R&D portion of our budget we had a very severe problem. The administration, while publicly saying they were going to increase defense spending, actually took a $3 billion cut out of the R&D account lines. They shifted that money over to procurement and called that an increase in defense spending. Now, I still cannot believe they did that. They cut the R&D account by $3 billion, shifted it to procurement, and they called that publicly a $3 billion increase in funding. They did not talk about what we were doing to those programs that are the future threats to America: The need to research weapons of mass destruction and how to deal with them; the need to deal with issues involving missile defense systems which are an emerging priority for all of us, both theater and national missile defense; and the need to deal with the issue of information dominance or what John Hamre calls cyber terrorism. So while the administration was talking a good game about refocusing its priority on national security, their words were not in fact following their deeds. These cuts were outrageous and they were beyond what we could live with. Working with the distinguished chairman and the ranking member of the full committee, we were able to find an additional $1.4 billion to restore a portion of that money that this administration proposed cutting. We could not restore the entire $3 billion, so there are some programs that we should be funding that will not be funded next year, but we did in fact find approximately one-half of that money that we are putting back in. In fact, in some areas, like information dominance, the supports, the great work of the services, especially the Army with their LIWA facility at Ft. Belvoir, we have increased funding by about $40 million more than what the administration asked for. We have also restored the only cooperative program with the Russians to build a stable relationship on the issue of missile defense. The administration actually proposed canceling the RAMOS project, which would have been devastating to building confidence. We restore that program in this bill and the effort to work in a more transparent way with the Russians. But let me say this, Mr. Chairman. While we do good things in this bill, we do not solve the problem. We need to understand that the need to commit to more funding is a long-term commitment, and I hope our colleagues will work together toward that end.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise tonight to continue to provide for our colleagues in the House and for the constituents that they represent across the country information relative to the Cox report and the way this report is being spun by this administration. Madam Speaker, I had wanted to go into much of the information I am going to share tonight in more detail yesterday, but because I had to leave after 30 minutes, I could not go into detail last evening. I will do so tonight. Madam Speaker, I want to start off this evening, as I did last night, by saying it is not my normal course to spend every evening over a given period of time on the floor of this House discussing the same issue. But like eight of my colleagues, I spent almost the last year of my life focusing on the investigation that we were asked to perform by the leadership in both parties in this body on potential security harm done to our country by our policies relative to China and other nations that might benefit from technology developed here in America. We worked tirelessly behind closed doors, cooperating fully with the FBI and the CIA, and with the full support of George Tenet, who heads the CIA, in trying to determine whether or not there were damages done to our national security, and if so, what was the extent of that damage. We deliberately made a decision when we began the process last summer that we would not go into the specifics of campaign finance activity or what other motives would have driven policymakers to lower the thresholds for exports, or perhaps the reasons why influence would be allowed by Chinese nationals and others, both at the White House and to other Federal agencies, to allow those key players to gain access to the key decisionmakers that would benefit them in acquiring technology. The nine Members that were a part of the Cox committee represent a broad basis of views in this Congress, four Democrats and five Republicans, very serious Members; and our goal was and the result was a totally nonpartisan effort. We looked at every aspect of technology that may in fact pose problems for us down the road: whether or not that technology had in fact been transferred; if so, to what extent, how it was transferred, and what the implications were for our long-term security. The almost 1,000-page document that we completed is, I think, very detailed and certainly would be required reading for any American. The problem is, most American citizens, like most Members of Congress, do not have the time to sift through almost 1,000 pages of detailed explanations and stories relative to various technologies that had been transferred out of the U.S. over the past several decades. Therefore, because much of this is contained within the thousand-or- so-page report, even though 30 percent of that remained classified because the administration would not declassify the entire document, the media, to a large extent, have chosen not to focus on the substance of what is in the Cox committee report. Unfortunately, the bulk of the American media, and I say the bulk because there are a few exceptions, people like Jeff Girth with the New York Times, who has been doing tireless work in this area before our report was even issued; people like Carl Cameron at Fox News, who continues to do extensive work in this area; people like 60 Minutes, who are right now doing research in these areas, and other network affiliates, they are the exception. The bulk of the mainstream media have chosen to accept the spin that has been given by this White House to the work that we did. What I am trying to do, Madam Speaker, is to present information to our colleagues, which they could, in turn, provide to their constituents, of a factual basis that compliments the work that was done by the Cox committee. Now, the public at large can receive copies of the Cox committee report. It is available on the newsstand, or they can get it on the Web site that has been established by the Cox committee itself. Many libraries now have copies of the Cox committee three-volume series. Last evening, I mentioned the fact that I have now established a Web site on the Cox report that goes beyond the information that is covered in the Cox report and provides the visual explanation of the overview of the problem that we dealt with in the Cox committee. So our colleagues, Madam Speaker, and all of their constituents can now turn to the Internet where they can access the material I am going to show this evening, and they can download the actual charts that I am going to provide. In addition, smaller versions of these larger charts have been made available to every Member of this body. All they have to do is contact my office, send a staffer over; and be they Republican or Democrat, they can get the charts and all the related information that goes with the charts so they can share this information in a factual way with their constituents. The Web site where our colleagues and the American people across this country can access this information is www.house.gov/curtweldon. Any American represented by any one of our colleagues can access this information through that Web site. In fact, last evening, we had a number of contacts from throughout the country from people who want to get additional factual information in an investigational form, in a condensed form about what actually the Cox report focused on. As I have said in a series of speeches that I have been giving both here and around the country, Madam Speaker, the focus of the Cox committee was not just on our laboratories. Now, if my colleagues listen to Bill Richardson, the Secretary of Energy and the point person that has been asked by the administration to provide the spin for the Cox committee report, my colleagues would think that our report only focused on our laboratories, Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore in particular. Nothing could be further from the truth, Madam Speaker. While it is true, the laboratory security was one part of what we looked at, it is only one small part of the bigger picture of the way that we loosened the controls over our technology for the past 7 years. The American people need to understand that this effort was well beyond our laboratories. But as I did last night, I want to highlight four specific actions that rebut what Secretary Richardson has been saying around the country as the point person for this administration as he has tried to spin the Cox committee report as though it is only concerned with lab security. Now, Madam Speaker, our colleagues know full well, because they have read the text of Mr. Richardson's speeches, that his focus has been something along the lines of this: This administration was the administration who uncovered the Chinese espionage in 1995 that happened in previous administrations that were run by Republicans, and we took aggressive action in this administration to correct those problems. Secretary Richardson would have the American people believe and would have our colleagues believe that this administration had no responsibility whatsoever in technology being transferred to China and that the only thing they did was that they uncovered the fact that, in 1995, they learned that China had stolen the designs for our warhead capabilities, the W-88 and the W-87, that occurred in previous administrations. That has been the extent of Secretary Richardson's comments. He has also gone on to say, now, look, we have taken steps to correct all of this, and today we have corrected the bulk of the problems. Well, I am here to rebut that, Madam Speaker. I would like to do it in a forum where I could stand directly across from Secretary Richardson, or even the President, and have a chance to go at it verbally and exchange information, but it looks like that is not going to be possible. The national media outlets will put Secretary Richardson on the Sunday morning talk shows to give the White House spin, but they have yet to give full consideration to the factual rebuttal to what Secretary Richardson has been saying. So I am going to attempt to do that here again on the public record tonight. First of all, we must remind the American people that contrary to what Secretary Richardson has been saying, it was this administration, under the leadership of then-Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary in 1993 that ended the policy of color coding laboratory security credentials at our laboratories. My understanding is that she thought having color coded badges was to some extent discriminatory and they were not necessary. So under her administration, acting on behalf of Bill Clinton, we did away with that process in 1993. Now what did that mean? That meant, Madam Speaker, that all of those employees at our labs that we used to be able to tell by the color of the identifying ID system that they had on them no longer could be done, or no longer could be checked, because we did away with that color coding, making it much more difficult to determine where employees could or could not work or be in a particular classified laboratory setting. So under Secretary Hazel O'Leary, this administration ended the practice of visually being able to identify what people at our labs could or could not have access to key areas. Now, obviously that made it much easier for unauthorized people to go into areas where they did not have appropriate clearance. Now, if this policy were so acceptable and defensive, my question is, why did this administration 2 weeks ago reinstate the policy as it existed under President Reagan, President Bush, and even President Carter and before that? If this policy change, which Secretary O'Leary made on behalf of Bill Clinton in 1993 and 1994, was so critically important and logical, why 2 weeks ago did they go back to the policy as it was under Republican Presidents? Was perhaps there some new revelation that this relaxation that occurred by the Clinton administration in 1993 and 1994 led to security problems in our laboratories? Bill Richardson has yet to answer that question. Second point, Madam Speaker, we have not heard Bill Richardson talk about the fact that it was under Secretary Hazel O'Leary, acting on behalf of President Clinton, that FBI background checks of people who worked at our labs and visited our labs were put on hold. Now, why do we have FBI background checks? They were there to discourage people who should not have access to our country's secrets to get into places where those secrets were kept. That was not done prior to 1993, Madam Speaker. That was done by this administration as a major change in policy that opened the floodgates for people to go to our labs, who in previous years would not have been allowed access to those facilities. Bill Richardson has not dealt with that issue, because as he said, this administration only inherited problems and did everything to correct them. Third point. There was an incident involving a retired employee from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the 1993 to 1995 time frame, where that employee, former employee, was accused by the Department of Energy of having released sensitive classified information to unauthorized people. The Department of Energy investigated that employee. The Oakland office of the Department of Energy saw fit, based on the factual evidence to remove that former employee's classified status so that he no longer, as a retiree, had access to classified information. The employee appealed that decision to the Secretary of Energy's office. Hazel O'Leary herself overturned the decision of the Oakland Department of Energy office and allowed that retiree to retain his classified status. When that occurred, Madam Speaker, employees all across DOE involved in sensitive security areas got the feeling that this administration felt that giving away classified secrets was no big deal. We lowered the threshold for the security clearance process. We stopped the FBI background checks. Then we even had an employee who was accused by the Department of Energy itself, and found guilty of giving classified information. The Secretary herself overturned the Department of Energy decision to take away his security clearance. Now, those people that I have talked to in the Department of Energy who worked under Hazel O'Leary, way more than one or two people, have said that under her leadership, there were wholesale actions to declassify massive amounts of information, in some cases boxes and cartons of records that no one had gone through, simply declassified, made available for people to read in a spirit that I guess was considered openness, even though these were, in many cases, the most important technical secrets that this country had. Let me give my colleagues one particular example, Madam Speaker. Secretary Richardson has gone around the country, and he has made the case that when this administration found the evidence in 1995 that China had stolen or received the design for our most capable nuclear warheads, the W-88 and the W-87, that this administration immediately corrected those problems so they would never occur again. Even though Janet Reno cannot properly explain why the Justice Department turned down requests for four wiretaps, for efforts by one of our employees at one of our labs that we thought was a spy, Secretary Richardson has said they took aggressive action. Now, that is what he said publicly. I wish he would answer this question, because that same year, in 1995, U.S. News and World Report published a special report entitled ``Shockwave.'' ``Shockwave'' was printed on July the 31, 1995, distributed all across the country and around the world. I am sure a number of these copies were sold in China. Because when I traveled to Beijing I saw copies of U.S. News and World Report on the shelves that people could buy. The same thing in Russia. These copies were available in North Korea, in Iran or Iraq. This edition of U.S. News and World Report's Special Supplement were sold wherever people would pay the price of whatever this document cost, $3.50. What was in this special report on the last page, which I showed last evening, was startling. On July 31, 1995, this administration, not the Reagan administration, not the Bush administration, not the Carter administration, this administration leaked the design for our W-87 warhead to U.S. News and World Report. Not just the Chinese, the North Koreans, the Iraqis and Iranians, anyone who would buy U.S. News and World Report on July 31, 1995 got a documented diagram of the W-87, which up until that point in time was classified. Here is the color version of what the Department of Energy released to U.S. News and World Report. This design shows in some detail the way our most capable nuclear warhead works. It shows and explains the process, it shows and locates the technology, the fuel, the process, the activity, the physics of the way America's most capable warhead would work. This was not secretly stolen by the Chinese, that this administration maintains they found in 1995. This diagram was given to U.S. News and World Report by this administration in 1995, and reproduced in U.S. News and World Report. As I said last evening, Madam Speaker, I have been told, and I am tracking this down right now, that there was an internal investigation within the Department of Energy to find out who leaked this diagram, this sensitive diagram to U.S. News and World Report. Because I have been told, Madam Speaker, that that individual and group were told to stop the investigation. Why? Because the assumption was that this diagram came from Hazel O'Leary's office herself. Why are we not hearing Secretary Richardson talk about this, Madam Speaker? Why is he not talking about in 1995, in July, when this diagram for the W-87 was reproduced and sold on newsstands all over the world to anyone who would pay the price? This was not some secret espionage capability of the Chinese. This was the Department of Energy, following Hazel O'Leary's desire to open up to the people of the world our most secret information about technologies important to our country. There is one additional factor that needs to be investigated, Madam Speaker. There was an individual, or is an individual employed at the Department of Energy who has currently been placed on what I call political administrative leave. His name is Edward J. McCallum. He was the one who briefed Members of Congress and their staffs about problems with one of our nuclear facilities, Rocky Flats. When it was found out that he had done the outrageous thing of informing Congress about security concerns at one of our nuclear sites, what was the response of this administration? They put him on administrative leave. Secretary Richardson has announced that he is going to fire Mr. McCallum because he claims he gave out classified information. Madam Speaker, I cannot believe this is happening in America, but there is some added irony here. Madam Speaker, I am providing for the Congressional Record, a document dated May 3, 1999, prepared by Mr. McCallum which outlines the problems at Rocky Flats and what steps he took to correct them. Statement of Edward J. McCallum Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak with the committee today on the Department of Energy's Safeguards and Security Program. Over the past nine years, I have served as the Director of DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security. In this capacity, I have been responsible for the development and promulgation of policy that governs the protection of the national security assets entrusted to the department, to include those assets that are part of the nation's nuclear weapons program. I am also responsible for providing training and specialized technical advice and assistance to DOE field sites when requested. My office is also charged with conducting special inquiries into incidents of security concern to include, but not limited to, those incidents involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. As you may know the Department of Energy has placed me on Administrative Leave since April 19, 1999. DOE officials allege that I committed a security infraction by claiming that I disclosed classified information during a conversation with a whistleblower from the Rocky Flats site. Based on the Department's own classification procedures and guidelines (CG-SS-3, Chap 10, Dispersal of Radioactive Material), I firmly believe that these allegations are completely unfounded. I have been an authorized classifier in the DOE and it's predecessor organizations for over 25 years and helped develop the first classification guide in this area in 1975. Further DOE also failed to follow its own procedures in investigating these issues before placing me on Administrative Leave. I believe this action to be an obvious act of retaliation against the individual and the office that has tried to bring an increasingly distressing message of lax security at the DOE Laboratories forward since 1995. Prior to joining the Office of Safeguards and Security I held several high level positions within the department's safeguards and security program areas. From 1988-1989 I served as Director, Office of Security Evaluations. In 1978 I joined the DOE at the Chicago Operations Office and in 1979 became the Director of the Safeguards and Security Division. Prior to joining DOE I served as an officer in the U.S. Army. Active military service included a number of Military Intelligence and Special Forces assignments in Europe and Southeast Asia. I culminated my military duty after over thirty years of active and reserve service. In fulfilling my responsibilities as the Director, Office of Safeguards and Security, I have attempted to provide senior DOE management with the most sound, professional judgment possible concerning the status of security within the department, along with recommendations as to how best to rectify shortcomings. As you are no doubt aware, much of what I have offered over recent years has not been altogether positive, nor well received. The steady decline in resources available to the DOE safeguards and security program as well as a lack of priority have allowed the department's protection posture to deteriorate to a point where a program that long operated in a defense in depth mode, where no single point failure permitted the system to fail, can no longer afford such a strategy. The information presented in this statement is not new. It has been repeated consistently over the last decade in Departmental reports such as the Annual Reports to the Secretary in 1995, 1996 and 1997 by the Office of Safeguards and Security. External reviews such as the Report to the Secretary in 1991, by General James Freeze, and the Nuclear Command and Control Staff Report on Oversight in the DOE in 1998 cite similar concerns. There have also been a large number of General Accounting Office Reports on these areas. However, for numerous reasons the department has not been able to resolve these serious and longstanding problems. Computer Security One of the primary interests expressed by the Committee, and indeed widely covered by the media recently, is the loss of classified information from the computer systems at the National Laboratories. Indeed, we may be sitting at the center of the worst spy scandal in our Nation's history. The DOE Computer Security Program suffers from a variety of problems. One of the primary concerns is the protection of unclassified sensitive information processed by the Department and the relationship of these systems to the classified architecture. Relatively little guidance has been issued on how to protect sensitive but unclassified information. System administrators are charged with the responsibility for designing their own protective measures. Unfortunately, many of them do not have the computer security background or knowledge required to implement a sound computer security program. Attempts to issue comprehensive guidance by my office and the Chief Information Officer as early as 1995 met with significant Laboratory resistance. Several Laboratories complained that providing protection such as firewalls and passwords were unnecessarily expensive and a hindrance to operations. Implementation of the proposed Computer Security Manual in 1996 would have prevented many of the problems being reported today. Another area of great concern is the migration of classified information from systems approved for processing classified data to less secure unclassified processing systems. My office has noted a number of problems in this area to include: Failure to conduct classification reviews before placing information onto an unclassified processing system, intentionally creating unclassified data that is very close to classified data to ease processing, and using personal computers at home to process classified information. A variety of computer security tools and techniques, such as encryption devices, firewalls, and disconnect features, are available and their use is required; however, these protective measures are not always used. In some cases, this is due to lack of knowledge by system administrators. In other cases, it is due to lack of funding or priority for the required equipment. Protective Forces While much of the attention of late has been directed toward the area of foreign visitors and the protection of classified information, equally serious cause for concern exists in other areas as well. For instance, since 1992, the number of protective forces at DOE sites nationwide has decreased by almost 40% (from 5,640 to the current number of approximately 3,500) while the inventory of nuclear material has increased by more than 30%. The number of Protective Force Officers has declined to the point where it is questionable at some facilities whether the DOE Protective Force could defeat an adversary. By 1996 several facilities were no longer capable of recapturing a nuclear asset or facility if it were lost to an adversary. Indeed, a number of sites stopped even training for this mission because resources had been reduced below the minimum level necessary to expect success. We have had some success in increasing these numbers of recent years so that at this time all sites report they can meet this minimum capability. Several sites are using performance tests to verify that their Protective Force can defeat the adversary; however, many of these tests are not realistic. For example, performance tests sometimes are not consistent in providing the adversary with the weaponry or explosive breaching devices used by terrorist groups. At times artificial ``safety constrains'' are imposed on exercise adversary teams that effectively neutralize their ability to operate. This results in ``winning'' the performance test, in a less than realistic scenario. There have been several other consequences of the reduction in the number of Protective Force Officers. First is a relatively older Protective Force (the average Protective Force Officer is now in his/her early 40s). Second, DOE sites are relying on local law enforcement agencies to handle serious security threats. Their ability in nuclear terrorist situations is questionable. Third, sites have difficulty increasing the tempo of security operations during high threat periods. Fourth, Protective Force personnel are displaying lower morale due to reduced training and job stagnation. Finally, an average annual overtime rate in our nuclear weapons facilities of approximately 25% has detrimental effects on safety, training, and response capabilities. Exercises A centrally funded and well-integrated National-level security exercise program is critical to meet the safeguards and protection needs of DOE and the nation. Exercises that address site response and management of security crisis are required by regulation to be held annually at critical DOE facilities. However, participation by State and local law enforcement, regional offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other Federal agencies is inconsistent and varies considerably across the complex. Under Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the Secretary of Energy is directed to conduct exercises to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear facilities from terrorism. DOE is also tasked to support the FBI in its lead as the Federal agency responsible for managing all domestic incidents involving terrorist threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the recent creation of the Department of Justice National Domestic Preparedness Office, the FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), and other National crisis response assets, requires that DOE plan and practice a new and expanded role in supporting a security crisis response beyond the local site and internal Department level. Currently, the present DOE organizational structure separates exercise responsibility between Program offices and Safeguards and Security; this hampers the integration of sequential training objectives that can be monitored and tracked and creates confusion at the site level. More importantly, the majority of the funding resides at the site level where expenditures must vie with other program needs each fiscal year, often to their detriment. physical security systems Another area of concern involves aging and deteriorating security systems throughout the DOE complex. Physical security systems are critical to ensure the adequate protection of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Many facilities have systems ranging in age from 14 to 21 years, and are based on mid-70's to early-80's technology. Because of the obsolescence of these systems, replacement parts and services are increasingly expensive and hard to obtain. Expensive compensatory measures (i.e., protective force response) are required to ensure needed confidence levels of adequate protection. Older systems are also increasingly vulnerable to defeat by advanced technologies that are now readily and cheaply available to potential adversaries. Continual reductions, delays or cancellations in line-item construction funding increases the vulnerability risks to sites protection capability. Also, DOE is not realizing significant savings available through advancements in technology that have increased detection, assessment, and delay capabilities. Some sites are using a variety of nonstandard security alarm and access control systems that have not been fully tested to determine if they contain vulnerabilities, or if they meet Departmental requirements without compensatory measures. Such systems may have back doors or viruses, that allow the insider adversary to cripple the entire site protection system, thus leaving the site vulnerable. Some sites do not have qualified personnel to conduct these vulnerability tests and are generally unwilling to conduct any type of attack on the system to determine if such vulnerabilities can be accomplished. Counterterrorism Measures PDD-39, The United States Policy on Counterterrorism, requires all governmental agencies to implement security measures to defend against Weapons of Mass Destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. The Office of Safeguards and Security has developed the necessary policies and requirements for implementing PDD-39. Field Elements, however, have been slow to purchase and install explosive detection systems, with only a limited number of sites having done so. Program Offices claim that there is no funding for such equipment. personnel security I fear that a recent decision by the department to have program offices fund the cost of clearances for field contractor personnel will have severe repercussions. Since implementing this new approach at the beginning of FY 1999, we have already begun to see a dramatic increase in the backlog of background investigations. As with other security areas, program offices must decide upon competing interests when determining those areas to be funded. Unfortunately, security activities are relegated to a lower tier in terms of importance by some program offices and selected field sites. This appears to be the case with the funding of security background investigations. As the first line of defense against the ``insider'' threat, the adequate funding and timely conduct of reinvestigations is critical to ensuring the department maintains a protection posture commensurate with the level of threat. Roles and responsibilities Operating beneath the surface of these major challenges are some fundamental issues that, if properly addressed, could provide the impetus to effect real progress. These challenges, for the most part, are not new, nor are their solutions. Organizational Structure: In all of the reviews of the safeguards and security program conducted during the last decade, there is a recurring theme. Simply, the Department's organizational structure of the Safeguards and Security Program is such that programmatic authority and responsibility are not properly aligned. The Safeguards and Security Program in its current structure has one organization developing policy, training and providing technical field assistance (NN), another organization providing funding and ``implementing guidance'' (Headquarters Program Offices), a third organization (Field Site) is responsible for implementation of policy, while a fourth (EH) is responsible for oversight. A fundamental change in both the organizational structure and funding of the Safeguards and Security Program is absolutely necessary before the Department can begin to systematically address the major challenges previously addressed. These organizations must be consolidated with policy, guidance and implementation in one location, with an appropriate budget to participate in the Department decision making. Safeguards and Security Program Funding: This is the central, driving issue. Budget cutbacks have adversely affected all of DOE. As previously alluded to, however, when Program Offices face funding shortfalls, there is a tendency to cut security programs on a pro rata basis without the benefit of assessing the impact these cuts would have on the department's protection posture. The implementation of virtually every security program, from the Information Security Program to the Protective Force Program, has suffered significantly as a result. I believe many of these cuts are shortsighted and ill advised as they eventually lead to security lapses. Nevertheless, my office has no authority to force the Program Offices to implement departmental security policies and requirements. Similarly, my office has no funds to provide to Program Offices or Field Elements to help pay for appropriate security measures. Without an adequate budget there is simply no authority. Security Policy and Requirements Formulation. DOE security policies and requirements are based upon current threat data and requirements identified by outside intelligence organizations. DOE, the Department of Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency meet every two years to evaluate current threat data and formulate an agreed upon threat statement that governs security programs throughout the U.S. Government. In addition, the Department of Energy internally reviews this threat statement annually. In DOE parlance, the resulting document is known as the Design Basis Threat. Program Offices are required to use the Design Basis Threat as the baseline for planning security measures. Security requirements are also levied upon the Department by the Office of the President, Congress, and the General Services Administration. For example, Presidential Decision Directive 39 directed all Executive Branch agencies to protect against terrorist attacks. This resulted in an increased need for explosive detection equipment, more frequent security patrols, and hardening of structures. In some cases, Program Offices have directed their field elements not to implement departmental security requirements. This is due to 2 main reasons: The program offices can't afford the new directive, or they simply don't agree with it. In other cases, they have issued interpretive guidance that changes the security policy or undermines the effectiveness of that policy. Again, the Office of Safeguards and Security has no authority to demand compliance with departmental security policies and requirements. accomplishments I would be less than forthcoming if I failed to mention some positive aspects of the department's safeguards and security program. Let me start by saying that the program is staffed by hard working dedicated men and women throughout the country who are firmly committed to protecting the critical national security assets entrusted to their care. The responsibilities of these individuals are most demanding, even dangerous in some respects. Yet despite the dwindling resources made available to them, these individuals continue to perform in outstanding fashion. Where this department has failed is in providing these professionals the necessary resources to allow them to perform their responsibilities appropriately. The Department has also failed to provide protection so that individuals will bring forward problems and deficiencies without fearing retaliation. Progress has been made in some of the areas I previously addressed. In the area of physical security, the Department is working to correct identified weaknesses. Specifically, the Department augmented security at some field sites by deploying new technologies to safeguard special nuclear materials and weapons; worked with other agencies to train departmental protective forces; identified and developed more sophisticated detection and deterrent systems; and hired additional security personnel. New explosive detection systems are being installed at selected nuclear facilities and some sites are upgrading access control systems. In the area of information security, the Secretary recently directed the shut down of classified computer operations at three national laboratories until such time as he was assured that information processed on the systems is being done so securely. From a longer-term perspective, the department is requesting a dramatic increase in budget for information security. The additional funding will be used to help further secure the department's classified and unclassified computer networks. The improvements will help strengthen fire walls, develop better intrusion detection devices, and fund rapid response teams to work with the FBI to detect and track cyber intruders. In the area of the control, measurement and accountability of special nuclear materials, the Department has established the Fissile Materials Assurance Working Group (FMAWG) to assess needed areas of improvement and make recommendations. In this regard, the FMAWG identified unmeasured materials and initiated actions to resolve discrepancies. They further identified issues regarding the safeguarding of irradiated material and are promulgating policy for implementation. The Department is developing new technologies for tamper indicating devices and proposing pilot projects for field implementation. a path forward All of these positive steps are good, necessary actions to ensure the adequacy of our protection posture. More is needed, however. As previously addressed, organizational realignment of safeguards and security activities is sorely needed. I understand that this is now under review by the department. While addressing the problems inherent in the current organizational structure of the Department will not in itself solve all of the issues contained in this report, it will establish the necessary framework to allow resolution in a more effective and lasting manner. Simple organizational realignment, however, by itself, will not result in the fundamental change in approach that is required. The Department should work closely with Congress to establish a budget line item for safeguards and security. Doing so will enable a more accurate accounting and control of safeguards and security expenditures. It will also improve the likelihood that policy will be issued in conjunction with the necessary resources to implement that policy. It should be apparent that attempts to have effective internal oversight of the DOE safeguards and security program have failed over a twenty-year period. While there have been high points and periods when oversight has been effective, organizational and budget pressures have played too central a theme for this function to remain within DOE. An organization like the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board should be established to independently review Security at DOE and the Laboratories. Further a direct reporting mechanism should be established to one or more of the Congressional Committees. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the department today as we strive to meet our protection responsibilities is the attitude throughout the complex toward security. There are some that believe that safeguards and security is an overhead expense. I disagree, strongly. Safeguards & security is a mission-critical element. Without it, why bother creating new national defense technologies, if present or future foes can have ready access to it? To treat it as a mission-critical element requires a greater sense of accountability than seen to date. Secretary Richardson has committed to establishing and maintaining a sound safeguards and security program. It will take the commitment not only of the Secretary, however, but of each and every program official throughout the department if this mission essential element is to be fulfilled. It is incumbent upon senior departmental management to make safeguards and security a priority. It is too important to be relegated to a secondary status where its operations are viewed as ancillary. Both Congress and the public rightfully expect our best effort in executing this vital program. We should demand no less from ourselves.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, Mr. McCallum has been punished and has been placed on administrative leave and may lose his job. Guess who now sits on the corporate board of directors, being paid, overseeing the operation of that same facility? You guessed it, Madam Speaker. Hazel O'Leary. Hazel O'Leary now sits on the board of directors of the company that oversees the Rocky Flats facility that Mr. McCallum attempted to bring to the attention of the Congress was being protected in a woefully inadequate way. What is the response of this administration? To make him the scapegoat. It is a shame that he did not precede Notra Trulock, because as many of my colleagues know, it was Notra Trulock who began to blow the whistle on this administration for not paying attention in 1995 to security breaches that were occurring in the Department of Energy. But Notra Trulock lucked out. Because when the administration realized that what Notra Trulock was saying was true, they could not go after him. They gave Notra Trulock a $10,000 bonus and now Notra Trulock is on national media programs and talks about how the administration has gotten its act together. It is a shame that Mr. McCallum did not precede Notra Trulock. Perhaps he would have gotten the $10,000 raise for being the whistle- blower. I can tell my colleagues, Madam Speaker, I am not going to sit by, and neither are a number of our colleagues, and see an innocent individual doing his job professionally be railroaded out of his position because this administration is embarrassed over the policies of their lack of control and decontrol in security measures involving our national laboratories, our Department of Energy facilities, our defense installations, and our military and other technology. The American people, Madam Speaker, can now read the statement of Mr. McCallum for themselves in tomorrow's Congressional Record. The American people also now, Madam Speaker, can read information I provided last evening giving the big picture of the China connection. I want to review that again today in some more detail. As a member of the Cox committee, I had the opportunity, over the 7 months that we worked aggressively on this project, to meet a number of senior and very capable intelligence officers and people within our intelligence establishment who are absolutely frustrated by what they see occurring in this administration on security issues. When we completed the Cox Commission report, I knew that the American people would not sit through and read, for the most part, a document that is almost a thousand pages in length. Very difficult to understand. So working with this group of people, and I would add for the record, who are today currently employees of this administration, so I cannot name them because they will be given the same treatment as Mr. McCallum has been given, these people have given me the information that I am providing to our colleagues and to the American people. This chart, Madam Speaker, for the first time, even though it looks like a hodgepodge of blocks, it can be pulled down on the Internet site, as I have said earlier, and this site is www.house.gov/ curtweldon. This document gives the full pictorial representation of what we think China had planned to acquire western technology. Now, should we fault China for establishing this network? Probably, yes. But as many have said, what country does not spy or look to acquire technology from other countries? I would say we are the fools if we are stupid enough to allow China to access information that we should be controlling. And that is why I think the bulk of the responsibility here, Madam Speaker, lies with our own government. It was our government that failed the American people. This chart outlines the Central Military Commission of the People's Liberation Army of China. The red boxes on this chart, which are too difficult to read without having the chart directly in front of you, are the various military commands and entities that are a part of the Central Military Commission that we know have been involved in engaging and in acquiring technology for China. Now, some of that acquisition has been legal, and there is nothing wrong with that. If they can buy it, how can we fault China for buying things we are legally willing to sell them or other countries will sell them? Some of it was not legal. By and large, though, much of what they got, they got through legal manipulation that we allowed to occur. The green boxes are those entities and banks and financial institutions here, in Hong Kong and Macao, as well as in Europe and Asia, that were designed to fund the acquisition of these technologies. Now, because they could not buy them directly, front companies were established, and they are the blue boxes. We estimate there were hundreds and hundreds of front companies established by the Chinese to acquire technologies, paid for by these entities, to go to the arms of the People's Liberation Army, because that is a desire they had for these specific technologies. A very elaborate scheme, but very simple. The financing through the entities to buy it go back to those entities that wanted to improve their missile systems, their nuclear programs, their computing capabilities, the design of their fighter aircraft, whatever the need might be. Again, if we are stupid enough to sell sensitive technology, how can we just blame China for buying it in the open market? This was the network. Now, we can see that what we did not look at in the Cox committee is what influenced these people to allow this technology to flow. Was it money, was it influence, was it a desire to increase economic activity for American companies? What was the motivation? We did not look at that in our China committee effort. We thought that should be a follow- on once we determined that there was security harm done to our country. That is why I prepared this document and the document I am going to follow up with. There are some connections here, Madam Speaker, that the American people need to look at, because some of these green boxes have attached to them campaign donations. Ted Sioeng, $200,000 to $400,000 to the Democratic National Committee. Or John Huang and James Riady, and all of these people who contributed millions of dollars to the Democratic National Committee. Or the temple that gave, through Maria Hsia, $50,000 at a fund-raiser at a temple of impoverished religious leaders. Those connections need to be pursued. This information, Madam Speaker, has been investigated much more thoroughly by the FBI and the CIA than I have. Now, I have seen some of the classified versions of this, which are far more elaborate, which I obviously cannot show publicly. What I have shown here is an unclassified version of the connections between these agencies that have been publicly identified. And in response to a question by a Member of Congress at a public hearing, Louie Freeh, the director of the FBI, was asked: ``How much of the information that we are aware about in public form, like this, compares to what you know in the FBI and the CIA about what happened in this entire series of transactions?'' This was the response of FBI director Louie Freeh. ``The public knows about 1 percent.'' One percent of what went on that we have in the FBI and the CIA in terms of these connections. One percent, Madam Speaker, which means that 99 percent beyond this our intelligence and our law enforcement agencies know about but we do not. Madam Speaker, the individual that Louis Freeh assigned to investigate this, Charles LaBella, when he got through all of this evidence, well beyond what I have, wrote a memorandum to Louis Freeh that I have been told is almost 100 pages in length. That then resulted in Louis Freeh sending a memo to Janet Reno saying there is enough evidence here that you better impanel a special investigative effort, an independent counsel, because of what may be here. Janet Reno refused Louis Freeh and refused Mr. LaBella. That document has never been released to the Members of Congress nor the American public. In fact, I am not aware of any Member of Congress that has read that memo. But I can tell you, Madam Speaker, every Member of this body and every citizen in America should demand of this President one thing, and, that is, to release the LaBella memorandum. If this President and Vice President Gore have nothing to hide, if there are no connections, if there is no scandal, if there is no grand scheme, if there are no implicating factors, it can all go away very quickly by releasing the LaBella memorandum. That document has been subpoenaed by the Congress and it has been refused by Janet Reno to be turned over to us so that we have not had the opportunity to see what Charles LaBella said was there in that 99 percent of information that we do not know about. What I have given to the American people is the unclassified information that they can read, and it in itself is revealing. In fact, Madam Speaker, you will notice there are lines connecting many of these boxes. The solid lines indicate direct working relationships between the PLA entities, the financing entities, and the front companies. So they are directly linked. The dotted lines, which are fewer in number, are those where there is a loosely connected relationship but not a direct relationship. Now, the logical question is, ``Well, hold it, Congressman, you can't just draw lines. You've got to provide some documentation.'' Well, we did. Again working with existing employees of this government who have been frustrated by what they have seen occurring have helped me identify 26 documents that are available on the public record that are not classified, that include newspaper articles, research documents, business reports, company annual reports where you can connect the lines. Each of the numbers on this chart which corresponds with a line gives you a specific document that you can read which I have outlined and identified in the Congressional Record yesterday which you can get off of my web site which gives you the public information that supports the linkage between these various entities. It is public information. Now, that is not all. And the media when I brought this out last week said, ``Well, wait a minute, you haven't established a direct relationship.'' I cannot show classified information here. That is a violation of our Federal laws. I have given unclassified documentation which without a doubt shows the connections between the major players in the effort to allow China to acquire technology that they have been wanting to buy. Now, the administration would have us believe that this is really all concocted by China and that we should make China the evil empire. I am not doing that, Madam Speaker. I cannot blame China if decisions made by this administration allowed technology to flow legally, and that is what occurred in most cases. The influence that was peddled by these financial people ended up lowering the controls over our regulation of technology being sold abroad. The influence exercised by these people and their money influenced key decisionmakers in this administration. In my opinion, that lies in terms of fault at the feet of this administration itself. And as much as we would like to totally blame China, I blame our own government. Now, are there instances where China went too far? Absolutely. And I would say this again on the record. If we can document that there is direct espionage that took place at our labs or at other facilities, we should use the full force of our law to prosecute those people who in fact spied on America, much like we have done in the past. But we cannot blame a country if we willingly sold them the bulk of this technology because of influence they were able to get by putting some money around or by currying favor with certain people. Let me go to the second chart, Madam Speaker. The second chart, which was also prepared with the help of existing employees that work for this government who are in sensitive positions, gives the time line, the time line of liberalized and decontrolled technologies to the People's Republic of China. But I want you to know, it was not just China that benefited from these policies. Many of these policy decisions benefited a number of countries who were able to legally buy our technology. Now, I am not against our companies selling technology abroad. In fact, I am an advocate of our companies being able to sell and compete in the world marketplace. But, Madam Speaker, that is not what occurred here. What occurred here was the elimination in a wholesale way of a legitimate process that was in place under previous administrations to monitor technology and to do it with our allies. As I mentioned last night, the reason I started this chart in 1993 was not because that is when Bill Clinton took office, it was because in 1993 this President ended a process called COCOM. COCOM was an organized group of our allied nations and Japan that met on a regular basis to monitor sensitive technology that was produced in any one of the allied countries. There was an agreement that none of those COCOM nations would sell sensitive technology to countries that we thought might use it against us, so that none of our companies were hurt because all the countries that have this technology were working together so that no one could benefit. It was this administration in 1993 that unilaterally decided to end COCOM, did away with it. Without even consulting with our allies, we said, ``We're doing away with this process.'' From 1993 on, the floodgates opened. Because now you had companies in Great Britain and France and Japan who said, ``Wait a minute, there's no more COCOM, we're not going to let the U.S. sell this technology abroad, we're going to sell competing technology.'' So now you had a mad scramble, you had American companies trying to keep up with German, French, Italian, British and Japanese firms who now saw American companies selling technologies that under COCOM they could not sell. So the European countries and Japan said, ``Wait a minute, we're going to sell that technology as well,'' and you had a mad scramble to sell technology in a totally uncontrolled fashion. That began in 1993 under this administration. The Commerce Department will tell you it was good for business. Some business leaders will tell you it was good for business. We on the Cox Committee will tell you it was bad for America. Other allied nations will tell you it was bad for international security. Proliferation has never been worse than it has been for the past 6 years. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, India, Pakistan, all have cutting-edge technologies that up until 1993 were tightly controlled by COCOM, all of that ended by this administration. That is the focus of the Cox report. The chronology of this chart takes each technology separately: warhead design, machine tools, low observable technologies, telecommunications, propulsion systems, high-powered computers, encryption technology, space launch technology, and analyses when key decisions were made by this administration and gives you the month and the date that allowed technologies to flow that up until these dates were controlled. And you can see by the number of red dots here that during this time frame, the floodgates opened. We said, ``We'll sell anything and everything and we won't consult with our allies.'' So you have had a mad competition among companies in countries that up until 1993 worked together to make sure that no one could unfairly have a larger share of the market with sensitive technologies. After 1993, the demise of COCOM, the floodgates opened. Everything and anything was for sale. Our companies got their way, they got to sell whatever they wanted, foreign countries and companies the same thing, and China took advantage of it. Now, there are some interesting other factors about this chart, Madam Speaker. You will notice a gray area in the center of this chart, starting in 1995, ending in 1997. Why did I make that gray? Because in 1995, we have been told by Bill Richardson that this administration found out that China was acquiring our most sensitive technology. And if you listened to Secretary Richardson, this is what he said: ``Boy, when we found that out, we took aggressive action. We said, `We're not going to let China steal our technology.''' Well, that is what he said. The color in the blue, Madam Speaker, and all the red dots you see here, just under Space Launch alone, 15 separate actions after this administration knew that China had stolen our design technologies that they took in 3 years to give more technology to countries like China. And that is across the board, Madam Speaker. So the blue indicates where this administration knew that China was trying to acquire this technology and doing it illegally, opened the floodgates even further for more technology. There is one more factor here, Madam Speaker. All of us in America know when the elections were held. It is kind of interesting when you look at this chart from a distance that the bulk of the clustering of these dots are in and around the time frame of 1996. I wonder what was happening in that year, Madam Speaker? Might that have been the year when the presidential elections were being held? Could there be some coincidence that many of these key decisions in terms of policy changes were being done because elections were being held and maybe people were interested and from the standpoint of corporate America in having policymakers make determinations to allow more products to be sold overseas, could that be a reason? That is what the LaBella memorandum referred to, Madam Speaker, that this country needs to see for itself, the reasons why these decisions were made. Why did we change our policy so much? Why did we allow access? Why did we totally decontrol technologies in a way that was not being aware and cognizant of our own security concerns? But it goes beyond these issues, Madam Speaker. Let us move down to this next item here. PRC Nationals to U.S. High Tech Companies. It was in 1994, in fact it was in March, that Chinese nationals to our U.S. labs and our U.S. high tech companies was allowed. The COMEX review of foreign nationals was abandoned, by this administration. That was in 1994. I am sure that was done because the companies wanted less hassle of foreign nationals going into our high tech companies. And over here in 1997, we revised our deemed exports policy to allow foreign nationals to work at U.S. high tech companies. Now, that was in 1997. These were decisions made that allowed more Chinese nationals to work in our high tech companies in America. And how about the high tech furnace approval for weapons of mass destruction? That approval was given in 1998, Madam Speaker, a technology that gives China capability for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Even though this administration said when they found out about the theft of nuclear secrets, they took aggressive action to control it. Let us go down further, Madam Speaker. During this same period of time, China and Russia were both violating international arms control agreements. The Missile Technology Control Regime, the control of exports. We caught them on a number of occasions. In fact, in last night's special order, and again the American people can read this through my web site or get a copy of it through the Congressional Record last evening--and I did not do the work, the Congressional Research did the work--we documented the arms control violations that we caught Russia and China involved in over 6-year time period. Here is that chronology as documented by the Congressional Research Service. The dates, the type of transfer, who the transfer went to are all documented. This was not done by some partisan group; it was done by the Congressional Research Service, a part of the Library of Congress. These violations of arms control agreements by China, were they sent technology? Where did they send the technology to? Let us look at the chart. Well, they sent technology to Pakistan, Iran; Iran? North Korea. Syria. They sent solid propellant production technology to Libya, Iran, Egypt. They sent missile accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Pakistan. They sent antiship missiles to Iran. They sent more material to Pakistan; chemical weapons technology to Iran again. All of these transfers done by China. What was the response of this administration? Nothing. On, yes, two times out of about 17 or 21, I forget which it is, they did impose temporary sanctions; but they eventually waived them. So not only are we getting Chinese access in a way they never had access before, not only were we helping to expedite and grease the skids for the financing of the purchase of technologies, but we were ignoring violations of arms control agreements that China was required to abide by. We did not call them on these violations. And at the bottom of the chart, Madam Speaker, even though I could not complete it, I was only able to do this up through 1996, I list a number of times that the major players in the Chinese financing scams visit at the White House, not visited Members of Congress, but were in private visits in the White House itself. In the case of John Huang, in the one year of 1993 alone, we know of 12 times he was in the White House. In 1994, twice; in 1995, let us see, one, two, three times; or 1994, three times; 1995, three times. These are people that are involved in that elaborate scheme of organizations and financing entities that were given direct access to our White House, to our top policy maker to our commander in chief, to our key leaders who were then being pressured to relax our policies relative to technology being sold abroad. Madam Speaker, these two charts represent the pictorial view of the Cox committee report. They represent what needs to be explored further. I am not here as a partisan, Madam Speaker. Both times I ran for mayor of my hometown I was the nominee of the Republican Party and the Democrat Party both times I ran. I work with many Democrats in this body and frequently get up on the floor of this House and praise our Democrat colleagues for their leadership role on defense and security issues. I have joined with members of the Democrats on a number of key issues involving social policy, family medical leave, environmental policies, protection for our workers, and I have supported the President and the administration in some of those issues which my party has not been supportive of. But, Madam Speaker, when it comes to national security, we have a big problem here. This needs to be looked at beyond the Cox committee. To me, I know why in my mind Janet Reno turned down the recommendation of Louis Freeh based on the memos sent by Charles LaBella to appoint an independent counsel. I am convinced, Madam Speaker, the evidence is there. I am convinced that 99 percent that we have been told we have not seen yet has far more than many people in this country want to become public. I am also convinced, Madam Speaker, that we had better pay attention here. This is not some story about a dress, this is not some intern in the White House. This is not some story about a travel office. This is not even about Republicans or Democrats. Madam Speaker, this is about the very core of what our country is about. No one, no party official in either party, no elected leader, has the right to allow a wholesale technology faucet to open that we are going to have to pay the price for. Now, if I am overreaching, Madam Speaker, I do not think I am because, a member of the Cox committee having sat through as many of those meetings as any one of my colleagues, with perhaps the exception of Chairman Cox himself, I know what evidence the FBI and the CIA has, and I have only seen a small fraction of what is not on this chart. I know there is much more. If there is nothing there, Madam Speaker, the President can clear this entire issue up in a heartbeat. All he has to do is release the entire unabridged version of the Charles LaBella memo to Louis Freeh. If there is nothing to hide, if there is nothing to these connections, if there is no story, I will be happy. I do not think that is the case, Madam Speaker. I think the reason why Janet Reno did not accept Louis Freeh's recommendation, based on LaBella's memo, is because she knew what is there. That document that LaBella prepared, which I understand is quite voluminous, goes into extensive detail and actually points to individual people. Madam Speaker, this country, this democracy, needs the American people and its elected officials to see the overview of the evidence that LaBella gave to Freeh that now remains closed and confidential. If there is nothing there, then there is no problem with the memo; if there is no evidence, if there is no story, if there is no substance, the whole thing will go away, and the China story will end, and we will make the necessary corrections to our own policies. Madam Speaker, I would encourage every one of our colleagues and every constituent in every district of a Member of this body and the other body to demand that this administration do one thing: release the full text, the uncensored text, of the Charles LaBella memorandum to Louis Freeh. Let us see what evidence they thought may be there in terms of a greater scheme for the Chinese to acquire technology by facilitating and greasing the skids of certain key people and certain key agencies that ended up with America's security being harmed. That was the unanimous vote of all nine members of the Cox committee, that America's national security has been harmed by the actions that we investigated in the Cox committee work. We cannot just stop with this document, and we cannot rely on the mainstream media because with the exception of a few people like those that I have mentioned and some others, the mainstream media is too stinking lazy to go through the investigative details necessary to uncover what is here. We need to have this administration come clean, give us the uncensored text of what Charles LaBella said to Louis Freeh which only went to Janet Reno. When that happens, we will then know the true extent of the China connection and its impact with this administration.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I say to Bill Richardson, tell the truth. He has been traveling around America and this city saying that when he found out, this administration, that China stole the secrets to our nuclear weapons, the W-88 and the W-87, that he took aggressive steps in 1995 to change that. Tell the truth, Bill Richardson. U.S. News and World Report, special feature, July 31, 1995, Hazel O'Leary leaked the plans, which are in this magazine, for the W-87 nuclear warhead. Tell the truth, Bill Richardson. It was this administration that publicly released the documented evidence relative to our W-87 warhead in U.S. News and World Report, July 31, 1995. Tell the truth, Bill Richardson.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk to our colleagues about what I think is one of the gravest issues to face this Nation, certainly in the 13 years that I have had the honor of serving in this body. I come before our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Republican Party but as someone who believes that national security issues rise above party politics. I am very proud of the fact, Mr. Speaker, that both times I ran for mayor of my hometown I was the nominee of both the Republican and the Democrat Parties. In fact I today enjoy significant support from Democrats back in my home district in Pennsylvania. In Congress, Mr. Speaker, I have taken great pride in working with Members of the other side on national security issues, and I have been the first to acknowledge that many of the struggles that we have won in this body against the White House involving national security were won only because we had the support of strong leadership on the Democrat side as well as the Republican side. I give those comments today, Mr. Speaker, because I want to focus on what is happening with the debate surrounding the Cox Commission of which I was a member and the resultant information that has been put forward to the American people about a matter that needs to be thoroughly investigated. Mr. Speaker, it is my contention that when the administration got a preliminary view of the Cox Committee report in early January, in fact we gave it to the administration sometime around January 2nd or 3rd, they got a chance to see a document that nine of us, Democrats and Republicans, had worked on together for 7 months in a very nonpartisan way. We did not care where problems had occurred, in which administrations they were in. If we saw evidence of our security being harmed or potentially harmed, we laid the facts basically where they were. We did not attempt to spin them or distort them or attempt to have them be other than what they in fact were. We did that because we wanted to have the integrity of our report kept intact once it was completed. No member of the Cox Committee released any information to the media. We swore to ourselves that we would not in fact jeopardize our findings. We gave it to the White House the first week of January and we asked for a very quick response to assist us in making that report available in a declassified version so the American people and our colleagues could read it and talk about it. As we all know, that took 5 months. But what gave me the first indication that this report was going to be spun politically was about a month later, in February. In fact it was February the 1st. Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser to the White House, issued a statement that I have a copy of to selective members of the Washington media, responding to the 38 recommendations that we made in our Cox Committee report that were still classified. Without asking any member of the Cox Commission, Sandy Berger released the White House's spin in response to those recommendations. Two days after he released that spin, I had the occasion of asking the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, in a closed National Security Committee hearing in front of 40 Members from both parties if he agreed as the head of the CIA with our findings that our security had been harmed. Now, Mr. Speaker, this was 2 days after Sandy Berger released public information about our still classified report. George Tenet said, ``Congressman, we at the CIA haven't finished reading the document yet.'' Which meant, Mr. Speaker, that the White House, before the CIA had even completed reading our report, was spinning it publicly to try to deflect attention away from the White House and any responsibility of this administration. That is not what the nine members of the Cox Committee did and that is not the approach we used. We did not spin anything. Yet that was my first inclination that this White House was not going to deal in an honorable way with the findings and the conclusions that we drew from our extensive research into the results of the transfer of technology both legally and illegally to China. Mr. Speaker, that spin continues today. Since the report was released some 2 weeks ago, the administration has sent Bill Richardson, a friend of mine whom I served with in this body, out a road show traveling around the country convincing the American people that the only issue in the Cox report is Chinese espionage, the stealing of our W-88 nuclear warhead design, the stealing of our nuclear design technology. And the reason why the White House has wanted to spin the Cox Commission report in this way is because they can point to this stuff to having occurred before the Clinton administration took office. So what Richardson has been saying publicly, on national TV shows, on the talk shows on Sunday mornings is, ``Look, when this administration in 1995 found out that China had stolen some of our designs, prior to us coming into office, we took aggressive steps to stop it. These problems didn't happen under the Clinton administration. They happened under previous administrations.'' I am here tonight, Mr. Speaker, to challenge that notion and to offer to debate Secretary Richardson anytime anyplace in a public format on the issues that I am about to unveil. First of all, Mr. Speaker, even though the Cox Committee report did not just focus on the nuclear laboratories and their security, let us talk about the labs for a few moments, because if you listen to Secretary Bill Richardson traveling around the country, he would have us believe that the only problems with the labs were problems that started under previous administrations which he has now cleaned up. That is hogwash, Mr. Speaker. Let us look at the facts. Mr. Speaker, it was in 1993 and 1994 when Hazel O'Leary was appointed to be the Secretary of Energy by President Bill Clinton that she decided that the color-coded ID system used in our Department of Energy labs which said based upon the color of the chain and the ID that you wore around your neck, you would only be allowed access to certain parts of our laboratories. It was the way that we kept people out of illegally accessing information that they did not have the proper clearance for. When Hazel O'Leary came into office, this long established practice that had been under previous administrations, Republican and Democrat, was overturned because she thought that color- coding was discriminatory. So what happened, Mr. Speaker, was in 1993 and 1994, the Clinton administration did away with that identification process which made it almost impossible for the lab directors and others to know whether or not a person was in a correct area of a lab gathering information and access to data that they should not have had. Now, Mr. Speaker, if that was a good decision back in 1993 and 1994 which maybe the President would say was the case, why then did this administration 2 weeks ago move to reinstate the policy that Hazel O'Leary did away with in 1993 and 1994? If it was good back in 1993 and 1994 and if the color-coded ID system was not necessary, why did they all of a sudden 2 weeks ago tell the labs, ``You're now going to put back into place a color-coded ID system'' at a tremendous cost to taxpayers. That was under this administration, Mr. Speaker. Number two, it was this administration and Hazel O'Leary who decided that FBI background checks, which had been the case under previous administrations, before people could gain access to our labs, that FBI background checks had to be done so that we could determine whether or not those people were spies or whether or not they were appropriately entitled to have access to classified information. Again it was Secretary O'Leary, Bill Clinton's appointee, who in 1993 and 1994 put a hold in at least two of our labs on FBI background checks, allowing scores of people to get access to our labs, not just Chinese or Asian nationals but a whole host of people because they were not being required to have FBI background checks. Number three, Mr. Speaker. It was in the 1993-1994 time frame when an employee of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory who had retired was accused of releasing sensitive and classified information in a public setting. The Oakland office of the Department of Energy did an investigation of that employee and they found out, and in fact accused him of violating the requirements of security at our labs. What did they do? They penalized that retiree by removing the access he had to classified information even as a retiree. They took the appropriate steps. What did Hazel O'Leary do, Mr. Speaker? When that removal of that retiree's classified status was undertaken and when he appealed it, all the way up to the Secretary's office, Secretary O'Leary overruled the Oakland office of the Department of Energy and reinstated the employee's classification status. Every employee in every laboratory in America saw the signal being sent by this administration, ``We don't need color-coded IDs, we don't need to have FBI background checks, and when employees give out classified information, we're not going to consider that a major issue.'' One more point, Mr. Speaker. And you do not hear Bill Richardson talking about these facts, but I am offering to debate him here tonight, anytime, anyplace. Mr. Richardson says that when this administration found out, in 1995, that the Chinese had stolen the designs to one of our most sophisticated warheads, the W-88 and the W- 87, that they immediately took action, they began a process of closing in on the security, and he said that began in 1995. Mr. Speaker, I want to call particular attention to my colleagues and to the American people this two-page spread that was in the July 31st, 1995 issue of U.S. News and World Report entitled ``Shockwave'' documenting the annihilation and destruction that would be caused by a nuclear attack or a nuclear bomb going off. In this document, Mr. Speaker, is an illustration of the W-87 warhead. Mr. Speaker, in 1995, this was classified. Mr. Speaker, this administration, in 1995, leaked this document to U.S. News and World Report, giving the entire populace of the world, through U.S. News and World Report, access to the design of the W-87 nuclear warhead, the same year that Bill Richardson is saying they were putting the clamps on the control of our technology. But it does not stop there, Mr. Speaker. Because when this occurred, the Department of Energy began an internal investigation as to who would have leaked this design of this W-87 nuclear warhead, who would have given this information out to a national magazine. Mr. Speaker, I have the name of the person that was conducting that investigation, and I have been told that he was told to stop the investigation because they knew where it was going to lead to, that it was Hazel O'Leary herself who gave U.S. News and World Report the actual diagram of the W-87 nuclear warhead in 1995. Yet Secretary Richardson, on the Sunday morning news shows, is saying, ``We have taken the steps to close these gaps.'' Mr. Speaker, I am today asking for a full investigation as to whether or not the Department of Energy did such an internal investigation and I want to know whether or not the individual who was overseeing this was told by his superiors not to pursue finding out who leaked this information in 1995. And, Mr. Speaker, if this administration was so intent on controlling access to these kinds of secrets, then they would surely be able to give us the answers to the questions I am posing tonight. Who did the investigation, and who did they find out leaked this particular diagram to U.S. News and World Report in 1995? It was not the Reagan administration, Mr. Speaker, and it was not the Bush administration. It was this administration. Mr. Speaker, the comments of Bill Richardson around the country are hollow, they are shallow, and they are nothing more than political rhetoric being spun to deflect attention away from one of the most gravest issues that has confronted this Nation in this century, and, that is, the overall loss of our technology, in many cases where we relaxed standards to allow people to take information or where we lowered the thresholds to give people information. Today we have the Secretary telling us that our labs are secure. I can tell you right now, Mr. Speaker, there are no controls on e-mails that are being sent out of our labs at this very moment. They will tell you they have a software system that looks for keywords, that if an e-mail is sent to Beijing or some other city and a keyword is in that e-mail, it raises a flag and that person then will be investigated. Raising a flag after the e-mail leaves the laboratory does us no good, Mr. Speaker. So for Richardson to say that secure measures are in place today is wrong, it is factually wrong, it is not correct, and he needs to be honest with the American people. Secondarily, Mr. Speaker, we have just learned that later on this year China will be testing the newest version of their long-range ICBM missile with a range of 13,000 kilometers that can be launched from a submarine that has the potential for a MIRV or a multiple reentry capability. This rocket, this long-range ICBM, the JL-2, is beyond anything they have had in the past, and it is almost a replica of the trident class ICBMs that we have used in this Nation. We did not think China would have this capability until several years down the road. We now have word they will test that missile, that ICBM, this year. Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious issue. The American people need to understand what is happening to their country. They need to understand the blame game cannot stop by firing lower level employees who are only following directions. The blame game cannot stop by saying it was industries' fault. Industry was only abiding by the rules set by this government, and they cannot blame Chinese or Asian Americans, many of whom are some of our finest citizens. It was this government and this administration that failed the American people, and the American people need to see the factual information. With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, the following two charts are now available on my web site nationally: The first chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time ever gives the complete linkage between those agencies and entities of the Peoples Liberation Army and the Central Military Commission of the PLA which are all indicated by the red boxes, and you cannot read them, our colleagues cannot read them, but you can get this off of our web site, and I have offered to give copies of this chart in a smaller form to every Member of Congress regardless of party. The red boxes indicate Chinese arms of the PLA. The green boxes, Mr. Speaker, which are again too small to read, are the financing entities that were established to finance the acquisition of technologies for the arms of the PLA and the Central Military Commission. They would identify the technology, and the green financing entities would then finance the purchase of that. How would they finance the purchase of it? Through the blue boxes or the front companies. Literally hundreds of front companies were established in this country, in Hong Kong, in Macao, all over the world, whose sole purpose it was, was to acquire western and American technology. Mr. Speaker, in this chart our colleagues and the American people can read for themselves who all of these players are and who all of these characters and all these organizations are, but there is something new here, Mr. Speaker: For the first time that I am aware of each of these boxes are interconnected with solid and dotted lines. The solid lines indicate direct working relationships between financing entities, PLA organizations and Chinese front companies. The dotted lines indicate working relationships. I am asking now to enter in the Record, Mr. Speaker, a document I entitled sources and references: Sources and References (1a) Chan, Christine. ``More J&A Securities Staff Quizzed.'' Hong Kong South China Morning Post, July 16, 1998: p a11. Article in Hong Kong South China Morning Post which cites corporation chairman Zhang Guoqing and corporation president Yang Jun as under investigation in connection with their activities at the People's Liberation Army-backed J&A Securities. (1b) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinance Increasing Share Capital and Creating Additional Shares. Company Reference No. 433562. June 8, 1995. Various company ordinances increasing capital, creating shares, and providing board information for the J&A corporation signed by Zhang Guoqing on behalf of the corporation. (1c) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. 1997 Brief: Introduction to J&A Securities Limited. 1997. J&A Securities Limited company brochure for 1997 which lists corporation officer and board members. (1d) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinances Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes. Company Reference No. 433562. December 21, 1993 through August 18, 1994. Various company ordinances changing the name, appointing directors and officers, and providing board information for the J&A corporation. (1e) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company ordinances Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes. Company Reference No. 433562. February 14, 1996 through July 18, 1997. Various company ordinances appointing directors and providing board information. (1f) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Mortgage and Charge Details. Company Reference No. 433562. April 1, 1998. Documents that detail loans and other incomes from The China State Bank, The Standard Chartered Bank. Documents also certify relationships with additional companies. (2) Laris, Michael. ``Chinese Executive Defend Loral's Role; Undue Missile Aid by U.S. Firm Denied,'' The Washington Post. June 22, 1998: p a17. Article in The Washington Post that identifies a Hong Kong businessman `Zhang' (Zhang Quoqing) as the source of $300,000 given to Johnny Chung. (3) Rempel, William C.; et. al. ``Testimony Links Top China Official, Funds For Clinton.'' The Los Angeles Times. April 4, 1999: p a1. Article in the Los Angeles Times that details the link between a Chinese intelligence official, Johnny Chung, $300,000 intended for the Clinton campaign. (4) ``General's Daughter In Probe.'' Agence France-Presse Wire. Clips from a French Newswire with citations from the South China Morning Post which cites the link between Liu Chao Ying (Daughter of China's Top General and Aerospace Official), Johnny Chung, and executives from Hong Kong and Chinese companies. (5) Chin, Michelle. ``Lippo Fund to Focus on Chain Stores.'' South China Morning Post. July 13, 1995: p 3. Article that cites the directors of the Lippo Fund and lists the China Aerospace International Holdings corp as partner in the fund. (6) Pusat Data Business Indonesia. Conglomeration Indonesia, 2nd edition. Jakarta, Indonesia. Pusat Data Business Indonesia. 1995. Company and shareholder information from a standard business reference work on nice conglomerates run by individuals with links to the Chinese government. (7) Kelly, Michael. ``TRB: CITIC-VIP.'' The New Republic. January 6, 1999. Article which links numerous high-profile Chinese government operatives who met with Clinton through Johnny Chung. (8) Liu, Melinda. ``The Portrait of a Hustler.'' Newsweek. March 31, 1997: p 36. Article in Newsweek that cites Johnny Chung's connection to the White House and the First Family. (9) Partial citation and timeline of activity at Marswell Investments Limited. Document which describes the directors and officers at various Hong Kong `Front' companies. (10) Translation Section of the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong. `` `Princeling' Influence Within PLA Said Growing.'' Hong Kong Guo Jih Pao. December 9, 1996. Serial: HK3012054596. Article translated from Hong Kong newspaper by FBIS which details the link between the PLA and CITIC. (11) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key Player: Wang Jun.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6, 1999. Washington Post website profile on Wang Jun, chairman of an arms trading company and White House coffee attendee. (12) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key Player: Ng Lap Seng.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6, 1999. Washington Post website profile on Ng Lap Seng, chairman of a Chinese financial conglomerate and DNC doner. (13) Summary of documentation on China Aerospace International Holdings Limited (CASIL). An analysis of CASIL background and its involvement with the satellite business and a citing of key figures. (14) Dun & Bradstreet. ``Ever-Victory System Engrg.'' Worldbase. April 25, 1997: p. 48. Business citation that establishes the link between Asia-Pacific Satellite and China Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd. (15) The United States Department of State. ``Sasser Writes Home About the Chinese Army.'' United States Department of State. October 1, 1998. A report from the U.S. Ambassador to China on the PLA and their plans to develop communications networks with private companies. (16) Lim, Wah Dr., et. al., ``Independent Review Committee Report on the LM-38B Launch Failure.'' Palo Alto, California. Space Systems/Loral. May 10, 1996. A report initiated by the Loral Company to evaluate the cause of failure for a Chinese Space Launch Vehicle. (17) Diamond, John. ``U.S. Probes Hughes, Chinese General's Son, in Satellite Export Deal.'' The Associated Press. July 3, 1998. AP wire article. (18) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key Player: Maria Hsia.'' Www.washingtonpost.com January 6, 1999. Washington Post website profile on Maria Hsia, Veteran Democrat fund-raiser indicted on money laundering charges in connection with an event attended by Vice President Gore. (19) Suro, Robert. ``Gore's Ties to Hsia Cast Shadow on 2000 Race.'' The Washington Post. February 23, 1998: p a1. A Washington Post article that details the link between Maria Hsia and Vice President Gore. (20) Reed Business Information Limited. ``The Bank of East Asia Limited.'' The Bankers Almanac. Reed Business Information Limited. 1998. Standard business reference material on the Bank of East Asia including profile and personnel information. (21) Sun, Lena H.; Pomfret, John. ``The Curious Cast of Asian Donors.'' The Washington Post. January 27, 1997: p a1. A Washington Post article on the Clinton connection to Asian Donors. (22) China Charity Federation. ``Founders of China Charity Federation and Permanent Members to the Executive Council.''<http://www.philiphayden.org/ccf/aboutus/ permanent_members.html> January 6, 1999. Promotional Materials that link the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to Silver Faith Holding. (23) Liang, Hsiao-chi and Ma, Chien-hsing. ``In a Major Reversal of Fortune in Struggle for Supremacy, Marketplace Wai Lands Himself in a Predicament.'' Hong Kong Yi Chou Kan. February 20, 1998: pp 38-42. Article in Hong Kong newspaper on CPC Officials and Triad links. (24) Op. Cit. Liu, Melinda. (25) The Hughes Corporation. ``China Programs Starting from 1/1/96.'' Hughes Network Systems. Internal company document specifying programs in China. (26) Gerth, Jeff and Golden, Tim. ``China Set Cash to U.S. Bank, With Suspicions Slow to Rise.'' The New York Times. May 12, 1999: p a1. New York Times article on money sent to the United States from Chinese banks. Mr. Speaker, this 4-page document gives 28 specific unclassified documents or 26 unclassified documents that are studied on this chart that provide all the linkages so the American people in unclassified form can read how all of these link together for the first time ever, and I encourage everyone of our colleagues and every person across this country to turn on the web site, get access to this, and then get access to these unclassified documents, and I would say to our colleagues, ``If you can't locate them, I have a master copy of each of these documents in my office. In fact I have several master copies. I will give you copies of whatever one of these documents you can't find.'' Now, as extensive as this is, Mr. Speaker, I can tell you this is only scratching the surface. In one of our House hearings one of our colleagues asked the FBI when they were doing the investigation of these linkages how much of what they know is now available in public form with all the reports, all the investigations, how much of what the FBI and the CIA knows is available to the public, and this was the answer: Less than 1 percent. So, as broad as this is, as documented as this is, we only know publicly less than 1 percent of what the FBI and the CIA know about the linkages between PLA front organizations, front companies and financing mechanisms, and the bottom line question has to be asked, Mr. Speaker, is: What made this happen? What was the grease that caused these transactions to take place? What caused these proliferation controls to be lowered? What caused these accesses to take place? And that gets to my second chart, Mr. Speaker, which is the time line. This chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time that I know of gives a detailed analysis of what has happened in this country since 1993. Now my colleagues on the other side are going to say, ``Well, a minute, Kurt. You picked 1993. You are being partisan because that is when Clinton took office.'' That is not the case, Mr. Speaker. I picked 1993 because two things happened. Up until 1993, Mr. Speaker, under Democrats and Republican Presidents alike, there was a process in place to control technology from Nations like America to be sent abroad to what we consider to be Tier 3 nations or nations that are not allowed or were not supposed to have very capable technology that could come back to hurt us. This process was called COCON. COCON was an international organization of allied nations, the U.S. and Japan, that met on a regular basis, and they decided collectively what kind of technology would be allowed to be sold and to which countries it could be sold to. In 1993, without pre-approval of any of the other countries, France, Great Britain, Japan or any of the other ones, this administration ended COCON, ended it, and the doors opened up. Now they put into place something called the Wassanar agreement which everyone has acknowledged is a total failure, yet COCON worked. In 1993 COCON ended, and the floodgates opened. Something else happened in that year, Mr. Speaker. I would like to enter in the Record at this point in time, Mr. Speaker, a letter from the White House dated September 15, 1993, to Edward McCracken, Chief Executive Officer of Silicon Graphics from Bill Clinton. Mr. Speaker, every American needs to read this letter because this letter was sent by the President of the United States September 15, 1993, and who did he send it to? To one of his biggest contributors and one of those blocks of people who supported his candidacy, Edward McCracken, Chief Executive Officer, Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, California. The White House, Washington, September 15, 1993. Hon. Edward McCracken, Chief Executive Officer, Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, CA. Dear Edward: Thanks for taking the time to come by for lunch on Wednesday. It was good to see you--and it was a pleasure to get your insights. I wanted to bring you up to date on a topic we were not able to discuss at lunch; the issue of export controls. As you know, for some time the United States has imposed stringent exports controls on many of our most competitive exports. By some estimates, unnecessary export controls cost U.S. companies $9 billion a year in lost sales. One reason I ran for President was to tailor export controls to the realities of a post-Cold War world. Let me be clear. We will continue to need strong controls to combat the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and dangerous conventional weapons, as well as to send a strong signal to countries that support international terrorism. But we also need to make long overdue reforms to ensure that we do not unfairly and unnecessarily burden our important commercial interests. In that regard, I wanted you to know that we hope to announce some important reforms by September 30. As you may know, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown has been leading a process within the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (IPCC) to examine how we might better promote U.S. exports. As part of that process, the National Security Council has led an effort to develop specific export control reforms. I hope to announce those when the TPCC issues its report on September 30. We have not yet finalized all of these reforms, because I want to be sure that they get a full interagency review. But I am optimistic that the steps we take will help liberalize controls on many of our most competitive exports, while protecting our important national security concerns. Let me give you a sense of the reform we are considering: Liberalize Computer and Telecommunications Controls. When this Administration began, the U.S. controlled any computer with a capacity above 12.9 MTOPs. My administration is in the process of raising that level to 67 MTOPs for most free world countries, relieving well over 13 billion of computer exports each year from the need for a license. By September 30, I hope to raise that level further--and also announce important liberalizations for telecommunications exports to most free world destinations. Reduce Processing Time. Delays in processing export control licenses is a burden on business--and a legitimate gripe against the Federal government. I hope to announce significant reductions in the time it takes the government to process export license applications. Expand Distribution Licenses. We hope to expand significantly the availability of distribution licenses for controlled computers so that exporters need not come back repeatedly to the Federal government for a license. Eliminate Unnecessary Unilateral Controls. Controls imposed only by the U.S. (and not by competitor countries) at times can put our exporters at an unfair disadvantage as competitor companies export like products freely. I expect to announce that, by December 31, my administration will identify and eliminate wherever possible unnecessary U.S. unilateral export control policies. I expect that these reforms will help liberalize controls on tens of billions of dollars worth of U.S. exports. It can help unleash our companies to compete successfully in the global market. These reforms fit into a broader framework. Soon we will complete our review of nonproliferation and export control policy, which will set guidelines for further steps we should take. I am also currently engaged in seeking major reforms to COCOM, which should lead to significant liberalization of controls on computers, telecommunications and machine tools, while establishing a more effective structure for addressing the changing national security threats we will face in the years ahead. Let me assure you that I am personally committed to developing a more intelligent export control policy, one that prevents dangerous technologies from falling into the wrong hands without unfairly burdening American commerce. It is important. It is the right thing to do. And many of these changes are long overdue. I look forward to working with you in building a new consensus around an effective exports control policy that meets these objectives. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. But what is the content of the letter, Mr. Speaker? The letter outlines the administration's plans to liberalize, liberalize the availability of technology to nations abroad. So here it is in black and white where the President is telling the CEO of Silicon Graphics this is what we are going to do for you over the next 6 years. Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They did it. What were some of the highlights? Let me read from the letter. Quote: Liberalize computer and telecommunication controls, reduce processing times, expand distribution licenses, eliminate unnecessary unilateral controls, and it goes into detail in describing. Now, Mr. Speaker, I am a free trader, and I believe in allowing our companies to compete. But what you had in 1993 was the wholesale opening of the flood gates. At the same time Hazel O'Leary is saying we do not have to worry about the people who work in our labs, they do not need color-coded IDs, they do not need to have FBI background checks, and when they give out classified information, we are going to ignore that and not worry about it. And, oh, by the way, US News, if you want this chart of the W-87, we will give it to you, and you can run it nationwide. Mr. Speaker, these stories need to be told across America. This time line from 1993 to 1999 shows every decision made by this administration that allowed a new technology to flow, in this case to China. It also shows activities of China in violation of arms control regimes. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I would ask at this time to insert Chronology of Chinese Weapons Related Transfers: [From the Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1998] Indignation Rings Shallow on Nuke Tests (By Curt Weldon) Escalating tensions between India and Pakistan should come as no surprise to the Clinton administration. Since the president took office, there have been dozens of reported transfers of sensitive military technology by Russia and China--in direct violation of numerous international arms control agreements--to a host of nations, including Pakistan and India. Yet the Clinton administration has repeatedly chosen to turn a blind eye to this proliferation of missile, chemical- biological and nuclear technology, consistently refusing to impose sanctions on violators. And in those handful of instances where sanctions were imposed, they usually were either quickly waived by the administration or allowed to expire. Rather than condemn India for current tensions, the blame for the political powder keg that has emerged in Asia should be laid squarely at the feet of President Clinton. It is his administration's inaction and refusal to enforce arms control agreements that have allowed the fuse to grow so short. In November 1992, the United States learned that China had transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The Bush administration imposed sanctions for this violation but Clinton waived them a little more than 14 months later. Clearly, the sanctions did not have the desired effect: Reports during the first half of 1995 indicated that M-11 missiles, additional M-11 missile parts, as well as 5,000 ring magnets for Pakistan nuclear enrichment programs were transferred from China. Despite these clear violations, no sanctions were imposed. And it gets worse. Not to be outdone by its sworn foe, India aggressively pursued similar technologies and obtained them, illicitly, from Russia. From 1991 to 1995, Russian entities transferred cryogenic liquid oxygen-hydrogen rocket engines and technology to India. While sanctions were imposed by President Bush in May 1992, the Clinton administration allowed them to expire after only two years. And in June 1993, evidence surfaced that additional Russian enterprises were involved in missile technology transfers to India. The administration imposed sanctions in June 1993, and then promptly waived them for a month, never following up on the issue. Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to aggressively pursue technology transfers from China. In August 1996, the capability to manufacture M-11 missile or missile components was transferred from China to Pakistan. No sanctions. In November 1996, a special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment were transferred from China to an unprotected Pakistani nuclear facility. No sanctions. Also during 1996, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency issued a report stating that China had provided a ``tremendous variety'' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program and was the principal supplier of nuclear equipment for Pakistan's program. Again, the Clinton administration refused to impose sanctions. Finally, in recent months we have learned that China may have been responsible for the transfer of technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile. Flight tested on April 6, 1998, the Ghauri missile has been widely blamed as the impetus for India's decision to detonate five nuclear weapons in tests earlier this month. Again, no sanctions were imposed on China. Retracing the history of these instances of proliferation, it is obvious that Pakistan and India have been locked in an arms race since the beginning of the decade. And the race has been given repeated jump-starts by China and Russia, a clear violation of a number of arms control agreements. Yet rather than enforce these arms control agreements, the Clinton administration has repeatedly acquiesced, fearing that the imposition of sanctions could either strain relations with China and Russia or potentially hurt U.S. commercial interests in those countries. Now the Clinton administration has announced a get-tough policy, threatening to impose sanctions on India for testing its nuclear weapons. But what about Russia and China, the two nations that violated international arms agreements? Shouldn't they also be subject to U.S. sanctions for their role in this crisis? Sadly, the Clinton administration is likely to ignore the proliferators and impose sanctions solely on India. In the meantime, China and Russia will continue their proliferation of missile and nuclear technology to other nations, including rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reported transfer by Administration's Date of transfer or report China Possible violation response ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1992........................... M-11 missiles or MTCR; Arms Export sanctions imposed on related equipment to Control Act; Export Aug. 24, 1993, for Pakistan (The Administration Act. transfers of M-11 Administration did not related equipment (not officially confirm missiles); waived on reports that M-11 Nov. 1, 1994 missiles are in Pakistan.). Mid-1994 to mid-1995................ dozens or hundreds of MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions missile guidance Nonproliferation Act; systems and Arms Export Control computerized machine Act; Export tools to Iran. Administration Act. 2nd quarter of 1995................. parts for the M-11 MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions missile to Pakistan. Control Act; Export Administration Act. Dec. 1994 to mid-1995............... 5,000 ring magnets for NPT; Export-Import Bank considered sanctions an unsafeguarded Act; Nuclear under the Export-Import nuclear enrichment Proliferation Bank Act; but announced program in Pakistan. Prevention Act; Arms on May 10, 1996, that Export Control Act. no sanctions would be imposed July 1995........................... more than 30 M-11 MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions missiles stored in Control Act; Export crates at Sargodha Air Administration Act. Force Base in Pakistan. Sept. 1995.......................... calutron NPT; Nuclear no sanctions (electromagnetic Proliferation isotope separation Prevention Act; Export- system) for uranium Import Bank Act; Arms enrichment to Iran. Export Control Act. 1995-1997........................... C-802 anti-ship cruise Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions missiles and C-801 air- Nonproliferation Act. launched cruise missiles to Iran. Before Feb. 1996.................... dual-use chemical Arms Export Control sanctions imposed on May precursors and Act; Export 21, 1997 equipment to Iran's Administration Act. chemical weapon program. Summer 1996......................... 400 tons of chemicals Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions to Iran. Nonproliferation Act;\1\ Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. Aug. 1996........................... plant to manufacture M- MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions 11 missiles or missile Control Act; Export components in Pakistan. Administration Act. Aug. 1996........................... gyroscopes, MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions accelerometers, and Nonproliferation Act; test equipment for Arms Export Control missile guidance to Act; Export Iran. Administration Act. Sept. 1996.......................... special industrial NPT; Nuclear no sanctions furnace and high-tech Proliferation diagnostic equipment Prevention Act; Export- to unsafeguarded Import Bank Act; Arms nuclear facilities in Export Control Act. Pakistan. July-Dec. 1996...................... Director of Central MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions Intelligence (DCI) Control Act; Export reported ``tremendous Administration Act. variety'' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions ``tremendous variety'' Nonproliferation Act; of assistance for Arms Export Control Iran's ballistic Act; Export missile program. Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported principal NPT; Nuclear no sanctions supplies of nuclear Proliferation equipment, material, Prevention Act; Export- and technology for Import Bank Act; Arms Pakistan's nuclear Export Administration weapon program. Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported key NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions supplies of technology Nonproliferation Act; for large nuclear Nuclear Proliferation projects in Iran. Prevention Act; Export- Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions ``considerable'' Nonproliferation Act; chemical weapon- Arms Export Control related transfers of Act; Export production equipment Administration Act. and technology to Iran. Jan. 1997........................... dual-use biological BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions items to Iran. Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. 1997................................ chemical precursors, Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions production equipment, Nonproliferation Act; and production Arms Export Control technology for Iran's Act; Export chemical weapon Administration Act. program, including a plant for making glass- lined equipment. Sept. to Dec. 1997.................. China Great Wall MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions Industry Corp. Nonproliferation Act; provided telemetry Arms Export Control equipment used in Act; Export flight-tests to Iran Administration Act. for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium range ballistic missiles. Nov. 1997/April 1998................ may have transferred MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions technology for Control Act; Export Pakistan's Ghauri Administration Act. medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996. ABWC--Biological Weapons Convention; MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime; NPT--Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr. Speaker, this CRS document, which I had prepared a year ago, outlines approximately 17 cases where we caught the Chinese selling technology illegally. This administration knew about it, and it is all documented here. They imposed the required sanctions twice and waived them each time. All of those or most of those transfers are documented here. Something else is on this chart, Mr. Speaker: White House presidential visits. I could only complete it up through 1995, the number of times that key people involved in this massive scheme were able to get into the White House. Now, I can tell my colleagues my constituents cannot ever get in the White House. We cannot even get White House tour tickets which are available for schools because we only allow four a year. These are American schoolchildren. Let me read you, Mr. Speaker. John Huang; he visited the White House four times in March of 1993, four times in April of 1993, two times in May, one time in June, one time in November, all in 1993. Now my constituents cannot do that. Yet this White House opened the floodgates to welcome selected people in who were a part of this network, Mr. Speaker. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the House Clerks Office tonight to give me the price of what it would take to put this document in the Congressional Record. I am not going to put it in tonight until I get the price. What is this document, Mr. Speaker? These are the FBI wiretap transcripts of conversations between Chung and Robert Lu, the FBI wire tapped transcripts that took place from May 6 of 1998 all the way through August of 98. In these transcripts in the words of these key players in this process, the American people, Mr. Speaker, for themselves can see what was going on and can read with their own eyes about the discussions that were taking place. Before I yield to my good friend, Mr. Speaker, I want to say what the rallying cry of this Member, and I would ask for, if I could, a price for that for the next day so I can decide whether or not to put it in the Congressional Record, but I would tell the American people it is available. It was given to me by Carl Cameron from Fox News. It is running nationwide, and I would encourage every American person, every colleague of mine, to read the transcripts contained in here of conversations as documented by the FBI. Mr. Speaker here is the real story: If this administration has nothing to hide, they can do one very simple thing: release the entire text of the memos sent by Louis Freeh and his subordinate investigator to Janet Reno requesting that a special prosecutor be named to handle this whole situation. If there is no other question we need to ask as Americans, for the next year and a half it is this one question because Louis Freeh, the head of the FBI, and his top investigator recommended Janet Reno, but because of all this data, and they have a lot more than I have shown my colleagues; in fact, I have seen a lot more as a member of the Cox Committee that I cannot put on here because it is classified. But they seen all of this data, the other 99 percent we cannot show, and they made their recommendations, and Janet Reno choose not to follow their recommendations. The American people are owed, owed an explanation as to why Janet Reno choose not to follow the advice of her chief law enforcement agent for this country. Every person in this country needs to send a card to the White House, every Member of Congress needs to ask the question why the White House will not release the FBI internal memos that Louie Freeh and his assistant sent to ask for a fully completed investigation of this network, of this operation, because that will tell us, Mr. Speaker, whether or not there were motives behind the transfer of technology that caused America's security harm, and that question needs to be asked by everyone in this country. Mr. Speaker, my hope is that all of our colleagues in this body and the other body will have literally tens of thousands of letter writing campaigns, post cards to the White House asking, and Janet Reno asking one simple question. This can be very confusing, and I do not expect the American public or even our colleagues to understand every nuance of what is explained here. It is very confusing, but they can ask one question: Why will you not release the Louis Freeh memos to Janet Reno in regard to the investigation of the connections between the PLA and the Central Military Commission, the Chinese front companies, the financing mechanisms including the donations of campaign funds to certain individuals to see whether or not there really was a tie and a connection in each of these cases? That question needs to be answered more than any other single question that I can think of. Mr. Speaker, I would urge all of our colleagues to make that their rallying cry over the next year and a half. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Hayworth).

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague for joining me. I would like to stay here and engage the gentleman, but I am supposed to do a TV shot, so, unfortunately, I have to yield back my time. But I would like to thank the gentleman for coming over and joining me.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Reclaiming my time, I would be happy to work with my colleagues and friends because they do have good ideas. As our friends know, there were 38 recommendations in the Cox committee. In fact, I was somewhat appalled that the White House spun a public response to those 38 confidential recommendations on February 1, before the Director of the CIA had even read the report, which he said 2 days later on February 3. I think a constructive as opposed to a political approach to solving the problems identified in the Cox committee is in order. I will pledge to work with both of my friends in that regard.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. No. I am not a cosponsor of the amendment, did not know it was coming up, would have helped the gentleman in the Committee on Rules if I would have known. But I just found out from the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry). He is on it. I am just saying, I think we would have had a better chance for a truly bipartisan effort if the Republicans on the Cox committee had been involved and engaged to help make this process before it.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. First of all, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, just to respond to my good friend and someone for whom I have the highest respect, I do not know of any Republican on the Cox committee that was consulted on the amendment. I was not. As the gentleman knows, I spend a lot of time on these issues in the Cox committee. I take my work on the Cox committee very seriously. There is no member of the Cox committee on our side of the aisle who is on that amendment because I was not aware of it.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I just wanted to clarify that, that I would liked to have been a part of that effort and will pledge to work with you in the future. This rule, I ask that our Members support. It is a good rule. There are some things I perhaps would have done differently, but it is a good rule in a very large bill. I want to point to some specific things that are in here. We took the recommendations of Deputy Secretary John Hamre and his Chief Information Dominance Officer Art Money and we increased what they asked us for. We see cyberterrorism and the use of information technology as a major weapon in the future of rogue nations. We increase the requests in those areas, so this Congress has been moving ahead of the request by the Pentagon in that area. We, I think, reversed what would have been one of the most destabilizing issues in working with the Russians that we have. The administration originally proposed defunding the only cooperative program we have with Russia on missile defense technology. That was the RAMOS program. That alarmed the Russians. We have heard a lot of the rhetoric about missile defense itself and steps that we are taking to back Russia into a corner. It was in this bill that we restore that funding with the cooperation of our colleague on the other side, Senator Levin, who felt it was critically important that we reverse this decision by the administration. This rule is worthy of our support. I ask our colleagues to vote ``yes.''

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker on rollcall No. 164, I was inadvertently detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.''

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, we can only spin national security issues and concerns so long, and eventually the truth catches up to us. The truth is about to hit the fan this week in Washington on the national security concerns of this country. For 7 years, Mr. Speaker, we have heard the rhetoric coming from the White House that the world is safe, there are no problems, our security is intact, and therefore, we can dramatically cut the size of our defense forces and we can, in fact, shift that money over to other purposes. During the 7 years that that has occurred, Democrats and Republicans alike in this body and the other body have joined together to constantly remind the administration that things were not quite as good as they were being portrayed to the American people. Unfortunately, we were not as successful as we would have liked. In fact, Mr. Speaker, State of the Union speech after State of the Union speech the President would stand before the American people and would talk about the economy, would talk about jobs, would talk about crimes domestically, but no mention of national security concerns. In fact, Mr. Speaker, this past January, as I sat through the State of the Union speech in this very room, I timed the President's speech. He spoke for 1 hour and 17 minutes. The total amount of time he devoted to national security was 90 seconds, 90 seconds to talk about the problems we have with our relationship with China, 90 seconds to talk about the problems that are resulting from the economic instability in Russia, 90 seconds to talk about the proliferation that has now caused Iran and Iraq and Syria and Libya to begin to develop medium- and eventually long-range missile systems, 90 seconds to talk about the sabre rattling between India and Pakistan, 90 seconds to talk about the problems with North Korea, both our nuclear development program and their testing of long-range missiles which the CIA acknowledges now for the first time ever can actually hit the mainland of the U.S. In fact, Mr. Speaker, during those 90 seconds, all the President did was point up to the gallery and praise one of our young pilots. Mr. Speaker, support for our military is not when the commander in chief parades a group of soldiers down the White House lawn for a photo op, it is not when the commander in chief stands on the deck of an aircraft carrier and talks about the pride in our services while morale is reaching an all-time low. We have serious problems, Mr. Speaker, and this week, starting tomorrow, those problems are going to be made available for the American people to see firsthand. Now, as I said earlier, Mr. Speaker, we are aware that this administration has tried to create the perception, and with a great deal of success, that everything is okay in the world, all is safe, Russia is our new friend, China is our new friend and partner, we do not have to worry about the Balkans because we have got our troops deployed. In fact, Mr. Speaker, what has been occurring over the past 7 years with strong concerns expressed by both Democrats and Republicans alike in this body is that we have committed our troops to too many places in a short period of time to be effective in modernizing for the future and in protecting America's vital interests around the world. I have used this comparison frequently, Mr. Speaker, and I want to use it again: In the time period from the end of World War II until 1991, during the administration of all those Presidents in between, from Harry Truman through Democrat and Republican administrations ending with George Bush, all of those commanders in chief, as they have the ability to under our Constitution, deployed our troops a total of 10 times, 10 times at home and around the world. Some of those deployments were very serious, like Korea and Vietnam and Desert Storm. Since 1991, Mr. Speaker, our current commander in chief has deployed our troops 33 times, 33 times in 8 years versus 10 times in 40 years. Mr. Speaker, none of these deployments were paid for, none of them were budgeted for, none of these deployments had the administration asking the Congress to vote in support of the deployment before our troops were committed. In the case of Bosnia, it was not that this Congress is isolationist. Nothing could be further from the truth. The problem in this Congress among Democrats and Republicans was why was America putting 36,000 troops into Bosnia when, for instance, Germany right next door, our friend and ally, was only committing 4,000 troops? It was a question of fairness. Why was America being asked in each of these 33 deployments to pick up an unusually large amount of the responsibility? In Kosovo today, when we see the nightly news of the bombing raids the previous night, we see U.S. and British planes conducting the bulk of those air strikes. By law and by NATO's mandate, the U.S. is only supposed to provide 22 percent of the support for NATO. So Members of Congress rightfully ask the question, where are the other NATO allies? Why is not Europe playing a larger role in these kinds of operations? In fact, Mr. Speaker, that was the reason why we passed the supplemental bill several weeks ago and just last week approved the defense authorization bill, calling for increases in funding to partially replace the funds that were siphoned off to pay for these 33 deployments, none of which were budgeted for. When the President would commit our troops to, say, Bosnia or to Haiti, we would then have to find the money in our defense budget, taking it from other programs or from quality of life issues for the troops to pay the costs of these operations. The comptroller of the Pentagon estimates that that cost us $19 billion over the past 7 years. In fact, Bosnia alone has already cost us close to $10 billion. At a time where we have been convinced that the world is safe, partially because our troops are today at this time deployed all over the world, we have decimated our ability to prepare for the future in our military. Some other things have occurred, Mr. Speaker, and I want to talk about them briefly. First of all, this President, working along with Tony Blair from Great Britain, decided it was in the best interest of the U.S. and Britain, along with our NATO allies. And make no mistake about it, the bulk of NATO is decided by our President and Tony Blair, NATO really is dependent upon the leadership of the U.S. and Britain. I do not think Luxembourg would have much of a chance in stopping America from doing anything it wanted in terms of NATO. The decision to go into Kosovo was one that required the debate and the consent of this body, but that was not to be. In fact, Mr. Speaker, hindsight always being 20/20 we can now look back, as I have, and talk to some of our analysts in the intelligence operation, which I have. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I have learned that every CIA Balkan analyst in the CIA, every one of them, unanimously, agree that an aerial attack on Serbia and Kosovo would not stop ethnic cleansing. The CIA, for all of its faults, and I was as troubled by the bombing of the Chinese Embassy as anyone, but the CIA's analysts who are the experts on the Balkans told this administration that the bombing that we eventually got involved in would cause a massive problem of refugees. The CIA Balkan analysts told the administration that bombing would not work, would not stop the ethnic cleansing. All of this was done prior to the administration's decision. In fact, there were documents internally within the intelligence community, submitted to the administration, outlining the CIA's concern that if the bombing took place it would cause a humanitarian catastrophe, and that is exactly what has happened. It is far worse than just the humanitarian catastrophe. In fact, many of those analysts said that we actually contributed to the refugee crisis because when we bombed, it obviously caused the observers who were in the former Yugoslavia to leave that country, which then gave Milosevic a free hand to continue at a much higher level the ethnic cleansing and the significant attacks on innocent people. So in effect, Mr. Speaker, what the intelligence community was saying to us as a Nation, prior to a decision to conduct the aerial campaign, was that if we went ahead, we would cause the situation to become much worse. That is exactly what has occurred. We are now into our 60-something day of consecutive bombing and many in this body, having seen the fact that we do not have the dollars to put forward to pay for the Kosovo deployment, which is now in excess of probably $2 billion, are now wondering what our strategy is to stop the bombing, what is our strategy to end the crisis. Since many of our colleagues, including myself, do not feel that we have a legitimate strategy to end the conflict, we wonder what the strategy is to win the conflict, because we are controlling what our military can and cannot do in Kosovo, in Serbia. We are limiting the strikes. We never committed to a ground force. So the question we have to ask is, if we do not have a strategy to end the conflict, and if we do not have a strategy to win the conflict, what is our strategy? For many of us, there is no strategy, Mr. Speaker. It is just a continuing massive amount of aerial attacks that in many cases are harming innocent civilians. Now, let me add further, Mr. Speaker, if we have to look at the situation in the former Yugoslavia and see what we have done, we can look certainly at three different things. We have now rallied all of the people in Serbia, many of whom were against Milosevic, many of whom are ready to try to remove him forcefully, we have managed to rally all of them in support of Milosevic as their hero. We have managed to help cause an extensive increase in the refugee crisis, to the extent now that we have almost 1 million men and women and children in outlying regions around Kosovo, with no decent housing and no decent food and no timetable to return them to their country. We have done something else, Mr. Speaker. We have managed to do what one colleague of mine from the Russian Duma told me the Soviet communist party could not accomplish in 70 years, after expending billions of dollars, to convince the Russian people that America was evil, that we really were designed as a nation to hurt innocent people. He said Russians are now convinced, after some 55 days of bombing, which it was when he was here, that this country really is evil. So we have managed to do in 55 days what the Soviet communist party could not accomplish in Russia in 70 years. Mr. Speaker, we are doing ourselves long-term harm in our relationship with Russia. First of all, after starting the aerial campaign, we did not engage Russia. Now the administration would have us believe otherwise. There was no direct contact with Russia after Rambouillet until, in fact, a group of Russian pro-western parliamentarians contacted us in the Congress and said: You do not understand what you are doing. You are driving our party out of power. We who support strong relations with America, we who want to help you solve the proliferation problem in our country, we who want to get rid of the communists and the ultranationalists are being driven out because your policies in the Balkans are causing the Russian people to identify with the communists and the ultranationalists. When the elections are held this year, if you continue this policy, you are going to drive Russia back into a Cold War era like we saw in the Soviet days. Our policies in the Balkans are very much of a concern to me, not just because of the crisis being created with the Serbs and with the Kosovars and the refugees, but also because of the long-term implications in our relationship with Russia. Now, make no mistake about it, Mr. Speaker. Like all of our colleagues in this body, I abhor what Milosevic has done. He is a thug. He is a war criminal, and after this is over we need to proceed in convening a war crimes tribunal. Our policies, Mr. Speaker, have not succeeded either. We need to have this administration understand that continuing a mistake is worse than trying to find an honorable solution. We have that opportunity. As I said on this floor several times, 11 Members of this body, 5 Democrats and 6 Republicans, attempted to find common ground with members of the Russian Duma 2 weeks ago in Vienna. We found that common ground. In fact, the agreement that we reached became the basis for the G-8 accord that came out 5 days later, which the U.S. was a signatory of. That agreement calls for a negotiated settlement along the lines of the five key NATO principles that our President has said are most important for us. Now is the time for us to use the leverage that we have and our NATO partners have and Russia has to convince Milosevic that he must come to the table on our terms. I am not convinced our administration is still at this very moment doing enough to engage the Russians in applying the appropriate pressure to Milosevic. Mr. Speaker, the agreement that we reached in Vienna we brought back to Washington, we faxed to the 19 parliaments of all the NATO countries and we asked them to apply pressure to their governments, not to cave into Milosevic, not to hand him a victory but to say now is the time to use our leverage to get this crisis done at the negotiating table, which I am firmly convinced can occur. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we introduced a resolution in support of our framework agreement in the Congress 2 weeks ago, and held a congressional hearing in the Committee on International Relations last week on that resolution. The Duma, following our lead, did the same, and on Friday of last week the State Duma of the Russian Federation passed that document as a formal document on the floor of the State Duma. We are now asking our leadership to work with us to accomplish a similar task, not because we are trying to embarrass the administration but because we understand the urgency of solving this crisis before any more lives are lost, before any more ethnic cleansing is done, before any more Americans are placed in harm's way. Now is the time for this administration to stand up and do what is right, and that is to bring Milosevic to the table and to do it directly, and to use the Russian leverage, which is considerable, in having Milosevic agree to the terms that we laid out with our NATO friends. This disaster is having a terrible effect on our long-term relationship with Russia. Mr. Speaker, we were supposed to have on Thursday of this week the Russian parliamentarians come back to Washington for a public press announcement in support of the work that we are doing. Because of the press of business and the fact that we will break for the Memorial Day recess this week, they will be coming back the first full week in June. Something else will happen tomorrow, Mr. Speaker. Two things of significant importance to all of our colleagues, which I hope our colleagues will convey to every constituent all across America. The first is, between 4:00 and 6:30 we will host probably one of the most investigative reporters on security issues in this city at a book signing ceremony in EF-100 of the U.S. Capitol building. Bill Gertz, who writes for the Washington Times, will be here to unveil to Members of Congress and our staffs his book entitled ``Betrayal.'' Every Member of Congress should read this book. In fact, it has hit the bestseller list in just the first week it was on the stands. Why is this book so important, Mr. Speaker? Because it details, in depth, an analysis of this spin on defense concerns in this country over the past 7 years. In one chapter in this book Mr. Gertz goes into great detail to talk about an incident involving a Canadian and a U.S. military officer that were flying in a helicopter out in the Seattle area, when a Russian ship that was supposedly spying, pointed and fired a laser weapon at that helicopter. The laser beam hit our American officer in the eye and did permanent eye damage to him. That incident, Mr. Speaker, if one reads the Gertz book, was covered up for 30 days. To this day, our government has never acknowledged that that Navy officer was hit deliberately by a Russian laser generator on a Russian vessel. We did not do the proper investigation. We did not hold the Russians accountable. Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, I am someone who spends a lot of time working on improving relations with Russia, but with Russia we have to understand one very basic tenet that Ronald Reagan knew very well. We must deal with the Russians from a position of strength, consistency and candor. When we are not candid with the Russians, when we do not call them when they violate treaties, when we do not ask them about things like Yamantau Mountain in the Urals where they are spending billions of dollars on a huge underground complex that we just do not know the purpose of, the Russians lose respect for us. That is the problem this administration has with Russia. We were so concerned with not embarrassing Boris Yeltsin that we forgot over the past seven years that Russia had to be held accountable for those things it did that were in violation of arms control regimes, that were things that destabilized our relationship, and we are now paying the price for those policies. A second chapter in Mr. Gertz's book deals with a letter that, up until this book, has been classified. The letter was sent and signed by President Bill Clinton to President Boris Yeltsin. Mr. Speaker, every one of our colleagues needs to read this letter because in the letter our President tells Yeltsin, ``Don't worry. Our policies will help you in your reelection effort.'' We were so concerned about not doing anything to expose Russian problems for what they were that we even went to the length of ignoring reality. When the Russians transferred technology to Iran for the SHAHAB-3 missile, we ignored it. When we caught the Russians transferring accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iraq, we ignored it. We were afraid to do anything to expose violations because we did not want to embarrass President Yeltsin. We are now paying the price for those policies, Mr. Speaker, and our national security has been harmed because of the absolutely overwhelming proliferation that has gone out from Russia to every destabilized country in the world, technology being used for missile proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, because we did not want to hold the Russians accountable for violations and for their lack of tight controls in terms of technology that could be used abroad. We are now paying the price for those policies, and Russia is a much more destabilized nation. And now, because of the Kosovo conflict, we are backing Russia into a corner, and the pro-western leaders in Russia are saying we are going to hand Russia over to the Communists and the ultranationalists if we do not get our policy back together again. The Gertz book documents these stories, Mr. Speaker, and I would encourage our colleagues to stop by EF-100 tomorrow between 4 o'clock and 6:30 to meet Bill Gertz personally and get a copy of his book and to read for themselves the hard evidence. In fact, I saw an article last week that the FBI may be considering actually pressing charges against Gertz for some of the revelations that he has exposed. It is an absolute shame and outrage when, in America, we have to have a reporter for a newspaper expose to us information that Members of Congress and the public should have a legitimate right to understand and know. It reminds me of that famous national intelligence estimate that this administration spun out four years ago when the President said we have no need to worry about any long-range missiles hitting America for at least 15 years, when the CIA publicly put that document out and the President used that document to veto our defense bill. Three years later, after tremendous pressure from many of us in this room from both sides of the aisle, the CIA has now publicly reversed itself and has acknowledged that North Korea has a long-range ICBM today. That is the kind of spin that this administration has placed on national security issues for seven years, but now it is about to unfold. Also tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, at 10:30 in the morning the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and nine members in total of the Cox committee, the Select Committee to look at technology transfer from the U.S. to China, which I was honored to be a member of, will issue our public statement. For five months, Mr. Speaker, we have tried to get the administration to declassify the Select Committee's report, and for five months we have been stonewalled. Nine Members of Congress, five Republicans and four Democrats, very honorable people, met behind closed doors all during the breaks, all during the holidays from July through January 1 and 2 of this year. Behind closed doors we interfaced with the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency. We held hearings, we called witnesses in, and we said nothing on the record. In a bipartisan way we developed a document that resulted in 32 specific recommendations of how to deal with the tremendous amount of technology transfer that has occurred to the People's Republic of China. We looked at cases where there was espionage involved. We looked at cases where companies went too far and perhaps violated U.S. laws, and we looked at cases where our government relaxed our technology controls to allow Chinese companies to buy technologies that should not have been on the marketplace. All of that information was summarized and by the first week of January of this year, our report was complete. With its 32 recommendations, all of which were classified, and with the volumes of data we had assembled, we sent the report to the administration and we asked the administration to look at our recommendations, to come back to us and begin a dialogue of how to protect our Nation's security. What did the administration do? Mr. Speaker, as they have done for seven years, they spun America's national security. Instead of dealing with it up front, putting the report on the table, they leaked stories out. One story that was leaked to the Wall Street Journal by the administration dealt with the Chinese acquiring our W-88 missile technology, or our nuclear warhead technology, not missile technology. And the reason why that was leaked is because that leakage occurred during a Republican administration. Now, I can tell my colleagues that the members of the Select Committee, both Democrats and Republicans, were not looking at what administration was responsible for security breaches. We did not care whether it was Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Carter, whomever. Our job was to do the right thing for America. But what did the administration do? They tried to spin it: ``We will leak the story about the W-88 because of the press feeds on that, and they will think that is what the China Select Committee looked at, and that was done during a Republican administration,'' and as the administration tried to say, ``Well, we corrected those problems.'' That was their initial spin. Then they went to the business community and they said, ``You have to understand what the Select Committee is doing. They are about ready to come out with a report that is going to lay all the blame at the feet of American industry,'' and that was not the case and is not the case, Mr. Speaker. In fact, I am going to publicly say tomorrow, as I am saying tonight, that while there were some cases where American companies went too far, and there are criminal investigations of at least two of those companies under way right now, the bulk of the time American companies have done the right thing. They have wanted to abide by the law. Now, the law has been changing. The regulations have changed. But it was not for us to blame only industry. Mr. Speaker, the administration would also have some believe, through its spin efforts, that it is all the fault of China, and China is this bad country that has been able to use espionage to get access to technology that they should never have gotten access to. And in some cases, that is the story. We are currently seeing that with the story on our laboratories. But, Mr. Speaker, how can we blame a country like China for buying technology if we as a Nation voluntarily allow that technology to be sold abroad? That is what has occurred over the past seven years. We allowed technology to be sold abroad that up until this administration was very tightly controlled and regulated, and was checked by a series of efforts within the intelligence community and the defense and State Department establishments to make sure that that technology would not enhance the capability militarily of a potential or current adversary. So blaming China alone is not going to be acceptable. No, Mr. Speaker, the reason why, as we will see tomorrow, we have had such problems with our technology has, in my opinion, largely been the direct result of this government, our own government. We have sent the mixed signals. We have lowered the threshold. We have removed the whistleblowers. We have stopped people from doing their job. The question of why that occurred is something that needs to be explored. Our Select Committee did not look at that, but the problem of the technology being transferred is real. For five months, Mr. Speaker, we have tried. Every one of the nine members of the Select Committee has tried to get this document out for the public to see. My comment was repeatedly, look, let us not have any more spin, just release the document and let the American people and the Members draw their own conclusions. It has taken us five months to make that happen. Tomorrow, that report will be released. I can remember back to February 1, Mr. Speaker, and this is probably the best example I can give of the attempt to spin this that I can think of. February 1, Sandy Berger, head of the National Security Council, issues a public response to selected media personnel in this city of the response of the administration to the 32 classified recommendations that we made in the Cox committee. So in January we make our recommendations and we issue the report and it is all classified. Without discussing their actions at all with any member of the Cox committee, on February 1 Sandy Berger releases in a public format the White House's response to those 32 recommendations. Now, if that was not bad enough, Mr. Speaker, two days later we have a Committee on National Security brief that is open to Members only. The brief is being given to us by the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet. When he is finished his brief about emerging threats and we get to the question and answer session, I ask the DCI, the Director of Central Intelligence, a question. I said, ``Mr. Tenet, you know that the China Select Committee one month ago issued its report, because we gave you a copy. You are the intelligence leader for our country. In that report we made 32 recommendations for changes, but we also reached a very simple unanimous conclusion, and that conclusion, Mr. Tenet, you know is that America's national security has been harmed in a significant way by technology transfers to China.'' I asked Mr. Tenet, ``Do you agree with that assessment that the nine of us reached unanimously?" This was his answer, Mr. Speaker, two days after Sandy Berger gave the media an unclassified response to our recommendations. George Tenet said, ``Mr. Congressman, can I get back to you? I have not finished reading the report yet.'' So here was the White House on February 1 issuing to selected media outlets unclassified response to a report that the Director of Central Intelligence two days later said he had not finished reading yet. Mr. Speaker, that is why we have problems with our national security. Tomorrow, the American people get to see for themselves. They get to hear about the warheads and the technology that we have lost. They get to hear about the neutron bomb. They get to hear about technology involving our space launch capability. They get to hear about the MIRVing nuclear warhead. They get to hear about military-industrial technology, high-performance computers. They get to hear about all of these things, and in the end, the administration is going to try to blame someone. They are either going to try to find a scapegoat within the administration who they can say caused these problems, as they are currently trying to do in the Department of Energy, trying to blame the labs, when some of the labs were doing an adequate job but others were not; or they are going to try to blame someone up in the Cabinet who can be the fall guy or gal who takes the blame for what has occurred. In the end, Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that the blame for our security lapses, as Harry Truman said, started at the top where the buck stops. The administration sets the policy. Now, some would say, well, the President cannot know everything, and this is true. Some of my CIA friends have told me that this is one of the first Presidents since Eisenhower who never sees the CIA's morning briefers, never sees them. He chooses not to see the briefers who are coming in to advise him of security concerns. The CIA does not even know if the President reads the daily brief provided to him. What the CIA analysts that I have talked to say is that they think that what Clinton gets is filtered through Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger. Mr. Speaker, this is going to be a bad week in the history of America. The Kosovo crisis continues; Russia is being backed into a corner, to the point where they are now very antagonistic toward America; Bill Gertz comes out with a book called ``Betrayal'' which documents specific events that have occurred that have undermined our national security; and tomorrow, a select group involving nine Members of Congress, five Republicans and four Democrats, present a unanimous report and finding of what we found, that our national security has been harmed by our sale and transfer of technology to China. Many Members are going to use this as a platform to jump all over China and blame the Chinese and say they are an evil nation. I am going to be one, Mr. Speaker, that stands up and says, let us pause a moment. We need to engage China. Has China done some things that are wrong? Yes. We must deal with them. Does this mean we should isolate ourselves from China and consider all Chinese to be bad people? Absolutely not, because, in the end, Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that the bulk of the problems that we uncovered were caused by our own government. If we are stupid enough to allow another nation to buy sensitive technologies, then we cannot blame that nation. We blame our own policies that caused those technologies to be allowed to be sold for the first time. In our testimony and in public statements that have been on the record, so I am not revealing any sensitive information, the first director of our Defense Technology Agency called DTSA, whose responsibility it was to monitor applications for technology sales abroad, and which was decimated during this administration, Steve Brian said that in 1996 China had zero high performance computers. None. These are the high end supercomputers, high performance computers in the 8 to 10,000 MTOPS range, very capable computers that are only used for very elaborate research or for weapons design. China had none. Only two countries were manufacturing those high performance computers at that time, the U.S. and Japan, and both of our countries had an unwritten understanding that neither would sell these high performance computers to those nations which were or could become potential adversaries of the U.S. We relaxed our policy on exporting high performance computers, Mr. Speaker, and in two years, by 1998, China had acquired over 350 high performance computers. Now, we were told the State Department would monitor where they were being used, but they did not do that, because China would not let our State Department monitor where these computers went. We know now that many of them are being used by organs of the People's Liberation Army. They are being used for weapons design, they are being used for their nuclear programs, and those devices came from this country. Mr. Speaker, China did not steal those high performance computers; they bought them. They bought them because we changed our policies. We allowed Chinese entities to acquire technologies that up until the mid- 1990s had been tightly controlled and monitored by those people who are watching out for our security concerns, now and in the 21st Century. Mr. Speaker, by Thursday of this week I expect to unveil two new documents, documents which I have been working on with a small group of people for the past four months. These two documents will not just focus on the China Select Committee, but will go beyond that. By Thursday of this week, it is my hope, if the graphic artists have completed the work, which I expect they will, to present two large charts, if you will, the visual presentation of what has happened in terms of technology transfer to China. The first chart, Mr. Speaker, which I have a rough sketch of, will trace every front company and operative arm of the People's Liberation Army that tried to acquire and did acquire technology in America, who the leaders were, what their ties are and were, and how they were able to get the approval to buy technology that is very sensitive and is being used by the Chinese military today, most of it with the support of our government. The second chart, Mr. Speaker, will be a depiction of a time-line, starting in 1993 and running through 1999. It will take every major technology area of concern that we have, encryption, high performance computers, military-industrial technology, space launch capability, nuclear weapons, it will take all of those technology disciplines and will track them through that 6 year time period, and it will list specific dates when actions took place in this administration to allow those technologies to be transferred. Almost all of those actions were done voluntarily by our country. Mr. Speaker, in the end we have got to understand that we are now going to begin to pay the price for 7 years of gloating over our economy, 7 years of gloating over what was supposed to be world security, 7 years of pretending Russia and China were not potential problems, and rather than being up front and candid and transparent with Russia and China, we glossed over problems. We pretended things were not happening. We told Yeltsin we would help him get reelected. We did not want to offend Jiang Zemin. In doing that, we gave away technology that America is going to have to deal with for the next 50 years. Mr. Speaker, this is not a partisan issue. Democrats and Republicans in this body and the other body have been together on national security concerns. Democrats and Republicans have worked hand-in-hand over the years in protecting America's security. This battle, Mr. Speaker, is between the White House and the Congress. This White House has done things that this Congress has tried to stop and overturn. Starting tomorrow and continuing through the next year and a half, until the presidential elections and both parties attempt to win the White House, the American people will have to judge as to whether or not our security has been harmed, how extensively it has been harmed, what is going to be the remedy for us to deal with these concerns that we have relative to technology flowing into hands that eventually could be used against America. I want to caution our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, not to rush to snap judgments. We should not tomorrow when the China Select Committee reports come out and bash all Chinese citizens, or certainly not Chinese-Americans. Some of our most capable leaders in this country are Chinese-Americans. In fact, some of my best friends are Chinese- Americans, leaders in the academic world, the scientific world, the technology world. We must make sure that we let them know that they are solid Americans that we respect. We must not let this report come out and be an effort where Members of Congress come out and trash China and trash our relationship with those Chinese American leaders in our communities across this country. The problem in the end, Mr. Speaker, is with us. It is within our own government. We should not try to find any scapegoats. We should not try to blame industry. We should not try to just blame the Chinese. We should not just try to blame any one group. The bulk of the problems I think we will find were caused by our own actions, by our own decisions, to ease up on the control mechanisms, to make technology available for sale. This is not to say there are not cases of espionage, because there are, and they need to be dealt with, as in our laboratories and the network that the Chinese established. But if we are foolish enough to allow China to set up front companies and buy technology from us, who is wrong? The Chinese, who are abiding by our laws and buying technology in many cases that we sell them, or are we at fault for loosening our controls and allowing them to buy these technologies? The same thing is true with companies. American industry by and large wants to do the right thing, but if we send confusing signals, if we change the regulations, if we loosen up the standards, then most American industry should not be blamed when these very technologies are then sold abroad because we have allowed those practices to go on. As I said earlier, there are companies that deserve to be investigated, and two are under criminal investigation right now. But I would hope tomorrow and for the rest of this week as we get ready to celebrate the Memorial Day holiday that we as a Nation step back and begin to seriously consider our national security. It has not been a high focus for the past 7 years. We have been lulled into a false sense of complacency. The economy is going strong, people are working, inflation is low, unemployment is low, and we have been convinced that the world is safe. Now, all of a sudden, we wake up and see Russia backed into a corner, China involved in technologies that we never thought they should have, North Korea deploying long and short range missiles that now threaten not just our territories, but the mainland of the U.S., Iran-Iraq developing medium range systems with the help of Russia, India and Pakistan saber rattling with nuclear warheads and medium-range missiles. Where did they get the weapons from, Mr. Speaker? Where? We saw China supplying Pakistan with the M-11 missiles. We saw China supplying Pakistan with ring magnets. We saw China supplying Pakistan with the technology for the nuclear furnaces. We saw Russia supplying India with technology. Why are we surprised? All of a sudden we come with the realization, we have problems in the world, and we have not dealt with those problems in a fair, open and honest way, in spite of tremendous efforts by Republicans and Democrats in this body and the other body. It is time to end the spin, Mr. Speaker. It is time for this administration to end the nauseating spin, the spin doctors at the White House, who want to spin everything, to make it look as if they have no role to play, just as they did when they lost the Congressional elections and did not want to accept any responsibility in the White House. It was all the fault of those Members of Congress who were out of touch. It is about time this administration and this President understand that once in awhile he needs to accept the responsibility for his actions and the collective actions of this administration.