Sheldon Whitehouse

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. A question, through the Chair: Would the Senator explain why it is that when it comes to the deficit it is more important to protect our national debt than it is to help our seniors, but it is less important to help our deficit and our debt than it is to give tax breaks to multi-multimillionaires? As I said, the 400 highest income earners the IRS has reported earning more than a third of $1 billion each on average, it would strike me that the deficit and the debt is a matter of national concern that should apply equally to millionaires--I mean multi-super-ultra- hyper-millionaires--than it is to seniors struggling to get by on Social Security. I don't understand why the deficit matters so much when it comes to depriving our seniors of a COLA adjustment, but it doesn't appear to matter at all when it comes to providing the very wealthiest Americans--people who have their own jets, have their own yachts, people who have, you know, seven homes--additional tax relief that most billionaires who have come forward in this matter say they don't want or need; that it is unpatriotic, frankly, from their perspective not to be asked to contribute more.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 637, S. 987.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that the Durbin amendment be agreed to; the committee-reported substitute, as amended, be agreed to; the bill, as amended, be read a third time and passed with no intervening action or debate; and that any statements be printed in the Record.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bills be read a third time and passed en bloc, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table en bloc with no intervening action or debate, and any statements be printed in the Record.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed en bloc to the following Federal naming bills, Calendar Nos. 658 through 661: H.R. 4387, H.R. 5651, H.R. 5706, and H.R. 5773.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Judiciary Committee be discharged from further consideration of and the Senate now proceed to S. Res. 686.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. 3998, which was introduced earlier today.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and any statements be printed in the Record.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 2; that following the prayer and pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each, with the majority controlling the first 30 minutes and the Republicans controlling the next 30 minutes. Finally, I ask that the Senate recess from 12:30 until 3:30 p.m. for the Democratic caucus meeting.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that it adjourn under the previous order.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, may I associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished senior Senator and reemphasize our pride in the contacts that Chairman Dodd, Senator Dodd, our friend Chris Dodd has with Rhode Island. I yield the floor.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act. I commend Senator Durbin, Senator Harkin, and the many other Senators who have worked so hard for so long on this important legislation. It is long past time that we make improvements to our food safety procedures in the United States, and we can see by the diversity of interests that have come together to support this bill from industry to farm to consumer groups that the time to address this issue is now. Like so many Rhode Islanders, I have been appalled by the stories of deaths and serious illnesses from seemingly benign foods such as peanut butter and spinach. These are foods we bring into our homes, expecting them to nourish our families. We shouldn't have to worry that they might make our children sick. American families need to know that their government is protecting the food supply. This bill goes a long way toward improving the Food and Drug Administration's food inspection and recall system. First, the bill improves our ability to prevent food safety emergencies through better record keeping, hazard analysis, controls, and food safety plans. These standards are also applied to imported foods, which is increasingly important in our global economy. Second, FDA's ability to react to foodborne illness outbreaks is significantly enhanced by increasing inspection and surveillance, making food more traceable in order to more quickly pinpoint the source of an outbreak. Furthermore, the bill grants the FDA the authority to order a mandatory recall of food if a company refuses to participate in a voluntary recall. Finally, this bill enhances FDA's capability to protect the American food supply from terrorist threats and from intentional contamination through building cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security at our ports. I am very pleased that all of this is accomplished while protecting small farmers and producers. Rhode Island is very proud of its small farms, local produce, and the wonderful farmers markets that can be found throughout the State. Our farmers are proud to feed families in Rhode Island and the surrounding States, and I know they do everything possible to ensure the food they sell is safe. I thank Senator Tester for his work on a compromise to protect farmers like those in Rhode Island, and throughout Nation, who believe in the value of locally grown food. It has been disappointing that the process to bring this bill about has taken so long. The bill's sponsors have been trying to bring it to the floor of the Senate for a vote for months, during which time the outbreak of salmonella in eggs made the need to improve our food inspection system even more clear. This is not a perfect bill, but it is a necessary one. Once it is passed, we must continue to build upon it. The matter of our families' safety is not a partisan issue; ensuring food safety is a fundamental function of our Federal Government.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I rise to speak about a bill I recently introduced: S. 3941, the Combating Military Counterfeits Act of 2010. This bill will help protect America's Armed Forces from the risk of defective equipment by enhancing the ability of prosecutors to keep counterfeit goods out of the military supply chain. The safety of our servicemembers and the success of their missions depend upon the proper performance of weapon systems, body armor, aircraft parts, and countless other mission-critical products. Unfortunately, America's military faces a significant and growing threat: the infiltration of the military supply chain by counterfeit products. These counterfeit products do not meet military standards, putting troops' lives at risk, compromising military readiness, and costing taxpayers millions in replacement costs. In the case of microelectronics, counterfeit parts also provide an avenue for cybersecurity threats to enter military systems, possibly enabling hackers to disable or track crucial national security applications. Let me give you a few examples from a recent report by the Government Accountability Office: The Defense Department discovered in testing that it had procured body armor that was misrepresented as being ``Kevlar.'' Think about that: a criminal sold fake body armor to the military, putting our troops' lives at risk just to make a buck. The law must provide strong deterrence and harsh sanctions for such conduct. And in another example, a supplier sold the Defense Department a personal computer part that it falsely claimed was a $7,000 circuit that met the specifications of a missile guidance system. As my colleagues may know, military grade chips are required to withstand extreme temperature, force, and vibration. Chips that don't meet those specifications are prone to fail--for example, when a jet is at high altitude, when a missile is launching, or when a GPS unit is out in the field. The possible tragic consequences of such equipment failing are unthinkable. And the increasing number of counterfeits has broad ramifications for our national security. A January 2010 study by the Commerce Department, for example, quoted a Defense Department official as estimating that counterfeit aircraft parts were ``leading to a 5 to 15 percent annual decrease in weapons systems reliability.'' And the risk is growing. The Commerce Department study, which surveyed military manufacturers, contractors, and distributors, reported approximately two and a half times as many incidents of counterfeit electronics in 2008 as in 2005. It is only going to get worse as the high prices of military grade products attract more and more counterfeits. Consider, for example, that before fleeing the country, the supplier that sold a counterfeit $7,000 circuit for a missile guidance system had been paid $3 million as part of contracts worth a total of $8 million. We should also evaluate this bill in the context of the relentless cyber attacks America weathers every day. The chip might not only be counterfeit, it might be the carrier for dangerous viruses and malware that may create windows for enemies to enter to sabotage our military equipment to steal our military secrets. I applaud those of my colleagues who have been working with the Department of Defense to ensure that it does everything it can to keep counterfeits out of its supply chain. And I am pleased the administration, and particularly the intellectual property enforcement coordinator, Victoria Espinel, is taking on this issue. But I also believe that Congress needs to give the executive branch more tools to address these problems. As a former U.S. attorney, I know the significant deterrent effect criminal sanctions can provide. To that end, the Department of Justice has a vital role to play in using criminal investigations and prosecutions to identify and deter trafficking in counterfeit military goods. Current law is insufficient. The existing counterfeit trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2320, provides for heightened penalties for trafficking in counterfeits that result in bodily injury or death. But unlike cases of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, it may not be possible to prove that a military counterfeit caused bodily injuries or death, since the faulty part may never be recovered from a battlefield. As a result, traffickers in military counterfeits are likely to face penalties that do not reflect the unacceptable risk that counterfeits impose on our troops, our military readiness, and our national and cyber security. We must address this flaw in our laws and we must do so soon. Traffickers should face stiff penalties if they knowingly sell the military a piece of counterfeit body armor that could fail in combat, a counterfeit missile control system that could short-circuit at launch, or a counterfeit GPS that could fail on the battlefield. The Combating Military Counterfeits Act of 2010 will make sure that such reprehensible criminals face appropriate criminal sanctions. It creates an enhanced offense for an individual who traffics in counterfeits and knows that the counterfeit product either is intended for military use or is identified as meeting military standards. It doubles the statutory maximum penalty for such offenses. The bill also directs the Sentencing Commission to update the Sentencing Guidelines as appropriate to reflect Congress's intent that trafficking in counterfeit military items be punished sufficiently to deter this reckless endangerment of our servicemembers and weakening of our national security. The bill is narrowly crafted. It adds to an existing offense so that it only targets particularly malicious offenders--those who already are guilty of trafficking in counterfeit goods and know that the goods in question are intended for military use. As a result, this bill will not affect legitimate military contractors who might be unaware that a counterfeit chip has made its way into one of their products. Nor will it apply to makers of products that unintentionally fall short of military specifications as a result of innocent mistakes. Indeed, this bill will help military suppliers by deterring criminals from selling counterfeits to them or to their subcontractors. Manufacturers will benefit from the protection of their intellectual property. To that end, I have received a letter of support from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce which explains that ``[t]his legislation would . . . provide an important deterrent to those seeking to profit from the sale of counterfeit parts to the military.'' The Semiconductor Industry Association has similarly weighed in with their support, explaining the irresponsible manner in which counterfeit chips are made and the harm that counterfeit chips, most of which are imported into the United States, can cause to the military and to their industry. I am grateful for their early support and I welcome the comments of other stakeholders as I work to make the legislation as effective as possible in its deterrence of this shameful criminal activity. I of course also very much look forward to working with my colleagues on what I expect to be bipartisan legislation that we can act on promptly. We all have had the privilege of visiting with our troops. We all know the sacrifices they make for our country. We all want to do everything we can to ensure that their equipment functions properly and that counterfeits do not compromise our nation's military readiness or security. By deterring trafficking in counterfeit military goods, the Combating Military Counterfeits Act of 2010 is a vital and necessary step towards these important goals.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 681, submitted earlier today.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I come to the floor to speak about the legislation that will be required in order to bolster our Nation's cyber defenses and to protect our Nation's intellectual property from piracy and from theft. In the course of my work on the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, it has become all too clear that our laws have not kept pace with the amazing technological developments we have seen, many information technologies over the past 15 or 20 years. Earlier this year, I had the privilege of chairing the Intelligence Committee's bipartisan cyber task force, along with my distinguished colleagues, Senator Snowe and Senator Mikulski, who made vital contributions and were great teammates in that effort. We spent 6 months conducting a thorough review of the threat and the posture of the United States for countering it. Based on that review and my work on the Senate Judiciary Committee, I have identified six areas in which there are overarching problems with the current statutory framework for protecting our country. The first is a really basic one; that is, that current law does not adequately facilitate or encourage public awareness about cyber threats. The government keeps the damage we are sustaining from cyber attacks secret because it is classified. The private sector keeps the damage they are sustaining from cyber attacks secret so as not to look bad to customers, to regulators, and to investors. The net result of that is that the American public gets left in the dark. We do not even have a good public understanding of how extensive and sophisticated the cyber forces arrayed against America are. Between the efforts of foreign governments and international organized crime, we are a long way from the problem of hackers in the basement. It is a big operation that has been mounted against us, and I would like to be able to describe it more fully, but it is both unhelpfully and unnecessarily classified, and so I can't even talk about that. Americans are sadly uninformed about the extent of the risk and the extent of the capacity that is being used against us. If Americans understood the threat and the vital role they themselves can play in protecting themselves and the country, I think we would all be more likely to engage in the cyber equivalent of routine maintenance. People would understand and they would support legislative changes which we need to protect our intellectual property and our national infrastructure. One of the principal findings of our cyber task force was that most cyber threats--literally the vast majority of cyber threats--can be countered readily if Americans simply allowed automatic updates to their computer software, ran up-to-date antivirus programs, and exercised reasonable vigilance when surfing the Web and opening e- mails. So we need far more reporting from the government and the private sector to let Americans know what is happening out there on the wild Web. Disclosures can be anonymized, where necessary, to safeguard national security or protect competitive business interests. But basic facts, putting Americans on notice of the extent of the present danger and harm, need to be disclosed. Second, we need, beyond just public information, to create a structure of rights and responsibilities where the public, consumers, technology companies, software manufacturers, and Internet service providers are all able to take appropriate roles for us to maintain those basic levels of cyber security. The notion that the Internet is an open highway with toll takers who have no responsibility for what comes down the highway, no responsibility no matter how menacing, no responsibility no matter how piratical, no responsibility no matter how dangerous can no longer be valid. We protect each other on our physical highways with basic rules of the road and we need a similar code for the information highway. Australia's ISPs have negotiated a cyber security code of conduct, and ISPs in compliance with the code can display a trust mark. That is one idea worth exploring. But one way or the other, there needs to be a code of conduct for safe travel on the information highway just as there is on our geographic highways. Third, we need to better empower our private sector to defend itself. When an industry comes together against cyber attackers to circle the wagons, to share information, and to engage in a common defense against those cyber attackers, we should help and not hinder that private sector effort. Legal barriers to broader information sharing among private sector entities and between the private sector and government must be lowered. I believe we can encourage cyber security in this way--common defense within the private sector--without undermining other areas of public policy. But it is not going to be a simple task, and we will have to work our way through it because those other areas of public policy are serious areas--antitrust protection, the safeguarding of intellectual property, protecting legal privileges, liability concerns, and even national security concerns in those areas where the government may be asked to share classified information. Bear in mind that there are three levels of threat. As I have said, the vast majority of our cyber vulnerabilities can be cured by simple patches and off-the-shelf technology. That is the lowest level--just follow basic, simple procedures and we can rid ourselves of most of the attacking. The next is a more sophisticated set of threats that require the best efforts of the private sector to defend against. Those private sector efforts are becoming increasingly sophisticated and capable. As to those types of attacks, the private sector can handle them alone and particularly so if we have empowered the private sector, industry by industry, to engage in more effective common defense and information sharing. The most sophisticated threats and attacks, however, will require action by our government. The notion that we can leave our Nation's cyber defense entirely to the private sector is no longer valid. This brings us to a fourth question--the increasingly important issue of cyber 911. When the CIO of a local bank or electric utility is overwhelmed by a cyber attack, whom do they call and under what terms does the government respond? Right now, the answers to those questions are dangerously vague. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act--or ECPA--is a vitally important statute. In 1986, 25 years ago, Chairman Patrick Leahy worked hard to establish statutory privacy protections in a domain where constitutional privacy protections were weak. It is an enduring legislative accomplishment and we must preserve its core principles. Since ECPA was enacted, however, the threat has dramatically changed. Imagine how technology has changed in 25 years. It is no longer true that private firms are capable of defending their networks from sophisticated thieves and spies on their own. As we found in the Cyber Task Force, there is now a subset of threats that cannot be countered without bringing to bear the U.S. Government's unique authorities and capabilities. There always needs to be strong privacy protections for Americans against the government. But we do let firemen into our house when it is on fire and the police can come into our house when there is a burglar. A similar principle should apply to criminals and cyber attacks when private capabilities are overwhelmed. There is one more step, and here is where it gets a little bit more tricky. You call 9-1-1 and the police or the ambulance rushes right over. But in cyber security, by the time you call cyber 9-1-1, it may be too late. Attacks in cyberspace happen at light speed, as fast as electrons flow. Not all the risks and harms that imperil Americans can be averted by action after the fact. Some attacks are actually already there, in our networks, lying in wait for the signal to activate. We as a country are naked and vulnerable to some forms of attack if we have not predeployed our defenses. Because the viruses and cyber attack nodes can travel in the text portion of messages, we have to sort out a difficult question: whether, and if so how and when, the government can scan for dangerous viruses and attack signals. In medieval times, communities protected their core infrastructure from raiders by locating the well, the granary, and the treasury inside castle walls. Not everything needs the same level of protection in cyberspace, but we need to sort out what does need that kind of protection, what the castle walls should look like, who gets allowed to reside inside the walls, and what the rules are. That leads to the question of a dot-secure domain. I have mentioned this before, but I would like to highlight it as an option for improving cyber security, particularly of the critical infrastructure of our country. Recently, General Alexander, Director of the NSA and commander of U.S. Cyber Command, has echoed this as a possibility. His predecessor at NSA, and a former Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, is also an advocate of such a domain for critical infrastructure. This doesn't have to be complicated or even mandatory. The most important value of a dot-secure domain is that, like dot-gov and dot-mil, now we can satisfy consent under the fourth amendment search requirements for the government's defenses to do their work within that domain, their work of screening for attack signals, botnets, and viruses. Critical infrastructure sites could bid for permission to protect themselves with the dot-secure domain label and be allowed in if they could show that lives and safety for Americans would be protected by allowing them entry. Obviously, core elements of our electric grid, of our financial, transportation, and communications infrastructure would be obvious candidates. But we simply cannot leave that core infrastructure on which the life and death of Americans depends without better security. Fifth, we must significantly strengthen law enforcement against cyber crooks. There is simply no better deterrent against cyber crime than a prospect of a long stretch in prison. We need to put more cyber crooks behind bars. It is not for want of ingenuity and commitment by our professionals that there are not more cyber crooks behind bars. During my work on the Cyber Task Force, I received a number of briefings and intelligence reports on cyber crime. The FBI and the Department of Justice have some real success stories under their belts, such as the arrests of the alleged perpetrators behind the Mariposa botnet this summer, and our agencies are beginning to work together better and better over the lines of turf defense that separate them. The problem is, the criminals are also ingenious and they are greedy and they are successful and they are astoundingly well funded. Again, we are not talking about hackers in the basement. We are talking about substantial criminal enterprise with enormous sums of money at their disposal and at stake. Many enterprises appear to work hand-in-hand with foreign governments, which puts even greater assets for attack at their disposal. They have a big advantage. The architecture of the Internet favors offense over defense. Technologically, it is generally easier for savvy criminals to attack a network and to hide their trail than it is for savvy defenders to block an attack and trace it back to the criminals. We are not on a level playing field against cyber criminals. That is the problem not easily overcome. What we can overcome, however, are the gaps, the weaknesses, the outdated strategies, and the inadequate resources in our own legal investigative processes. One example: the most dangerous cyber criminals are usually located overseas. To identify, investigate, and ultimately prosecute those criminals under traditional law enforcement authorities, we have to rely on complex and cumbersome international processes and treaties established decades ago that are far too slow for the modern cyber crime environment. We also need to resource and focus criminal investigation and prosecution at a level commensurate with the fact that we, America, are now on the losing end of what is probably the biggest transfer of wealth through theft and piracy in human history. I will say that again: We are at the losing end of what is probably the biggest transfer of wealth through theft and piracy in human history. I am pleased that in fiscal year 2010 the FBI received an additional 260 cyber security analysis and investigative positions. DOJ's Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section has not received new resources in 5 years. With the FBI poised to ramp up its investigatory actions against our cyber adversaries, I am concerned the DOJ may not have the resources to keep up. Sixth, we need clear rules of engagement for our government to deal with foreign threats. That is, unfortunately, a discussion for another day since so much of this area is now deeply classified. But here is one example: Can we adapt traditional doctrines of deterrence to cyber attacks when we may not know for sure which country or nonstate actor carried out the attack? If we can't attribute, how can we deter? With respect to any policy of deterrence, how can it stand on rules of engagement that the attacker does not know of? Not only do we need to establish clear rules of engagement, we need to establish and disclose clear rules of engagement if any policy of deterrence is to be effective in cyberspace. Finally, as we go about these six tasks, the government must be as transparent as possible with the American people. I doubt very much that the Obama administration would abuse new authorities in cyberspace to violate Americans' civil liberties. But on principle, I firmly and strongly believe that maximum transparency to the public and rigorous congressional oversight are essential. We have to go about this right. I look forward to working with my Senate colleagues and with the administration as the Congress moves toward comprehensive cyber security legislation to protect our country before a great cyber attack should befall us. Let me close my remarks by saying the most somber question we need to face is resilience. First, resilience of governance: How could we maintain command and control, run 9-1-1, operate FEMA, deploy local police and fire services, and activate and direct the National Guard if all of our systems are down? Second, resilience of society: How do we make sure people have confidence during a prolonged attack that food, water, warmth, and shelter will remain available? Because the Internet supports so many interdependent systems, a massive or prolonged attack could cascade across sectors, compromising or taking over our communications systems, our financial systems, our utility grid, and the transportation and delivery of the basic necessities of American life. Third, our American resilience as individuals: Think about it. Your power is out and has been for a week. Your phone is silent. Your laptop is dark. You have no access to your bank account. No store is accepting credit cards. Indeed, the corner store has closed its doors and the owner is sitting inside with a shotgun to protect against looters. Gasoline supply is rationed with National Guard soldiers keeping order at the pumps. Your children are cold and hungry and scared. How, then, do you behave? I leave this last question, our resilience as a government, as a society, and as individuals to another day. But I mention it to highlight the potentially catastrophic nature of a concerted and prolonged cyber attack. Again, such an attack could cascade across multiple sectors and could interrupt all of the different necessities on which we rely. When your power is down, it is an inconvenience but you can usually call somebody on the phone. Now the phone is out, so you can go to the laptop and try to e-mail somebody, but there is no signal on the laptop. You need cash. You go to the ATM. It is down. The bank is not open because a run would take place against its cash assets, given the fact that it can no longer reliably electronically let its customers know what their bank account balances are. We are up against a very significant threat. I hope some of the guideposts I have laid out will be helpful in designing the necessary legislation we need to put in place to empower our country to successfully defend against these sorts of attacks. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for perhaps 15 minutes.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until 9:30 a.m., Thursday, November 18; that following the prayer and pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day; that following any leader remarks, there be a period of morning business for one hour, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each, with the time equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees, with the Republicans controlling the first half and the majority controlling the final half; that following morning business, the Senate resume consideration of the motion to proceed to S. 510, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, postcloture; and the Senate recess from 12:30 until 3 p.m., with the time during recess, adjournment, or period of morning business counting postcloture.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I rise today to express my disappointment in the failure of the Senate to invoke cloture on the Paycheck Fairness Act. After our triumph 2 years ago in advancing gender equality through the Lilly Ledbetter Act, the first piece of legislation signed by President Obama, the Paycheck Fairness Act would have been another step towards ending gender discrimination in the workplace. Four decades after the Equal Pay Act was signed into law, women still earn only 77 cents for every dollar earned by their male counterparts. That equates to almost $11,000 less per year. In Rhode Island, women on average make approximately $36,500 where men make $49,000. For full- time, college educated Rhode Island workers over 25 years old, women make an average of $55,000, while men average $70,000. This is simply unacceptable and shows that the remedies provided by current law are not adequate. Those who dismiss the disparity as a consequence of women's ``choice of work'' ignore the fact that the wage gap exists even in highly skilled industries such as aerospace engineering and network systems and data communications analysis. The Paycheck Fairness Act would have required employers seeking to pay women less money than their male counterparts to justify the difference with legitimate business factors. It would also have allowed women to compare their wages to those of their colleagues in the same county, not just their own office, providing a larger and fairer pool of comparative examples. And the bill would have allowed women to receive punitive and compensatory damages equal to those in cases of race-based discrimination. We owe it to the hard-working women of the United States, especially in these difficult economic times, when every penny of every paycheck counts, to continue to fight for equality. I commend the bill's original sponsor, Secretary Clinton, as well as Senator Dodd and Senator Mikulski, who have worked so hard to bring attention to the issue of gender discrimination in the workplace. I will continue to fight alongside my colleagues for the passage of the Paycheck Fairness Act.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that it adjourn under the previous order.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I now ask for a second reading en bloc, and I object to my own request en bloc.