Jim Webb

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I wish to say I am very disappointed in some of the provisions in this report. I must say that candidly. At the same time, I believe, very strongly, the reservations I have pale in comparison with my disappointment in the failure of leadership that has brought us into Iraq in the first place--a leadership that refuses to find a suitable turning point which will bring us out. This administration must be confronted. It must understand the American people have grown tired of this disastrous, one-dimensional approach to a crisis that demands innovative answers. It is for that reason I support this measure.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I commend to my colleagues a Senate resolution that I have cosponsored with my esteemed colleague, the senior senator from Virginia. As my home State celebrates its 400th anniversary, this resolution recognizes one of Virginia's most esteemed citizens, as he is preparing to celebrate an important milestone of his own. Oliver White Hill, a pioneer in the field of American Civil Rights law, will soon celebrate his 100th birthday at a gathering of hundreds of his friends, family and other admirers in Richmond, VA. I am honored to be counted among the list of guests, and it is with immense pride and an even greater sense of humility that I filed this resolution honoring the life and work of Mr. Hill. Oliver Hill was born on May 1, 1907 in Richmond, and his family later moved to Roanoke, VA, and then Washington, DC, where he graduated from Dunbar High School. After leaving Dunbar, Mr. Hill enrolled at Howard University, earning both an undergraduate and law degree from that fine institution. As a testament to his brilliance, he graduated second in his class, a group whose valedictorian was none other than legal giant and future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. Although much of America was racially segregated, Mr. Hill nonetheless became a member of the Virginia Bar in 1934, and began his law practice in Roanoke. He later moved to Richmond and began a remarkable tenure leading the Virginia legal team of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from 1940 to 1961. Often forgoing lucrative legal work in pursuit of equal rights under the law for African Americans, Mr. Hill worked as one the principal attorneys on the historic Brown vs. Board of Education case in 1954. His dedication to this nation was further demonstrated when, in the midst of World War II, Mr. Hill interrupted his private law practice to serve in the Armed Forces from 1943 to 1945. Mr. Hill was appointed by President Harry S. Truman to a committee to study racism in the United States. In 1948, Mr. Hill made history as the first African-American elected to Richmond's City Council since the days of Reconstruction. His public service career also included stints at the Federal Housing Administration and at the Department of Housing and Urban Development during that agency's early days. Over the years, Mr. Hill acted as legal counsel in numerous landmark civil rights cases. His work encompasses equal opportunity in education, employment, housing, transportation, and the justice system. Mr. Hill's age has not deterred him from continuing to actively engage in civic activities throughout the United States and the world. He has been received countless awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President William Jefferson Clinton in 1999, the prestigious Spingarn Medal from the NAACP in 2005, the dedication of a building in his honor on the grounds of the Virginia State Capitol in 2005 and professional accolades too numerous to count. Oliver Hill is living history, and an American of the finest order. Generations of attorneys, activists and public servants, including myself, have been inspired and mentored by Oliver Hill. In recognition of his outstanding service to our country advancing the cause of freedom for all Americans, I am proud to have submitted this resolution in his honor on the occasion of his 100th birthday.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, today I wish to discuss an issue that has held a special place in my life for many years, the preservation of our Nation's civil war battlefields. Our historic battlefields--outdoor classrooms where visitors may walk in the very footsteps of heroes from past generations--are under threat. More than 200,000 acres of historically significant battlefield land remain unprotected and are threatened by development pressures. That is why I urge my colleagues to fully fund the Civil War Battlefield Protection Program. This arm of the National Park Service is an invaluable tool to preserve our Nation's history. In 1990, Congress established the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission, a blue-ribbon panel empowered to investigate the status of America's remaining Civil War battlefields. Congress also tasked the Commission with the mission of prioritizing these battlefields according to their historic importance and the threats to their survival. The Commission ultimately looked at the 10,000-plus battles and skirmishes of the Civil War and determined that 384 priority sites should be preserved. The results of the report were released in 1993 and they were not encouraging. The 1993 Commission report recommended that Congress create a $10 million-a-year emergency program to save threatened Civil War battlefield land. The result was the Civil War Battlefield Preservation Program. To date, the Preservation Program, working with its partners, has saved 14,100 acres of land in 15 States. The key to the success of the Preservation Program is that it achieves battlefield preservation through collaborative partnerships between State and local governments, the private sector and nonprofit organizations, such as the Civil War Preservation Trust. Matching grants provided by the program protect lands outside of the National Park Service boundaries and do not add to the Park Service's maintenance costs. But for the Preservation Program and their partners with the Civil War Preservation Trust, we would have lost key sites from such national shrines at Antietam. Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg, Manassas, Harpers Ferry, Bentonville, Mansfield, and Champion Hill. Their names still haunt us to this day. Had the Civil War Battlefield Preservation Program not intervened, the sites would have been lost forever to commercial and residential development. Now they have been protected for future generations to enjoy and learn about our Nation's history. They are islands of greenspace in a seemingly endless sea of commercial sprawl. The need to protect our Nation's battlefields is far too great for any one well-intentioned Federal program. That is why the partnership with the Civil War Preservation Trust is so critical. This visionary preservation group is able to work with other foundations, State and local governments and their membership to match Federal funds by 100 percent. How often can we tout such an achievement with other Federal programs? The trust receives no financial gain from the Preservation Program and, working with their non-Federal partners, has raised more than $30 million to secure key battlefield sites in 15 States. They are in this fight for all the right reasons. This partnership truly serves as a model in bringing all stakeholders to the table to tackle pressing national issues. For me, these hallowed grounds, these living memorials to the 620,000 Americans who sacrificed their lives to fight in the Civil War, have special, personal significance. Ancestors of mine fought on both sides during the war, including William Jewell, who was wounded in the Battle of Cedar Mountain in Culpeper County, VA, wounded again at Antietam and was finally killed in action at Chancellorsville on May 3, 1863. It is not every day you can visit these battlefield sites and have an immediate, direct connection with your ancestors. We must preserve these sites so that future generations might see and touch the very places where so many sacrifices were made, by soldiers and civilians alike, to settle the unresolved issues from the American Revolution of slavery and sovereignty. We are a stronger, more diverse and genuinely free nation because of these sacrifices. I would remind my colleagues that the Preservation Program has enjoyed bipartisan, bicameral support since its creation. In 2002, program funding was authorized through the Civil War Battlefield Preservation Act at the level recommended by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission--$10 million a year. The clock is ticking against these threatened historical sites given the pace of commercial development. Just last month, the Civil War Preservation Trust released its list of the 10 most threatened battlefield sites. Among them: Gettysburg; Fort Morgan, Alabama; Marietta, Georgia and three sites in the Commonwealth of Virginia. In 5 years there may be little left to protect. That is why I am here today to urge my colleagues to join me in requesting the full, authorized amount for the Preservation Program. These Federal funds will leverage millions more in private and other charitable donations; thereby increasing the trust's ability to preserve more threatened battlefield sites. When the ``Soldiers' National Cemetery'' was dedicated at the Gettysburg battlefield in November 1863, President Lincoln spoke eloquently of the imperative to honor those who had given their ``last full measure of devotion'' 4 months earlier. The Civil War Battlefield Preservation Program allows us to carry on Lincoln's vision. I urge my colleagues to join me in seeking full funding for the program this fiscal year.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I would like to thank the senior Senator from Virginia for having taken the initiative to bring this matter briefly to the floor today as we consider other issues. As we have learned more facts about this incident during the time that I was presiding over the Senate, I am sure that over the next day or so we are going to learn a lot more that will help us understand, perhaps, how this incredibly tragic incident occurred. We will have time to reach out to the grieving families and hopefully begin to heal ourselves and to again regain the confidence and the respect of the people who go to that institution. But I thank the senior Senator for bringing this matter to the floor. I want to associate myself fully with his comments. There is very little I can add in terms of describing the depth of our feelings and our regret over the fact that this incident has occurred. It is an incredible human tragedy. As I said, there will be, I am sure, many stories over the coming days about how it occurred and the implications of it. But it is very fitting for us to pause for a few moments as we consider all of these other issues that are on the table, some of them which obviously divide us by party, but certainly on an issue such as this we are all together in extending our compassion and our regrets to the families of those who are involved. This is a great institution. The lives that were lost today were of those people who had in their early days demonstrated an enormous amount of promise, and we again express our regrets to the families and our determination that we will help the people of the community around Virginia Tech regain the sense of purpose and vitality once we reach more understanding of what happened. Again, I thank the senior Senator and I thank you, Mr. President, for allowing us to stop for a few moments in business today to mention this incident. I yield the floor.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I again express my gratitude to the senior Senator from Virginia for taking the initiative on this resolution and working with us to make sure this is language which is acceptable to all the Members of this body. I also express my appreciation to many people in this body--Members-- and also staff members and others who have come forward today and expressed their condolences about what happened in this incident. Again, all of us are truly saddened by what has happened today in this tragic event. This is a very small gesture of condolence and support from our body, but I think it is a very appropriate one, and I am pleased to be one of the cosponsors of it. Hopefully, once the grieving is done, we can, indeed, move forward to finding ways that will prevent these sorts of incidents from happening in the future. I yield the floor.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I am aware of at least one other Senator who wants to speak, Senator Nelson of Florida. I don't know procedurally how we would go about that. I assume we could get a call from the cloakroom and see if he could come down. If we could reserve 10 minutes for the Senator from Florida at the time he arrives.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I would like to first express my profound appreciation for the majority leader's words today. Senator Reid likes to say he is not a speaker of eloquence, but I have rarely heard such eloquence of words on this particular issue. They were from the heart, they touched me deeply, and also they were humbling. But most importantly, having the majority leader stand here and bring words to the floor today, as my colleague, Senator Hagel, and I are attempting to do, in an attempt to inject a reality, a responsible reality to this debate that in many cases has been lacking, is greatly gratifying to me. I also would like to thank and congratulate my good friend and colleague, the Senator from Nebraska. I greatly respect his service to our country. I greatly admire his courage and his willingness to speak out on this issue over the past several years. I would point out that he and I began our Government service many years ago as people who had come back from a different war and decided we would devote a good portion of our lives to trying to take care of those who had served. The motivation behind the amendment he and I have worked so assiduously on over the last couple weeks is that same motivation that began nearly 30 years ago. I have seen a lot of comments over the past 3 months, some of it accusatory with respect to people who are trying to bring a different focus to our situation in the Middle East, saying that the people who are doing this were somehow hurting the troops. The question becomes, how do you support the troops? What does it mean to support the troops? Who is really speaking for the troops? We have a good many Members of this body--and I respect them all--who have come back from multiple trips to Iraq. They have sat down with the military leaders who are charged with the responsibility of carrying out our policies. They have heard in many cases optimistic predictions. In too many cases, they have come back and basically said: If you want to do something different, you are affecting the options of the Commander in Chief, and you are being disloyal to the troops. Who is really listening to the troops? On the one hand, the people who have been serving in this war are justifiably proud of their military service. On the other, they are carrying out the policies of our political process. If we look at polls--our best way of trying to figure out how the average military person feels about this war--we will see they share the same concerns in the aggregate as everyone else in the country. A little more than a year ago, when I announced for the Senate, there was a poll of our Active-Duty people actually serving in Iraq. Seventy-two percent of those people believed the United States should withdraw from Iraq by the end of last year. This included 70 percent of the Regular Army and 58 percent of the regular Marine Corps. Our motivation today is to try to put a formula together that will respect the policies of the United States and truly show the best way to take care of the troops. I note with some irony that the bill before us is called an emergency supplemental appropriation. Beginning the fifth year in this war, we are now calling it an emergency that we need to bring more money to the table. Why? There are a lot of different possibilities, but let's start with this: This has been a war which has been fought without a strategy. You do not have a strategy unless you can clearly articulate the end point of your military operations. I have been saying this for more than 4 years. But what we have had instead of a strategy is the plan of the week. We have had a lot of flailing around from the political leadership that has spilled over into the military leadership--let's try this; let's try that; let's extend our troops; let's deploy our troops early; let's send them back before they have had a chance to rest, recuperate, and refurbish. We are seeing now, as my good friend from Nebraska mentioned, the military cost of that kind of policy. We are also seeing a human cost. Who pays for this lack of clarity? The troops pay. They are sacrificing. They are proud to serve their country, and they can't plan their lives. They have kids being born, weddings to go to, people to visit, holidays to enjoy--all a part of the plan when they were deployed. This amendment goes to that point, the proper utilization of our military. The first thing that it does is it establishes clearly, as Senator Hagel and I and others have been saying for a long time, that the primary U.S. policy objective in Iraq should be a political solution that can be obtained through increased, concerted regional and international diplomacy. We have seen the seeds of that over the past couple of months. We are stating that this should be recognized as our primary goal. The second point is that we are putting in, as the Senator from Nebraska mentioned, legally binding restrictions calling for the certification of any unit in the U.S. military that is going to be deployed, that it be fully mission capable. We have a reality check in this provision. We understand that in terms of heavy equipment, many units deployed fall onto equipment inside the theater of operations. We are not requiring that they have that equipment with them when they first deploy. We also have Presidential waivers in terms of possible national emergencies that might occur. Other than that, we should have unit-ready deployments. The third portion of this amendment goes to extending deployments. We are basically saying Army units that deploy for a year should come back in 365 days. Marine units that are deployed for 7 months should come back at the end of 210 consecutive days with certain, again, realistic exclusions. The fourth provision goes to the minimum period between deployments. You are not going to deploy military units until they have been home at least the amount of time they previously were deployed. This goes for individuals as well as units. It is quite possible in today's military for an individual to come back from deployment and, after a very short period of time, be backfilled into another unit that is going. Technically, the unit may have been back here for a year or 7 months, but the individual has not. That has to stop. We are also saying in terms of the Guard and Reserve that they need a one for five. They need to be able to be home for five times the length of time they have been deployed. On this one-to-one cycle for Active Forces, the military itself, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has said they would like to have a two-for-one cycle--for every year you have been gone, 12 years home. In my experience in the Pentagon, as Assistant Secretary of Defense and as Secretary of the Navy, we looked at a two-for-one ratio for our ships, for our troops, a period of time deployed, a period of time to come back, get reacquainted with your family, get some down time, and then an equal period of time to refurbish and get ready to go again. All we are asking for here is a one-for-one. If you look at what has happened in the conduct of this war, it has not been operational demands that have created the situation for our troops; it has been a lack of proper leadership. There is nothing in Iraq that would require this sort of chaotic planning. There is no emergency right now that can justify the unpredictability we have built into these deployments. At the right time, when the Senator from Nebraska is able to negotiate this with the leadership--and I will pursue this as well--we want a vote. We are working to get a vote. I urge all of my colleagues to support the amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Madam President, I have been on the Senate floor on a number of occasions to discuss the amendment which I am introducing today. I introduced it on March 5 as S. 759, which is a bill to prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran without the consent of the Congress. I am offering this legislation today as an amendment to the fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental appropriations bill, with the support of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee. This bill has received a good bit of discussion and also a good bit of correspondence from various citizens groups that have gone to Members' offices. I will not take a great deal of time in terms of going through a lot of the debate about it. I would like to say at the outset that I have taken great care in the preparation of this amendment to ensure that it will not in any way prevent our military forces from carrying out their tactical responsibilities in places such as Iraq and in other areas that are on the coastlines and border lines of Iran. But I would like to emphasis that, in my view, this amendment is essential to revitalizing the constitutional health of our governmental process. The purpose of this legislation is to restore a proper balance between the executive and legislative branches when it comes to the commencement of war. Any general attack on Iran would be, beyond cavil, a commencement of a new war in a region that is already enduring two costly and debilitating wars. If this action is to be taken, it should be done only with the full and considered consent of the Congress. At the same time, the legislation allows American forces to directly respond to attacks or possible attacks which might be initiated from Iran, as well as those which might be begun elsewhere and then carry over into Iranian territory. Specifically, the amendment requires that the President seek congressional authorization prior to commencing any broad military action in Iran, and it allows the following exceptions: first, military operations or activities that would directly repel an attack launched from within the territory of Iran; second, those activities that would directly thwart an imminent attack that would be launched from Iran; third, military operations or activities that would be in hot pursuit of forces engaged outside the territory of Iran who thereafter would enter Iran; and finally, those intelligence-collection activities that have been properly noticed to the appropriate committees of Congress. The major function of the amendment again is to restore the constitutional balance. No administration should have the power to commence unproved military activities against Iran or any other nation without the approval of the Congress, but the issue of the day is Iran. I am offering this amendment partly due to my concern over President Bush's signing statement which accompanied the 2002 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. That amendment, if you read it carefully, indicates that this administration believes it possesses the broadest imaginable authority to commence military action without the consent of the Congress. It should not be left unanswered by this body. This amendment will not take any military operations off the table, any options off the table. It will not tie the hands of this administration if our military forces are actually attacked from Iranian soil or territorial waters or by forces that retreat into Iranian territory. This is responsible legislation. I urge my colleagues to support it. I yield the floor.

Mr. WEBB. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to call up my amendment No. 692.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that will prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran without congressional authorization. The purpose of this legislation is to restore a proper balance between the executive and legislative branches when it comes to the commencement of military activities. I have taken great care in the preparation of this bill to ensure it will not in any way prevent our military forces from carrying out their tactical responsibilities in places such as Iraq and in the international waters off of Iran's coast. I want to put up a chart. These are the exceptions that are clearly outlined in this bill: The legislation allows American forces to directly respond to attacks or possible attacks that might be initiated from Iran as well as those that might be begun elsewhere and then carry over into Iranian territory; the so-called hot pursuit exception. I have also excluded operations relating to intelligence gathering. The major function of this legislation is to prevent this administration from commencing unprovoked military activities against Iran without the approval of the Congress. The legislation accomplishes this goal through the proper constitutional process of prohibiting all funding for such an endeavor. Unlike the current situation in Iraq, where cutting off funds might impede or interrupt ongoing operations, this legislation denies funding that would be necessary to begin such operations against Iran in the first place. In the past 2 weeks, we have seen a fresh willingness on the part of this administration to pursue new approaches for a regional settlement that will eventually allow the United States to withdraw our forces from Iraq and also increase stability in the Middle East. I commend Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates for their efforts in bringing about what seems to be the beginning of a clear and much needed course correction. It is particularly significant that Iran and Syria have been invited to participate and that the United States will join in the upcoming regional meetings regarding Iraq. These upcoming meetings will offer many different countries the opportunity to address legitimate concerns and to emphasize mutual interests. I am hopeful it will open the door for a different kind of dialogue with Iran. Despite its newfound level of influence in Iraq, it is not in Iran's best interest to see Iraq disintegrate into anarchy. Iran also has challenges with its own sectarian groups, not the least of which are the Kurds. Al-Qaida represents a threat to Iran as well, and it is not in Iran's interest to see this terrorist movement gain even more power. Free and open access to the Strait of Hormuz also is vital to Iran's economy given its overwhelming reliance on oil exports. As this regional conference approaches, the rhetoric with respect to possible Iranian activities inside Iraq continues, and the increases to our naval and missile defense presence in the gulf remain. The administration's past failure to engage with Iran diplomatically in a meaningful way, coupled with what Iran could perceive as preparations for a military strike, creates a potent brew that easily could lead to miscalculation on both sides. The 1988 incident with the USS Vincennes comes to mind, when an overly aggressive commanding officer, operating inside Iranian territorial waters, according to a subsequent admission by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Crowe, shot down commercial passenger aircraft Iran Air Flight 655. These circumstances--the stated desire of many connected to this administration to invade Iran, the saber-rattling rhetoric, the strategic miscalculations in Iraq--call for this Congress to formalize an historic mandate that in recent years seems to have been lost to the public's understanding. Quite simply, it is the constitutional obligation of the administration to obtain congressional approval in order to commence military action against another country, except under very limited circumstances. This is the very process our Founding Fathers envisioned. In fact, the records from the Constitutional Convention in August 1787 make this abundantly clear. There was much debate during this convention regarding how much authority should be in the hands of the President with respect to actually initiating military action. The Convention's participants carefully decided the President should not be given the power to decide with whom this Nation should go to war or to undertake aggressive actions without the consent of Congress. The President's powers to initiate military action were to be for the purpose of repelling sudden attacks--and this is the language I have used in this legislation. As Constitutional Convention delegate James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: This system will not hurry us into war, it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress. To state the obvious, Iran is not Iraq. The President has no authority to begin unilateral military operations against Iran. In this regard, I strongly urge my colleagues to consider that the issue before us is not simply policies with respect to Iran but the proper procedures with respect to how we as a government lead the United States. This is far less a matter of possible differences between Republicans and Democrats than it is our mutual concern for protecting the rightful place of the legislative branch in determining the interests of the country and the possible consequences of further military action. In this regard, I point out that the principal sponsor of similar legislation in the other body is Congressman Walter Jones, a Republican, from North Carolina. On the one hand, the administration assures us it has no intention of launching military operations against Iran. On the other, the administration tells us all options remain on the table, at a time when our military buildup in the region continues to grow rapidly. While we see encouraging diplomatic initiatives with respect to Iraq, it is important that we clarify formally the perimeter of our immediate military interests in the Middle East. It is time we move forward to end our military involvement in Iraq, and the path to doing so is not to widen the war into Iran. Proper robust diplomacy will enable us to bring greater stability to the region, to remove the American military from Iraq, to increase our ability to defeat the forces of international terrorism, and, finally, to focus on the true strategic challenges that face us around the world. I hope my colleagues will take note of the news articles today in the media around the world that show China again has increased its defense budget by double digits last year to the tune of 18 percent. These are strategic challenges the United States is ignoring at its peril as it remains paralyzed in the Middle East. I believe the American people will welcome this legislation. This administration has used force recklessly, choosing the military option again and again, while never matching the quality of our military's performance with robust, creative diplomacy. Furthermore, the President's signing statement accompanying the 2002 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq indicates that this administration believes it possesses the broadest imaginable authority to commence military action without the consent of the Congress. In signing that 2002 Iraq resolution, the President denied that the Congress has the power to affect his decisions when it comes to the use of our military. He shrugged off this resolution, stating that on the question of a threat posed by Iraq, his views and those of the Congress merely happen to be the same. He characterized the resolution as simply a gesture of additional support rather than as having any legitimate authority. He stated, and I think it is worth noting: My signing this resolution does not constitute any change in the President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to the United States interests. This is a sweeping assertion of powers that leaves out virtually nothing. It is a far different matter than repelling an immediate attack or conducting a war that has been authorized by the Congress. Let us match up a couple of those words. The President is saying, for instance, he possesses the authority to use force to deter threats to U.S. interests. How does one use force to deter a threat rather than responding to it? What kind of U.S. interest is worthy of the use of force? Most importantly, how do these vague terms fit into the historically accepted notions of a Commander in Chief's power to repel attacks or to conduct military operations once they have been approved by the Congress? During our recent hearings in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I asked both the Secretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of State during his confirmation hearings, for a clarification of this paragraph. My question was whether this administration believes it has the authority to conduct unilateral military operations against Iran in the absence of a direct attack or a compelling immediate threat, without the consent of the Congress. Both wrote me lengthy letters in reply but neither could give me a clear response. The situation we now face is that the administration repeatedly states it seeks no war with Iran at the same time it claims the authority to begin one, and at the same time it continues a military buildup in the region. The legislation I introduce today is intended to clarify this ambiguity. In so doing, the Congress will be properly restating its constitutional relationship with the executive branch, the Congress will be reinstituting its historical role as it relates to the conduct of foreign policy, and the Congress will be reassuring the American people that there will be no more shooting from the hip when it comes to the gravely serious question of when we send our military people into harm's way. I emphasize that this bill will not take any military operations off the table nor will it tie the hands of the administration if our military forces are actually attacked from Iranian soil or its territorial waters or by forces that retreat into Iranian territory. Nor does this legislation let Iran off the hook in terms of our insistence that Iran become a more responsible nation, including our positions regarding Iran's nuclear program and Iran's recognition of Israel's right to exist. I was one of the early voices warning that in terms of national security Iran was a far greater threat than Iraq. This was one of the reasons I opposed the invasion of Iraq in the first place. All of the options regarding Iran remain on the table. The question is in what context these options should be debated, alongside other options designed to eventually open Iran and bring it responsibly into the world community. In my view, and in terms of the constitutional process, absent a direct attack or a clearly imminent threat, the place for that debate is here in the open forum of the Congress and not in some closed-door meeting at the White House. It is my hope we can take up this necessary legislation either in the format in which I have introduced it today or as an amendment to the 2007 supplemental appropriations bill, which we will consider in the next few weeks. I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and I would welcome their support.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that will prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran without congressional authorization. The purpose of this legislation is to restore a proper balance between the executive and legislative branches when it comes to the commencement of military activities. I have taken great care in the preparation of this bill to ensure it will not in any way prevent our military forces from carrying out their tactical responsibilities in places such as Iraq and in the international waters off of Iran's coast. I want to put up a chart. These are the exceptions that are clearly outlined in this bill: The legislation allows American forces to directly respond to attacks or possible attacks that might be initiated from Iran as well as those that might be begun elsewhere and then carry over into Iranian territory; the so-called hot pursuit exception. I have also excluded operations relating to intelligence gathering. The major function of this legislation is to prevent this administration from commencing unprovoked military activities against Iran without the approval of the Congress. The legislation accomplishes this goal through the proper constitutional process of prohibiting all funding for such an endeavor. Unlike the current situation in Iraq, where cutting off funds might impede or interrupt ongoing operations, this legislation denies funding that would be necessary to begin such operations against Iran in the first place. In the past 2 weeks, we have seen a fresh willingness on the part of this administration to pursue new approaches for a regional settlement that will eventually allow the United States to withdraw our forces from Iraq and also increase stability in the Middle East. I commend Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates for their efforts in bringing about what seems to be the beginning of a clear and much needed course correction. It is particularly significant that Iran and Syria have been invited to participate and that the United States will join in the upcoming regional meetings regarding Iraq. These upcoming meetings will offer many different countries the opportunity to address legitimate concerns and to emphasize mutual interests. I am hopeful it will open the door for a different kind of dialogue with Iran. Despite its newfound level of influence in Iraq, it is not in Iran's best interest to see Iraq disintegrate into anarchy. Iran also has challenges with its own sectarian groups, not the least of which are the Kurds. Al-Qaida represents a threat to Iran as well, and it is not in Iran's interest to see this terrorist movement gain even more power. Free and open access to the Strait of Hormuz also is vital to Iran's economy given its overwhelming reliance on oil exports. As this regional conference approaches, the rhetoric with respect to possible Iranian activities inside Iraq continues, and the increases to our naval and missile defense presence in the gulf remain. The administration's past failure to engage with Iran diplomatically in a meaningful way, coupled with what Iran could perceive as preparations for a military strike, creates a potent brew that easily could lead to miscalculation on both sides. The 1988 incident with the USS Vincennes comes to mind, when an overly aggressive commanding officer, operating inside Iranian territorial waters, according to a subsequent admission by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Crowe, shot down commercial passenger aircraft Iran Air Flight 655. These circumstances--the stated desire of many connected to this administration to invade Iran, the saber-rattling rhetoric, the strategic miscalculations in Iraq--call for this Congress to formalize an historic mandate that in recent years seems to have been lost to the public's understanding. Quite simply, it is the constitutional obligation of the administration to obtain congressional approval in order to commence military action against another country, except under very limited circumstances. This is the very process our Founding Fathers envisioned. In fact, the records from the Constitutional Convention in August 1787 make this abundantly clear. There was much debate during this convention regarding how much authority should be in the hands of the President with respect to actually initiating military action. The Convention's participants carefully decided the President should not be given the power to decide with whom this Nation should go to war or to undertake aggressive actions without the consent of Congress. The President's powers to initiate military action were to be for the purpose of repelling sudden attacks--and this is the language I have used in this legislation. As Constitutional Convention delegate James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: This system will not hurry us into war, it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress. To state the obvious, Iran is not Iraq. The President has no authority to begin unilateral military operations against Iran. In this regard, I strongly urge my colleagues to consider that the issue before us is not simply policies with respect to Iran but the proper procedures with respect to how we as a government lead the United States. This is far less a matter of possible differences between Republicans and Democrats than it is our mutual concern for protecting the rightful place of the legislative branch in determining the interests of the country and the possible consequences of further military action. In this regard, I point out that the principal sponsor of similar legislation in the other body is Congressman Walter Jones, a Republican, from North Carolina. On the one hand, the administration assures us it has no intention of launching military operations against Iran. On the other, the administration tells us all options remain on the table, at a time when our military buildup in the region continues to grow rapidly. While we see encouraging diplomatic initiatives with respect to Iraq, it is important that we clarify formally the perimeter of our immediate military interests in the Middle East. It is time we move forward to end our military involvement in Iraq, and the path to doing so is not to widen the war into Iran. Proper robust diplomacy will enable us to bring greater stability to the region, to remove the American military from Iraq, to increase our ability to defeat the forces of international terrorism, and, finally, to focus on the true strategic challenges that face us around the world. I hope my colleagues will take note of the news articles today in the media around the world that show China again has increased its defense budget by double digits last year to the tune of 18 percent. These are strategic challenges the United States is ignoring at its peril as it remains paralyzed in the Middle East. I believe the American people will welcome this legislation. This administration has used force recklessly, choosing the military option again and again, while never matching the quality of our military's performance with robust, creative diplomacy. Furthermore, the President's signing statement accompanying the 2002 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq indicates that this administration believes it possesses the broadest imaginable authority to commence military action without the consent of the Congress. In signing that 2002 Iraq resolution, the President denied that the Congress has the power to affect his decisions when it comes to the use of our military. He shrugged off this resolution, stating that on the question of a threat posed by Iraq, his views and those of the Congress merely happen to be the same. He characterized the resolution as simply a gesture of additional support rather than as having any legitimate authority. He stated, and I think it is worth noting: My signing this resolution does not constitute any change in the President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to the United States interests. This is a sweeping assertion of powers that leaves out virtually nothing. It is a far different matter than repelling an immediate attack or conducting a war that has been authorized by the Congress. Let us match up a couple of those words. The President is saying, for instance, he possesses the authority to use force to deter threats to U.S. interests. How does one use force to deter a threat rather than responding to it? What kind of U.S. interest is worthy of the use of force? Most importantly, how do these vague terms fit into the historically accepted notions of a Commander in Chief's power to repel attacks or to conduct military operations once they have been approved by the Congress? During our recent hearings in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I asked both the Secretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of State during his confirmation hearings, for a clarification of this paragraph. My question was whether this administration believes it has the authority to conduct unilateral military operations against Iran in the absence of a direct attack or a compelling immediate threat, without the consent of the Congress. Both wrote me lengthy letters in reply but neither could give me a clear response. The situation we now face is that the administration repeatedly states it seeks no war with Iran at the same time it claims the authority to begin one, and at the same time it continues a military buildup in the region. The legislation I introduce today is intended to clarify this ambiguity. In so doing, the Congress will be properly restating its constitutional relationship with the executive branch, the Congress will be reinstituting its historical role as it relates to the conduct of foreign policy, and the Congress will be reassuring the American people that there will be no more shooting from the hip when it comes to the gravely serious question of when we send our military people into harm's way. I emphasize that this bill will not take any military operations off the table nor will it tie the hands of the administration if our military forces are actually attacked from Iranian soil or its territorial waters or by forces that retreat into Iranian territory. Nor does this legislation let Iran off the hook in terms of our insistence that Iran become a more responsible nation, including our positions regarding Iran's nuclear program and Iran's recognition of Israel's right to exist. I was one of the early voices warning that in terms of national security Iran was a far greater threat than Iraq. This was one of the reasons I opposed the invasion of Iraq in the first place. All of the options regarding Iran remain on the table. The question is in what context these options should be debated, alongside other options designed to eventually open Iran and bring it responsibly into the world community. In my view, and in terms of the constitutional process, absent a direct attack or a clearly imminent threat, the place for that debate is here in the open forum of the Congress and not in some closed-door meeting at the White House. It is my hope we can take up this necessary legislation either in the format in which I have introduced it today or as an amendment to the 2007 supplemental appropriations bill, which we will consider in the next few weeks. I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and I would welcome their support.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. WEBB. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes in morning business.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 10 minutes.

Mr. WEBB. I believe very strongly that we should leave our military people out of these political debates. I am not using these figures to advance the Democratic Party's point. I believe it is inappropriate for the other party to use our military people in a way that might insulate them from criticism over the woeful failures of this administration's policy. The American people's confidence in this administration is at rock bottom. Many rightly believe they were misled on the reasons for going to war. The administration's credibility has suffered--rightly so--also with respect to its intentions for dealing with Iran. I do not believe one can speak of our responsibility on these immediate issues without stating clearly our concerns about the entire region, and especially the administration's position regarding its constitutional authority to use military force outside of Iraq. The administration's view of its Presidential authority to conduct unilateral military action against other countries, and particularly with Iran, was documented in President Bush's signing statement accompanying the original authorization for the use of force against Iraq in October 2002. I urge my colleagues to examine this language. In part, it states: My signing this resolution does not constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests. In other words, if one were to read that carefully, this administration is stating that it has the authority to use force to respond to threats to our interests. What is an ``interest''? I have raised this language with the Secretary of State, as well as with the Deputy Secretary. My question was whether this administration believes that it possesses the authority to conduct unilateral military activity against Iran in the absence of a direct threat and without the approval of the Congress. I have not received a clear answer from either of them on that point. That is troubling. This administration and its supporters must understand the realities that are causing us, as a Congress, to finally say enough is enough. After 5 years of misguided policy, ineffective leadership, and diminished U.S. stature around the world, the Congress must show the way to reclaiming the moral high ground and exert its proper oversight role more forcefully. For these reasons, I support the pending Iraq resolution before us, and I will vote for cloture. I urge my fellow Senators to do the same. I yield the floor.

Mr. WEBB. Another poll, of December 29, 2006, by the Military Times, the most credible military newspaper in America, indicates that barely one-third of our service members approve of the way the President is handling the war. In fact, only 41 percent of our military now believes the United States should have gone to war in Iraq in the first place. I ask unanimous consent that this poll be printed in the Record.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I would like to state my support of the vote we will take tomorrow. Last week, I expressed my support for the bipartisan Levin-Warner resolution which was denied a vote by the full Senate due to procedural motions. Ten days later, we find ourselves in a similar situation. Our colleagues in the House have spent the last 4 days debating the current course of action in Iraq, and they have completed a vote on final passage today. At the same time, the Senate has continued to engage in partisan bickering and political gamesmanship. The House found a way, it found a bill, and it took a vote. We have a bill, and we need to debate it. At bottom, this debate is not about whether one is a Republican or Democrat; it is about the legislative branch exerting its proper constitutional oversight by deliberating on the most vital and challenging issue of our day. I would urge my colleagues to think about the vote that took place in 2002 authorizing the use of force in Iraq and about what happened afterward. This was not a party-line vote. I was not a Member of this body, and I do personally believe it was an erroneous vote, at least in its outcome, but at the same time, most importantly, we should look at the lack of respect shown by the administration after the vote. This lack of respect was a clear signal that the true issues dividing us in this Government are more related to the relations between the executive and legislative branches than between our respective parties. The administration has failed the country again and again in the conduct of this war. At the same time, it repeatedly claims that it holds the power, regardless of the input of the Congress, to continue to push our military people to the limits of their endurance, while avoiding the diplomatic options crucial to resolving the situation in Iraq which inevitably evolved from our invasion and occupation. I have heard discussion today about the consequences of withdrawal. No one on this side is advocating a precipitous withdrawal, but the consequences that are being described--increased terrorism, the empowerment of Iran, the loss of prestige of the United States around the world, and economic distress in our country--are, quite frankly, the exact conditions many of us were warning about if we invaded in the first place. The question is not how we withdraw or should we withdraw. Some day, we are going to withdraw. Inevitably, we are going to withdraw. The question is the conditions we leave behind when we do so. I have long advocated that an integral part of our strategy in Iraq must include engagement with all of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria. As Iraq's neighbors, they are stakeholders in both the future of Iraq and the need for stability in the region. As we seek to decrease our presence in Iraq and increase our ability to fight terrorism and address strategic challenges elsewhere in the world, we must bring those two countries to the table. An overwhelming majority of those who recently testified before hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee agree with that assessment. I have heard today the name of General Petraeus invoked several times as evidence of this body's support for the administration's current policy. I voted for General Petraeus. A vote for General Petraeus is not a vote for this administration's policy or its strategy or its, quite frankly, lack of strategy. That vote was to support the qualifications of an individual to command troops in Iraq. That was a military vote, not a political vote. If the strategy were to change, as I hope it will, I have full confidence that General Petraeus is capable of overseeing that policy as well. We must see evidence of a new diplomatic effort from this administration before we, as a Congress, not as Democrats and Republicans, ratify the expanded use of our military. On that note, it should be emphasized that despite comments today about the fact that the Baker-Hamilton group supported a temporary military surge in its report, it did so only in consonance with a robust regional diplomatic surge which was supposed to begin more than 2 months ago. Many Republicans seem to be implying that we must support all of this administration's actions or, by inference, we don't support the troops. The issue is not whether we support the troops; it is whether we agree on the political issues to which they are being put. This effort demands clear direction from the top. It depends on the extent to which this Government is capable of forging a regional consensus regarding Iraq's future. This administration has refused to do so. It is not in the interest of our troops to continue sending them in harm's way without a clear strategy that will bring closure to this endeavor. I believe very strongly that our political representatives should be careful in claiming to speak politically for our troops. Our military is a mirror of our society, and so are its political views. We have heard a lot of anecdotal evidence today--TV clips, newspaper interviews with individuals. But anecdotal evidence notwithstanding, poll after poll shows that our troops are just as concerned about this policy as is the public at large. I have one poll from a year ago, a Zogby poll, that says that 72 percent of the people then stationed in Iraq believed the war should have ended by the end of 2006. This includes 7 out of 10 of our Regular Army soldiers and a vast majority--nearly 60 percent--of our marines. These are people who have done their job. They know what their military job is, but they have the same questions about the political policies as do the rest of Americans. I ask unanimous consent to print the Zogby poll in the Record.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, February 6, 2007, at 9:30 a.m., in open session to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2008 budget request and the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 war supplemental requests in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2008 and the future years defense program.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public Works be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, February 6, 2007. The agenda to be considered: Oversight of Recent EPA Decisions.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be authorized to meet during the session on Tuesday, February 6, 2007, at 2:45 p.m., in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building, to hear testimony on ``The President's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Proposal.''

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, February 6, 2007, at 10 a.m. to hold a hearing on Somalia.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on ``Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?'' for Tuesday, February 6, 2007 at 9:30 a.m. in Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226. Witness List: The Honorable Mark Pryor, United States Senator [D, AR]; The Honorable Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC; Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP, New York, NY; Laurie L. Levenson, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CA; Stuart M. Gerson, Partner, Epstein Becker & Green, Washington, DC.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on ``Judicial Nominations'' for Tuesday, February 6, 2007 at 2:30 p.m. in Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226. Witness List: John Preston Bailey to be U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia; Otis D. Wright II to be U.S. District Judge for the Central District of California; George H. Wu to be U.S. District Judge for the Central District of California.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on February 6, 2007 at 2:30 p.m. to hold a closed hearing.

Mr. WEBB

Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the Senator from Minnesota, for her kind remarks about the people who have served. I emphasize my support for the resolution--actually, the resolutions--that were so painstakingly put together by a number of senior Senators from both sides of the aisle, only to be denied a full debate and an open vote through the procedural motions yesterday evening. Winston Churchill once wrote about watching good ideas getting nibbled to death by ducks. Last night, we saw this phenomenon in action. We had before the Senate a measure that would allow this Congress to speak clearly of concerns regarding the woeful lack of leadership by the President on an issue that affects our Nation and our military people such as no other. And the other side--including some Senators who had helped to draft the resolutions and had their names on it--punted the ball down field rather than giving the people of this country the debate they not only need but are calling for in every opinion poll. Quite simply, there is no way, other than through a strong resolution or restrictive language in an appropriations bill, for this Senate to communicate to this administration that its so-called new strategy is lacking in the most crucial elements that might actually lead to a solution in Iraq. This is not a strategy. It is a one-dimensional tactical adjustment that avoids the elements of a true overarching national strategy. It relies too heavily on our military, while ignoring the overwhelming advice of those with long experience in this region that we must pursue robust diplomacy in order to bring this misguided effort to a conclusion. There have been allegations by those on the other side that we who take this position are not supporting the troops. I submit that the best way to support the troops would be for this administration to outline and pursue a comprehensive strategy that includes the diplomatic measures that will be essential to ending our involvement. Mr. President, a reminder: During the Vietnam war our military killed more than a million enemy soldiers--enemy soldiers--by official count of the present Hanoi Government. Actually, that count is 1.4 million enemy soldiers. But without a clear strategy and without adept diplomacy, that simply was not enough. From the very beginning in Iraq, this administration has consciously neglected its proper diplomatic duties. It has attempted to frame the debate over Iraq's future as one of military action on the one hand and a set of vague guidelines to the Iraqi Government on the other, as if the rest of the region were somehow not crucial to the eventual outcome. This, in and of itself, is a recipe for continued violence and for American failure in Iraq. It is widely known that the Iraqi Government lacks the power to control the myriad of factions that are causing chaos. The latest National Intelligence Estimate not only confirms this, it indicates that these factions have been broken into so many different components that it is not even fair to call this problem one of sectarian violence any longer. The administration knows this. Most of the administration's strongest supporters know this. Their reaction has been to increase the pressure on an impotent government and to go to the well, again and again, asking for even greater sacrifices from the military, while ignoring their most basic responsibility, which is to put together a clear diplomatic effort that will bring full context to the issues that face us and, in short order, end our involvement. This is not supporting the troops. This is misusing the troops. With respect to the troops, I would caution any political leader who claims to speak on behalf of the political views of our men and women in uniform. Our military people are largely a mirror of our society, particularly in the enlisted ranks, and their political views are as diverse as our own. As one example, last year, a survey of those in Iraq indicated that more than 70 percent believed that the United States should exit Iraq within a year. That was a year ago. As I have said before, it is inverted logic to claim we should continue to fight this war on behalf of the troops. The fact is, they are fighting this war on behalf of the political process. They deserve political leadership that is knowledgeable and that proceeds from an assumption that our national goals are equal to the sacrifices we are asking them to make. For the last 5 years, from before this invasion, this administration and its supporters have refused to admit the most fundamental truth of the entire war. It is a truth that was echoed over and over again last month by expert witnesses during more than a dozen hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Armed Services, both of which I am privileged to serve upon. It is a truth that this administration and the architects of this war too often refuse to recognize, perhaps because they fear it might potentially embarrass them in the eyes of history. The unavoidable truth is that this war will never be brought to a proper conclusion without the active participation of the other countries in the region--all of them. We hear stories of the Saudis helping the Sunni insurgency. We are told by this administration Iran is equipping and training portions of the Shia militias. We hear Turkey and Iran are quietly cooperating to limit the influence of Kurds. We hear Syria is the favorite starting point for many al-Qaida guerillas who infiltrate into Al Anbar Province. We know the entire region is being flooded with refugees from the violence in Iraq, including, especially, Jordan and Syria. None of this is surprising. Indeed, all of it was predictable and predicted, even before the invasion of Iraq. I recall many of the speeches by the Presiding Officer on those points. What is truly surprising and unsettling is that this administration has not developed an overt diplomatic effort to bring order out of this chaos in a way that might allow us to dramatically decrease our presence in Iraq and, at the same time, increase the stability of the region, increase our ability to fight terrorism, and allow us to address strategic challenges elsewhere in the world. These countries have historic, political, and cultural ties to Iraq. They are going to be involved in Iraq's affairs in the future, long after the United States departs the region. It is in our national interests and, as a great nation, it is our obligation to take the lead in causing each of these countries to deal responsibly with Iraq's chaos and with its future. We did exactly this in 2001, after the invasion of Afghanistan, bringing the major players to the table, including India, Pakistan, and Iran, and we should do so now. This approach would have additional benefits beyond Iraq. It would begin to loosen the unnatural alliance between Iran and Syria which could, in turn, increase the potential for greater stability in Lebanon, Israel, and the surrounding territories. It would begin to bring countries such as Iran to a proper role of responsibility inside the international community. On this point, I cite an important historical reference. In 1971, China, similar to Iran today, was considered a rogue Nation. China, in those days, was already a nuclear power. It had an American war on its borders in Vietnam, a war it was actively assisting. We, the United States, took the initiative, aggressively opening China through diplomatic energy and, over time, helped to bring China into the international community. We should not be afraid of taking similar actions with Iran and also, by the way, with Syria. The bottom line of all this is this administration and its supporters must understand the realities that are causing us as a Congress to finally say ``enough is enough;'' that the time has come for a new approach; that the answer in Iraq and to our fight against international terrorism and to our diminished posture around the world is for us to show not only our prowess on the battlefield but also our leadership in the diplomatic arena; that, indeed, we have an obligation to the men and women who have served so selflessly on our behalf, to match their proficiency and their loyalties with the kind of thoughtful leadership that will bring this effort to a proper conclusion. If there were other ways to convince this administration to change its ineffective one-dimensional approach to the situation in Iraq, I would welcome them, but after 5 years of political disarray, I do not believe it is so. I support this resolution as a first step in reclaiming America's strategic purpose and international reputation. I urge my fellow Senators to do the same. I yield the floor.