Mark Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first of all, I want to agree with my friend, the chairman of the Commerce Committee, on issues she already outlined, whether it be the need for aid for Ukraine, support for Israel, humanitarian aid for Gaza, or the necessary funding that has taken place for the Indo-Pacific, and, obviously, legislation that we all supported on fending off fentanyl. But I want to particularly commend her for comments she has made on these technology issues. Over the last 7 years, as vice chair and now chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I spent an awful lot of time looking at what I think is one of the most significant intelligence failures of the last half century, and that was the failure we had to anticipate and disrupt Russian efforts to meddle in our elections. Since that time, though, we have seen a wide spectrum of foreign adversaries who tried to copy the Russian playbook. But don't just take it from me. A succession of now-declassified intelligence assessments has described the ways in which foreign adversaries like Iran, like the People's Republic of China, and others are seeking to stoke social, racial, and political tensions in the United States. They are seeking to undermine confidence in our institutions and our elections systems and even to sow violence amongst Americans. The extent to which our adversaries have exploited American social media platforms is a matter of public record. The committee I chair has held many hearings--open hearings--on the failure of U.S. social media platforms to identify the exploitation of their products by foreign intelligence services. As a Senator, along with the Senator from Washington, I have been among the leading critics of these platforms for their repeated failures to protect consumers. While the exploitation of U.S. communication platforms by adversaries continues to be a serious issue, at the end of the day, our platforms are at least independent businesses. They do not have a vested interest in undermining our basic democratic system. The truth is, though, I can't say the same for TikTok, the fastest growing social media platform in the United States, whose parent company ByteDance is based in the PRC. Even as U.S. social media platforms have fumbled in their response to foreign influence operations, there was never any concern that these platforms would operate at the direction of a foreign adversary. Again, I cannot say the same for TikTok. I yield back to Senator Cantwell.

Mr. WARNER. I would like to expound a little bit on what Senator Cantwell just said. It has been made absolutely clear that a number of Chinese laws require Chinese companies and their subsidiaries to assist PRC security agencies and abide by the secret and unchallengeable government directives. The truth is, these Chinese companies, at the end of the day, don't owe their obligation to their customers or their shareholders, but they owe it to the PRC Government. In the context of social media platforms used by nearly half of Americans, it is not hard to imagine how a platform that facilitates so much commerce, political discourse, and social debate could be covertly manipulated to serve the goals of an authoritarian regime, one with a long track record of censorship, transnational oppression, and promotion of disinformation. In recent weeks, we have seen direct lobbying by the Chinese Government, indicating, perhaps, more than anything we will say on the floor here, how dearly Xi Jinping is invested in this product--a product, by the way, that is not even allowed to operate in the Chinese domestic market, itself. Story after story, over the last 18 months, have exposed the extent to which TikTok had grossly misrepresented its data security and corporate governance practice, as well as its relationship with its parent company. Countless stories have refuted the claims made by TikTok executives and lobbyists that it operates independently from its controlling company ByteDance. We have also seen documented examples of this company surveilling journalists. We have seen corresponding guidance from leading news organizations, not just here in America but across the world, advising their investigative journalists not to use TikTok. These public reports, based on revelations of current and former employees, also reveal that TikTok has allowed employees to covertly amplify content. Unfortunately, those who suggest that the United States can address the data security and foreign influence risk of TikTok through traditional mitigation have not been following TikTok's long track record of deceit and lack of transparency. I yield back to Senator Cantwell.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to commend the Senator from Washington for her leadership going through the disparate effects of TikTok versus other social media platforms. And let's acknowledge, TikTok, I think, realized they had a problem over a year ago. So they tried to develop a response--it was something called Project Texas--to allegedly address concerns related to TikTok's handling of America's data. However, Project Texas would still allow TikTok's algorithm, source code, and development activities to remain in China. They would remain so under ByteDance control and subject to Chinese Government exploitation. Project Texas allows TikTok to continue to rely on engineers and back-end support from China to update its algorithm and source code needed to run TikTok in the United States. How can they say there is not the possibility of interference? This reliance on resources based in China, again, makes it vulnerable to Chinese Government exploitation. That is why Project Texas does not resolve the United States' national security concern about ByteDance's ownership of TikTok. Now, let me acknowledge--and I think Senator Cantwell and I worked on a more, frankly, comprehensive approach that, in a perfect world, we might have been debating today, but we work in the world of getting things right. So I stand firmly in support, as Senator Cantwell has, of taking action now to prevent the kind of intelligence failure we first saw back in 2016. And, again, the chair of the Commerce Committee has indicated this is not some draconian or novel approach. For decades, we have had systems in place to examine foreign ownership of U.S. industry. We have seen even more scrutiny in instances where foreign buyers have sought to control U.S. telecom and broadcast media platforms. Frankly, this country should have adopted a similar regulatory approach for social media--again, something that Senator Cantwell and I worked on--which has considerably more scale and barriers to entry than broadcast media had a decade ago. But this bill is an important step in fixing that glaring gap. It goes a long way toward safeguarding our democratic systems from covert foreign influence, both in its application to TikTok and forward- looking treatment of other foreign adversary control over future online platforms. Before I yield back, I want to make clear to all Americans: This is not an effort to take your voice away. For several months now, we have heard from constituents how much they value TikTok as a creative platform. And yesterday was the 4-year anniversary of my once-viral tuna melt video on another social media platform. I can kind of understand why TikTok has become such a cultural touchstone. To those Americans, I would emphasize: This is not a ban of a service you appreciate. Many Americans, particularly young Americans, are rightfully skeptical. At the end of the day, they have not seen what Congress has seen. They have not been in the classified briefings that Congress has held, which have delved more deeply into some of the threat posed by foreign-controlled TikTok. But what they have seen, beyond even this bill, is Congress's failure to enact meaningful consumer protections on Big Tech and may cynically view this as a diversion or, worse, a concession to U.S. social media platforms. To those young Americans, I want to say: We hear your concern, and we hope that TikTok will continue under new ownership, American or otherwise. It could be bought by a group from Britain, Canada, Brazil, France. It just needs to be no longer controlled by an adversary that is defined as an adversary in U.S. law. And with that, I urge that we take action on this item, and, again, appreciate the great leadership of the chairman of the Commerce Committee on working with our friends in the House to bring this important legislation to the floor of the Senate. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to first of all thank my dear friend and colleague from Virginia for his impassioned remarks. And I know that the Presiding Officer can't enter into these discussions, but as the gentleman who represents the neighboring State of Maryland, I think I can say, without fear of being contradicted, that the Virginia and Maryland delegations in the U.S. Senate are completely united in total agreement on this issue. As Senator Kaine just pointed out, I think it is amazing that there has not been more news coverage of it yet. I hope that the paper of record, the Washington Post, actually covers some of these items, but two planes came within 300 feet of colliding at DCA on the runway. Now, I am thankful there was no loss of life, but it is just plain unacceptable that this even happened. And, again, Senator Kaine said you don't have to take his word. You don't have to take my word. You can go online and listen to the audio from the control tower to understand just how frighteningly close we came to disaster. That we came so close to catastrophe yesterday makes it absolutely clear: It is just plain crazy that some are pushing to add even more flights to DCA's already overburdened runway. Let me go through some of the stats. DCA averages 819 daily takeoffs and landings from its main runway. That is more than any other runway in the Nation. That is more than any runway at LAX, Chicago O'Hare, Atlanta Hartsfield, at Newark--you name it. The most overburdened runway in America is DCA. Yesterday's near crash is a stark example of the burden this airport already faces. Again, how did we get here? Well, the airport was designed to accommodate 15 million passengers. Last year, 2023, in part thanks to, as my colleague said, over the years, chipping away on the perimeter rule--every 5 years when FAA comes up, people try to chip away. So last year, in part thanks to this chipping away, it broke an alltime record, DCA--25.5 million passengers. That is 10.5 million additional passengers beyond what DCA was designed for. What does that result in? Well, you have the near catastrophe last night, yesterday, but in 2022, DCA--Reagan Airport--had the third worst cancellation rate amongst the Nation's busiest airports. As of today, the current status, 20 to 22 percent of flights into and out of Reagan experience delays averaging 67 minutes. There are some who have argued that while Reagan is at capacity during peak hours, between 6 a.m. and midnight, additional flights could be added during nonpeak hours, after midnight and before 6 a.m. First of all, I said to my colleague, I have not heard any airline coming in and begging for a 2 o'clock or 3 o'clock or 4 o'clock in the morning flight, and, frankly, I would be very skeptical there would be much consumer demand. Unlike my colleague, who is a morning person, I am known to be a little bit more of a night owl, but you are not going to find me climbing on an airplane at 3 a.m. in the morning. Second, as we pointed out over and over, Reagan's runway is already the busiest runway in America. Any flexibility that still remains in Reagan's schedule after Congress has continually loaded it up with new flights over the years should not be made by Congress; it ought to be made by the operators of the airports in conjunction with the FAA to manage safety, timeliness, and delays. If we don't do this, if we end up with the Senate position that at least the Commerce Committee has floated, if we end up anything close to what the Senate Commerce Committee has advocated, near crashes such as yesterday would become much more common. For all the Members who already use this airport, think about that not only in terms of the overall safety but just how you climb on an airplane almost on a weekly basis. The so-called five new slots, which means you have to come and go-- that means 10 additional long-haul flights beyond the currently existing DCA 1,250-mile perimeter rule--would be flown almost exclusively, because they would go longer, with larger airplanes. Larger airplanes, again, take longer to taxi more people into the terminal, already straining Reagan's resources. Considering yesterday's near crash and an average of 819 daily takeoffs and landings already, why would we sacrifice safety or, for that matter, just the ability to get in and out of the airport in a timely manner any more? The safety of the flying public must be our primary focus. Yet we are now debating, as my colleague said, whether some lawmakers who want this added convenience are somehow more important than passenger safety. Incidents like this incident that happened yesterday, with the position of additional flights, would be happening on a much more common basis, would dramatically undermine the basic role of the FAA: the safety of the flying public. We should not take that action when the FAA reauthorization comes up. It is not often that we say in this body that we ought to listen to the House, but in this case, we ought to listen to the House. They had a full-flung debate on this issue, and an overwhelmingly bipartisan position came up with zero new flights out of Reagan. I urge my colleagues to prioritize the safety of the flying public and reject any changes to slot and perimeter rules at Reagan in the FAA reauthorization bill we will take up shortly. With that, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I appreciate my friend the gentleman from Utah's strong feelings on this bill. He has been consistent repeatedly. I disagree. I believe 702 is one of the critical aspects of our national security regime. Literally 60 percent of the information that appears in the President's Daily Brief is obtained from section 702. Again, I disagree with the gentleman as well in terms of the fact that we have seen--prior to 2008, when the preceding bill expired for a brief period of time, there are entities that said: We no longer have to participate with the government. I think that is a risk we cannot afford to take with the vast array of challenges our Nation faces around the world. I would also point out--and I know that for some of my colleagues, it has not been enough--the Senate FISA bill--the House FISA bill has 56 separate reforms in it. As a matter of fact, through processes that are already at least partially in process, we have seen the FBI's noncompliance rate on their own queries of 702 drop from about 30 percent noncompliant to less than 1 percent. We have reforms that make sure there are no further batch queries; that there is not the kind of effort where people could simply have the right to query the 702 database without showing a reason; making sure as well, as critics have pointed out, that should an American who is an elected official, a religious figure, a journalist--a whole extra set of reforms there as well. I believe we need to proceed on this. I know both sides are negotiating in good faith. I think those negotiations need to continue, and therefore I object.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I oppose this amendment. When 702 was drafted in 2008, the telecom world was very different than it is today. Things like cloud and data centers didn't exist. I disagree with my colleague's definition of the amendment. I have a letter here from the Attorney General that says that under this new definition, section 702 could never be used to target any entity inside the United States, including, for example, business, home, or place of worship. I will work with colleagues to further refine this definition within the IAA bill that we take up this year. I yield the balance of my time to Senator Rubio.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to this amendment. This amendment would have the effect of basically destroying section 702. Unfortunately, over the last 20 years--Anwar al-Awlaki, Robert Hanssen, Faisal Shahzad--there have been a number of American citizens who created terrorists acts that 702 has been used for. As a matter of fact, many times, when you start the investigation, you don't know if the individual is an American or a foreigner. I respectfully ask us to defeat the amendment and give the balance of my time to Senator Rubio.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this is the last amendment. If we can get this bill passed before 12 midnight, we will meet our goal. I commit to working with all to make sure that we continue to review the amicus proceedings in the next Intel authorization. So I urge Senators to reject the amendment. Vote on Amendment No. 1840

Mr. WARNER. I thank Senator Schumer. I just want to say I know these issues are tough. I appreciate all of the members of the Intelligence Committee, particularly Senator Rubio. For the areas that still need improvement, we commit to work with you to make this incredibly important tool more efficiently and effectively overseen as well. I urge adoption of the bill.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum call with respect to the cloture motion on the motion to proceed to H.R. 7888 be waived.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I have come back to the floor today to reprise some of the things I said yesterday but, hopefully, to add some more color on an issue that has literally popped up in the last few days. I start with the premise that we have a big, big question in front of us this afternoon and tomorrow: whether we are going to go ahead and continue maintaining the intelligence community and its most powerful tool, section 702. So I rise in support of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, H.R. 7888, which we will be voting for cloture on in a few short moments. As I shared with my colleagues yesterday, no other law is more important to the work of the intelligence community than section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Section 702--I enumerated all of the ways it has been used, whether that is thwarting terrorist attacks, dealing with weapons of proliferation, stopping foreign cyberattacks, dealing with fentanyl trafficking; but the key point to remember is that 60 percent of the intelligence that is provided in the President's daily brief--not only under this President but former Presidents as well--comes from products of 702. It is hard to overstate either the importance of this law or, frankly, the gravity of allowing it to sunset. Yet we are 36 hours away from that happening. Now, I understand that some of my colleagues would like to amend the House-passed bill and continue the process of debate and negotiation. Listen, there are things I would like to change in the House bill as well, but the reality is that we are out of time. The choice before us--and as we think about amendments, this is the case--is pass this bill or allow 702 to sunset. I have to tell you, as we follow all of the ups and downs of the House, if anyone thinks that amending this bill and returning it to the House will somehow yield a better agreement that has eluded us, literally, for the last 5 or 6 years on this very contentious issue, I don't think that is a realistic assumption. But what it will do if we send it back to a House that is entwined with leadership issues and the whole question of whether the national security provisions will be voted on and dealt with this weekend--what it will do if we were to amend and send it back to the House: It will invite a sunset, an unspeakable outcome that the President's own Intelligence Advisory Board has said will be remembered as one of the worst intelligence failures of our time. We all know, as we assemble here today, Israel is at war with Hamas, we potentially have not only a regional but, potentially, a global conflict with Iran, our allies in Ukraine endure repeated Russian military bombardments. I just came from a broadly bipartisan biotech roundtable where expert after expert pointed out what China was doing and how much we have got to do to keep up and catch up. The idea that we would, in effect, almost go out of the intelligence business at this moment in time is extraordinarily dangerous. So I know we will have the overall bill discussions and we will have discussions about why something that sounds, on its surface--a warrant provision, which I have said yesterday and I will repeat for colleagues--over half the times an American is queried in the 702 database, they are a victim of a crime--not someone that you would show probable cause has done something wrong but, oftentimes, the victim of a cyber crime. Or if not, the question I raised yesterday, we arrest a terrorist in Paris, we have got a different Presiding Officer, and that terrorist has a 213 area code number in their pocket--we don't know whether that is a real phone number. We don't know if it goes to an American, goes to a foreign person. But the warrant requirement would require, before you could even query--and I get my friend the Senator from Illinois, Dick Durbin. He has a slightly different variation on this--you would be allowed to query that phone number. Remember, this comes off of a known terrorist. But you wouldn't be able to look at the results unless you could show probable cause. They will say that we can have an expediency requirement, but the idea that we would potentially put this into a FISA proceeding that could take days or weeks, I think, is very dangerous. But I would like, again, to use the remainder of my time to discuss one provision of the bill--a technical amendment that was added in the House to the definition of an ``electronic communication service provider''--that has drawn considerable scrutiny and has been the focus of many of my colleagues' appropriate questions. It is important that the Members have a complete understanding of this provision that is grounded in fact and not distorted by, frankly--with some of the outside groups--what are, frankly, absurd distortions being raised by some of its opponents. The amendment does not, as some have suggested, allow the government to spy on Americans at coffee shops or bars or restaurants or residences or hotels, libraries, recreational facilities, and a whole litany of other similar establishments. It would absolutely not, as some critics have maintained, allow the U.S. Government to somehow compel, for example, a janitor working in an office building in northern Virginia to spy for the intelligence community or for your housekeeper to somehow access your laptop at home. Nor would it ever allow, as some have absurdly claimed, States to use 702 to target women in terms of their healthcare choices. If Members have questions about this amendment, I urge them to take time to go through some of the classified information down in Senate Security. And the Department of Justice will be on hand later today to walk folks through why this technical amendment was added. But let me talk about--my business for 25 years was in the telecom sector. I know a little bit about what is trying to be accomplished here. The law that was set up in 2008 was one world of telecommunications and telecommunications networks. The world we live in today, in 2024, is dramatically different. I said yesterday, in 2008, a cloud was something you had to worry about that might rain, not a network of computer operations. As technology has evolved, so must we. The truth is, this amendment does not change the scope of 702; it simply accounts for new technological advances since the law was first written in 2008. It is not the first time we have had to amend certain laws to account for new technologies, nor will it be the last. As a reminder one more time, section 702 authorizes the intelligence community to collect critical foreign intelligence about foreign targets located outside the United States. Some of the ways we do that is with compelled assistance of United States--American--electronic communications service providers, or ECSPs. Now, why has this suddenly now become such an issue? Well, one of these communication providers--remember I talked about clouds, data centers, how these networks come together and how network traffic is intertangled at these data centers? One of these entities that controlled one of those new enterprises that didn't exist in 2008 said: Well, hold it. You can't compel us to work with the American Government because we don't technically fit the definition of an electronic communication service provider. And the fact was, the company that raised that claim won in court. So what happened was, the FISA Court said to Congress: You guys need to close this loophole; you need to close this and change this definition. So that is where a lot of this debate has come from. Yesterday, as White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained in a statement he released, the amendment is ``directly responsive to encouragement from a federal appellate court to update the definition of the private-sector companies with which the U.S. Government can work, under supervision of federal judges and with extensive oversight by four congressional committees, to obtain the communications of non-Americans abroad.'' The National Security Advisor urged Members to ``reject mischaracterizations'' of the amendment. He also reiterated that ``nothing in this amendment changes the fundamentals of Section 702, which can be used to target for collection only the communications of non-Americans located outside the United States.'' Now, one, I think the amendment could have been drafted better. I have a letter here from the Attorney General which shares the view and memorializing DOJ's narrow interpretation of this amendment. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. In that letter, the Attorney General said: [I]t would be unlawful under Section 702 to use the modified definition of ECSP to target any entity inside the United States including, for example, any business, home, or place of worship. Continuing: It would also be unlawful to compel any service provider to target the communications of any person inside the United States-- And here we even go because 702 can't even be used to target foreigners inside the United States. So, clearly, this provision would not allow any communication provider to target a person inside the United States, whether or not that person is in contact with a non-U.S. person outside the United States. Any of these tools are used to target foreigners outside the boundaries of the United States. Let me be clear. The Department of Justice has documented, in writing, that it would be unlawful to use the ECSP definition to target any business, home, or place of worship or to compel any provider to target communications of U.S. persons inside the United States. The letter goes on to state: [T]he Department commits to applying this definition of ECSP exclusively to cover the type of service provider at issue in the litigation before the FISC-- That is the court that reviews these proceedings-- that is, technology companies that provide the service the FISC concluded fell outside the current definition. I also continue to quote from the Attorney General. This was needed: To facilitate appropriate oversight and transparency of the government's commitment to apply any updated definition of ECSP only for the limited purposes described above, the Department will also report to Congress every six months regarding any applications of the updated definition. So, despite arguments that you may have heard, Congress is going to continue to have complete oversight of any use of this provision, and any interpretation of the revised definition of ECSP must still be approved by the FISA Court, an article III court comprised of independent Federal judges. And the opinions of that court will be available to Congress. In addition, the legislation we are considering today reauthorizes-- again, we have to remember, what we are dealing with today in reauthorizing section 702 is only for a mere 2 years. If Members have a concern with how this law is implemented by the DOJ or interpreted by the court, we will have the opportunity in just 24 months to address it further. I will also make clear that I am committed to working with any of my colleagues who still have a concern with this provision to see if we can improve the definition of the ECSP before the next sunset, including through any legislative vehicle between now and then. One thing we cannot do, however, is blind ourselves to the many national security threats facing our country now. I think we will blind ourselves if we amend this bill and send it back to the House, expecting us not to go dark by Friday night, not knowing what the House may even look like after the furious debate about the supplemental is concluded. So I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to pass H.R. 7888 without amendment and ensure that these vital authorities are reauthorized.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, following the cloture vote on the motion to proceed to the FISA bill, we expect to execute the order with respect to the Crapo tailpipes emissions bill, S. 4072, and vote on passage of the bill at 2:30 today.

Mr. WARNER. With that, I yield the floor. Cloture Motion

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the junior Senator from Washington be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills or joint resolutions from April 18, 2024, through April 19, 2024.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today as a Senator from Virginia and, more importantly, as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, in support of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, H.R. 7888, which passed the House earlier this week, with a 273-to-147 broad, bipartisan support. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, which a lot of this debate is focused on, is a critical source of foreign intelligence. It is indispensable to the work that the men and women of our intelligence community, and many others, do every day to protect our national security. Section 702 authorities have enabled the IC to thwart terrorist attacks, track foreign spies, uncover economic espionage, impede weapons proliferation, protect U.S. troops, expose human and drug trafficking, prevent sanctions evasion, and disrupt foreign cyber attacks--a whole litany of the responsibilities of the IC. Just to demonstrate how important these capabilities are to our national security: 60 percent--60 percent--of the items that appear in the President's daily intelligence brief actually are sourced to information obtained pursuant to section 702. In the public domain, there are many examples of the value of section 702. These include when section 702 contributed to a successful operation against one of the last remaining 9/11 architects, Zawahiri; section 702 coverage that identified evidence of an al-Qaida courier in Pakistan with imminent plans to detonate explosives on subway tracks in Manhattan and, through that surveillance, was able to prevent the attack; section 702 identified the hackers responsible for the 2021 ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline that crippled fuel supplies across the east coast and enabled the United States to recover 2.3 million in paid ransom. Secretaries of Defense, Directors of National Intelligence, and many other Cabinet officials from both the current and the former administration have spoken out on the vital importance of ensuring that section 702 does not lapse. To quote the President's intelligence advisory board: If Congress fails to reauthorize Section 702, history may judge the lapse of . . . 702 authorities as one of the worst intelligence failures of our time. Quite honestly, that is what we are looking at if we don't get this done. Nonetheless, as we indicated, we just find ourselves just hours away from a possible sunset of this critical authority, which sunsets Friday night at midnight. Now, some Members have argued that because the FISA Court recently approved new certifications, there is no urgency to reauthorize the law. Those claims are both misguided and dangerous. In the event of a statutory lapse, some providers--American companies who are working with us--are likely to stop or reduce cooperation, perhaps with existing targets of collection but especially with new ones. We know this can happen because it is exactly what happened when a similar lapse occurred following the expiration of section 702's predecessor statute: the Protect America Act. Now, to be fair, it is also true that section 702 is in need of some reforms. And myself, Senator Rubio, 16 Members, bipartisan, have sponsored the Senate version of this bill, have pressed for additional reforms to protect the civil liberties of Americans while still preserving the core values of the program and protecting American national security. In recent years, a key oversight focus has been on the number of queries of section 702 information. Section 702 is a database. There are a series of databases. You can sometimes query that database within certain protections. Now, the focus is focused on particularly those queries performed by the FBI and involving U.S. persons. There is no dispute that, for too long, the FBI query practices were sloppy. For a time, as recently as 2019, more than 3 in 10 of the FBI queries were noncompliant. That means, literally, 30 percent of the time, the FBI was not even following their own procedures. The FBI took too much time to implement needed reforms. But, finally, in 2022 and 2023, it implemented comprehensive reforms that have proven effective and dramatically improved the query compliance rate from 70 percent to over 90 percent. That means less than 1 percent of these queries fall outside of the reform practices the FBI has put in place. What do these reforms include? Maybe one of the most important ones is that rather than, by default, FBI agents query a series of databases. In the past, they would have to opt out of querying the 702 database. Now they have to opt in and make the case that they need that for national security purposes. Another reform that has been put in place is there was a series of actions in the past called ``batch queries.'' A group of people might be arrested and suddenly you are querying a whole batch of them. Those batch queries have been dramatically diminished. At the same time, there are new reforms that require the FBI leadership to improve sensitive queries of politicians, journalists, and religious leaders. Literally, it has to be the Director of the FBI, the Deputy Director, or the head of the National Security Agency. The bill before us--which, again, we had preconferenced most of this with the House--this is the House bill we will be taking up later this week. The bill before us now codifies these reforms, ensuring that a future President, Attorney General, or FBI Director cannot simply walk them back. When we pass this legislation and it is signed, these reforms will become the law of the land. In addition to the reforms I already talked about, the bill we are debating goes even further. It also includes significant new protections for U.S. person queries, including a complete prohibition on queries solely used to find evidence of a crime, as was unanimously recommended by the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. The bill also increases transparency of FISA Court proceedings, going so far--this was added in the House--as to allow Members of Congress and their staffs to attend court hearings. We have heard on this floor and before and the House many times: We don't know what is going on in the FISA Court hearing. Now, if a Member of Congress wants to sit in or send their staff, they will be able to do that. This legislation also enhances reporting requirements from both the Bureau and the intelligence community and creates an ongoing reform commission to recommend further FISA reforms. The truth is, section 702 is already the most regulated and closely overseen intelligence authority of any we have in this country and, frankly, in countries around the world. If enacted, the reforms included in this bill would be the most comprehensive set of reforms ever enacted in the statute's history. We often reform this every 5 years or it had to be reauthorized. This set of reforms are much more sensitive than actions in the past. I would like to speak briefly on two issues that have been the subject of considerable debate. First, some have suggested that we should impose a warrant requirement on U.S. person queries. Let me again be clear. A warrant requirement for U.S. person queries would do grave damage to national security. The FBI and other Agencies have relied on U.S. person queries of section 702, as I enumerated earlier, to prevent terrorist attacks, investigate cyber attacks, prevent assassination plots, and to disrupt narcotics trafficking. Many of these successes would not have been possible if the government was required to obtain a warrant for U.S. person queries, and significant intelligence would be lost. Why is that so hard to put in place? Think about this for a moment. A warrant requirement requires a ``probable cause'' that the subject of the query is an ``agent of a foreign power.'' The truth is--I remember talking with the Presiding Officer about this--the majority of times that an American person is queried is not because we suspect them to be an agent of a foreign power but because they have been a victim, oftentimes, of a cyber attack. Even the most fervent advocate of a warrant has not been able to explain if you are trying to contact the person who has been a victim of a cyber attack, there is no way you could get a probable cause showing that that person is an agent of a foreign power. That agent is a victim of a foreign power. The warrant requirement could not meet the notification requirements put in place. The idea that we could simply contact the person--well, that does not pass the smell test. Sometimes this gets complicated. I spent a lot of time trying to get this. Let me give you a couple of theoretical ways that this warrant requirement, I believe, falls short. Let's say that the intelligence community is aware that Iran is planning a cyber attack against a U.S. victim--maybe even a victim that would sit in this Chamber. In that case, the intelligence community may want to query whether it has intelligence collected against Iran for when Iran or their agents are talking about that American so that we could actually get the full exposure to make sure that we both do victim notification and also preclude future attacks. These queries would serve to protect the victim, not investigate them. But it would never be possible to establish, as any warrant application would require, probable cause that the victim is an ``agent of a foreign power'' because they are not; they are a victim. Let me give you another example. Assume the United States apprehends a known foreign terrorist overseas. On that person--I point this out to the Presiding Officer--there is a phone number, and it is a 303 area code. We don't know whether that phone number is a real number, whether it is a number of an American, or whether it is a number of a foreigner because as the Presiding Officer knows, somebody might have been a foreigner, gone to Colorado, gone to Denver, bought a phone and carries that phone with him forever. The idea that you could get a warrant of probable cause on the basis of that phone number alone, again, does not pass the smell test. It cannot happen. The truth is, as well, someone said we will give you an exemption for exigent circumstances. The process will not work or will work in such a slow fashion that the use of this critical tool--60 percent of the intel the President reads every day comes from 702 intelligence. The truth is, it would take weeks or months to obtain an order from the FISA Court during the time which that guy--let's go back to the example. We arrested a terrorist with a 303 area code. You are going to wait weeks before you can even query that phone number to see if it is a real number, an American, a foreign person. Then, some say: Why don't you make the query, but we won't let you look at the results? Again, either one of those circumstances basically neuters the whole ability of 702 to work. Second issue. The House-passed bill includes an important amendment to the definition of electronic communications service providers, ECSPs, that address collection gaps caused by developments in internet and telecommunications technology since 702 was first written in 2008. Let me say, as somebody who spent a career in telecom, the world has dramatically changed in the telecom domain from 2008. This amendment, in terms of the definition, is, again, focused on this current intelligence gap. It still requires that the targeting that goes on in 702 focuses on overseas non-U.S. persons. And contrary to what some Members literally said on the floor of the Senate, this technical amendment that was added in the House specifically excludes coffee shops, bars, restaurants, residences, hotels, libraries, recreational facilities, and a whole litany of similar establishments. It would not, as some critics have maintained, allow the U.S. Government to compel, for example, a janitor working in an office building in Northern Virginia to somehow spy for the intelligence community. Nor would it allow, as some have absurdly claimed, States to use 702 to target women seeking abortions. First of all, State and local authorities don't even have access to all 702 data. Secondly, the law is and remains crystal clear on this point: 702 cannot be used to target U.S. persons domestically--period, full stop, no exceptions. The amendment, the ECSP amendment, was required because, as I pointed out earlier, the world of telecom changed dramatically since the law was first put in place 16 years ago. Keep in mind, back in 2008, when section 702 was first passed, we had pay phones on most corners, and the cloud was actually something that might cause rain rather than be a place where communication is often stored. In short, what happens here is that the government served a 702 directive. And this is why this came about. And that American company said: We think your old definition of a service provider doesn't apply to us. And you know what? In litigation, that claim won, and the FISA Court specifically said we need to make sure that we update the definition. The House added that updated definition. I don't believe we should roll that back. This is not, as some have claimed, some broad expansion of 702 powers of jurisdictions. Again, I could get into the complexities of how there are some data centers, as has been reported in the press, that at certain times activity will take place in the data center that don't fall into the old definition of 2008. Do we really want that data to pass through the data center to be allowed to be lawfully collected? I think we do. Let me be the first to say that the House bill is not perfect. I think we should have gone for a 5-year reauthorization. The House- passed was a 2-year reauthorization. I accept that. I think the reforms that were put in place will further protect. I go back to the earlier comments I made. We have gone from a 30-percent noncompliance of the FBI to less than 1 percent. (Ms. CORTEZ MASTO assumed the Chair.) Madam President, in terms of the warrant requirement, you are never going to get a probable cause warrant if the individual who is being queried is actually the victim of a crime. We sure as heck are not going to be able to get a warrant requirement met if you capture a terrorist--I will go from the 303 area code to, I think, Las Vegas is 702. If you have to show, based upon that number alone, you have probable cause, you don't know who or what that number is until you do the query. And as I mentioned these last couple of moments, this new definition, this technical definition the House adopted--again, with an overwhelming bipartisan majority--is not an expansion that simply brings up the terminology around telecom providers up to 2024, which was different than 2008. The notion that we would allow this incredibly--in a sense, the crown jewel of our intelligence collection abilities to go dark as we simultaneously try to debate aid for Ukraine and Israel and humanitarian relief to Palestinians and Gaza, the idea we would suddenly go dark at this moment in time would be the height of irresponsibility. I know we have to get through this afternoon's proceedings, but I would strongly urge Members to join me in voting to pass H.R. 7888, without amendment, to make sure that we don't have a lapse. I know we made documents and individuals available in the SCIF, but if Members have questions, if Members have concerns, if Members here come to the floor and make other charges, please talk to me, talk to Senator Rubio, talk to anybody in law enforcement or the intelligence community. So many of the claims being made here just are not accurate in terms of what this bill is doing. I think this is a strong reform bill. I think it needs to get passed, and we need to not let this critical authority lapse.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was absent on Monday, April 15, 2024, for rollcall vote No. 126. Had I been present, I would have voted yea on the motion to invoke cloture on Executive Calendar No. 478 Ramona Villagomez Manglona, of the Northern Mariana Islands, to be a U.S. District Judge for the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands for a term of ten years, rollcall vote No. 126, PN1252.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Ms. Jasmine Yoon, whom President Biden has nominated to serve as a U.S. district court judge for the Western District of Virginia. For the last decade and a half, Jasmine has served as an invaluable asset to Virginia's legal community, offering both a unique zeal for public service and an incredible life story. Jasmine came to this Nation at age 14 from South Korea, speaking virtually no English. All through eighth grade--and I am trying to think of myself in the eighth grade, and I cannot imagine going through this--but all through eighth grade, literally, at home she read Merriam Webster's dictionary and watched American TV. And by the time she entered high school, she spoke English fluently. Thanks to this hard work, she developed a stellar academic record, such that she became a two-time graduate at the University of Virginia where she was awarded the Jack Kent Cooke Foundation scholarship, a full 3-year scholarship to the UVA School of Law given for academic and extracurricular achievement. Shortly before law school, Jasmine became a U.S. citizen. She has spoken movingly to me and to Senator Kaine about her memories of that ceremony and what citizenship means to her. Following law school, Jasmine began her public service career clerking for The Honorable James C. Cacheris in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, a distinguished jurist and lifelong mentor for Jasmine. After completing her clerkship, Jasmine went to work as an assistant U.S. attorney in the Eastern District. During her time in that office, she prosecuted countless complex cases. Her work was so notable that she won the FBI Director's Award, given for outstanding prosecutorial skills and service to the FBI. Upon the conclusion of her time as a prosecutor, she went back to UVA, this time as a lawyer in the university's counsel's office. In taking this job, she and her husband chose to move their entire family to the Western District of Virginia, where they put down deep roots. As counsel to the university, Jasmine impressed everyone she met with her calm and measured approach to nuanced and subtle issues. Jasmine's community-oriented mindset, her career qualifications, and numerous accolades and awards make her an exceptional nominee for the Western District of Virginia. Her nomination has received countless letters of support, including from university leadership, local leaders, and the Asian Pacific American Bar Association of Virginia. Jasmine was also voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee with a strong bipartisan vote. Once sworn in, Jasmine will be the first Asian-American Federal judge in Virginia. I know she will serve with distinction and make our country and our Commonwealth proud. I urge my colleagues to support her nomination. With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that--and I don't think my remarks will go over 5 minutes, but if they extend beyond a minute or 2, that I be able to finish my remarks before we go to the vote.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to celebrate the incredible life of a dear friend and a great American, Hal Malchow, someone whom I think many of my colleagues on the Democratic side have known. I first met Hal in 1985. I was visiting my dear friend from law school, Rob McDuff, in Oxford, MS. Hal and I were pretty young back in those days, both interested in politics, and the two of us really hit it off at a party that Rob hosted. Now, Hal has long enjoyed a successful career as one of the country's premier political consultants, but before that, he went to Millsaps College and then the McGeorge School of Law in California. He did practice law for a bit in Jackson, MS. But Hal's real passion was never the law; it was always politics. In fact, when young, aspiring lawyers would come to his office to get advice about following him into law, Hal was known to reach into his big, impressive wooden desk and pull out his latest rental car contract with Hertz. ``See that contract?'' he would ask the enterprising, would-be attorney, slapping it face down on the table. ``You go to law school, you are going to spend the rest of your career writing those kind of deals.'' So after a few years as a bond attorney in Mississippi, Hal turned his attention to politics. He took on three different candidates as a campaign manager and managed to lose all three races. Undaunted, in 1984, Hal took on a new challenge. There was an up-and- coming young Congressman from Tennessee with a pretty good resume and a well-known family name who was thinking about running for the Senate. And despite his rather unimpressive track record so far, Hal managed to get an interview. ``So,'' Al Gore said to him, ``I've got one question for you, Hal. If I hire you to be my campaign manager, how am I supposed to explain it to my supporters?'' The way Hal tells it, he looked Gore in the eye and said, ``Everyone in Tennessee thinks you're a lock for this seat. But you can tell them you're taking nothing for granted because you hired the hungriest SOB in the country to run your race.'' Needless to say, Hal got the job, and Al Gore went on to the Senate that year. Soon, Hal moved to DC. Starting at his kitchen table in a small, one-room apartment, he managed to build the Nation's largest voter contact firm, pioneering the use of advanced data analytics to revolutionize political targeting, launching experiments to measure and improve campaign tactics, and revolutionizing direct mail and fundraising. He brought the notion of the ``moneyball'' approach to politics a decade before anybody else was doing it. That will be one of Hal's greatest legacies to the Democratic Party and to American politics: the idea that spending decisions should actually be driven by data. He wanted to hold campaign consultants like himself accountable for being wise stewards of donor dollars. He measured success in effectiveness, hard proof that spending motivated voters one way or the other. Hal worked on every one of my campaigns; and at one point or another, I suspect that Hal has worked with at least half of my colleagues on the Democratic side. But Hal was more than just a consultant; he is also my friend. I know him not only for his brilliant, strategic mind but as someone who is honest, loyal, and extraordinarily creative. My wife Lisa and I have looked forward to receiving his hilarious Christmas cards. He would create a different message and a different approach every holiday season. In addition to writing a series of political books on moving and motivating voters, Hal is also an accomplished fiction writer. His writing career began when his then-8-year-old son approached him with an idea. Two years later, they completed the first draft of ``The Sword of Darrow,'' a highly acclaimed young-adult fantasy novel. In 2014, writing alone, he published a sequel, ``The Dragon and the Firefly,'' before penning two political thrillers, including ``42 Million to One,'' a finalist for a number of international and national book awards. As that story illustrates, Hal is also a devoted father to his son, Alex. For many years, he served on the board of trustees at Alex's alma mater, the Lab School. After his son was diagnosed with dyslexia, Hal dove into the challenges facing other children like Alex, eventually becoming the president of the International Dyslexia Association. Hal is also the biggest Cheesehead I know. Hal was very proud of the fact-- even though he had grown up in Mississippi--that his grandfather was one of the original shareholders in the Green Bay Packers. And Hal has followed in his grandfather's and his father's footsteps as a Packers fan. For the last several decades, Hal has organized annual trips to Green Bay to watch the Packers play, and I was lucky enough to join him in November for what has turned out to be Hal's final football season. Now struggling with the effects of Alzheimer's, Hal has approached his illness the same way he has approached life: with no bitterness. He said to me, the last time I saw him, ``I'm the luckiest guy in the world, with the life I've lived.'' He tells me he has no regrets, so I can't have any either. So Lisa and I will continue to keep Hal and his family--including Anne, Alex, and Astrid--in our thoughts and hold them close to our hearts during this difficult season. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize and celebrate the career of an exceptional public servant, GEN Paul Nakasone. General Nakasone is retiring from the Army after 37 years of military service, most recently as the Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of United States Cyber Command. He is a decorated combat veteran, and his career has been exceptional. His first operational tour of duty, in 1987, was at Fort Carson, CO, as an assistant intelligence officer. His tours since have brought him everywhere from Korea to Kansas, Georgia to Iraq, and to Fort Belvoir, the Pentagon, and Alexandria, VA. Over the last 6 years General Nakasone has led the women and men of the National Security Agency, ensuring that its unique, timely and accurate intelligence insights on topics of critical national security are delivered to warfighters, policymakers, and U.S. allies. As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am a firsthand daily consumer of NSA's signals intelligence and analysis, and I cannot stress enough the importance, value, and insight it brings to us as policymakers. Under his leadership of NSA and concurrently, as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, General Nakasone oversaw greater integration between U.S. Cyber Command and the NSA. He established several NSA organizations, including a Cybersecurity Directorate, a China Strategy Center, and the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center, to partner with private industry. He spearheaded the development of several successful joint NSA and Cyber Command teams such as the Russia Small Group on election security, which has been vital in securing U.S. elections through the last three election cycles. In 2018, during General Nakasone's first appearance before the committee as Director of the NSA, he told members that his priority coming into the position was the NSA workforce. He called them the core of the Agency and was adamant about assessing the challenges to retaining ``his talent'' and also recruiting more talent. He knew, as with any successful organization, the NSA relies on its brilliant and skilled workforce of intelligence professionals to accomplish its national security mission. Their well-being and success have been a priority for him throughout his tenure and during his nearly 20 appearances before the committee. He helped to grow the next generation of intelligence analysts and collectors, mathematical scientists, linguists, and cybersecurity experts with programs such as Women in Cyber, cybersecurity and foreign language summer camps, codebreaker challenges, and with partnerships at colleges and universities across the country. In speaking of the next generation, I would be remiss in not sharing the incredible story of General Nakasone's father, retired Colonel Edwin Nakasone, known as Bud. On the morning of December 7, 1941, then 14-year-old Bud Nakasone, now 96, was eating a bowl of corn flakes in his kitchen when he saw Japanese planes streaking through the skies, part of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. He saw the planes strafing the nearby barracks and saw a bomb drop on the nearby airfield. He saw U.S. planes, barracks, and hangars going up in flames. As one of the planes flew over their home, he saw on the plane ``the big red meatball''--what the military called the large red circle representing the Japanese Rising Sun--and in the cockpit, the Japanese pilot wearing goggles and a white scarf--and he realized we were at war. Bud Nakasone enlisted in the Army in 1945, and he served as an interpreter during the occupation of Japan. He later served both on Active Duty and with the Army Reserve, retiring after 41 years of service. He made his career as a high school teacher and college professor in Minnesota. General Nakasone's mother Mary was also an educator--a librarian at the University of Minnesota--when she met Bud. They were married in 1954 are still both living in Minnesota and will celebrate 70 years together this September. General Nakasone has said that his father's career in the Army Reserve influenced his decision to enroll in the Army's ROTC program and that, when he started learning about the 442nd Infantry Regiment of the U.S. Army--a World War II fighting unit composed almost entirely of second-generation American soldiers of Japanese ancestry--and interviewed several of its veterans, he also became interested in serving. He has remarked that some of his most satisfying assignments included the privilege to command soldiers, including as a company commander while deployed along the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea. He is a big sports fan, including of the Minnesota Vikings, which means he knows how to keep a stiff upper lip when life brings disappointment or misfortune, whether in the form of a missed Gary Anderson field goal or a lengthy Senate hold. On General Nakasone's bio, it is noted that he and his wife Susan are the proud parents of four children, who form the nucleus of ``Team Nakasone,'' and I know how important their efforts and sacrifices have also been in allowing General Nakasone to take on assignments of increasing responsibility and importance to the security of the United States. On behalf of a grateful nation, as he transitions to future opportunities, I would like to publicly thank Paul for his long military career, his contributions to the Nation and our national security, and for his leadership of the intelligence professionals at the National Security Agency, and I want to personally thank the Nakasone family for their critical role in supporting him throughout his service to the Nation. Paul, thank you, and we will miss you.