Don Young

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, in answering the question of the contractual agreement of the forest, it will affect the ability to take trees off that forest. There is no doubt about that. With all due respect to the gentleman from California, I do believe his legal staff will tell him that. I am going to suggest this issue is not in this bill. This is the first time I believe on this House floor that we have not had a Tongass provision in the committee bill that came to the floor. I never tried to put one in.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, not in Alaska. They are not talking about the same forest condition the gentleman has in California. I can say the same areas that have been growing timber since we harvested in 1900, they are now considered old growth trees. They are only 100 years old.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. So if a dead tree is dead, a dead tree is dead, and there is no harvesting of trees. Of the 93 percent, that means there will be no new trees. So, for future generations, that is nothing but dead trees.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, 93 percent of the forest is left. Ninety-three percent is left, and now, get this, of the 93, that is all 500-year-old trees. But do forests grow back?

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, in fact, I encourage the gentleman to withdraw the amendment and let this thing go over to the Senate side without the mention of Tongass and see what happens. But if the gentleman leaves it in there, I want to tell him, Katie bar the door, if he thinks El Nino is bad, try this one.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman's amendment is adopted, I can guarantee him with my two Senators on the other side this is going to become one of the major issues. I tried very systematically to leave the Tongass out, on behalf of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Regula), on behalf of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), and leave the Tongass out of it.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, today I am pleased to introduce legislation which will enable Alaska Native Settlement Trusts to achieve the goals envisioned for them by the Congress in the original authorizing legislation: to encourage Alaska Native Corporation to use their own assets to provide segregated, protected funds to ``promote the health, education, and welfare of . . . (Settlement Trust) beneficiaries and preserve the heritage and culture of Natives.'' Settlement trusts have been impeded from achieving the laudatory goals originally envisaged because of deficiencies in the original legislation and impediments arising from certain IRS interpretations as well as inflexibility in current tax administration with regard to the trust. In recent years I have written to the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee informing him that what has started as a simple proposition, promoted by Congress in the Settlement Trust legislation--to provide aid from a protected source to Alaska Natives who often have very little in other available assets to sustain them and in particular in their retirement years--had become a complex and bewildering situation which frustrated the use of the settlement trust provisions in law. This result stems from an IRS interpretation calling for the immediate taxation to potential beneficiaries when these trusts are established by Alaska Native corporations which have earnings and profits, as opposed to taxation when the money is actually received by the beneficiaries. Put simply, in the case of some beneficiaries, particularly the elderly, who have to prepay taxes in order to receive their benefits and, if they die prematurely, they will not even receive the amount of their prepaid taxes back. Needless to say, this is a substantial impediment to setting up and continuing such beneficial trusts. But those Native corporations having favorable tax situations which enable them to make contributions to trusts which are not immediately taxable to their beneficiaries face other impediments. The IRS has taken the position that there is no authority to withhold tax from beneficiary payments, which prevents a simple way for a Native to pay his or her tax. The IRS requires that trust reporting to beneficiaries be accomplished via the complex so-called ``K-1'' form as opposed to the simple 1099 form, so familiar to most of us. As you can imagine, the requirement to use the former, particularly in rural areas in the state of Alaska where accountants may not be readily available, presents major reporting problems. We believe the IRS internally has been supportive of such a change but has advised in the past that it would need to be accomplished by statute. Finally, the original authorizing legislation failed to provide a mechanism to encourage sustaining the longevity of these trusts dedicated to the goals enumerated. Such trusts are currently treated as regular trusts and penalized for accumulating income with an assessment of the highest marginal tax rate. Accordingly, from the standpoint of a settlement trust, it currently makes good tax sense to distribute all income to the beneficiaries rather than leaving it to be taxed at the current trust tax rate. This, however,does not make good social sense and encourages the opposite result one would envision for these entities, whose goal is to sustain the funds on a long-term basis in order to fulfill the objective envisioned for Settlement Trusts. Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, Congressman Miller and Congressman Hayworth, and I are today introducing legislation today which will rectify these problems and facilities settlement trusts functioning in a manner more in keeping with the underlying goals of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. In general, this legislation provides that: 1. Contributions to settlement trusts will not result in immediate taxation to beneficiaries. In the case of ANCSA corporations which have earnings and profits at the time of transfer, any and all distributions from the trust of either principal or interest, will be taxable as ordinary income to the beneficiaries when received up to the amount which would have been subject to taxation under present IRS rulings. This replicates the taxation presently imposed by the IRS but delays it from the establishment of the trust to the distribution to beneficiaries, which is clearly the proper point of taxation. It should be noted that currently, the distribution of principal is not taxable. This provision provides for the taxation of such distribution as part of the overall balance worked into the bill. 2. A settlement trust will be able to defer taxation of up to 45% of its current income in order to ``inflation proof'' and not dissipate the principal. However, when this deferred income is ultimately distributed to beneficiaries, they will be taxes at ordinary income rates rather than at more favorable capital gains rates or, in some cases at present, not taxed at all. 3. Beneficiaries of settlement trusts will be able to have up to 15% of their distributions by the trust withheld to satisfy their anticipated federal income tax obligations. This will obviously speed up and help insure IRS collections. 4. A settlement trust will be able to issue form 1009's to beneficiaries which should greatly simplify their reporting and again enhance tax collections. Mr. Speaker, in the development of this bill, a serious effort has been made to address concerns raised during discussions with Department of Treasury officials as well as with representatives of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Substantial information has been provided already to the Joint Tax Committee to help permit the committee to make a realistic revenue estimate. In this regard, it is our belief that by providing offsetting tax measures in the bill and speeding up and otherwise enhancing the collections of tax, we believe that the legislation we introduce today should be essentially revenue neutral. In sum, such trusts were intended to provide for the segregation of Native assets, to immunize such assets from potential dissipation through business ventures (or premature distributions) or otherwise and to provide a fund which would remain intact fort a substantial period of time and hence contribute to the health, education, welfare, heritage and cultural objectives in the current settlement trust statute for years to come. Unfortunately, general tax interpretations and policy, established for far different reasons, have hampered these Congressional goals and objectives. Therefore, I am pleased that, on a bipartisan basis, I can join with my colleague and Ranking Minority Member on the Resources Committee, Mr. Miller, and my other distinguished colleagues Mr. Hayworth to introduce this important remedial legislation. Narrative Explanation For Settlement Trust Tax Legislation bill section 1(a) Identification of ANCSA Settlement Trusts As Eligible To Elect Tax Exempt Status This provision of the draft legislation permits settlement trusts organized under the Alaska native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (ANCSA), to elect tax exempt status. bill section 1(b) Detailing Tax Treatment For Settlement Trusts And Their Beneficiaries This new subsection amends the Tax Code to add a new section 501(p), which is comprised of six paragraphs clarifying the tax treatment of ANCSA settlement trusts. Paragraph (1) provides that contributions to ANCSA settlement trusts are not deemed distributions to the ANCSA corporation's shareholders--the conveyance to the trust does not trigger taxation to the beneficiaries. Paragraph (1) applies whether or not a settlement trust has made the (p)(2) election, and alters an existing IRS ruling posture which has operated as a disincentive to contributions to settlement trusts by taxing beneficiaries prior to their receipt of distributions. However, as noted below, the draft legislation further provides that if an ANCSA corporation has earnings and profits for the taxable year of a contribution, those earnings and profits (up to the amount of the contribution) must be transferred to the trust. Subsequent distributions by the trust will produce ordinary income to the beneficiaries, until these transferred earnings and profits are exhausted. This transfer of earnings and profits eliminates the possibility that settlement trusts could be used to bail out corporate earnings and profits. Paragraph (2) provides the basic mechanism by which a settlement trust elects tax exempt status. In general under the legislation an electing settlement trust must meet two requirements to be tax exempt. First, the trust must timely file for the election as prescribed. Second, the beneficial interests in the trust must abide by alienation restrictions which prohibit transfers of trust units in the same manner that transfers of ANCSA corporate stock are prohibited; failure to do so results in revocation of the election. If an electing trust violates the alienation restrictions at any point during a taxable year, the section 501(p) election will be automatically revoked for that year and all subsequent years. Once the section 501(p) election is evoked, that trust would not be able to reelect. Paragraph (3) provides the distribution requirements for an electing trust in the amount of 55% of adjustable taxable income. If an electing trust fails to meet this requirement, it is taxable at the maximum individual tax rates (presently 39.6%) on whatever amount it would have had to distribute to meet the 55% requirement. As an example, if an electing trust distributed only 50% of its taxable income for a given year, then 5% (55% requirement less 50% actually distributed) would be subject to tax. Paragraph (4) describes the taxation of the beneficiaries of settlement trusts. Subparagraph (4)(A) applies to electing settlement trusts and imposes a rule that distributions by such trusts are automatically taxable as ordinary income regardless of the source of those distributions. This would include amounts retained without tax incidence at the trust level which are subsequently distributed to beneficiaries. Subparagraph (4)(B) applies to trusts which have not made the new subsection 501(p)(2) election. If the ANCSA corporation does not have earnings and profits for tax purposes when a contribution is made to a settlement trust, subsequent distributions by that trust are taxable to the beneficiaries under the existing rules of Subchapter J of the Code. In general, under existing law the character of income earned by the trust would flow out to the beneficiaries and distributions of capital and accumulated income are tax free. On the other hand, if the ANCSA corporation has earnings and profits when a contribution is made to a settlement trust, further rules apply. The contribution is deemed to transfer the corporation's earnings and profits up to the amount of the contribution to the settlement trust. Subsequent distributions by the trust to its beneficiaries will be deemed to come from these transferred earnings and profits and produce ordinary income to the beneficiaries, the same as would occur if the ANCSA corporation had distributed those earnings and profits directly. This treatment continues until the trust has fully distributed the amount of the transferred earnings and profits. Only thereafter is taxation of the beneficiaries controlled by Subchapter J. Paragraph (5) permits beneficiaries to elect to have up to 15% of their distributions by the trust withheld from their ongoing trust distributions to satisfy their anticipated federal income tax obligations. This paragraph applies whether or not a settlement trust has made the 501(p)92) election. Paragraph (6) defines a settlement trust with reference to

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce legislation to amend the Indian Employment, Training and Related Services Demonstration Act of 1992. My legislation will provide for the transfer of services and personnel from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Office of Self-Governance and to emphasize the need for job creation in Alaska native communities and on Indian reservations. Since its enactment in 1992, the ``477'' program of the Indian Employment, Training and Related Services Demonstration Act, has become one of the few successful economic development programs in Indian country. This program was implemented to help tribes address severe problems in employment and poverty faced in their communities. It allows tribal governments to consolidate formula funded employment, training and related programs into one streamlined, efficient program, which enable tribes to reduce administrative time and costs, and increase services to their members. Alaska tribes have informed me that they have reported great savings in administering employment and training programs through consolidation of application and reporting requirements. On October 9, 1997, Senator Campbell introduced S. 1279 and on this same date, Senator Murkowski introduced S. 1281, which proposed amendments to the ``477'' program, and included Alaska-specific provisions. On May 14, 1998, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held a committee oversight hearing to discuss the program of the program. S. 1279, as amended, incorporates several provisions of S. 1281, and makes other technical corrections. The Senate Indian Affairs Committee held a mark-up of their two bills and favorably reported S. 1279 out of Committee. My legislation is identical to S. 1279, as reported out of committee, and would at long last address the extreme unemployment in Alaska native communities and to provide young Alaska natives with both educational and job skills so they can fully participate and contribute to Alaska's economy. The bill I am introducing today will lead to further economic growth and more efficient use of Indian job training dollars. I urge my colleagues to support my bill

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce legislation with my distinguished colleague, Mr. Dale Kildee of Michigan, to amend the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA). In 1988, pursuant to Section 405 of the IHCIA, the Indian Health Service (IHS) was directed to select up to four tribally-operated IHS hospitals to participate in a demonstration program to test methods for the direct billing for and receipt of payment for health services provided to Medicare and Medicaid eligible patients. This was established to determine whether collections would be increased through direct involvement of tribal health care providers versus the current practice which required billings and collections be routed through the IHS. In 1996, Congress extended this demonstration program until 1998. This extension allowed Congress additional time with which to consider whether to permanently authorize the collection program. The law also required the IHS to submit a report to Congress on the demonstration program on September 30, 1996, the same day the program was originally to expire. The report was to evaluate whether the objectives were fulfilled and whether direct billing should be allowed for other tribal providers who operate an IHS facility. This report is still undergoing Departmental review, however, it is our understanding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Indian Health Service are very pleased with the success of the demonstration program. All four participants have reported a dramatic increase of collections for Medicare and Medicaid services, which provided additional revenues for IHS programs at these facilities. In addition, there has been a significant reduction in the turn-around time between billing and receipt of payment and an increase in efficiency by being able to track their own billings and collections in order to act quickly to resolve questions and problems. On behalf of my constituents, the Bristol Bay Area Health Corporation and the South East Area Regional Health Corporation, I am introducing this legislation to provide permanent status for the demonstration program established by Section 405 of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, to provide a ``grandfather'' clause for the current four demonstration participants to enable them to continue their programs without interruption, and to expand eligibility for the program to tribes or tribal organizations who operated or are served by an IHS hospital or clinic.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, this is a relatively simple bill. It is the proposed Advisory Council on California Indian Policy Extension Act of 1997, to extend the life of the Advisory Council on California Indian Policy, ACCIP, until March 31 of the year 2000. The ACCIP has issued 8 reports on various topics as well as an overview of California Indian history. Some of these recommendations by the ACCIP are controversial and will not be implemented by the Congress. Other recommendations are too expensive. However, some of the recommendations included in the 8 reports issued make good sense and should be given full consideration by the Administration and the Congress. H.R. 3069 would add additional new duties to those provided for by Congress when the ACCIP was created in 1992. These new duties include: Working with Congress to implement its proposals; consulting with Federal departments to implement its recommendations; and presenting draft legislation to Congress. H.R. 3069 is very important to the many Indian tribes of California. While I do not agree with each and every recommendation made by ACCIP, I think we should move forward in the process. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3069. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. YOUNG of Alaska asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3069) to extend the Advisory Council on California Indian Policy to allow the Advisory Council to advise Congress on the implementation of the proposals and recommendations of the Advisory Council.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a simple bill--a bill to protect the good name of one of America's greatest Presidents, Ronald Reagan. On February 4 of this year, Mr. Speaker, this body and the other body both overwhelmingly passed legislation renaming National Airport after Ronald Reagan. President Clinton signed the bill into law on February 6, President Reagan's 87th birthday. Nevertheless, the National Park Service has announced that it intends to thumb its nose at the will of Congress and the President by erecting signs on the George Washington Memorial Parkway that omit President Reagan's name. This bill prohibits such a move, and requires new signs that use the correct name of the airport. And, if the Park Service decides to go ahead with its plan to thwart the will of Congress, then we will require the signs to be replaced, with the funds coming out of the budget of the director of the National Park Service. Ronald Reagan is an American hero. Mr. Speaker, the Park Service must not be allowed to rob him of any part of his tremendous legacy. Mr. Speaker, I insert a copy of the bill for the Record:

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, today I am filing a report by the Committee on Resources entitled Abuse of Power: The Hardrock Bonding Rule which presents the results of the Committee's oversight investigation of an informal rule-making process at the Department of Interior. We are publishing the report in order to open the curtains and let full sunlight shine on Interior's rule-making process. The issue here is not about mining--it is about the right of a citizen to meaningful participation in the rule-making process. The report concludes that Department documents obtained by the Committee clearly show that undue interference of political appointees at Interior in the rule-making was so great that the integrity of the rule-making process itself was discredited. In addition, the new rule was published despite warnings from Interior's own regulation writers and lawyers that they had significant concerns about compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). After this regulation was implemented, political appointees at the Department of Interior attempted to prevent and obstruct the Committee on Resources from carrying out its Constitutional oversight responsibilities. A drawn-out string of dilatory tactics was initiated after all document pertaining to this rule-making were requested. Some records were produced by Interior pursuant to this request, but many documents were withheld from the Committee under a prospective claim of ``privilege.'' The Department also tried to impose rules and conditions under which this Committee could have access to documents. After these dilatory tactics continued for more than three months, the Committee subpoenaed the documents. In their dissenting views file with the report, the Minority argues that the documents obtained under the subpoena are confidential and part of the deliberative process. We disagree. A consensus has emerged under the APA that a rule-making record or file should be created in informal rule-making. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the Supreme Court stated that, although agency action is entitled to a presumption of regularity, ``that presumption is not to shield [the] action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.'' 401 U.S. 402 (1971). These documents are part of the rule-making record. An appendix to the report contains some of the subpoenaed documents which illustrate the serious problems with this rule-making. Perhaps this will encourage the political appointees at Interior to comply with the laws governing rule-makings and goad the Department into reforming their rule-making process to restore meaningful input from the American people. Certainly, a higher standard can be expected of the ``most ethical Administration'' in American history. The Minority also says that ``despite assurances to the contrary'' during oversight hearings conducted by Subcommittee on Mineral and Energy Resources Chairman Barbara Cubin, the report concludes that actions by a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals constitutes a ``serious conflict of interest.'' The Minority is construing more from these remarks than we implied. Indeed, immediately after this statement during the June 19th hearing, Chairman Cubin told Department officials that ``the cure for this problem or perceived problem would be to allow public comment, because the appearance isn't very pretty. I mean it really looks bad. . . .'' Interior was also withholding key documents from the Committee at the time of the oversight hearings. Interior produced these documents, but only after they were subpoenaed, nearly two months after these remarks were made. In fact, Interior recently lost a lawsuit over this regulation. The Minority Views to the report try to minimize this stating that the court ``did find that DOI [Interior] violated only the procedural requirement of the RFA [Regulatory Flexibility Act] by not consulting with the SBA [Small Business Administration] on the definition of a `small entity.' '' The court decision concerned whether Interior obeyed the law in issuing the regulation. The court granted a summary judgment against Interior, which means that after construing all of the relevant facts in the most favorable light for Interior, the court found that Interior had no case, and ordered the Department to rescind the regulation and start over. In her concluding statement, the judge said, ``While recognizing the public interest in preserving the environment, the Court also recognizes the public interest in preserving the rights of parties which are affected by government regulation to be adequately informed when their interests are at stake and to participate in the regulatory process ad directed by Congress [emphasis added].'' I am attaching a copy of this Court decision to these remarks for inclusion in the Record. The Resources Committee told Interior officials more than a year ago--long before the Department was sued--that the new rule was illegal because the department violated the rule-making process. We urged them to withdraw the rule and correct these violations. Instead, Interior wasted taxpayer money defending an untenable position in a lawsuit. This whole sorry episode results from the refusal of a few imperious, high-level, politically motivated bureaucrats to obey laws that govern a rule-making. Accountability is the issue. Political bosses at Interior, who love to write regulations for others to obey or face severe penalties, refuse to heed laws that regulate their own actions. Shouldn't they be accountable too? [United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 97-1013 (JLG)] Northwest Mining Association, plaintiff, v. Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior; et al., defendants memorandum This matter is before the Court on opposing motions for summary judgment. The Plaintiff, Northwest Mining Association (``NWMA'', disputes a final rule enacted by Defendant United States Bureau of Land Management (``BLM'') concerning reclamation of mining lands. The Small Business Administration (``SBA'') submitted an amicus curiae brief in favor of NWMA's position. The Arizona Mining Association and the Nevada Mining Association jointly submitted an amici curie brief, also in favor of NWMA's position. The Court heard oral argument on March 10, 1998. For the reasons that follow, NWMA's motion is granted and the BLM's motion is denied. I. Background In 1976, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (``FLPMA''), 43 U.S.C. 1701, (et seq. (1994). Congress declared in the FLPMA that it is the policy of the federal government, through the Secretary of the Interior, to manage public lands ``in a manner which recognizes the Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals . . . from public lands[.]'' 43 U.S.C. 1701(a)(12).\1\ Congress, however, also recognized the need to manage the public lands ``in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archaeological values[.]'' 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1701(a)(8). Accordingly, while managing public lands under the Act, the Secretary and the BLM must ``take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands'' by ``regulation or otherwise.'' 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1732(b). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\The Secretary is charged ``to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.'' 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1740. The administrator of these rules and regulations is the Director of the BLM, through the authority and at the direction of the Secretary. 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1731(a). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The BLM's obligatory duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of public lands has significant application in the mining industry. The extraction of hardrock minerals, such as gold and copper, often involves the excavation of large open pits, the use of toxic chemicals, disruption of underground water, and various other negative environmental effects. Historically, some miners abandoned their claims after the minerals ran out and left the land disturbed. In many cases, the use of millions of dollars of public funds has been required to reclaim such old, abandoned mining operations and return them to an environmentally sound state. (Def. Mem. at 2-3.) In 1981, the BLM responded to this problem by promulgating regulations, set forth in 43 C.F.R. Sec. 3809, which allowed it to require bonds from miners in certain situations. Bonding ensures a miner's compliance with environmental standards by proactively funding the reclamation before the operation begins. In the event of a miner's default of its reclamation obligation, the bond, or other surety, will fund the environmental restoration, not the public. (Def. Mem. at 2-3.) The original regulations defined three levels of mining activities: ``casual'' level use, where only negligible disturbance of the land results (43 C.F.R. Sec. 3809.0- 5(b)); ``notice'' level use, where mining operations are greater than casual use but still disturb less than five acres per calender year and where the operator need only submit a general notification of operations to the BLM before commencement (43 C.F.R. Sec. 3809.1-3(a)-(c)); and ``plan'' level use, where more than five acres per calendar year are disturbed and where the operator must submit a detailed plan of all operations and reclamation to be undertaken to the BLM for approval (43 C.F.R. Sec. 3809.2-9(b)). The original regulations allowed the BLM to require plan level operators to post a bond to ensure the reclamation of disturbed areas, but such bonds were not mandatory to all plan level operations (43 C.F.R. 3809.1`-9(b)). On July 11, 1991, the BLM issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend its bonding requirement rules. The proposed rule would require bonds for all mining operations larger than casual level use. 56 Fed. Reg. 31,602 (1991). Notice level operators would be required to post a $5,000 bond for each claim, Id. at 31,604, while plan level operators would be required to post a bond in an amount specified by the BLM, but in no case to exceed $1,000 per acre for explorational operations and $2,000 per acre for mining operations. Id. at 31,605. Additionally, the proposed rule would allow alternative financial instruments to be substituted or bonds, Id. at 31,602, and would require operators with a history of noncompliance with BLM regulations to file plans on subsequent operations which would normally be conducted on a notice level. Id. at 31,602. The BLM stated that it would accept comments on the proposed rule amendments until September 9, 1991, Id. at 31,602, but later extended the comment period to October 9, 1991 (56 Fed. Reg. 41,315 (1991)). On February 28, 1997, almost six years after the original proposal, the BLM issued the final rule. 62 Fed. Reg. 9093 (1997). The final rule contained several substantive differences from the proposed rule which are pertinent to this case. Most notably, notice level and plan level operators are each required by the final rule to post bonds for 100 percent of the estimated reclamation costs. Id. at 9100, 9101. Additionally, the final rule requires notice and plan level operators to employ an outside engineer to calculate and certify the cost of reclamation of the disturbed areas, Id. at 9100-01, provide bonds for all its existing mining disturbances within ninety days (if not in compliance with the rules), Id. at 9103, and meet water quality standards for one year at the reclaimed site before the bond would be released. Id. at 9102. The final rule imposed criminal sanctions on persons who knowingly violate the regulations. Id. at 9103. The BLM stated that the rule, as enacted, would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. Id. at 9099. The BLM defined ``small entity'' as ``an individual, small firm, or partnership at arm's length from control of any parent companies.'' Id. at 9099. The NWMA seeks summary judgment under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 551, et seq. (1994) (``APA'') on the basis that there was no notice in the proposed rule of the 100 percent bond requirement, the professional third party engineer requirement, the water quality requirement, or of the potential criminal sanctions. Alternatively, the NWMA seeks summary judgment under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA''), 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 601, et seq. (1994) (as amended by Pub. L. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 864-67 (1996)) on the grounds that, when certifying that the final rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, the BLM did not use the Small Business Administration's definition of ``small miner'' and did not follow the appropriate procedure for adopting an alternate definition as required by the RFA. The BLM generally denies the NWMA's allegations and itself moves the Court for summary judgment, arguing that the NWMA lacks standing to object. The BLM alleges that, since the NWMA failed to participate in the rulemaking process by filing any comments during the appropriate period, the NWMA lacks standing to challenge the new rule under the APA. \2\ The BLM also alleges that, because the NWMA is not itself a small entity, it lacks standing to challenge the new rule under the RFA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The NWMA asserts that, in fact, it did submit comments, but that its records of such have been lost in the intervening five years. (Pl. Mem. At 12-13, Pl. Reply at 3- 7.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. Discussion The Court shall grant summary judgment ``if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A. Standing of the NWMA The BLM claims that the NWMA does not have standing to object to its final rule under either the APA or the RFA because it did not submit comments during the notice and comment period. The NWMA asserts that it need not have submitted comments because the BLM's original rule proposal did not properly inform it that its interests were at stake. The NWMA further asserts that, in any event, it has associational standing as a representative of its members. The Plaintiff is correct. The nature of the NWMA's claims under the APA is that there was insufficient notice of the altered and additional aspects of the final rule given by the BLM in its initial proposal. There is no way the NWMA could have submitted comments regarding interests it was not informed were at stake. The BLM also challenges the NWMA's assertion of associational standing, contending that it does not apply to rulemaking procedures. The BLM does not provide an explanation of why this is so. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1974), and Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), the Supreme Court refined its associational standing doctrine into a three-prong test. ``[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.''--Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. The Plaintiff here meets these elements and the Court finds no basis to conclude that rulemaking should be regarded as exempt from this test. Accordingly, the Court finds that the NWMA has standing under the APA to object to the final rule at issue here. The BLM also claims that the NWMA lacks standing under the Regulatory Flexibility Act because the language of the RFA extends standing to seek judicial review only to a ``small entity.'' The RFA provides that ``a small entity that is adversely affected or aggrieved by final agency action is entitled to judicial review. . . .'' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 611(a)(1). Section 601(6) of the RFA states, in relevant part, that the term ``small entity'' shall have the same meaning as the term ``small organization.'' Section 601(4) states, in relevant part, that the term ``small organization'' means ``any not- for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field. . . .'' Here, the BLM does not contest the NWMA's assertion that it is an independently owned and operated, not-for-profit enterprise which is not dominant in its field. (Pl. Mem. at 34-37.) Therefore, the NWMA is a ``small entity'' as defined by the RFA and has standing to object.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ It is probable that the NWMA would also have standing to object under the RFA based on associational standing, discussed supra. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Plaintiff's Claims Under the APA The standard for judicial review of the BLM's actions here is set forth in Section 706 of the APA. The court shall ``hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, of otherwise not in accordance with the law.'' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A). The Court must show ``great deference'' to the agency's interpretation of its own powers and responsibilities. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980) (citation omitted). The gist of the NWMA's numerous counts under the APA is that the final rule enacted by the BLM is significantly different from that originally proposed. The NWMA alleges that the differences are great enough to constitute abuses of the notice and comment requirement, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b), and the basis and purpose requirement, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(c) of the APA. The final rule, however, ``need not match the rule proposed [and] indeed must not if the record demands a change.'' Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F. 3d 1509, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). To do otherwise ``would lead to the absurdity that . . . the agency can learn from the comments on its proposals only at the peril of starting a new round of commentary.'' International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F. 2d 615, 632 n. 51 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The test is whether the agency gave notice to interested parties that a different rule might be enacted. Kooritzky, 17 F. 3d at 1513. Adequate notice is given if the final rule is a ``logical outgrowth'' of the proposed rule. Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F. 2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Therefore, the pertinent question to be asked in this case is whether the BLM's final rule is a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule. The determination of what rule is a logical outgrowth of another can be a difficult task and require detailed examination of the administrative record. For instance, the NWMA alleges that the minimum bond amounts required by the final rule cannot be a logical outgrowth of the maximum amounts contemplated by the proposed rule. At first blush, this might seem to be one of the NWMA's strongest arguments. An examination of the administrative record reveals that the rule proposal does, indeed, state that bond amounts for plan level operations ``would be capped at $1,000 per acre for exploration activities and $2,000 for mining activities.'' 56 Fed. Reg. 31,603. The proposal goes on, however, to state that ``[c]omments are specifically requested on the adequacy of these definitions.''Id. The request for commentary on the definitions reasonably could be construed to include commentary on the adequacy of the dollar amount, which, in turn, reasonably could be found to constitute adequate notice that the rule might be changed. It is uncertain whether additional examination of comments received would be indicative of the adequacy of the notice. It is also uncertain whether testimony at trial might prove dispositive of the issue. In other words, the claim is not readily applies to the summary judgment standard, i.e., that no reasonable factfinder could find for the BLM in this matter. The Court does not need to conduct such as exhaustive examination of the administrative record to reach the merits of the NWMA's claims under the APA because of the disposition of their claim under the RFA. C. Plaintiff's Claim Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act The NWMA's claim under the RFA is that the BLM did not follow the legal procedure required by the RFA when it issued the final rule. The RFA requires administrative agencies to consider the effect of their actions on small entities, including small businesses, small non-profit enterprises, and small local governments. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 601, et. seq.; Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 118 (3d Cir. 1997). See also S. Rep. No. 96-878, at 1-6 (1980). When an agency issues a rulemaking proposal, the RFA requires the agency to ``prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis'' which will ``describe the impact of the proposed rule on small entities.'' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 604(a). Rather than prepare initial and final regulatory flexibility analyses, the BLM chose to use the exception allowed by Section 605 of the RFA. Section 605 provides: Sections 603 and 604 of this title shall not apply to any proposed or final rule if the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. If the head of the agency makes a certification under the preceding sentence, the agency shall publish such certification in the Federal Register at the time of publication of general notice of proposed rulemaking for the rule or at the time of publication of the final rule, along with a statement providing the factual basis for such certification. The Agency shall provide such certification and statement to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.--5 U.S.C. Sec. 605(b). In a section of the final rule publication entitled ``Compliance With Regulatory Flexibility Act,'' the BLM stated that the final rule ``will not have a significant econimic impact on a substantial number of small entities.'' 62 Fed. Reg. 9099. The BLM stated that, for the purposes of this certification under the RFA, the term ``small entity'' is defined as ``an individual, small firm, or partnership at arm's length from the control of any parent companies.''. Id. The BLM set forth a short factual basis for the certification. Id. The nature of NWMA's challenge is that the BLM did not use the correct definition of ``small entity'' (specifically, a small miner) when it made the ``no significant impact'' certification. The RFA requires agencies to use the Small Business Administration's definition of small entity. Section 601 of the RFA sets forth, in relevant part, ``[f]or the purposes of this chapter . . . the term `small entity' shall have the same meaning as the term `small business' . . . . '' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 601(6). The term ``small business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 632 (1994). 5 U.S.C. Sec. 601(3). An examination of the Small Business Act reveals that the SBA may ``specify detailed definitions or standards by which a business concern may be determined to be a small business concern for the purposes of [the Act] or any other Act.'' 15

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to say that I speak in support of H.R. 512, and I can only suggest that this is just a small step forward in the right direction. I often suggest in this legislative work that nothing happens without a reason. The reason I introduced this bill, we did have cases where the Fish and Wildlife Department, especially in the district of the gentleman from California (Mr. Pombo), there is another one in another district, one of the Members came to me the other day where they do it by action of the agency without any input from the Congress. Under our Constitution, we are the only ones that should have the authority to make designation of lands. This is a small step forward and requires the agencies to go forth and at least identify the representative of that area and also have consultation with public input and then having to come back to the Congress for the identification of those refuges that would take place. I think it is important that we must keep the integrity for the refuge system in place, and I hold no second place to anyone when it comes to refuge creations by act of Congress. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), a dear friend of mine, and I worked on this legislation for over 28 years. So I am confident that this is the right step. But I will, as the gentleman from Washington asked me, continue, as chairman of the committee, to watch what the agencies are doing. How does this affect the community? Is the community supportive? And, really, who is asking for this refuge? If it is scientifically backed up, people back it up, then it ought to go forward and go through the congressional action. I rise in support of this modified version of H.R. 512, which is the product of successful negotiations between the Department of the Interior, our colleagues, John Dingell, George Miller, Richard Pombo, and me. While this compromise is not as comprehensive as a Congressional authorization, it will improve the refuge land acquisition process and establish additional safeguards for private property owners. Under the terms of this proposal, no money can be authorized to be appropriated from the Land and Water Conservation Fund to create a new refuge unless: The environmental reviews required by the National Environmental Policy Act are completed; a copy of the final environmental impact statement or environmental assessment and a summary of all public comments on the proposed refuge are provided to the House and Senate authorizing and appropriations committees; and the Department of the Interior provides notice to each Member of Congress representing a district in which the proposed wildlife refuge will be located when a preliminary project proposal is completed. The bill also requires that notice be provided in the local newspapers of an affected community of any public meetings to discuss the scope of a proposed new refuge. In fact, according to NEPA regulations (40 CFR 1501.7), ``There shall be an early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to proposed action. This process shall be termed scoping.'' Finally, H.R. 512 clarifies that no additional land use restrictions shall be imposed on property included within the acquisition boundary of a National Wildlife Refuge until that land is purchased by the Federal Government. This compromise does not provide the same level of oversight that is afforded to Bureau of Land Management lands, National Forests, Parks, or Scenic Rivers. It does, however, provide an increased opportunity for Congressional review when necessary, fairness to property owners who are waiting to sell their land to the government, better notice to the public when new refugees are proposed, and statutory protection to private landowners whose property is located within a refuge boundary. With a $600 million backlog of critical resource management needs, reasonable people can ask why the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is obsessed with buying more private land, which by their own admission they are incapable of managing effectively. Nevertheless, I recognize that many members of this body want additional land acquisitions and because of their support, this process is likely to continue in the future. At the same time, there are thousands of Americans who want to keep and use their private property without the shadow of Federal land control. This measure strikes a balance between those groups. It allows the creation of new wildlife refuges while ensuring that the local community and its elected representatives in Congress are informed of the Service's plans for new refuges. Finally, this institution will have a full and complete record of information in order to assess the merits of the various land acquisition requests. I urge an ``aye'' vote on this important legislation.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I am pleased to respond to that inquiry. I certainly understand the gentleman's concern, and I can assure the gentleman that the committee is fully committed to strengthening the congressional role on national wildlife refuge systems as well as designations and other what we call acquisition of lands by any other Federal agency.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings).

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Glacier Bay National Park Boundary Adjustment Act of 1998. The legislation is a manifestation of efforts to make the construction and operation of a small hydro-electric facility near the city of Gustavus, Alaska, possible through a land exchange. The hydro project would be constructed and operated by Gustavus Electric Company, and is intended to benefit the city's residents by providing a cheap source of electricity as an alternative to using diesel-powered generators. The project could also supply low-cost power to the National Park Service facilities in Glacier Bay National Park. An Act of Congress is necessary to allow the development of this hydro project. The project location is within designated wilderness of Glacier Bay National Park. Current law governing wilderness areas does not permit such construction and operation of hydro power facilities. The legislation I am introducing will provide for a land exchange in which the appropriate lands where the project is located are transferred to the State of Alaska, and the Park Service acquires State lands of equal value to compensate. Once the state acquires its lands under the exchange, construction of the facility will be possible. To reflect an understanding among the parties to this exchange, this legislation requires that the proper environmental and economic analyses and licensing procedures of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission be followed prior to any transfer of lands. This stipulation assures the integrity of the lands and wildlife will be maintained before construction of the project may begin. In addition, the bill requires an exchange that is of equal value to the State and the federal government, and a ``no net loss'' of wilderness acreage. The major provisions of this bill were negotiated by people most directly affected by the land exchange. It is therefore a local solution to a local problem.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill just passed and just debated.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to introduce the All- American Resolution expressing the sense of Congress that any missile defense system deployed to protect the U.S. from missile attacks would include protection for Alaska, Hawaii and territories. As we can see on this diagram right now, Alaska comes into direct threat by India, China, et cetera, and now the administration sought to avoid protecting Alaska, avoid protecting Hawaii, and I think it is reprehensible to have that occur. It is time for us to recognize that Alaska and Hawaii are part of the United States and ought to be protected. In fact, we ought to set up our own missile system in Alaska so that we can counterattack in this uncertain time. I urge the passage of this legislation. Today I rise to introduce ``The All-American Resolution'' expressing the sense of the Congress that any missile defense system deployed to protect U.S. from missile attack should include protection for Alaska, Hawaii, territories and commonwealths of the United States. The U.S. Constitution provides that it is an essential responsibility of the federal government to protect to all United States citizens against foreign attack. However, the Administration's development plan is based on a policy of observing the restrictions of the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending all U.S. territory. As such, the plan excludes Alaska, Hawaii, and territories. While this legislation does not attempt to abrogate or amend the ABM Treaty, it does express the sense of Congress that space, sea, or land-based systems are required to include them and the commonwealths, when a system is deployed in the future. A year ago the Alaska State Legislature passed a resolution expressing the view of the people of Alaska that they, along with other Americans, should be defended against a missile attack. Why are Alaskans concerned about their vulnerability to missile attack? In 1995, the Administration adopted a national intelligence estimate (NIE) asserting that the U.S. did not face a threat of missile attack for at least 15 years. To arrive at this conclusion, the Administration excluded from the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) an assessment of the threat of missile attack to Alaska and Hawaii. Excluding Alaska and Hawaii from the NIE served to bypass an earlier assessment by then- Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch that territories in these two states could be subject to attack by a North Korean missile, the Taepo Dong 2, by the end of this decade. In fact, the Secretary of Defense issued a report titled Proliferation: Threat and Response (November 1997) which exemplifies the possible threat to Alaska from both North Korea and China. I believe it is reprehensible to prepare the NIE while leaving some Americans undefended in its pursuit of the most minimal missile defense capability possible. My resolution also provides that Alaska and Hawaii, territories and commonwealths must be included in any NIE prepared by the Administration. While Alaska and Hawaii were the only two states excluded from consideration under the NIE, most states and territories will be vulnerable as well. The Administration's missile defense plan calls for the development of a system in which a deployment decision may be made in 2000 and deployment completed by 2003. This could leave the vast majority of U.S. territory vulnerable to missile strikes. The Administration's policy views the ABM Treaty as ``the cornerstone of strategic stability.'' I will give a quick history of the ABM Treaty. Article I of the ABM Treaty barred the deployment of a national missile defense system capable of defending all the nations' territory. In fact, Article III of the Treaty, as amended by a 1974 Protocol, permitted the deployment of a single missile defense site that is capable of protecting only the region in which it is deployed. The U.S. designated Grand Forks, North Dakota as this site, although the system located there is mothballed. Taking the Grand Forks system out of mothballs and upgrading its capabilities may allow it to provide protection to all of America. Whether you agree with the ABM Treaty, or not, I believe we would all agree on the necessity to defend all of America, including Alaska, Hawaii, the territories and commonwealths from the threat of ballistic missile attacks. I call on all my colleagues who wish to see their constituents protected, to look seriously at the resolution introduced today. My friends, this act will improve the interests of all Americans, now and into the future.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2807, the Rhino and Tiger Product Labeling Act, a bill introduced by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans, Jim Saxton. There is no question that intense competition for land has resulted in the destruction of critical rhino and tiger habitat. After all, we are talking about some of the most densely populated countries in the world. Nevertheless, the major cause of the decline of rhinos and tigers is the huge ongoing demand for products made from these animals. For generations, Oriental medicines have contained ingredients of rhino and tiger parts that are consumed to fight headaches and fever in children, kidney and liver problems, convulsions, and heart conditions. In almost all cases, rhino horn and tiger bones are obtained from illegal sources. We must eliminate the market for these products and stop their importation into the United States. This is the goal of H.R. 2807. Instead of spending thousands of dollars trying to prove whether a particular Chinese medicine contains rhino or tiger parts, this legislation simply prohibits them from entering this country if the label says they contain these highly endangered species. By closing the U.S. market, the hope is that the demand for these products will end and the financial incentives to illegally kill rhino or tiger will no longer exist. Furthermore, there are synthetic alternatives to these products and it is essential that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service renew their educational efforts. Based on surveys conducted by the Wildlife Conservation Society, the majority of those people consuming traditional medicines have no idea they might be contributing to the destruction of these flagship species. I urge an aye vote on this bold wildlife conservation legislation which will hopefully stop the slaughter of rhinos and tigers in the wild. House of Representatives, Committee on ways and means, Washington, DC, April 23, 1998. Hon. Don Young, Chairman, Committee on Resources, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Don: I am writing to address certain issues with H.R. 2807, as reported by the Committee on Resources on March 11, 1998, which would amend the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of 1994. The bill contains import prohibition and Customs forfeiture provisions, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. With respect to the import ban, H.R. 2807, as reported by the Committee on Resources, prohibits any person from selling, importing or exporting or attempting to sell, import, or export any product, item or substance intended for human consumption containing or purporting to contain any substance derived from any species of rhinoceros or tiger, creates criminal and civil penalties, and allows for the forfeiture of such products. Because these provisions fall within the Committee's jurisdiction, the Committee would ordinarily meet to consider the bill. However, because the bill, as reported, applies the ban in compliance with the letter and spirit of U.S. obligations under an existing multilateral agreement governing such trade, I do not believe that a markup of the bill is necessary. With respect to forfeiture, section 2 of H.R. 2807, as reported, includes language within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Under normal circumstances the Committee would meet to consider the bill. However, it is my understanding that you will be offering an amendment on the floor of the House of Representatives to substitute the following language so that the existing statutory Customs forfeiture provisions would apply: (c) Forfeitures.--Any product, item, or substance sold, imported, or exported, or attempted to be sold, imported, or exported, contrary to the provisions of this Act or any regulation made pursuant thereto shall be sized and forfeited to the United States. All equipment, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, and other means of transportation used to aid the selling, exporting, or importing, or an attempt to sell, export, of any product, item, or substance in violation of this Act or any regulation issued pursuant to this Act, may be seized and forfeited to the United States. All laws relating to the seizure, forfeiture, and condemnation of a vessel for violation of the customs laws, the disposition of such vessel or the proceeds from the sale thereof, and the remission or mitigation of such forfeiture, shall apply to the seizures and forfeitures incurred under this Act, insofar as those laws are applicable and not inconsistent with this Act. Based on your assurances to this effect, and in order to expedite consideration of this legislation, I do not believe that a markup by the Committee on Ways and Means will be necessary on this issue. I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 2807, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the record during floor consideration. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance on this matter. With best personal regards, Bill Archer, Chairman.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Chairman, I would say just one thing. I was not going to get involved in this argument. But the concept that a judge can raise taxes on the public without due representation is inappropriate. Secondly, when we hear these scare tactics about clean water and clean air and all these good things in this bill, that is pure nonsense. States have the authority to do this to begin with. The States have the right to do it, and they should do it. I am going to suggest, I have seen small communities that EPA and other agencies have required to do certain things and they have gone broke. They have lost their schools, they lost other facilities in the infrastructure because of the agency saying they had to raise certain amounts of money to put in certain standards in that area. I am suggesting, respectfully, that this amendment is a mischievous amendment that will give back the authority for judges. And I do not particularly like judges to begin with. I want to tell my colleagues right now, especially those that are appointed and have a life expectancy. I think it is also time to let them recognize that the people should be represented in this Congress.