John Yarmuth

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Horsford), a distinguished member of the Budget Committee.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett), who is a distinguished member of the Budget Committee.

Mr. YARMUTH. We will have a floor debate as well. In regular order, the gentleman will go through the Rules Committee. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Jeffries), who is the chairman of the Democratic Caucus and a distinguished member of the Budget Committee.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining?

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), a distinguished member of the Budget Committee.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Sires), a distinguished member of the Budget Committee.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Chu), a distinguished member of the Budget Committee.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), another distinguished member of the Budget Committee.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I rise today to congratulate J. Gary Mudd, Vice President of Government and Community Affairs at the American Printing House for the Blind (APH), on his retirement. For more than 34 years, Gary has been a tireless advocate for thousands of students and adults who are blind or visually impaired. Gary has been the face of APH on Capitol Hill for decades. His approach to educating Members of Congress and their staff was to emphasize the importance of increased funding for the blind and visually impaired; demonstrating the many technologies developed by APH; and making clear how that investment helps expand educational opportunities for those without sight. Gary's determination, both personally and professionally, proved to all who know him that a blind man can achieve great success. Gary is a proud graduate of the University of Louisville where he received his Bachelor of Science Degree in Sociology. Gary was known to many on Capitol Hill, and his guide dogs were often more recognizable than their owner. When Gary called for an appointment, the first question was: ``Is the dog coming?'' Heathcliff was his first companion. When he passed away, Denver filled the coveted position. Not that we weren't pleased to see Gary, but his companions were always a highlight of the day. Gary was a valuable resource for members of the Capitol Hill community and was always available to answer any questions about educating the blind and visually impaired. Gary's accomplishments are many: he played a key leadership role on the APH executive board; helped establish the National Prison Braille Network--a partnership with the APH and prisons across the United States to learn braille to transcribe textbooks for blind students; and played an integral role at the APH Museum, the InSights Arts Competition, and the National Instructional Materials Accessibility Center resources services team. Gary was not only instrumental in ensuring that the APH facility was an accessible workplace for all, but also led the team to include accessibility for the blind for the Louisville Metro region to expand accessibility and technology for transit, buildings, and streets, and he worked tirelessly to help incorporate changes into city planning documents for our city. As Helen Keller said, ``The only thing worse than being blind is having sight but no vision.'' Gary's work at the APH demonstrated more than vision. He inspired others to join in his quest to provide the best for blind students, adults, and the visually impaired all over this great nation. I wish Gary the very best in retirement and send my good wishes to him, his wife Susan, daughters Kelly and Rachel, and grandchildren Cate, Carter, Davis, and Kase

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I unfortunately was unable to be present for a vote taken on the House floor on December 3, 2020. Had I been present, I would have voted in the following manner: Roll Call Vote No. 232: YEA.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act because it is an abomination that the people who keep me safe cause others to live in fear. I rise because I was Breonna Taylor's Congressman, and I will continue to represent her until she gets justice because Breonna Taylor, when her door was broken down after midnight, wasn't just killed by one cop, a bad apple, or even three. I rise because Breonna Taylor was killed by a system, a system that allowed police to blindly fire 22 shots, killing an unarmed woman in her home, and says that is not a crime. I rise because Breonna Taylor's story, though tragic, is not unique. Because far too often, that system is more interested in shielding those who perpetrate these atrocities than seeking justice for those it is meant to serve. And because, while tragedies like Breonna's are not uncommon, and millions must live in fear for their lives every single day--I am not one of them. People who look like me are not among them. I rise because this system is far too badly broken for Band-Aid solutions. And this bill, the most dramatic rethinking of policing ever to come before the United States Congress, is a much-needed and long- overdue step. And every day we delay will cost more lives. I rise because hundreds of thousands have risen up and made their voices heard and shown me the way. And most importantly, I rise because Black lives matter.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I unfortunately was unable to be present for votes taken on the House Floor on February 26, 2020. Had I been present, I would have voted in the following manner: Roll Call Vote No. 71: YEA; Roll Call Vote No. 72: YEA; and Roll Call Vote No. 73: YEA.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record the December 10, 2018 Government Accountability Office's decision confirming Congress' power of the purse by concluding that, while the Impoundment Control Act does, under limited circumstances, allow the President to withhold money for up to 45 congressional session days, the President cannot freeze the money for so long that it can no longer be used. I am submitting this in the Record to help inform the public of the Administration's systematic disregard of Congress' constitutional authority, separation of powers principles, and the Impoundment Control Act. GAO, U.S. Government Accountability Office, December 10, 2018. Subject: Impoundment Control Act--Withholding of Funds through Their Date of Expiration Hon. Steve Womack, Chairman, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives. Hon. John Yarmuth, Ranking Member, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives. This responds to your request for our legal opinion regarding the scope of the authority provided under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA) to withhold budget authority from obligation pending congressional consideration of a rescission proposal. Pub. L. No. 93-344, title X, 88 Stat. 297, 332 (July 12, 1974), amended by Pub. L. No. 100- 119, title II, Sec. Sec. 206, 207, 101 Stat. 754, 785 (Sept. 29, 1987), classified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 681-688; Letter from Representative Steve Womack, Chairman, and Representative John Yarmuth, Ranking Member, House Committee on the Budget, to Comptroller General (Oct. 31, 2018). Under limited circumstances, the ICA allows the President to withhold amounts from obligation for up to 45 calendar days of continuous congressional session. See ICA, Sec. 1012(b); 2 U.S.C. Sec. 683(b). At issue here is whether the Act allows such a withholding of a fixed-period appropriation scheduled to expire within the prescribed 45-day period to continue through the date on which the funds would expire. As discussed below, we conclude that the ICA does not permit the withholding of funds through their date of expiration. The statutory text and legislative history of the ICA, Supreme Court case law, and the overarching constitutional framework of the legislative and executive powers provide no basis to interpret the ICA as a mechanism by which the President may unilaterally abridge the enacted period of availability of a fixed-period appropriation. The Constitution vests in Congress the power of the purse, and Congress did not cede this important power through the ICA. Instead, the terms of the ICA are strictly limited. The ICA permits only the temporary withholding of budget authority and provides that unless Congress rescinds the amounts at issue, they must be made available for obligation. The President cannot rely on the authority in the ICA to withhold amounts from obligation, while simultaneously disregarding the ICA's limitations. In accordance with our regular practice, we contacted the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for its legal views on this matter. GAO, Procedures and Practices for Legal Decisions and Opinions, GAO-06-1064SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2006), available at www.gao.gov/ products/GAO-06-1064SP; Letter from General Counsel, GAO, to General Counsel, OMB (Nov. 1, 2018). In response, OMB provided its legal analysis. Letter from General Counsel, OMB, to General Counsel, GAO (Nov. 16, 2018) (Response Letter). background The Constitution specifically vests Congress with the power of the purse, providing that ``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.'' U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7. The Constitution also vests all legislative powers in Congress and sets forth the procedures of bicameralism and presentment, through which the President may accept or veto a bill passed by both houses of Congress and Congress may subsequently override a presidential veto. Id., art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2, 3. The procedures of bicameralism and presentment form the only mechanism for enacting federal law. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (``[T]he prescription for legislative action in Art. I, Sec. Sec. 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.''). The Constitution also vests Congress with power to make all laws ``necessary and proper'' to implement its constitutional authorities. U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 18. To that end, Congress has enacted several permanent statutes that govern the use of appropriations, including the Antideficiency Act, which provides that agencies may incur obligations or make expenditures only when sufficient amounts are available in an appropriation. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1341. Because agencies may incur obligations only in accordance with appropriations made by law, and because the Constitution vests all lawmaking power in Congress, only appropriations duly enacted through the constitutional processes of bicameralism and presentment authorize agencies to incur obligations or make expenditures. The Presentment Clauses allow the President to veto an appropriations bill before it becomes law. See Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2, 3. However, the Constitution provides no mechanism for the President to invalidate a duly enacted law. Instead, the Constitution requires the President to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' U.S. Const., art. II, Sec. 3; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (the Constitution does not authorize the President ``to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes''). An appropriation is a law like any other; therefore, unless Congress has enacted a law providing otherwise, the President must take care to ensure that appropriations are prudently obligated during their period of availability. See B-329092, Dec. 12, 2017 (noting that the ICA operates on the premise that the President is required to obligate funds appropriated by Congress, unless otherwise authorized to withhold). An ``impoundment'' is any action or inaction by an officer or employee of the federal government that precludes obligation or expenditure of budget authority. GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2005), at 61. The President has no unilateral authority to withhold funds from obligation. See B-135564, July 26, 1973. The ICA, however, allows the President to impound budget authority in limited circumstances. The President may temporarily withhold funds from obligation--but not beyond the end of the fiscal year--by proposing a ``deferral.'' ICA, Sec. 1013; 2 U.S.C. Sec. 684. The President may also seek the permanent cancellation of funds for fiscal policy or other reasons, including the termination of programs for which Congress has provided budget authority, by proposing a ``rescission.'' ICA, Sec. 1012; 2 U.S.C. Sec. 683. When the President transmits a special message proposing a rescission of budget authority (a rescission proposal) in accordance with the ICA, amounts proposed for rescission may be impounded (that is, withheld from obligation) for a period of 45 calendar days of continuous congressional session. See ICA, Sec. 1012; 2 U.S.C. Sec. 683. The Act states that such amounts ``shall be made available for obligation unless, within the prescribed 45- day period, the Congress has completed action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved.'' ICA, Sec. 1012(b); 2 U.S.C. Sec. 683(b). Section 1017 of the ICA establishes expedited procedures to facilitate Congress's consideration of a rescission bill during the 45-day period. ICA, Sec. 1017; 2 U.S.C. Sec. 688. This opinion focuses on the withholding of amounts pursuant to a rescission proposal. discussion The ICA authorizes the President to withhold funds from obligation under limited circumstances. At issue here is whether the ICA allows the withholding of a fixed-period appropriation, pursuant to the President's transmission of a rescission proposal, to continue through the date on which the funds would expire. powers granted by the ica are limited To interpret the ICA, we begin with the text of the statute and give ordinary meaning to statutory terms, unless otherwise defined. Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369,376 (2013); BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006). Section 1012(b) states that funds proposed to be rescinded ``shall be made available for obligation unless, within the prescribed 45-day period, the Congress has completed action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be rescinded . . . .'' Use of the conjunction ``unless'' denotes that the clause that follows provides an exception to the rule that precedes the term. See American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2009) (defining ``unless'' as ``except on the condition that'' and ``except under the circumstances that''). Further, ``shall,'' in the context of a statute, generally means ``must.'' Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (defining shall as ``the equivalent of `must,' where appearing in a statute''). See also Western Minnesota Municipal Power Agency v. FERC, 806 F.3d. 588, 592 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (``shall give preference'' was a mandatory directive to the commission); Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 473 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting `` `shall' is a mandatory, not permissive form''). The phrase ``shall be made available'' thus constitutes a mandatory directive that funds proposed for rescission be made available for obligation, and the term ``unless'' denotes the single exception to this requirement. The text of section 1012(b) then provides that the only mechanism that permits budget authority to be permanently withheld is Congress's completion of action on a rescission bill within the 45-day period. An appropriation is available to incur new obligations only during its period of availability, which, for a fixed-period appropriation, is a finite period of time. See 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1551(a)(3). See also 31 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1501, 1502 (obligation of a fixed-period appropriation must correspond to the bona fide needs of the appropriation's period of availability and must be executed before the end of such period). For example, an agency may use a one-year appropriation to obligate the government for expenses properly chargeable to that year, or may use a multiple-year appropriation to obligate the government for expenses properly chargeable to that multiple-year period. But the government may not incur obligations against such appropriations after the relevant time frame, as the budget authority's period of availability would have ended. Immediately after the period of availability for obligation of a fixed-period appropriation ends, the budget authority is ``expired'' and no longer available to incur new obligations. Glossary, at 23 (defining expired budget authority). See also 18 Comp. Gen. 969 (1939). An expired account is only available to record, to adjust, and to liquidate obligations properly chargeable to that account during the account's period of availability. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1553(a). Notably, the permissible uses of an expired appropriation relate back to obligations incurred during the period of availability of the funds and do not constitute new obligations themselves. The plain language of section 1012(b) provides that absent Congress's completion of action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part of amounts proposed to be rescinded within the prescribed 45-day period, such amounts must be made available for obligation. The authority to withhold is not severable from the provision's requirement regarding the release of the funds. Indeed, the provision permits a temporary withholding of budget authority, and otherwise requires its availability for obligation in all other circumstances. As budget authority is available to incur obligations only during its period of availability, implicit in the ICA's requirement under section 1012(b) that budget authority be ``made available for obligation'' is that such budget authority must not be expired. Because a fixed-period appropriation is current only for a definite period of time, section 1012(b) of the ICA requires that if Congress does not enact a rescission bill, the appropriation must be made available for obligation during that finite period. After this finite period has ended, the appropriation is expired and cannot be available for new obligations. Consequently, the ICA does not permit budget authority proposed for rescission to be withheld until its expiration simply because the 45-day period has not yet elapsed. A withholding of this nature would be an aversion both to the constitutional process for enacting federal law and to Congress's constitutional power of the purse, for the President would preclude the obligation of budget authority Congress has already enacted and did not rescind. For example, consider a situation where fiscal year budget authority is withheld pursuant to a special message submitted less than 45 days before the end of the fiscal year and where, upon conclusion of the 45-day period, Congress has not completed action on a corresponding rescission bill. An interpretation of section 1012(b) that would permit the withholding of such budget authority for the duration of the 45-day period would result in the expiration of the funds during that period. The expired amounts then could not be made available for obligation despite Congress not having completed action on a bill rescinding the amounts, as expired appropriations are not available for obligation. The ICA represents an agreement between the legislative and executive branches, whereby the President may withhold budget authority for a limited period during which Congress may consider the corresponding proposal to rescind the amounts using expedited procedures. The expiration of these amounts would frustrate the design of the ICA, as it would contravene the plain meaning of section 1012(b), which requires that amounts not rescinded during this period of consideration be ``made available for obligation.'' Regardless of whether the 45-day period for congressional consideration provided in the ICA approaches or spans the date on which funds would expire, section 1012(b) requires that budget authority be made available in sufficient time to be prudently obligated. The amount of time required for prudent obligation will vary from one program to another. In some programs, prudent obligation may require hours or days, while others may require weeks or months. We have previously signaled that the consequence of an unenacted rescission proposal should be the full and prudent obligation of the budget authority. B-115398, Aug. 27, 1976. In 1976, the President submitted a special message for which the 45-day period would end on September 29, 1976, leaving one day to obligate appropriations that were withheld. Id. We noted this one-day period could be insufficient to prudently obligate the funds. Id. We found the timing of the proposal ``particularly troublesome'' as it could ``operate to deny to the Congress the expected consequence of its rejecting a rescission proposal--the full and prudent use of the budget authority.'' Id. We have drawn similar conclusions concerning deferrals under the ICA. In such cases we have noted that deferred funds must be released in sufficient time to allow them to be prudently obligated. See B-216664, Apr. 12, 1985 (emphasizing that deferral, under the President's sixth special message for fiscal year 1985, of amounts scheduled to expire should not extend beyond the point at which the funds could be prudently obligated). See also 54 Comp. Gen. 453 (1974) (recognizing that a deferral of budget authority that ``could be expected with reasonable certainty to lapse before [it] could be obligated, or would have to be obligated imprudently to avoid that consequence'' constitutes a de facto rescission, and must be reclassified as a rescission proposal). The legislative history of the ICA supports this construction of section 1012(b). During consideration of the report of the committee of conference on H.R. 7130, 93rd Cong. (1974), which was ultimately enacted into law as the ICA, members recognized that affirmative congressional action is required for a rescission of funds under the language of section 1012. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., the sponsor of a related bill, stated regarding section 1012: ``[The purpose) is to provide an orderly method by which differences of opinion may be reconciled between the President and Congress in respect to the amounts of appropriations sought . . . The recommendation of the President that an appropriation be eliminated or reduced in and of itself would have no legal effect whatsoever. In other words, for it to become effective, both Houses of Congress, by a majority vote, would have to take action either eliminating the appropriation or reducing the appropriation . . . I might say that the 45-day provision is placed in the bill for the purpose of spurring speedy congressional action, but with recognition of the fact that Congress cannot deprive itself of any other power it has under the Constitution.'' 120 Cong. Rec. 20,473 (June 21, 1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (emphasis added). As one member stated succinctly when discussing similar language: ``the impoundment fails unless Congress acts affirmatively.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 15,236 (May 10, 1973) (statement of Sen. Roth) (debating S. 373, which would have required an impoundment to cease within 60 days unless it had been ratified by Congress). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1101, at 76 (1974); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-924, at 76 (1974) (``Unless both Houses of Congress complete action on a rescission bill within 45 days, the budget authority shall be made available for obligation.''). Congress considered bill language under which an impoundment would have continued indefinitely unless Congress took specific action to affirmatively disapprove of the impoundment. H.R. 8480, 93rd Cong. (1973) (providing that an impoundment ``shall cease if within [60] calendar days of continuous session after the date on which the message is received by the Congress the specific impoundment shall have been disapproved by either House . . .'' (emphasis added)). However, Congress did not enact such language. Instead, Congress enacted legislation under which an impoundment becomes permanent only if Congress enacts appropriate legislation through the processes of bicameralism and presentment. Under the Constitution, the President must take care to execute the appropriations that Congress has enacted. Though the ICA permits the President to withhold amounts from obligation under limited circumstances, the amounts are permanently rescinded only if Congress takes affirmative legislative action through the constitutional processes of bicameralism and presentment. One must read the ICA as a whole. The Act outlines a process, and affords the President limited authority to withhold appropriated amounts while Congress expedites its consideration of the President's legislative proposal to rescind the already enacted appropriations. It would be an abuse of this limited authority and an interference with Congress's constitutional prerogatives if a President were to time the withholding of expiring budget authority to effectively alter the time period that the budget authority is available for obligation from the time period established by Congress in duly enacted appropriations legislation. It would be inimical to the ICA and to its constitutional underpinnings for the executive to avail itself of the withholding authority in the ICA, but to ignore the remainder of the process. See generally B-330376, Nov. 30, 2018 (citing NROC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 205 (2d Cir. 2004)) (finding that agencies ``cannot have it both ways,'' claiming both the benefit of adhering to a statutory provision, while simultaneously arguing that the requirements of the provision do not apply). Therefore, amounts proposed for rescission must be made available for prudent obligation before the amounts expire, even where the 45-day period for congressional consideration provided in the ICA approaches or spans the date on which funds would expire: the requirement to make amounts available for obligation in this situation prevails over the privilege to temporarily withhold the amounts. OMB asserts that the ICA does not preclude an impoundment from persisting through the date on which amounts would expire. Response Letter, at 2. Specifically, OMB relies on the purported silence of section 1012 with regard to the President's ability to propose rescissions under the ICA late in the fiscal year, as compared to the language in section 1013, which governs the deferral of budget authority. Id. In particular, section 1013 states that a deferral ``may not be proposed for any period of time extending beyond the end of the fiscal year in which the special message proposing the deferral is transmitted to the House and the Senate[,]'' and also provides that the provisions of the section, which necessarily includes this proscription, do not apply to amounts proposed for rescission under section 1012. ICA, Sec. Sec. 1013(a), (c); 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 684(a), (c). According to OMB, these distinctions demonstrate that section 1012 does not require the President to make withheld budget authority available for obligation before the end of the fiscal year. Response Letter, at 1. Under OMB's rationale, the ICA grants the President authority to withhold funds for the entire 45-day period, even if such withholding would result in the expiration of impounded balances. We disagree with OMB's position. As a practical matter, OMB's interpretation of the ICA would grant the President unilateral authority to rescind funds that are near expiration by altering the time period that the budget authority is available for obligation from the time period established in existing law. Suppose the President were to transmit a special message less than 45 days before amounts are due to expire. In OMB's view, an impoundment could continue through the funds' date of expiration--at which point the funds would no longer be available for new obligations. Therefore, fiscal year funds proposed for rescission in a special message late in the fiscal year, even if not legally rescinded by the enactment of legislation, would be effectively rescinded if Congress takes no action at all. In OMB's view, only through affirmative legislative action could Congress prevent the rescission of funds that the President proposes for rescission in a special message transmitted close to the date on which the funds would expire. OMB's reading of the ICA would preempt the congressional process by which the budget authority's period of availability was established, fundamentally ceding Congress's power of the purse to the President. This interpretation would contradict the plain meaning of section 1012, which, by its terms, requires that amounts not rescinded through a rescission bill be made available for obligation. As previously discussed, this requirement that amounts be made available for obligation already limits the time frame during which such amounts may be permissibly withheld; there is no need in section 1012 for language that specifically prohibits amounts from being withheld beyond the end of the fiscal year. In addition, the legislative history of the ICA indicates that the distinctions between section 1012 and section 1013, on which OMB relies, do not carry the implications that OMB suggests. See 120 Cong. Rec. at 20,473 (statements of Sen. Ervin and Sen. McClellan) (discussing distinction between deferral and rescission proposals). Unlike a rescission proposal, through which the President seeks the permanent cancellation of budget authority and may temporarily withhold amounts pending congressional consideration, the ultimate objective of a deferral proposal is a temporary withholding only. Section 1013 was crafted to govern this temporary withholding of budget authority and, thus, specifies that amounts may not be withheld beyond the end fiscal year. See id. In contrast, section 1012 limits withholding to the prescribed 45-day period, absent Congress's completion of a bill rescinding the amounts proposed for rescission. Neither does section 1013(c), which provides that the provisions of section 1013 do not apply to rescission proposals submitted under section 1012, support OMB's position that there is no restriction on when the President may submit a rescission proposal. Rather, section 1013(c) was intended to clarify that any action that would seek the permanent cancellation of budget authority must be governed by the more stringent provisions of section 1012. See id. (statement of Sen. Ervin) (``Any action or proposal which results in a permanent withholding of budget authority must be proposed under section 1012. Section 1013(c) specifically provides that section 1013 does not apply to cases to which section 1012 applies. Only temporary withholding may be proposed under section 1013 . . .''). Through the ICA, Congress did not grant the President the extraordinarily broad rescissions authority that OMB asserts. Indeed, the ICA grants the President no authority whatsoever to rescind funds. The Act allows the President to transmit legislative proposals for rescission to Congress, while granting the President authority to withhold the funds for limited periods of time while Congress considers the proposals. Congress considered, and did not enact, language that would have granted the President authority to propose rescissions that would take permanent effect if Congress took no action. Instead, as we discussed above, under the ICA only Congress may rescind budget authority. Under the Constitution, Congress enacts laws, and the President must take care to faithfully execute the terms of those laws, including appropriations acts. Within this framework, Congress enacted the ICA, which granted the President strictly circumscribed authority to temporarily withhold funds from obligation. The overarching constitutional framework of the executive and legislative powers, as well as the statutory text and legislative history of the ICA, provide no basis to construe the ICA as a mechanism by which the President may, in effect, unilaterally shorten the availability of budget authority by transmitting strategically-timed special messages. Rather, amounts proposed for rescission must be made available for prudent obligation before the amounts expire, even where the 45-day period for congressional consideration in the ICA approaches or spans the date on which the funds would expire. prior opinions We have previously considered situations in which the President transmitted special messages concerning amounts that were near their date of expiration. We have intimated that in such a situation, the President may withhold the budget authority from obligation for the duration of the 45- day period, and that Congress must take affirmative action to prevent the withheld funds from expiring. See, e.g., B- 115398, Dec. 15, 1975. In some instances we have simply noted that funds may expire, without stating whether the funds were properly withheld or reporting that they must be made available for obligation. See, e.g., B-115398, Aug. 27, 1976. See also B-220532, Sept. 19, 1986 (reclassifying deferral as rescission proposal, recognizing potential for funds to expire before being able to be obligated for intended purpose). As we explain below, in light of Supreme Court precedent and subsequent amendments to the ICA, we overrule these prior opinions. In the President's second special message for fiscal year 1976, submitted on July 26, 1975, he included two rescission proposals of budget authority scheduled to expire on September 30, 1975. B-115398, Aug. 12, 1975. In our review of the special message, we stated that these amounts would lapse nearly a month before expiration of the 45-day period, B- 115398, Aug. 12, 1975, and, in a subsequent report on the status of funds, confirmed the amounts had in fact lapsed during the 45-day period, B-115398, Dec. 15, 1975. In our report on the status of the funds, we stated that ``having to wait 45 days of continuous session before it can be determined that a proposed rescission has been rejected is a major deficiency of the [ICA].'' B-115398, Dec. 15, 1975. We offered that Congress should have an affirmative means within the Act to address scenarios such as this, by, for example ``changing the Act to allow a rescission resolution as is now allowed for deferrals, or changing the Act to prevent funds from lapsing where the 45-day period has not expired.'' Id. We stated that with respect to the two rescission proposals, ``Congress was unable, under the Act, to reject the rescission in time to prevent the budget authority from lapsing.'' Id. When the ICA was enacted, it required deferred funds to be made available if either house of Congress passed an ``impoundment resolution'' disapproving of the deferral. Pub. L. No. 93-344, Sec. 1013(b) (prior to 1987 amendment). In 1975, we suggested that Congress create an analogous process to enable rejection of a rescission proposal. B- 115398, Dec. 15, 1975. However, our statement predated INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, in which the Supreme Court held a one- house veto provision to be unconstitutional because it was an exercise of legislative power that circumvented the procedures of bicameralism and presentment. The deferral provision in the ICA was later eliminated in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-119, title II, Sec. 206. Our 1975 opinions are based on the premise that Congress could amend the ICA to provide Congress with a unilateral mechanism to reject a rescission proposal. In addition to Chadha, other Supreme Court decisions also have resoundingly invalidated this premise. See Clinton, 524 U.S. 417, 438-41; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-58. As the Court made clear in Clinton, the Constitution vests the President with authority to ``initiate and influence legislative proposals.'' 524 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added). A rescission proposal is one such legislative proposal. The rescission proposal does not have the force of law: ``[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.'' Id. Because bicameral passage by Congress is necessary for the President's proposal to become law, no congressional action is necessary to invalidate the President's proposal. Without affirmative congressional action, the President's proposal remains just that: a proposal. Our 1975 opinions intimate that, under some circumstances, congressional inaction on a rescission proposal can be tantamount to affirmative congressional action to enact the rescission proposal. This interpretation would, in effect, give the President power to amend or to repeal previously enacted appropriations merely by calibrating the timing of the submission of a special message. This interpretation is clearly contrary to the Supreme Court's rulings in Chadha and Clinton. See 524 U.S. at 448-49; 462 U.S. at 951-58. Therefore, we overrule our prior inconsistent opinions. conclusion The terms of the ICA are strictly limited. They vest in the President limited authority to propose a rescission of budget authority and to withhold such budget authority from obligation for a limited time period during which Congress may avail itself of expedited procedures to consider the proposal. However, the statutory text and legislative history of the ICA, Supreme Court case law, and the overarching constitutional framework of legislative and executive powers provide no basis to construe the ICA as a mechanism by which the President may, in effect, unilaterally shorten the availability of budget authority by transmitting rescission proposals shortly before amounts are due to expire. To dedicate such broad authority to the President would have required affirmative congressional action in legislation, not congressional silence. See, e.g., B-303961, Dec. 6, 2004 (declining to interpret a general ``notwithstanding'' clause to imply a waiver of the Antideficiency Act without indication that Congress intended to relinquish its ``strongest means'' to enforce its power of the purse). To paraphrase the Supreme Court, Congress does not alter the fundamental details of its constitutional power of the purse through vague terms or ancillary provisions-- ``it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.'' See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (declining to interpret a statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain meaning). A construction of the ICA that would permit the withholding of funds proposed for rescission through their date of expiration would be precisely this elephant. Though the ICA permits the President to withhold amounts from obligation under limited circumstances, the amounts are rescinded only if Congress takes affirmative legislative action through the constitutional processes of bicameralism and presentment. Therefore, amounts proposed for rescission must be made available for prudent obligation before the amounts expire, even where the 45-day period for congressional consideration in the ICA approaches or spans the date on which the funds would expire. We overrule prior inconsistent GAO opinions. Sincerely, Thomas H. Armstrong, General Counsel.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record the December 2019 House Budget Committee report outlining the timeline of actions taken by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the seemingly unprecedented step of stripping career officials of their normal role in the apportionment process, and how the OMB's actions hindered agencies' ability to obligate funds by the end of the fiscal year. I am submitting this in the Record to help inform the public of the Administration's systematic disregard of Congress' constitutional authority, separation of powers principles, and the Impoundment Control Act. On September 27, House Budget Chairman John Yarmuth (KY-03) and House Appropriations Chairwoman Nita Lowey (NY-17) sent a letter to the Trump administration expressing ``serious concerns'' that recent actions taken by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) constitute unlawful impoundments and are an abuse of the authority delegated to OMB to apportion appropriations. As part of the committees' efforts to ensure Congress maintains the power of the purse, as established in the Constitution, the Chairs requested documents and answers regarding OMB's involvement in the withholding of foreign aid, including nearly $400 million in crucial security assistance funding for Ukraine. The committees received a partial production from OMB, however, OMB failed to meet the committees' deadlines and has not provided the bulk of the documents.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record the letter to the Office of Management and Budget questioning the Trump Administration for declaring bogus national emergencies to usurp funds Congress appropriated for military construction and counternarcotic initiatives to use for the President's border wall. I am submitting this in the Record to help inform the public of the Administration's systematic disregard of Congress' constitutional authority, separation of powers principles, and the lmpoundment Control Act. March 8, 2019. The Hon. Russell Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget. Dear Acting Director Vought: The President's announcement to spend up to $6.725 billion in additional funding for construction of a border wall or barrier came at the end of bipartisan negotiations on an agreed-to funding level of $1.375 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 for border security. The executive action plan further specified that the $6.725 billion would be used sequentially as follows: $601 million from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund, up to $2.5 billion under the Department of Defense funds transferred for Support for Counterdrug Activities (10 U.S.C. Sec. 284), and up to $3.6 billion reallocated from Department of Defense military construction projects under the President's declaration of a national emergency (10 U.S.C. Sec. 2808). However, important budgetary details of the plan have not yet been provided, including the specific funding sources and additional authorities that would be used and the programs, projects, and activities from which funds would be diverted. As the Article I branch, it is essential that Congress remains at the center of funding decisions, especially decisions that Congress has spent considerable time debating and negotiating. We have significant concerns with the Administration's plan, and we are frustrated by the lack of transparency from the Administration. Congress should receive adequate information to consider the use of the $6.725 billion referenced in the President's executive action plan. The executive action plan also needs to be considered in the context of fast-approaching deadlines for a budget resolution and decisions about the discretionary cap levels for the appropriations process, as well as for Article I equities more broadly. To that end, we request that you provide the following documents and information: 1. All documents prepared for or relating to meetings about or decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director, Acting Director, Deputy Director, Associate Director(s), Deputy Associate Director(s), or any other OMB or White House official or staff concerning the President's executive action plan to use up to $6.725 billion to build a border wall, including statements of conclusions and background materials, received or produced by OMB in relation to interagency meetings or discussions relating to the President's executive action plan. 2. All documents relating to the budgetary details of the President's executive action plan to use up to $6.725 billion to build a border wall, including information on all affected appropriations and Treasury Appropriation Fund Symbols (TAFS) by fiscal year and by program, project, or activity. 3. All documents since January 20, 2017 relating to any OMB Budget Data Request or any other OMB request to agencies to identify funding available to build a border wall or to otherwise fund border security or counterdrug activities at the border. 4. All documents relating to the authorized, planned, or intended use of the $6.725 billion prior to any consideration or determination that such amounts may be used instead to build a border wall, including all documents relating to: a. The authorized, planned, or intended use of the ``first tranche'' of approximately $242 million to be expended under the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF); b. The authorized, planned, or intended use of the ``second tranche'' of approximately $359 million to be expended under the TFF; c. The authorized, planned, or intended use of the approximately $2.5 billion under the Department of Defense funds transferred for Support for Counterdrug Activities under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284; d. The authorized, planned, or intended use of the approximately $3.6 billion reallocated from the Department of Defense military construction projects under the President's declaration of a national emergency pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2808. 5. Any documents, including any guidance or instructions to agencies, relating to the de-obligation of funds, delay in obligation or expenditure, or any other change in the rate of obligation and expenditure involving the potential or planned use of such funds to carry out the President's executive action plan. 6. All documents relating to any spend plan for any appropriation account affected or relevant to the President's executive action plan to use up to $6.725 billion to build a border wall, including documents exchanged between or among OMB and the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, or the Department of the Treasury. 7. All documents relating to each apportionment and reapportionment for FY 2019, including department or agency requests to OMB, for each affected or relevant TAFS related to the President's executive action plan. This also includes all apportionment and reapportionment documentation for any TAFS from which funds would be contributed, to which funds would be contributed, from which transfers would be made, to which transfers would be made, in which transfers or reprogrammings would occur, or that is otherwise relevant in tallying (a) the ``$601 million'' amount described by the Administration from the TFF; (b) the ``up to $2.5 billion'' amount described by the Administration pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 284; and (c) the ``up to $3.6 billion'' amount described by the Administration pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2808. 8. All documents relating to the legal or programmatic basis upon which OMB apportions or reapportions any TAFS to carry out the President's executive action plan, including any Administration legal opinion(s) prepared in whole or in part by, or in consultation with, OMB, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the National Security Council, or the White House Counsel's Office. 9. All documents relating to the potential, planned, or completed obligations or outlays incurred for each appropriation and TAFS or any other budget execution steps to carry out the President's executive action plan or in anticipation of potential use related to the plan. 10. All other documents relating to the President's executive action plan, including documents relating to (a) the Department of Homeland Security's identification of priorities for potential construction of a border wall and the relation to supporting the use of the armed forces, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2808; (b) the Department of Homeland Security's request of support from the Department of Defense pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 284 and any response from the Department of Defense; and (c) any contractual awards or modifications or any other changes to contracting to carry out the President's executive action plan. While the President has issued a national emergency proclamation, our committees are still responsible for performing their constitutional oversight responsibilities. As such, given the speed with which we believe the Administration may be acting in response to the emergency proclamation, we request that you produce the requested documents and information no later than March 22, 2019. We appreciate your time and attention to this urgent matter. Sincerely, John Yarmuth, Chairman, House Committee on the Budget. Mike Quigley, Chairman, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government. Nita M. Lowey, Chairwoman, House Appropriations Committee. Lucille Roybal-Allard, Chairwoman, House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record the Government Accountability Office's January 16, 2020 legal opinion finding that the Trump Administration's Office of Management and Budget violated the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 by withholding foreign aid. I am submitting this in the Record to help inform the public of the Administration's systematic disregard of Congress' constitutional authority, separation of powers principles, and the Impoundment Control Act. Gao Decision Matter of: Office of Management and Budget--Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance. File: B-331564. Date: January 16, 2020.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Earlier today, the Congressional Budget Office released its updated budget and economic outlook for the next decade. This report once again confirms that, despite the economic expansion he inherited, the fiscal outlook has worsened since President Trump took office. Under President Trump, deficits have risen to heights not usually seen outside of recessions and major world wars. They have increased every year, an unusual trend given that deficits tend to fall as unemployment rises. In fact, the deficit in 2019 was the highest since 2012, when we were recovering from the Great Recession and the unemployment was 8 percent, more than double today's rate. As a result of these deficits, the national debt has climbed higher and faster than CBO projected at the end of the Obama administration. Perhaps we shouldn't be surprised. After all, this is the same President who proclaimed just last week, ``Who the hell cares about the budget?'' The record is clear that he doesn't. On their face, these fiscal facts might not be so concerning if one forgets about the multitude of deficits we face in the real economy: crumbling infrastructure, skyrocketing healthcare costs, widening student achievement gaps, warming climate, lower life expectancy. In light of these and other problems, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that we should be making bolder investments in American families and our Nation's future. But President Trump didn't use our fiscal space to repair the roads and bridges that support our economy, to reduce drug prices for working families, or to bolster our environmental resilience in the face of the defining threat of a generation. No, President Trump and Republicans in Congress ran up our tab with a $1.9 trillion tax cut--if you add interest, $2.3 trillion-- that showered benefits on corporations and the wealthy. Madam Speaker, that $1.9 trillion had little meaningful impact on the economy, other than increasing our already shameful income inequality. Madam Speaker, that $1.9 trillion could have been, but was not, put toward making childcare more affordable, college education more accessible, and retirement security more achievable for American families. Making this situation far worse, President Trump is once again suggesting that he will offset the deficits that his signature policy exploded by cutting Social Security and Medicare, taking money right out of the pockets of America's seniors and forcing them to foot his bill. Our economy and budget face difficult times ahead. An aging population and rising healthcare costs mean economic growth is projected to be slower and deficits are expected to be larger going forward. Addressing this issue over the next several decades will require a balanced approach that includes a fair tax system. President Trump has taken us precisely in the wrong direction by adding trillions to the debt for a tax giveaway for the rich that yielded little in return for everyone else. He is squandering the chance to lay the groundwork for a more productive and equitable economy. Despite these challenges, we still have the opportunity to make responsible investments in the American people, our infrastructure, and the environment, investments that reflect our values, promote a stronger economic and fiscal outlook, and move our Nation forward. As chairman of the Budget Committee, I have stressed that we need to think seriously about severe and persistent deficits in the real economy, not just deficits in the budget. That doesn't mean that we can spend tax dollars without thought or discretion, but it does require that we use our Nation's resources, including our deficits, more wisely than this administration has. It means prioritizing policies that improve the living standards of current and future generations that support those most in need and help mitigate the challenges American families are facing today and the challenges they may face tomorrow.

Mr. YARMUTH

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on my Special Order.

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, a week from today, we will hear about the state of our Union from an impeached President who has repeatedly shown a complete disregard for the principles on which that union was founded. President Trump has brazenly trampled the constitutional boundaries of executive power, damaging the foundation of our democracy. He shamelessly betrayed his oath of office by putting his own corrupt agenda before our national security. His withholding of aid to Ukraine has dominated the news, but the administration's willingness to pervert our laws for President Trump's ego, personal vendettas, and political gains goes much deeper. Earlier this month, the nonpartisan U.S. Government Accountability Office, or GAO, issued a legal opinion stating that Trump's Office of Management and Budget, OMB, violated Federal law, specifically the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, by withholding foreign aid. Madam Speaker, I will include that opinion in the Record. As chairman of the Budget Committee, which has jurisdiction over this law, it is my responsibility to provide the full story to the American people and to Members of Congress so that we can all fully understand what is happening to our government. To start with, this violation of Federal law was not an innocent mistake. Withholding Ukrainian aid was an intentional and brazen abuse of power. This quid pro quo is the most egregious example that we know of, but the Budget Committee has been concerned by OMB's questionable behavior and apparent violations of the Impoundment Control Act for some time. A deeper look clearly reveals how methodically the President and his administration have been circumventing our laws to advance their authoritarian view of executive power. To understand their scheme, we must understand the law they tried to secretly dodge and ultimately broke, the Impoundment Control Act. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to appropriate our tax dollars, while the President's administration carries out these spending decisions. It is a simple but incredibly important check on executive power. In 1974, Congress passed the Impoundment Control Act, the ICA, in response to another law-breaking President, President Nixon. By refusing to spend congressionally appropriated funds for programs he opposed, such as funding for clean drinking water, Nixon's administration was impounding funds. An impoundment means any action or inaction that prevents Federal funds from being obligated or spent, either temporarily or permanently. By passing the ICA, Congress reasserted its constitutional power of the purse by establishing procedures to block the President and other government officials from substituting their own funding decisions for those of Congress. It created two pathways the executive branch can use to reduce, delay, or eliminate congressionally appropriated funding: They can propose to cancel funding, which is known as a recision, or delay funding, which is a deferral, but both must meet strict requirements. For example, if the President wants to eliminate funding for a specific program, he must first secure congressional approval to cancel that funding. The ICA requires that the President send a special message to Congress identifying the amount of, the reasons for, and the effects of a proposed recision. After submitting this special message, the President can withhold those funds for up to 45 legislative session days while Congress considers the request. But if Congress does not pass a law to cancel those funds within that 45-day period, those funds must be released. So even with this process, the President cannot cancel funding without Congress' explicit approval. Also, the President cannot use the recisions process to run out the fiscal year clock, in other words, to withhold funds for so long that they can no longer be used. We will come back to recision, so keep this in mind. Now, the ICA defines a deferral as withholding, delaying, or effectively preventing congressionally approved funds from being obligated or spent, either through executive action or inaction. But here is the catch. There are only three narrow circumstances in which the President can propose a deferral: to provide for contingencies, to achieve budgetary savings through approved operational efficiency, and as specifically provided by law. Notice that policy reasons is not one of the three. As with recisions, the ICA requires that the President send a special message to Congress identifying how much they want to defer, why, and for how long. However, a proposed deferral may not extend beyond the end of the fiscal year. Only once Congress receives this special message can the President withhold those funds. Again, the President cannot withhold funds for so long that they can no longer be used. I hope that didn't make anyone's eyes glaze over, but the details of the Impoundment Control Act are at the heart of this administration's lack of respect for our Nation's separation of powers and rule of law. Today, nearly 46 years after the ICA became law, Congress confronts a President and an administration eager to blow past the boundaries of executive budgetary power and co-opt Congress' power of the purse for the President's personal gain. This brings us to 2018 and one the first red flags. My committee's concerns about ICA violations under the Trump administration actually started in 2018, when I was serving as the committee's ranking member. Multiple reports warned that the Trump administration was considering a late-in-the-year recisions package that would have effectively started that 45-day clock close to the end of the fiscal year. As you recall, the ICA requires congressional approval before funds can be canceled. By withholding funds through their expiration date, President Trump and OMB aimed to game the system and create a backdoor recission. The White House had to abandon this scheme in the face of bipartisan condemnation. To send a clear message to the White House and to put an end to any future attempts at backdoor recisions, then-Chairman Womack and I, in October of 2018, requested GAO's legal opinion on whether an ill-timed recision package from the White House would violate the ICA. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record the letter that then-Chairman Womack and I sent to the GAO. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, Washington, DC 20515, October 31, 2018. Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Dodaro: We are requesting clarification in the form of a legal opinion on the issue of proposed rescissions of funds submitted close to their expiration date. It is important that Congress remain at the center of the decision of whether to withhold funds. To that end Congress should have adequate time to receive, consider, and act on any rescission message sent by the President. Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA), the President may submit a special message proposing the rescission of budget authority and may withhold funds from obligation for a period of 45 calendar days of continuous session following transmission of the special message. Public Law No. 93-344, as amended, 1012; 2 U.S.C. Sec. 683. If Congress does not pass a rescission bill within the 45-day period, the ICA requires that the funds be released for obligation. Specifically, section 1012(b) states: ``Any amount of budget authority proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved as set forth in such special message shall be made available for obligation unless, within the prescribed 45-day period, the Congress has completed action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved.'' As you know, the rescission process has been used this year for the first time since the Clinton Administration. Naturally, some questions have arisen. One question of particular importance to Congress concerns whether the executive can use the rescission process to withhold funds from obligation for the duration of the 45-day period, even if the funds expire before the end of that period. GAO has never issued an opinion on the legality of withholding funds in this circumstance. We now request GAO's legal opinion regarding whether the ICA allows funds to be withheld from obligation in this situation. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely, Steve Womack, Chairman, John Yarmuth, Ranking Member.

Mr. YARMUTH. In December 2018, GAO issued a decision, which I will include in the Record, concluding that, while the ICA does, under limited circumstances, allow the President to withhold money for up to 45 congressional session days, the President cannot freeze the money for so long that it can no longer be used. GAO confirmed Congress' constitutional role, saying: ``A withholding of this nature would be an aversion both to the constitutional process for enacting Federal law and to Congress' constitutional power of the purse, for the President would preclude the obligation of budget authority Congress has already enacted and did not rescind.'' Mr. Womack and I both welcomed this opinion from GAO, calling it an important confirmation of Congress' constitutional authority over funding decisions. While GAO was deliberating, OMB submitted their views, as is customary. A letter from OMB's general counsel seems to assert the belief that the President can do whatever he wants, that he doesn't have to respect our separation of powers or the will of Congress to cancel funds he doesn't want to spend, that he is above the law. As GAO stated in their opinion: ``The President has no unilateral authority to withhold funds from obligation.'' ``The President cannot rely on the authority in the ICA to withhold amounts from obligation, while simultaneously disregarding the ICA's limitations.'' This deliberate disregard for our laws undermines our democracy. The executive branch is not a monarchy, but this attitude is a pernicious problem with this administration. Less than a year later, in August of 2019, a document, a letter apportionment from OMB, was leaked. An apportionment is a legally binding budget document used by OMB to set the rate at which an agency spends its funds over the course of a fiscal year. For example, we wouldn't want an agency to come to Congress in March saying that it has already spent its entire annual operating budget and must cease operations unless Congress provides more money. To prevent this, OMB apportions agencies money. However, this leaked letter from August 3, 2019, raised multiple red flags. First, this letter apportionment, sent to officials at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, put an abrupt freeze on billions in foreign aid less than 60 days before the end of the fiscal year. OMB put a legally binding hold on 15 key accounts that covered a spectrum of assistance, international control, peacekeeping operations, global health programs, foreign military financing programs, and more. Similar to 2018, reports were circulating that President Trump planned a late-in-the-year recisions package, despite GAO's decision just 9 months earlier rebuking the tactic as an end run around Congress. On August 19, Senate Budget Committee Ranking Member Sanders and I wrote a letter to President Trump's Acting Chief of Staff and OMB Director Mick Mulvaney urging him to follow the law and to respect Congress' constitutional authority. Second red flag, this apportionment was signed by Michael Duffey, an administration political appointee. Since OMB's inception, career officials with knowledge and expertise of the apportionment process and impoundment law, not political appointees, have signed these highly technical budget documents. This means that OMB took the unprecedented step of stripping career officials of their normal role in the apportionment process and, instead, gave this responsibility to someone who had been appointed by the President. This was, to say the least, suspicious. Third red flag, under current law, apportionments are not public documents. OMB sent no special message to Congress to flag this hold on foreign aid, as the law requires; they kept Congress in the dark. If the document had not been leaked, Congress might not have ever discovered this suspicious funding freeze. What else were they hiding? While this leaked August 3 letter apportionment is what first alerted Congress to the President's willingness to break the law, at that time we could not have guessed how nefarious it really was. A few weeks later, the Budget Committee would uncover a pattern of abuse of the apportionment process, our separation of powers, and current law. As part of our investigation, my committee asked OMB for documents and answers detailing their involvement in the withholding of foreign aid. After review of the materials provided to us, it was clear that this was an intentional and willful abuse of power. To lay this out as plainly as I can, I will outline what happened chronologically. It all starts on May 23, 2019, when the Pentagon sent a letter to Congress certifying that the Government of Ukraine had met Congress' anticorruption requirements and was, therefore, eligible to receive the critical security assistance it needed. Most importantly, the Pentagon notified lawmakers of its plans to spend the money. Keep in mind that this is critical funding Ukraine needs to protect itself from Russia, our shared adversary. The first sign of trouble came almost a month later, on June 19, 2019. In response to our request for answers, OMB asserts that this is when they first reach out to the Department of Defense to ask about the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI, funds. Mark Sandy, an Afghanistan veteran and top career OMB official who is responsible for managing the flow of Pentagon funds, testified that OMB officials were told the President wanted the Ukraine aid paused, but he didn't understand why. So, while reaching out to the Pentagon to learn more about the aid package, he also repeatedly pressed Mr. Duffey about why President Trump imposed the hold. But Mr. Sandy didn't get a clear answer. He testified that Mr. Duffey ``didn't provide an explicit response on the reason. He simply said, `We need to let the hold take place'--and I'm paraphrasing here--`and then revisit this issue with the President.' '' Just about a week later, on June 27, Mick Mulvaney was flying on Air Force One with President Trump when he fired off a quick email to an aide back in Washington. The email said: ``I'm just trying to tie up some loose ends. Did we ever find out about the money for Ukraine and whether we can hold it back?'' The aide, Robert Blair, replied that, while they could carry out the President's request, the move to withhold aid passed in a bipartisan spending deal would not go over well with Congress. ``Expect Congress to become unhinged,'' he wrote back. I don't know about unhinged, but Congress was not going to let this abuse of executive overreach go unanswered. These early conversations are critical to our timeline because they show that this administration's abuse of our laws and plans to blackmail a foreign nation into helping President Trump cheat our elections was premeditated. President Trump, Mulvaney, and Duffey abused OMB's authority to withhold Ukraine security assistance at the same time President Trump directed his personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, and his associates to solicit foreign interference in our elections. In July, they set their plans in motion. During an interagency meeting on July 18, an OMB staffer relayed President Trump's order to freeze all Ukraine assistance to the State Department and the Pentagon. This stunned and infuriated our own top Ukrainian diplomats, who understood the necessity of strong American support for Ukraine in their fight against Russia. Later that day, the House Foreign Affairs Committee was warned about the hold by administration sources, urging them to investigate. But the bottom line was that there was no legal way for President Trump to withhold aid to Ukraine without Congress' approval. Since it was a politically motivated hold, it would not even qualify for a deferral under the ICA. If the President was going to hold this aid hostage, he had to find a way to go behind Congress' back and secretly impound hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. Mr. Sandy testified that, on July 19, Mr. Duffey proposed using the apportionment process to implement the hold, that is, to use a legally binding budget document to withhold security assistance to Ukraine. Mr. Sandy also testified that, while approving apportionment schedules for agencies is routine, attaching a footnote to block spending was so unusual he did not recall another event like it in his 12 years of service at OMB. There is a reason for that. It could be considered a violation of the Impoundment Control Act. As you will recall, the ICA prohibits the President and his administration from withholding aid unless it is done under the authorities of the Impoundment Control Act, which require notification to Congress, which OMB did not want to do. A week later, on July 25, President Trump had his now-infamous call with Ukrainian President Zelensky, where he asked a foreign government to dig up dirt on a political rival. Just 90 minutes after the President hung up the phone, Mr. Duffey emailed the Pentagon, putting a hold on the Ukraine aid. In his email, which was only obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, Mr. Duffey shared OMB's plan to ``formalize the pause with an apportionment footnote'' that would come later that day. In another red flag, Mr. Duffey asked Pentagon officials to keep this ``hold'' decision as secret as possible. According to documents obtained by the House Budget Committee, at 6:44 p.m. Eastern time, just hours after the ``perfect call,'' Mr. Sandy signed an apportionment that officially imposed what OMB claimed at the time to be a ``brief pause'' in USAI funds. OMB inserted a footnote into the apportionment that froze all remaining USAI funding until August 5. The footnote states that the funds are being held ``to allow for an interagency process to determine the best use of such funds,'' but also that ``DOD may continue its planning and casework for the initiative during this period.'' Why would OMB allow the Pentagon to continue working on current plans and casework if they were claiming they needed to freeze the funds to review those same plans and casework? Because this hold was never about a policy review. This hold was this administration's attempt to get around Congress and secretly undermine the law, to freeze foreign aid so that they could use it to pressure Ukraine into helping President Trump cheat to win reelection in 2020. It is the same hold that Mulvaney referenced in his June email to Mr. Blair while flying on Air Force One with the President, and it is the same hold that would ultimately lead to grounds for impeachment. The July 25 apportionment would be the last one Mr. Sandy would sign. The White House needed to make sure the aid remained frozen while they kept up their pressure campaign on President Zelensky. But OMB career officials were becoming uneasy about the freeze and the illegality of using apportionments to create secret impoundments. In an unprecedented move, Mr. Sandy was stripped of his authority to oversee the management of Ukraine aid, and the apportionment authority was transferred to President Trump's political appointee, Mr. Duffey. Remember that leaked letter apportionment that raised red flags? When that apportionment leaked in early August, Congress still didn't know about the plot to withhold the Pentagon's $250 million in Ukraine aid. So here we have 15 State and USAID foreign aid accounts on hold, one of which includes $26.5 million in Foreign Military Financing funds for-- you guessed it--Ukraine. On top of that, this apportionment is the first one with Mr. Duffey's signature. August was a busy time for Mr. Duffey. Someone who had never before signed apportionment documents started signing all the apportionment documents in both the National Security Division and the International Affairs Division instead of career officials. On August 6, Mr. Duffey signed the first extension of what was supposed to be the brief withholding of the Pentagon's USAI funds, using another footnote to freeze the funds until August 12. Separately, on August 9, our documents show Mr. Duffey signed another apportionment affecting the State Department and USAID foreign funds included in the leaked apportionment. This time, OMB said the agencies are only allowed to spend 2 percent of the funds each day, and it withholds the rest from the agencies. That is not a programmatic, funds management, or even a policy decision. The State Department doesn't send a couple thousand dollars to support international peacekeeping missions one day and then a couple thousand dollars to support international narcotics control the next. That is not how it works. Limiting agencies to such a minuscule amount effectively prevented these funds from being spent at all, while at the same time, the apportionment continued to withhold the majority of remaining funds. It was another backdoor attempt to freeze funding and possibly rescind it completely by running out the clock. On August 19, Senator Sanders and I sent our letter to OMB and the White House, calling on the administration to stop impounding funds, to respect GAO's legal opinion from the previous December, stating that a late-in-the-year rescission request that prevents congressional action and withholds funds until they can no longer be used would violate the ICA. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record the letter Senator Sanders and I sent to Director Mulvaney. Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, August 19 2019. Hon. Mick Mulvaney, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC. Dear Director Mulvaney: We write to express our profound concern regarding the Administration's reported plan to submit a rescission request to the Congress just a few weeks before the end of the fiscal year. Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA), the President may submit a special message proposing the rescission of budget authority and may withhold funds from obligation for a period of 45 calendar days of continuous session following transmission of the special message. In keeping with Congress's constitutional power of the purse, however, such funding must be released absent approval by Congress within the 45-day period. Specifically, section 1012(b) of the ICA states: Any amount of budget authority proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved as set forth in such special message shall be made available for obligation unless, within the prescribed 45-day period, the Congress has completed action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved. Submitting a rescissions request and withholding funds from obligation this late in the fiscal year could result in funding being withheld through its expiration date. In December 2018, at the request of the House Budget Committee, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a legal opinion that addressed this circumstance. GAO found that ``the ICA does not permit the withholding of funds through their date of expiration.'' Further, GAO determined that absent Congressional action to rescind the funds, amounts proposed for rescission must be made available for prudent obligation before the amounts expire, even where the 45-day period for congressional consideration provided in the ICA approaches or spans the date on which funds would expire: the requirement to make amounts available for obligation in this situation prevails over the privilege to temporarily withhold the amounts. The authority provided by the ICA to the Executive Branch to withhold funds temporarily is necessarily limited. The GAO opinion states: It would be an abuse of this limited authority and an interference with Congress's constitutional prerogatives if a President were to time the withholding of expiring budget authority to effectively alter the time period that the budget authority is available for obligation from the time period established by Congress in duly enacted appropriations legislation. As the chairman and ranking member of the respective House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over the Impoundment Control Act, we affirm our strong agreement with the legal analysis and conclusions reached by GAO. We strongly urge the Administration to refrain from sending a rescission message to the Congress; however, in the event the Administration submits such a message, it must take measures to ensure that the affected funds will be prudently obligated in the event the Congress does not approve the rescission, as required by law. To withhold these funds until they can no longer be prudently obligated or until they expire, in the absence of Congressional approval of the rescission, would violate the ICA and flout an important constitutional check. We trust that you will comply with the law and respect the constitutional role of the Congress to remain at the center of funding decisions. Thank you for your attention to these concerns. Sincerely, John Yarmuth, Chairman, House Committee on the Budget. Bernard Sanders, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Budget.

Mr. YARMUTH. At this time, we did not understand that the President and OMB actually had learned from their 2018 attempts to circumvent Congress. But they learned the wrong lesson. Now, they were just trying to bypass Congress completely. By the second week of August, Mr. Duffey was issuing holds on USAI funds every couple of days to block the Pentagon from sending aid. OMB was doing what it could to keep the President's hold on Ukraine aid active, but on August 28, a senior administration official told Politico about the hold on USAI funds. The President's scheme was unraveling. On August 29, our documents show Mr. Duffey signed another letter apportionment releasing 25 percent of the remaining State Department and USAID funds each Sunday in September. With this latest trick, it was clear these agencies were not going to be able to spend all the funds Congress appropriated before they expired on September 30. And in fact, they didn't, which was apparently OMB's intention all along. Meanwhile, Mr. Duffey was still signing apportionments to freeze USAI funds until September 12. During this time, DOD warned that OMB's ongoing hold on Ukraine assistance would prevent them from using all the funds Congress appropriated before they expired on September 30. And, of course, DOD was right. On September 18, Chairwoman Lowey and I wrote to OMB, expressing deep concerns about OMB's escalating abuses of its apportionment authority and its blatant attempts to undermine Congress' power of the purse. Basically, we told them to stop their pretty obvious attempts to evade, invalidate, and violate congressional appropriations laws and the ICA. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record that letter of September 18. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, Washington, DC, September 18, 2019. Hon. Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House, Washington, DC. Hon. Russell Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget, Washington,

Mr. YARMUTH. But then, Madam Speaker, the whistleblower report was made public. The report outlined how President Trump instructed his administration and OMB officials to put a hold on almost $400 million in Ukraine security assistance ahead of his July 25 phone call with President Zelensky. The President abused his power and betrayed the oath he took before the American people to defend our national security and honor our Constitution. As the plan unraveled, the picture became clear. The administration was abusing the apportionment process to secretly and illegally impound funding provided by Congress to protect our national security, to use this leverage against a foreign nation to help the President cheat our elections, and they couldn't hide it any longer. On September 24, Speaker Pelosi announced a formal impeachment inquiry into the shady dealings of the Trump administration. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record a letter of September 27 that Chairwoman Lowey and I sent to OMB, seeking answers and documents related to the withholding of the Ukraine aid, State and USAID funds, and abuse of the apportionment process. Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, September 27, 2019. Hon. Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House, Washington, DC. Hon. Russell Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget, Washington,

Mr. YARMUTH. Madam Speaker, while we received a partial production of documents from OMB, they left out large batches of requested materials. Meanwhile, the House committees involved in the impeachment inquiry were getting completely stonewalled by the administration. If they did nothing wrong, why wouldn't they turn over documents or allow officials to testify? If the President could clear his name, don't you think he would have done it by now? Instead, the President and his Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, have gone on national television and confessed to the very thing Congress caught them doing. Mulvaney's response? ``Get over it,'' and, ``We do it all the time.'' In December 2019, the House Budget Committee released a report, which I intend to put in the Record, outlining three main takeaways from the documents produced by OMB. Number one, the timeline of actions taken by OMB, as seen in the provided apportionments, shows suspicious activity and document a pattern of abuse of the apportionment process, OMB's authority, and current law. Number two, OMB took the seemingly unprecedented step of stripping career officials of their normal role in the apportionment process and instead vested a political appointee with that authority. And, three, OMB's actions hindered agencies' ability to prudently obligate funds by the end of the fiscal year, bypassing Congress and creating backdoor rescissions in violation of the ICA. Weeks after our report was published, the House of Representatives impeached Donald J. Trump for abuse of power and obstruction of justice. On January 16, 2020, GAO issued a legal opinion, stating that the actions taken by OMB to withhold foreign aid to Ukraine violated the ICA. The nonpartisan watchdog even went so far to say: ``OMB's assertions have no basis in law.'' GAO found the White House's action to withhold security assistance funding constituted an illegal deferral of funding in violation of the ICA. The ICA permits deferrals only for very limited purposes and requires advanced congressional notification. But this was not just a notification violation. GAO determined that this deferral was prohibited under the ICA, period. As GAO emphasized: ``The ICA does not permit deferrals for policy reasons. . . . OMB's justification for the withholding falls squarely within the scope of an impermissible policy deferral.'' So even if the President had notified Congress in advance of the deferral, it still would have been illegal. The White House has taken a disturbing sense of pride in its obstruction of Congress so it is no surprise that they failed to fully cooperate with GAO as well. In its decision, GAO called out the Trump administration, stating: ``We consider a reluctance to provide a fulsome response to have constitutional significance.'' The House Budget Committee repeatedly warned the Trump administration about the ICA. The Department of Defense warned them. The State Department warned them. Even people in the Executive Office of the President called out this flagrant abuse of Federal law. But the President ignored the warnings. Instead, he used the powers of his office to subvert our laws, solicit foreign interference to help him cheat in his next election, and then try to cover it all up. While the House has taken action to show that no one, including the President, is above the law, OMB is still scheming. President Trump's administration continues to abuse its authority and infringe on Congress' power of the purse--for example, holding up disaster relief to Puerto Rico. I would wager it is because the President couldn't handle some criticism from one of their mayors. We shall see. Last March, my colleagues and I wrote a letter to OMB, which I intend to put in the Record, calling out this administration for declaring bogus national emergencies to steal funds Congress appropriated for crucial military construction and counternarcotic initiatives to use for the President's border wall, another decision motivated by the President's political campaign and not taxpayer interests. There is more, I am sure, that we just don't know about yet, but we will find out. In the face of this administration's clear and present threat to our democracy, we must defend Congress' constitutional authority, protect our separation of powers, and strengthen the ICA to prevent such unilateral actions. In March, I will introduce legislation that will protect Congress' power of the purse. It will promote transparency of the executive branch to limit abuse and ensure no President can hide lawbreaking from the American people again. It will add teeth to budget law by creating significant deterrents, including administrative discipline, to create more accountability for executive branch officials so they won't break the law, and it will ensure Congress remains front and center in determining whether emergency declarations made by the President and the related shifts in funding are justified. Look, this is a lot of information, and I am normally not one to give long statements, but in the face of such horrendous attacks on our democracy, I wanted it all on the Record. I am also submitting every letter I referenced into the Congressional Record, as well. As chairman of the House Budget Committee, I felt it was my responsibility. It is my hope that these facts help expose this administration's systemic lawbreaking because if they get away with this and Congress does not fight back, it will not stop. We all know that. He could attack specific communities by withholding funds that support their healthcare. He could retaliate against Senators for their votes by freezing Federal investments in their States. He could punish States that he views as unsupportive of his election by withholding the infrastructure funds. If we don't stop him, President Trump will use our taxpayer dollars to punish political adversaries. That creates a destructive precedent for other Presidents who follow. I implore our Republican colleagues to join us in this effort to uphold the oath we all swore and to make it unequivocally clear that, in the United States of America, no one is above the law. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.