Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, our Nation faces many national security challenges in the post-cold war era. I can think of no greater challenge than the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Aspen Strategy Group, which I chair along with Ken Dam, is committed to providing a bipartisan forum within which to address this and other national security concerns. In August of this year, the Aspen Strategy Group, which included top U.S. national security officials and experts, met in Colorado to discuss our Nation's proliferation challenges and policies. I believe the observations from these meetings, as well as the resulting ideas and recommendations, will enhance our Nation's understanding of these important issues. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the Aspen Strategy Group's recommendations related to the threat of nuclear proliferation.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I might also add that I completely support the expressed desire and wish of the Senator from California that we pass a parks bill. Interestingly enough, one of my campaign commitments is yet uncompleted since 1972. It is sort of hard to admit that it is still outstanding after 24 years. In that bill is the Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Park. That is the site of the famous Civil War battle where the road has to be taken out of the park because traffic is basically interfering with the park. This bill has the authorization requiring the completion of that project. It is my hope that the Senate, before it adjourns, will help me carry out that very important campaign commitment that has been pending now for 24 years. So I share the Senator's sentiments and thank her for her kind remarks.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, as the 104th Congress and my own Senate career draw to a close today, I want to say a special word of appreciation to our terrific floor staff and our support staff for all of their help to the Members and staff of the Armed Services Committee and to me personally during the past 2 years, and, indeed, during my entire Senate career. I chaired the Armed Services Committee for 8 years and was ranking Democrat on that committee for 2 years before I became the chairman. During the last 2 years, I have been the ranking Democrat on the committee under Senator Thurmond's leadership. So for 12 years of my Senate career, I have worked constantly with the floor staff. I observed them before that time. In these last 12 years, I have developed a very acute understanding and appreciation for their splendid service. A great deal of work in the Senate takes place in the Senate committees. We know that. But the culmination of the completion of legislative process occurs right here on the Senate floor; always has, and always will. Our guests in the gallery and the people who watch television around the country understand--because they watch and hear the procedures-- that the legislative procedure on the Senate floor is complicated. It always has been. Maybe we can make it simpler. It always will be complicated because parliamentary rules in a democracy are complicated. The sequencing of legislation, the filing and adopting of amendments, advising the Presiding Officer and individual Senators of parliamentary procedures, the taking down of every word that is spoken on the Senate floor--as our reporters do so well every day, even in the heat of debate--are all essential ingredients of the legislative process on the Senate floor. This process could not take place without the dedicated work of extraordinarily capable and talented staff members. Our Democratic floor staff works under the direction of Marty Paone, the Secretary to the Minority. Marty stepped into some pretty big shoes when he took over from his predecessor and long-time valuable Senate staff member, Abby Saffold, but those shoes fit Marty very well today. Marty's thorough knowledge of the details of the legislative process have made him indispensable to the U.S. Senate. Marty has always been available to me and to my staff to provide counsel and assistance whenever we needed that assistance. I especially appreciate Marty's support in ensuring prompt consideration of the thousands of nominations that the Armed Services Committee reports every year. On the staff of the Democratic leader Senator Daschle, John Hilley, who left last year to become the Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs; Peter Rouse, Senator Daschle's Chief of Staff; Larry Stein and Randy DeValk have worked very effectively with the Armed Services Committee Members and staff on national security issues and legislation. Mr. President, I cannot say enough about the excellent day-to-day support we have had from Democratic floor staff of Brad Austin, Gary Myrick, Paul Brown, and Kelly Riordan who recently left the Senate staff. These individuals work under the leadership of our highly capable chief Democratic floor assistant, Lula Davis. I believe Lula is in the Chamber now. Lula is not only terrific in her leadership role; she always has time for a friendly word or often a humorous remark to put our heavy burdens in the proper perspective. Lula is even thoughtful enough to point out when the senior Senator from Georgia is wearing a tie that is ``off color and out of style''. Unfortunately, that sometimes occurs every day of the week. I am grateful for that kind of candid and frank advice from Lula in her leadership role. That probably is a little out of the scope of duty, but nevertheless it is appreciated. Managing and passing defense authorization bills and other legislation in the Senate becomes more challenging every year. Lula, Brad, Gary, and Paul are terrific individuals, are great staff, and have always been indispensable in assisting us move our committee bills through the Senate. I also want to thank our excellent Democratic cloakroom staff of Leonard Oursler, Christine Krasow, Paul Cloutier, and Brian Griffin. They must get asked about 1,000 times a week ``When is the next vote? When are we going to get out? What time do we adjourn?'' Of course, they do not always know, but they always give you a good answer and their best assessment. They never fail to cheerfully respond to that or any other question even though it may have been answered by them 100 to 1,000 times a day. Their selfless and dedicated service has made all of our jobs easier. Certainly, it has made mine easier during the entire time I have been in the Senate. I should also note that while not working with them on a day-to-day basis as we do with our own floor staff, the Republican floor staff under the Secretary of the Majority Liz Greene has always worked with us to resolve any problems or issues associated with our committee's work. I must also note that Howard Greene was very helpful to me on many occasions and to the committee when he served as the Secretary of the Majority. Legislative Clerk Scott Bates and his assistant David Tinsley; Bill Clerk Kathie Alvarez and her assistants Mary Anne Clarkson and Danielle Fling; and Enrolling Clerk Tom Lundregan and his assistant Charlene McDevitt are an indispensable part of the legislative process on the Senate floor. Mr. President, I frankly do not know how they do it sometimes, but they are able to keep track of all the amendments on major bills and produce a complete Senate bill in a very short time. Executive Clerk David Marcos and his assistant Michelle Haynes keep track of thousands of nominations that the Armed Services Committee and other committees of the Senate act on each year. We are deeply indebted to these capable people. I also want to express my appreciation to the Senate Parliamentarian Bob Dove, and members of his office: Alan Frumin, Kevin Kayes, and Sally Goffinet, as well as their predecessors since I served in the Senate. When I came to the Senate, Dr. Floyd Riddick was the Parliamentarian, and he was succeeded by Murray Zweben, both of whom were excellent and took many, many hours of time to help junior Senators, like the Senator from Georgia, when we first arrived in the Senate. We were so desirous and in need of parliamentary advice. All of the Parliamentarian staff have consistently provided objective and timely answers to the many questions I have had over the years. I think that is true of other Senators and certainly true of our staffs as they have sought advice day in and day out. Finally, Mr. President, I thank all of the official reporters of debate that takes place in the Chamber under the direction of Chief Reporter Ron Kavulick and all of the staff members who have the awesome responsibility of producing the verbatim transcript of the Senate's proceedings. Journal Clerks Bill Lackey, Mark Lacovara, and Patrick Keating, and Daily Digest Editor Thom Pellikaan and his assistants Linda Sebold and Kim Longsworth also play a key role in making the record of all of the activities of the Senate available to the public. I am certain that I have left someone out in this listing of indispensable people, but certainly I intend to include all of the staff in my praise. The words that are spoken on the Senate floor and the action that the Senate takes will be preserved for history long after we are gone, thanks to these talented individuals who work miracles under extraordinary deadlines every day. In summary, Mr. President, my final words in this Chamber are simply a thank you--a thank you to all the staff members who support the day- to-day activities on this Senate floor, for their dedicated service to the Senate and to our Nation. They, indeed, make this Republic work. They make the democratic system work. Everyone who follows the work of this great body should understand that the Senate could not function without the tremendous effort and professionalism these staff members provide. I close by thanking my own personal staff that arrived with me in 1972, and those that depart with me in 1996, as well as those who will remain and serve in other offices and those who have left during the interim. I have had a remarkable personal staff. I have had a remarkable Armed Services Committee staff. I thank the staff members of the Armed Services Committee on the Democratic side and also on the Republican side who have been so faithful to their duties. I have also had a remarkable staff on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations all of these years. I inherited that subcommittee and became acting chairman under the guidance of Senator Henry ``Scoop'' Jackson, one of our all-time great Senators. I have been associated with the subcommittee since about 1976, either as the vice chairman, acting chairman, chairman, or ranking Democrat on the committee under Senator Roth. Mr. President, it has been a real pleasure working with all of these staff members, and I wish all of them continued success in the future. Finally, Mr. President, my colleagues in the Senate, I will not name each of you as there are so many Senators who I have been privileged to have been associated--like my good friend, Senator Warner, is in the Chamber and others. I have served with a number of giants in the annals of Senate history. I was in a seminar about 2 weekends ago. Some of the most distinguished people in the country were gathered together, famous authors who had written books, playwrights, people who succeeded fabulously in business, chief executive officers in corporations, famous sports figures, including Ray Floyd and Jack Nicklaus, great golfers. I looked around the room, and I was, of course, winding down my career. I asked myself the question, ``Would you swap the last 24 years with any of these people, some of whom are fabulously wealthy, and most of whom are very famous?'' My answer was, ``No, I would not swap the last 24 years of service in the Senate with the service that any other person in this country or, indeed, in the world has rendered.'' My service in the Senate and my service to the people of Georgia has been a very special privilege and certainly the highest honor of my life. I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleagues.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I want to say first to the Senator from California that I thank her for her kind remarks. I have thoroughly enjoyed serving with the Senator from California, as well as the personal friendship that we developed, particularly since she has been in the Senate, but even before in conference committees that we had between the House and the Senate. I enjoyed our affiliation, and I will be looking forward to the future years of excellent leadership by the Senator from California as I view this great body on C-SPAN, and as I watch the activities and follow the daily events.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the success of the 1996 Centennial Olympic games and the Paralympic games which were held this summer in Atlanta. The statement made by many that the Centennial games in Atlanta were the greatest ever was right on the mark. The athletes and the spectators who attended the events understand better than anyone the extraordinary success of the 1996 Olympics. In the face of pressures that defy imagination, ACOG staff and volunteers staged an Olympics of breathtaking grandeur and dignity. Our law enforcement and military personnel put together a security force that was unprecedented in its commitment, performance, and cooperation. I have talked to countless people who attended both the Centennial games and the Paralympic games, and I have talked to numerous individual members of the International Olympic Committee. There was universal praise of the extraordinary job that was done in Atlanta and elsewhere in dealing with events that were unprecedented in their size and scope. All in all, more than 10,000 athletes and 2 million spectators from around the world participated in the Olympics. In comparison, the Atlanta Olympic games were twice the size of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics in terms of the number of participants and spectators, and larger than the Los Angeles and Barcelona games combined. More spectators attended women's events at the Centennial games than attended all events in Los Angeles. In addition, Atlanta hosted athletes from 197 countries around the globe. That is an additional 57 countries above the 140 who participated in the 1984 Games. To give my colleagues a point of reference, particularly for the football fans among them, the Atlanta Olympic games were the equivalent of one city hosting six Super Bowl games each day for 17 days straight. So it was a Super Bowl times six, each day for 17 days. That was quite an undertaking. While much praise should be given to the many workers who contributed to the success of these Games, I would be remiss if I failed to mention some of the athletes who gave it their all in these Games. Who can forget the South African marathon runner, Josiah Thugwane, the first black South African to win a Gold Medal for the unified team of South Africa? Or Naim Suleymanoglu, endeared to all as ``Pocket Hercules,'' who stunned the world by lifting over his head nearly triple his weight? I will always remember watching Michael Johnson sprint across the finish line. Among America's special heroes was young Kerri Strug, who as you may recall, injured herself on the vault but continued valiantly to make a second leap to help ensure a team gold medal for the U.S. women's gymnastics team. I could spend all day recounting the many heroic and inspirational accomplishments from the Olympic games, but the story from Atlanta did not end there. Just 12 days after the conclusion of the 1996 summer Olympics, another sporting event of great magnitude occurred in Atlanta. The Paralympic games hosted more than 3,500 athletes from 119 nations, competing in 19 different sports. While not as large as the Centennial games, this was the largest gathering of people with disabilities ever assembled anywhere in the world. Certainly it was every bit as large as the Centennial games in terms of the spirit, heart, and courage of those who competed. I have been honored to work for a number of years in assisting the Atlanta Paralympic Organizing Committee in preparation for the Paralympics. I consider the opportunity I had to support these games to be one of the highlights of my Senate career. I also had the pleasure of being a spectator at many of the Paralympic events, and I know that the level of skill and achievement shown by these athletes was truly outstanding by any standard. The opening ceremonies offered a glimpse of what was to come, as a sold-out crowd of over 64,000 spectators watched 36 year old American mountain-climber Mark Wellman light the Paralympic Torch by pulling himself hand over hand up the 98-foot tower carrying the torch between his legs. Mark was paralyzed from the waist down after a 50-foot fall while mountain climbing 14 years ago. He was soon followed by Hou Bin of China who set a world record in the high jump on the first day of the track and field competition by clearing 1.92 meters, approximately 6 feet, 3 inches. For those of you unfamiliar with Hou Bin, he has only one leg, but that did not stop him from winning the hearts of spectators from around the world as he went on in an attempt to break his own record. While he was ultimately unsuccessful, you would not have known that from the roar of the crowd. Yet another stunning performance was that of Troy Sachs who led the Australian men's wheelchair basketball team to victory by scoring a Paralympic record-breaking 42 points. I rank it among the finest basketball performances I have ever seen. Leading the American Paralympic team was Tony Volpentest who set a new world record in the 100 meter dash, running a time of 11.36 seconds--that is 1.52 seconds shy of Donovan Bailey's record in the Olympics. Mr. President, I also want to take this time to recognize and honor all of the many people who dedicated their time and efforts. This effort brought together literally hundreds of Federal, State, local, and civic leaders, as well as thousands of volunteers. The Atlanta volunteers were certainly the best in history. They were simply amazing, and the games could not have been held without them. Unfortunately, time prohibits me from mentioning all of the people who were truly instrumental in putting on the games, but I would like to recognize a few of them. Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games When Billy Payne originally submitted his proposal to bring the Olympic games to Atlanta, many people did not take him seriously; but just ask them now. He is perhaps the best example of what Atlanta has to offer in terms of leadership and vision. His partner, former Atlanta mayor, Congressman, and Ambassador Andy Young, provided the key element of diplomacy needed to convince the International Olympic Committee to choose Atlanta. I should also thank A.D. Frazier, who did an outstanding job, as well as the entire team at ACOG. Atlanta Paralympic Organizing Committee My special thanks go to the Atlanta Paralympic Organizing Committee, led by its president, Andy Fleming. Andy had perhaps the most difficult challenge of all in leading the effort to stage the Paralympic games. Faced with the disadvantage of lesser name recognition and financial resources, the Paralympic Organizing Committee put on a world class event which truly met the high standards set by the Olympic games. Andy was assisted by the able leadership, service, and great dedication of Harald Hansen, chairman of First Union National Bank of Georgia, and David Simmons, chief operating officer for the Paralympic games. DoD Support The 1996 Centennial Olympic and the Paralympic games were successful in large part due to the tremendous support of the Department of Defense. Without the assistance of the Department of Defense, working in concert with State and local public safety officials, the Olympics and Paralympics could not have been held. Not surprisingly, these events were too big for any single municipal or State government to ensure safety and security without appropriate help from the Federal Government. Those who won the selection of Atlanta as the Olympic venue understood at the beginning that they would be responsible for providing the cost of putting on the Games, and they raised about $1.5 billion to do so. They could not, however, guarantee the security of all the athletes and the millions of visitors from all over the world. In the era of modern terrorism, safety for an event of this type simply cannot be guaranteed without help from the Federal Government. I hope the Congress will keep this in mind as our friends in Utah prepare for the 2002 winter Olympic games. Billy Payne expressed his appreciation for the Department of Defense support this way: Thanks to the support of the Department of Defense and the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who served in Atlanta during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, the safety of the public and the athletes was assured. DoD and its military forces provided the safety net and back-up law enforcement needed when confronted with securing the largest peacetime event in history. From the explosive ordnance teams to the military police units to communications specialists, DoD personnel performed critical missions. Working in conjunction with law enforcement, DoD personnel helped secure the village where the athletes of 197 nations were housed. On the night of the tragic bombing in Centennial Olympic Park, DoD personnel in the downtown area remained calm and at their posts, reinforcing the public's perception that security authorities were fully prepared to deal with the situation. The ability of military personnel to increase their shifts and immediately provide more manpower to the streets was a clear signal to the Olympic family and spectators that America was prepared for all contingencies. All who came to the Games in Atlanta are indebted to the Department of Defense for the professional and dedicated effort of the troops who were part of the Summer Olympics. These men and women showed the world, once again, that the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the United States military are the finest in the world. In 1992, Congress first appropriated funds to the Department of Defense for security and logistical support for the 1996 Olympic and Paralympic games. Since that time, a multitude of DoD personnel have aggressively worked to ensure the success and security of this significant public event. The impact of DOD support to the 1996 summer Olympics is difficult to summarize in a short time. More than 13,000 active duty, Reserve, and National Guard personnel were committed in support of the Games in Atlanta and in the other competition cities. These military members came from 45 states and territories and provided support to security operations at 44 Olympic sites. Of the men and women who came to Atlanta, over 9,000 National Guard personnel provided support in the form of roving and fixed perimeter security, command post support, route security, and vehicular inspection. More than 1,000 active duty soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were entrusted with the important responsibility of transporting athletes and law enforcement personnel to the secured villages and venues. These drivers successfully negotiated the crowded streets of Atlanta more than 650 times each day. DOD provided 33 helicopters, and military aviators flew 300 missions in support of the law enforcement security operations. DOD provided critical equipment to more than 60 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and organizing committees. DOD bomb disposal experts responded to 450 calls on suspect items; and DOD, the FBI, and our health officials prepared for any kind of chemical or biological attack. A force of more than 1,300 personnel, from all services, was required to provide base camp support for the DOD personnel supporting the Olympic games. When the tragic explosion in Centennial Park occurred, National Guard and uniformed military personnel were on the scene immediately, and their calmness and discipline were absolutely indispensable in the first few critical moments. Within 24 hours, military personnel were able to double their security forces at select critical locations. DOD also provided critical transportation support for almost 500 additional State personnel who were activated in response to the bombing to supplement state law enforcement resources. The Federal law enforcement training center depended on DOD for transportation, housing, meals, and other support for more than 900 personnel they committed to the post- bombing security operations when no other source was available. Let me pause here for a moment to again express my sympathy for the family of Mrs. Alice Hawthorne, who died during this tragic event. Her death has sent a powerful message throughout our Nation and the world about the horror of acts of senseless violence and terrorism. However, we must never forget that this tragedy in the context of the Olympics pales beside the unspeakable personal loss and grief that have befallen her family. In addition to supporting the Olympic games, DOD extended assistance to the 1996 Paralympic games. Over 990 active duty and National Guard personnel supplied transportation, medical, linguistic, logistical, and communications support to 17 venues in the Atlanta area. Our soldiers took great pride in participating in a project that assisted athletes of such astounding and great courage. Members of our military sadly are no strangers to the impact of injury or illness that some define as incapacitating. But the Paralympic athletes proved by their own performance and their tremendous courage that the definition of incapacitated needs reexamination by our society. I want to thank in particular Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, Secretary of the Army Togo West, Assistant Secretary Mike Walker, General John Tilleli, and his assistant General Bob Hicks for their outstanding leadership and support in assisting the Olympics and Paralympics. In addition to DOD personnel, I would like to thank the Attorney General Janet Reno, the Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, FBI Director Louis Freeh, Atlanta Director of the FBI Woody Johnson, and Gil Childers for all their hard work. Let me also recognize all the administration staff from the DOD and the Federal law enforcement agencies whom I have not named here for all of their hard work. Finally let me thank President Clinton and Vice President Gore, particularly Vice President Gore, whose direct personal involvement from the beginning was vital in keeping the Federal involvement in the games focused and effective. All of us in Georgia are grateful for their support. State and Local Officials It goes without saying that State and local support was crucial in putting on these games. The State of Georgia spent more than $72 million on Olympic security alone, including the salaries of law officers who were assigned to full-time Olympic security duties. Not counting State prison guards, some 73 percent of all State of Georgia employees who have law enforcement credentials were assigned to the Olympics. These figures obviously do not include fire and emergency medical personnel. Governor Zell Miller led the effort to ensure that the State of Georgia contributed the appropriate resources to help construct the various venues, roads, and buildings necessary for the games. Gary McConnell, chief of staff of the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command, Georgia Adjutant General William Bland, Director Buddy Nix of the GBI, Colonel Sid Miles of the Georgia State Patrol and Department of Public Safety, and Atlanta chief of police Beverly Harvard led the State and local security effort. Our National Guard units from Georgia and other States under the leadership of General Bland were superb. Special thanks should also go to Atlanta Mayor Bill Campbell, members of the Atlanta city council, and the Fulton County Commissioners whose leadership was instrumental in preparing Atlanta to host the games. In addition, I want to thank all the Georgia health officials who were involved in preparing for the Olympics and Paralympics and insuring the well being of the spectators and participants. They are often overlooked, but their contributions are every bit as critical. I would also like to thank my fellow colleagues in the Congress who helped with the Olympics and Paralympics, especially my fellow colleagues from the Georgia delegation. Most noteworthy, of course, were Congressman Lewis, Speaker Gingrich, and Senator Coverdell. Finally, I would like to thank my staff on the Senate Armed Services Committee and my personal staff for their assistance to me in working on these games. Mr. President, I wish I could personally thank everyone who was involved in preparing for these great games. This was literally a historic event. I am proud to have been a part of these games, and I am thankful for the opportunity.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, it is my privilege today to recognize the retirement of Linda Collins Hertz, a Federal prosecutor from Florida and a native of Georgia. A graduate of Shorter College in Rome, GA, Ms. Hertz received her law degree from the University of Miami cum laude in 1973. After 6 years as an assistant attorney general for the State of Florida, she joined the U.S. attorney's office in the Southern District of Florida. In her 15- year tenure as the chief of the appellate division in that U.S. Attorney's Office, Ms. Hertz has overseen the filing of in excess of 3,000 briefs in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. I have been told by her former colleagues that the judges of that court frequently comment that the briefs filed under Ms. Hertz' supervision can be counted upon to reflect the highest standards of appellate advocacy, and bear the mark of her commitment to candor, forthrightness and vigorous, but always fair, argument. Ms. Hertz' efforts to ensure that the positions of the United States are argued in a manner consistent with the highest ethical standards serve as a testament to her own high standards. Her coworkers further advise me that Ms. Hertz has consistently provided support to other assistant U.S. attorneys in south Florida and elsewhere, and her counsel is regularly sought on matters of great import and complexity. Ms. Hertz has been recognized by her colleagues and the Department of Justice for her extraordinary work through numerous awards like the Justice Department's John Marshall Award for the Handling of Appeals, and the U.S. Attorney's Vince Antle Award. In sum, Mr. President, based on the record and based on the testimony of those who know her best I believe Linda Collins Hertz of Rome, GA, and Miami, FL, deserves our gratitude for her dedication and service on behalf of the citizens of Florida and our Nation.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, as this Congress and my own career in the U.S. Senate come to an end, I want to pay tribute to a distinguished American who has been of great assistance to me, to the Senate, and to our Nation, Ambassador David Abshire. During my career in the Senate, David Abshire has been one of the leading figures in the national security field in the United States. Although he is probably best known for his service as our Ambassador to NATO and as the founder and president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], these are just two examples from his career of service to our Nation. David Abshire was born in Chattanooga, TN in 1926. He graduated from West Point in 1951 and served with distinction in the Korean war, as a platoon leader, company commander and division assistant intelligence officer. His decorations for service as a front line commander included the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster with V for Valor. In 1959 he received a Ph.D. in history from Georgetown University, where he returned to serve as an adjunct professor for many years. In the early 1970's, he served as Assistant Secretary of State and later as chairman of the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting. He was a member of the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and headed President Reagan's National Security transition team. During the Reagan administration he served with distinction as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Abshire served in this position during a very challenging period when the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles led to NATO's deployment of the cruise missiles and the Pershing missile. Ambassador Abshire's efforts bore fruit when the U.S. deployment led to the first major arms reduction treaty, the INF treaty. For his service as Ambassador he was awarded the Defense Department's highest civilian award, the Distinguished Public Service Medal. I had the opportunity of working with David Abshire during his tenure as Ambassador on several important issues, including my amendment to force our NATO allies to contribute their fair share to our common defense, and on the NATO Cooperative Research and Development program. In 1987, after finishing his service as Ambassador, he served as Special Counsellor to President Reagan. It is not surprising that a man to whom so many of us have turned for wise counsel and advice should be called on by the President of the United States as a Special Counsellor. David Abshire's contributions to the national security field are not limited to his Government service. In recent years Dr. Abshire and CSIS have continued to stimulate debate and discussion on important foreign policy issues such as our policies toward Bosnia and China. Dr. Abshire's talents have extended beyond Government service and academia to benefit our Nation in other areas as well. He is a member of the Council on Competitiveness, the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, to name but a few of the organizations who have sought out his talents. Dr. Abshire is also an author, and I want to call special attention to his most recent book, ``Putting America's House in Order.'' This book demonstrates Dr. Abshire's keen grasp not just of matters of national security, but of the whole range of issues from deficit reduction to investments in, and reforms of, our education and training policies, that are necessary to put our Nation's house in order. In 1991, under Dr. Abshire's leadership, CSIS created the Strengthening of America Commission to address these issues. I was honored that Dr. Abshire asked me and my friend and colleague from New Mexico, Senator Pete Domenici, to serve as co-chairs of this commission. I am very proud of the Strengthening of America report that our commission released in September of 1992 and am grateful to David Abshire for his leadership in creating this commission and seeing it through to a successful conclusion. The work of the CSIS Strengthening of America Commission exemplified the best of David Abshire--long-term thinking and a keen insight into the fundamental issues facing our Nation. Our report challenged not just Government but our schools, our businesses and our parents to take the steps needed to secure a prosperous future for our Nation. We laid out a plan of action to get our fiscal house in order; to raise our level of national savings and our level of public and private investment in both physical and human capital; and to improve the way Washington works. It is with great pleasure that I end my Senate career with a public thank you to a man who has contributed so much to U.S. national security and foreign policy and to me personally, David Abshire. I wish David, his wife Carolyn, and his family all the best.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on September 17 the U.S. Capitol Historical Society hosted a wonderful dinner honoring the Senate Armed Services Committee as the Committee celebrates our 180th anniversary. For those who may not be familiar with the history of the Senate committees, the Senate established the Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs in 1816, and these two committees were replaced by the Armed Services Committee in 1946. Under the leadership of former Congressman Clarence Brown, the Capitol Historical Society does an outstanding job of preserving the history of the Congress and promoting and encouraging the public's interest in this great institution. I want to express my appreciation to Congressman Brown and the staff of the Capitol Historical Society for the delightful evening honoring the committee. Mr. President, the featured speaker at this dinner was Dr. James Schlesinger, a man who has made an enormous contribution to our national security. I have know and worked with Jim Schlesinger since I came to the Senate in 1973. Over the years he has testified numerous times before the Armed Services Committee--both as a cabinet official and as a private citizen whose advice and counsel the committee has repeatedly sought on most of the difficult national security issues we have faced over the years. All of the members of the Armed Services Committee-- both Democrats and Republicans --regard Jim Schlesinger as one of the pillars of this Nation's security. In my remarks at the dinner, Mr. President, I recalled a Senate resolution which the Armed Services Committee and the full Senate adopted in 1975 and which I coauthored with our late colleague Senator Scoop Jackson. It was Senate Resolution 303, and it read: Resolved, That the Senate of the United States commends Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger for his excellence in office, his intellectual honesty and personal integrity, and for his courage and independence. The Senate believes that our country and the free world owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary Schlesinger for his untiring efforts to improve the efficiency of our armed forces, the cohesiveness of our alliances, the wisdom of our strategic policies and doctrine, and for his determination to convey to the American people the truth as he saw it and the sense of the future he so deeply believed they must understand. Mr. President, those comments about Jim Schlesinger are as true today as they were when the Senate passed this resolution in 1975. As I end my Senate career, I want to thank Jim Schlesinger for his tremendous contributions to U.S. national security and foreign policy and to me personnally. I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Schlesinger's remarks to the Capitol Historical Society dinner honoring the 180th anniversary of the Armed Services Committee be included in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks. Mr. President, I also want to note for my colleagues that the Center for Legislative Archives of the National Archives will soon be publishing a history of the Armed Services Committee by historian Richard McCulley. All of us on the Armed Services Committee are very excited about this project and eagerly look forward to its completion.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, almost 4 years ago I made a series of speeches about our men and women in uniform who won the cold war. I asked my colleagues to remember their sacrifice as we undertook the unprecedented drawdown of our All Volunteer Force. I asked that we ensure that the drawdown was accomplished in a way that preserved the legacy of national security which that force had built. And I called on the Congress to see that people leaving military service were given a helping hand as they moved into civilian life, because we owed it to them and because the Nation needed their skills. When I made those remarks, the post-cold-war drawdown was mostly in front of us. Although it had started in 1987, the downsizing moved slowly at first and then halted completely for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Today, as I rise to review what has happened in the intervening 3 years, the downsizing is over 90 percent complete, and next year it will essentially be complete. Let me begin by looking at the drawdown and how we did at meeting this enormous challenge. In the late 1980's, after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it became clear that we could make significant reductions in the size of our Armed Forces. It was decided by the Bush administration and the Congress to reduce military personnel by approximately one-third over a period of 5 years. As a nation, we had experience with large demobilizations after World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. This drawdown, however, was to be different. The United States had never before sought to downsize an all-volunteer force. In those earlier reductions, our conscripted soldiers were more than happy to return to civilian life. In contrast, the men and women who had won the cold war had all chosen a military career and expected to be able to remain in uniform as long as they performed their duties well. Under these circumstances, nobody in the Congress or in the Defense Department knew how the downsizing would turn out, and many were skeptical that it would turn out well. A drawdown of this magnitude could easily have caused bitterness, skill gaps, stalled promotion opportunities, morale problems and could have created a hostile attitude toward the military across the society. As we began to reduce the size of the force, some predicted that the best and the brightest would take the opportunity to get out of the service, leaving us with a less than ready military. But Congress, two administrations, and the military leadership worked together to ensure that through the drawdown the force was carefully shaped to maintain quality and readiness. We in the Congress provided creative tools, like early retirement and special separation benefits, which allowed the Pentagon to carefully shape the force and to address emerging problems as they occurred. In this regard, each of the military services--and especially the Army--did a tremendous job in balancing the needs of current and future readiness with the imperative of easing in every way possible the transition to civilian life of those who would be leaving the service as a direct result of the drawdown. Mr. President, the results are impressive: The quality of our force is higher than at the start of the drawdown. The proportion of active duty enlisted personnel in the upper aptitude categories has increased from 56 percent in 1987 to 66 percent in 1995. Those in the lowest acceptable aptitude category dropped from 11 percent of the force in 1987 to just 6 percent in 1995. Our force is more experienced, as measured by age and length of service. For example, the average age increased 1.4 years from 1987 to 1995 (to 28.7) and there are 45 percent fewer enlisted service members under age 22. And, despite warnings that the drawdown would sacrifice the military's hard won gains for women and minorities, their representation has actually increased. The percentage of women in active service has increased from 10 percent to 13 percent. Total minority representation in the active force has increased from 27.4 percent to 30.5 percent. Minority field grade officers showed an even larger increase: from 7 percent of the total to 12 percent. As we achieved these impressive results, we maintained our obligation to be fair to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Only a very small number of service members were involuntarily separated to achieve our downsizing goals. Let me repeat that, although over 1 million people have left the military during the drawdown, fewer than 2,000 service members were involuntarily separated. The Pentagon used tools such as the special separation benefit, provided by the Congress, to perform this miracle. The Nation will be reaping the benefits of that accomplishment in recruitment and public good will for years to come. We also took special care with the service members who had dedicated their professional lives to the military. In order to maintain an orderly flow through the ranks, we had to thin at all experience levels, including those with 15 to 19 years in the service. Service members with this many years in uniform had made a long-term commitment to military, but had not yet reached the 20 years necessary for retirement benefits. In many cases their decisions to stay in the Armed Forces were predicated on being able to make it to 20 years to be eligible for retirement. An easy approach would have been simply to dismiss these people--but that would have been short-sighted and, I believe, morally indefensible. However, using the early retirement program which I called for in 1992 and which became law in fiscal year 1993, we were able to keep faith with these patriots and save taxpayer money, too, by offering early retirement. Over 34,000 men and women have availed themselves to the early retirement option. By shaping the force thoughtfully, we also maintained promotion opportunities that helped us keep the highly skilled and experienced service members we needed to retain. In sum, the drawdown has been a real success. The credit for that success goes to those who administered this effort, to my colleagues and former colleagues in the Congress, to the leadership of the military services, and to the rank and file service members who have performed so brilliantly during this time of turbulence. The second part of my call in January 1992, was to see that those departing the service were helped in their transition to the civilian economy. It would have been wasteful and wrong to send these people out into the job market with no guidance or support. I am pleased to report that the military has used the programs created by the Congress to benefit departing service members on an unprecedented scale. The effort begins 3 months before a service member leaves the military, when they are offered preseparation counseling. This includes information concerning relocation, employment issues, financial assistance, education and training benefits, health and life insurance rules, veterans benefits and assistance in developing individual transition plans. The next step in preparing for the civilian job market is the transition assistance program workshop. Working in coordination with the Departments of Labor and Veterans Affairs, the Department of Defense has implemented transition assistance programs at some 200 sites in the United States, and more overseas. Staffed by outplacement and employment experts, 330 transition sites worldwide provide intensive individual counseling to departing service members and their families. These programs teach resume writing and interviewing, provide information on the current job market and help the attendees understand how best to translate their military skills into skills needed in the civilian work force. The courses have also been put on video to accommodate the special needs of sailors deployed at sea for their last tour and those service members stationed at remote duty locations. The rewards of this program can be seen with people like Jerry Sack. As Jerry was getting out of the Marine Corps in California, he had two dreams, to be a fireman and to move to Georgia, where his wife had grown up. He said at the outset that he thought these twin goals were nearly impossible. But the transition assistance people worked intensively with Jerry on his resume, interviewing techniques, and job search strategies. Then they gave him a lead on a civilian fire chief's job at the Marine Corps logistics base in Albany, GA. With the tap team's guidance, he hit the books to prepare for the interview. The team heard that Jerry got his dream job when he wrote back saying: Because of your staff, and only because of your staff, I was able to prepare myself personally and on paper to be selected for this position as fire chief. The Department of Defense has also created an automated job matching system. Departing service members enter their resumes, skills, and job criteria and they can be matched with private employers who use the service free of charge. This system and a transition bulletin board maintained by DOD, is a great example of how the information super highway can be used to help veterans. Here are just a few examples of the results of this system: a number of individuals have been placed with Infotec Corp. in Virginia helping to track down missing children; a dozen more are working as managers and line officers at the Indiana Department of Corrections; three were hired by Metropolitan Life Insurance; and the new engineering coordinator at Telspan International was hired through this system. And there are many more who have been hired as computer programmers, stockbrokers, and supervisors. One satisfied employer who used this high-technology service wrote back saying, ``the guys coming out of the military are our best workers.'' That comes as no surprise to anyone here, but it is good to know the word is getting out to employers nationwide. All of this has led to a much friendlier transition for many thousands of military families. The best indicator of our success is that thousands of employers who hire veterans come back to hire more through the automated systems and job fairs. A healthy economy is certainly helping, but the transition programs are ensuring that people leaving the military can match their skill to high quality civilian jobs. The heart of my challenge 3 years ago was to help departing service members use their skill and leadership abilities to address some of our Nation's pressing needs. The problems I talked about then are, unfortunately, still with us today including violence in the streets and a need for discipline and role models in our schools. In the fiscal year 1994 Defense Authorization Act, we created a program within the temporary early retirement authority which encouraged retiring service members to enter public and community service employment. Under this program, if an early-retiree takes a job in a critically needed skill area, he or she can accrue additional military retirement credit up to the 20-year mark. Today almost 9,000 individuals who chose early retirement are working in public and community service positions and, as such, are earning additional credits toward their military retirement. This program has encouraged many of our former service members to use their talents to improve their communities. There has been a big push lately for the Federal Government to help States and localities cope with crime. But in many ways, the quality of law enforcement will never be better than the quality of the front line police officers patrolling the street. That's why I suggested that service people, with their training to think on their feet and handle complex and dangerous situations, be encouraged to pursue a law enforcement career. To this end, we authorized the Troops to Cops Program. A combined effort of the Departments of Defense and Justice, Troops to Cops will provide funds to local law enforcement agencies to offset the initial cost of hiring former service members as police officers. We may never have statistics on the number of crimes prevented or how much safer people feel as a result of having these highly-trained professionals on their local police force, but America will certainly be the better for it. Perhaps the most successful community service initiative we established for people leaving the service is the troops to teachers program. This program provides stipends to assist people leaving the military in obtaining certification as elementary and secondary school teachers or teachers' aides. In addition, it helps disadvantaged local schools that have a shortage of teachers and teachers' aides to hire program participants. This program helps bring together one of our greatest national needs, tough but inspiring teachers for tough schools, with one of our greatest national assets the men and women trained and molded by the Armed Forces. Departing service members placed in the troops to teachers program everywhere from South Carolina to New York are writing back to the Department of Defense, raving about the support they've gotten. To date, 4,337 departing service members have been selected for the troops to teachers program; 1,482 are now in training programs leading toward the necessary certification. And over 800 former soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are already in classrooms helping America's kids. This is a success story of the first order. In sum, Mr. President, the post-cold war drawdown of our forces and the transition programs for departing service members are a case of government doing a job well. The Congress, the executive branch, and the uniformed military each did their part, and we all had the readiness of the force and the well-being of the service members in mind as we created and executed these policies.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have been contacted by my constituent, Dr. Christina Jeffrey of Kennesaw, GA, who was formerly the historian for the other body. Dr. Jeffrey has asked that I place in the Record materials which would help correct unfounded media reports about her professional reputation. I am pleased to do this for Dr. Jeffrey because I have long noted the fact that the media is sometimes quick to report the negative, but slow to report corrections. I know of Dr. Jeffrey from her service as a volunteer with other academicians on my nonpolitical advisory board which selects young men and women to serve as interns in my Senate offices. Based on what I know regarding her reputation among her colleagues who know her best, Dr. Jeffrey is a person of integrity with a genuine interest in public service as well as higher education. It is sad that in this city, both elected officials and staff are often subjected to accusations and actions that go far beyond the bounds of fair play. I hope the following material helps clarify the facts involving Dr. Jeffrey's professional reputation. The material follows: Department of Education, Washington, DC, March 22, 1989. Hon. Richard Shelby, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Shelby: Your letter to Secretary Cavazos concerning Dr. Christina Price has been forwarded to me for reply. Dr. Price's concern is understandable. She was generous in acting as a reviewer for the National Diffusion Network (NDN) on the application for funding of a curriculum entitled ``Facing History and Ourselves.'' Denial of that funding application has created an extended controversy, and disclosure of her comments in the media has created a great deal of misunderstanding about both the program and Dr. Price's own views. I believe Dr. Price was acting in good faith, and was delivering honest opinions, when she reviewed ``Facing History.'' She argues that here comments were written in a kind of academic shorthand, not for public consumption, and that in no way did she intend to convey an attitude of racism or anti-Semitism. We accept her contention. And to the extent that any Department of Education official has characterized Dr. Price herself as racist or anti-Semitic, we do indeed apologize. However, it is also true that some of Dr. Price's review comments were ambiguously phrased, and that portions lifted out of context and reprinted in the media could lead an objective reader to conclude that she favored presenting the Nazi or KKK point of view in the interests of ``balance or objectivity.'' While the best education about any historical issue requires an understanding of the motivations of all parties, the teaching of the Holocaust demands clear delineation between good and evil. To the extent that outside observers believed Dr. Price to be advocating a morally neutral approach to the teaching of the Holocaust--and to the extent that they further believed this represented the position of the Department of Education--it is not surprising that they would raise strenuous objections. It should also be noted that under the Freedom of Information Act, the Department of Education was required to release a list of reviewers, and the evaluations of the projects submitted by them, without identifying which reviewers made which comments. We complied with FOIA requirements in supplying this information. Dr. Price was informed of this policy in a letter from Dr. Shirley Curry, director of the Recognition Division, on November 19, 1986. It read in part: ``Your review of applications for grants becomes part of the official government record and will be a determining factor in choosing who will be funded. If requested, applicants will be given copies of the reviewers' comments. However, the names of the reviewers will be removed from the review instruments before being sent out. '' The most difficult aspect of this episode is that I am sure Dr. Price feels as strongly about appropriate teaching of the Holocaust as we do (and for that matter, as strongly as those who created the ``Facing History'' curriculum). She did what was asked in good faith. Unfortunately, what she wrote left room for misinterpretation. In the event that this controversy continues, you may rest assured that I will do everything possible to ensure that no further confusion arises, and that no one in this Department casts aspersions on the character of Dr. Price. Thank you for your interest in this matter. Since you wrote on behalf of Dr. Price, we trust you will be providing her with a copy of this response. Sincerely, Patricia Hines, Assistant Secretary.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, next Monday the Comptroller General of the United States, Charles A. Bowsher, will retire after 15 years in that position. At the time of his appointment in 1981, President Reagan said ``this is one of the most important appointments that I shall make as President, adding that ``it's obvious that in this post, a strong and effective leader can have an enduring impact on our political institutions.'' As chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I have had the privilege of working with Mr. Bowsher and his able staff as they assist the Congress in its oversight function. I believe his efforts have made an enduring impact on our Government, making it more responsible, efficient and accountable to our citizens. During his tenure, Mr. Bowsher has overseen a tremendous growth in the amount of reports produced by GAO as well as the amount of official testimony given to Congressional committees. GAO is now producing over 1,000 reports per year, and provides expert testimony before congressional committees over 300 times per year, doubling their productivity since 1983. Despite reductions of 25 percent in their audit and staffing budget since fiscal year 1992, Mr. Bowsher made sure the quality of GAO's report and services remained uncompromised. Under their mandate to evaluate and audit all Government programs and activities, GAO has consistently produced reports that are on the cutting edge of research, analysis, and investigation. Mr. Bowsher continually pressed for strengthened and revised budget and accounting systems. As a result of GAO's recommendations, over $100 billion in savings and benefits have been realized through budget reductions, cost avoidances, appropriations deferrals, and revenue enhancements. As chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I came to rely on the work produced by GAO through their high risk series. These reports documented programs where the potential for billions of dollars in waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement existed. Their expertise in identifying problem areas didn't end here. Through their work for the subcommittee, they identified innumerable areas for improvement. In the last few years alone, their work for the subcommittee has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in documented savings to the Federal Government. In the Armed Services Committee, we relied on GAO's work on many occasions, especially in areas such as financial management and acquisition policy, and on their investigative abilities in cases where the committee needed to find out exactly what the facts were. GAO's fine work under Mr. Bowsher's leadership goes well beyond measurable cost savings. Although the benefits are less qualifiable than dollar savings, they are just as significant. Their work has repeatedly alerted Congress and the executive branch to weaknesses in Federal regulations, law enforcement, and issues related to our Armed Forces. Some examples include: Identifying problems in requirements for reporting currency transactions at banks and other financial institutions to strengthen the ability to detect money laundering to prevent billions of dollars of drug and criminal proceeds to escape taxation, forfeiture and seizure; Highlighting the shortcomings of State insurance regulation of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans that exposed thousands of subscribers to loss of health care benefits through insurer default; Identifying differences and weaknesses in state insurance regulations that permit fraudulent insurance schemes to sell worthless policies to unsuspecting consumers; Identifying loopholes in Department of Education procedures that regulate the Federal Student Loan and Pell Grant Programs to protect the quality of postsecondary education; and Prodding the Defense Department to improve its troubled financial management systems, providing continued oversight of DOD's progress, and continuing to press for further improvements in DOD's oversight of the Defense business operations fund and other systems required to ensure that the taxpayer's money has been correctly accounted for. Mr. Bowsher has also demonstrated great vision as our Government prepares for the next millennium. Under his leadership, GAO greatly enhanced its focus on issues related to information management and technology, and they have produced cutting edge analysis of the challenges our Government will face in the information age. GAO recently issued a report on the extent to which Defense computer systems are being attacked, the actual and potential damage to its information and systems, and the challenges the Defense Department is facing in securing its sensitive but unclassified information systems. This report and their resulting testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was some of the most professional and skillful I have seen. This Congress and the American people owe a great debt to Charles Bowsher for his fine work. I congratulate him on his 15 years of service, and wish him well in his future endeavors.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, last year, I spoke to a group about the changes that have occurred since the demise of the former Soviet Union. In my remarks, I offered a Tom Clancy-like hypothetical, set in 1998, that was intended to illustrate the possible nightmares that we might face in an age of proliferation. In my scenario, Libyan terrorists used a drone aircraft filled with anthrax to attack the Capital during the President's State of the Union Address. Seventy-two hours later, the Government is stunned as Washington hospitals are overwhelmed with fatalities, including many of our elected and appointed leaders. In my scenario, there were few survivors except for those few visionary Senators who had retired in 1996. Today I will offer another scenario, perhaps even more unbelievable, Imagine that a group of religious zealots led by a charismatic, half- blind yoga instructor assembles an international following of nearly 50,000 members and collects over $1 billion in assets. Further imagine, this group recruits physicists and scientists from all over the world, and finds a large number of converts among the scientific and professional communities in Russia and Japan. Believing it is their destiny to destroy the world, they begin work on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons right under the noses of their governments and go completely unnoticed by foreign intelligence services. They purchase sophisticated dual-use technology along with many of the precursors needed to develop their lethal weapons. They send their members worldwide: looking for the Ebola virus in Zaire; mining for uranium in Australia; seeking protein databases for biological weapons and laser instruments in the United States; and obtaining helicopters and drone aircraft, as well as other weapons delivery systems, from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. They then conduct macabre experiments on sheep and humans. They are only caught after an attempted sarin nerve gas attack on a major subway system goes awry. A mistake in crafting their delivery system reduces the possible fatalities from tens of thousands, to 12 people, although 5,000 are injured including scores with severe nerve damage. Of course, this is not a Tom Clancy novel, it is fact. If I had used this same scenario before March 20, 1995, the date of the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack, people would have said, ``impossible.'' The world has learned much since then about the Aum Shinrikyo attack. Much of what we know stems from hearings held by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations last year. Those hearings revealed that the Aum and their doomsday weapons were simply not on anybody's radar screen. The initial response to the subcommittee's revelations was astonishment and disbelief. It sounded unbelievable. Subsequent hearings focused on another previously unthinkable event, the frightening prospect of nuclear chaos in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Aum, we now know, was not alone in trying to exploit instability in Russia to buy unconventional weapons and materials--the Iranians and others have been shopping around the former Soviet Union in search of materials, technology, and know-how. The seizure of 2.7 kilograms of weapon grade uranium in the Czech capital of Prague and other smaller amounts of plutonium elsewhere in Europe prove that nuclear smuggling is a reality. These shipments were intercepted by law enforcement authorities, but is it possible that other shipments may have gone undetected? Last spring I participated in a CSIS study of the nuclear black market headed by former FBI and CIA Director, William Webster. The CSIS panel, which included top intelligence and nuclear specialists, concluded that this was a problem we cannot ignore. It is simply unrealistic to assume that the tons of nuclear materials that are improperly secured, along with thousands of out-of-work Soviet weapons scientists and their equipment will never end up in the wrong hands. Add to this new proliferation problem evidence of possible organized crime involvement in weapons smuggling and you have the ingredients of a full blown disaster looming on the horizon. Unfortunately, nuclear smuggling is only part of the problem, and perhaps even the least likely one to threaten our security. unthinkable power within the grasp of the unthinking Weapons of mass destruction are increasingly within the grasp of a growing number of developing countries, sub-national groups, terrorist groups and even individuals. The borderless world of cyberspace expands access to information about terrorist techniques and unconventional weapons even further. Various violence-prone groups now share recipes for making weapons of mass destruction on the Internet and offer their trade secrets on how to make and use unconventional weapons for sale through catalogs. This situation is, as observed by Alvin Tofler, ``The ultimate devolution of power, the demassification of mass-destruction weapons.'' Proliferation and terrorism are not new threats. However, changes in the international situation, in access to technology, and in terrorist motivation require us to think anew about the potential use of unconventional weapons against the United States. In August I attended a meeting of the Aspen Strategy Group that examined these post-cold-war security threats. The Aspen Strategy Group is a bipartisan committee sponsored by the Aspen Institute that examines critical issues affecting U.S. national security. Secretary of Defense William Perry and other top officials also attended the meeting. The consensus of the meeting was that the convergence of proliferation, terrorism, and organized crime makes the post-cold-war period a uniquely dangerous time for our country. Although the risk of nuclear war is vastly reduced and the overall outlook for our security is greatly improved, the risk of chemical, biological or some form of nuclear terrorism has increased. This new threat does not put our civilization at risk in the way that nuclear confrontation did, but it is much harder to deter. The familiar balance of nuclear terror has yielded to a much unpredictable situation, where adversaries may not be dissuaded by threats of retaliation. Our massive retaliatory forces are useless against terrorists who hide among civilian populations. Our biggest threats of the future may well be people who do not have a return address. At the same time that most of the world has turned its back on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a few desperate nations, terrorist groups, ideologically driven cults, ethnic minorities, disaffected political groups and even individuals may view weapons of mass destruction as the only way to wield power over world events. And if battlefield-usable weapons are not available, crude bombs or dispersal systems may suffice to produce mass terror. The Aspen group and other assess the risk of chemical and biological terrorism as higher than nuclear, with the caveat that radiological weapons could produce massive terror even without posing a major health hazard. The trend lines in the last several years are not encouraging. In our own country, survivalist and militia-type groups have been charged with attempting to acquire bubonic plague and ricin, a deadly substance derived from the castor bean. A small amount of ricin can kill in minutes if ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin. Two individuals associated with a group called the Minnesota Patriots Council were convicted of planning to use ricin to assassinate IRS officials and other Government employees. A former member of the Aryan Nation ordered the plague, saying he needed it for research purposes. And it is useful to recall that in May 1994, the sentencing judge in the World Trade Center case said the defendants had placed sodium cyanide in their explosives package with the intent of creating a poisonous cyanide gas but fortunately the gas burned during the explosion. If true, we have already had the first attempted chemical terrorist attack here at home. preparing for the unthinkable Add to these events the bombings in Oklahoma and Dharhan, the plans of the World Trade Center bombers to blow up tunnels during New York City rush hour and another plot to kill thousands by downing commercial aircraft and the challenge is clear. The moral, political, military, and technical factors that made WMD terrorism unthinkable may not last forever. The nuclear strategist Herman Kahn warned over thirty years ago that we must think about the unthinkable in order to avoid it. We need to think about the unthinkable possibility of a terrorist WMD attack against our country. These indicators of terrorism's future take place against a background of proliferation, which also continues after the cold war. We learned in 1995, after four years of unprecedented inspections, the true extent of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Before the gulf war, Saddam Hussein possessed bombs and missiles deployed with anthrax, botulinum, sarin and VX, the most lethal form of nerve gas. Saddam also planned to seize the safeguarded enriched uranium from Iraq's civilian nuclear program and quickly make it into a nuclear bomb. Iran is developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and Libya continues its drive for weapons of mass destruction. North Korea still possesses an unknown quantity of plutonium and continues to sell missiles despite the freeze on its nuclear construction projects; China may be selling nuclear missile technology despite its pledges not to do so. In South Asia, we see India and Pakistan embarking on a nuclear arms race. The list of countries actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons and missiles continues to grow. There are some bright spots on the proliferation front--not least of which is the fact that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are giving up the Soviet weapons on their territory. The new twist is that terrorists may join the ranks of the proliferators. Some proliferators such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria are also sponsors of terrorism. Would a government supply WMD capabilities to terrorists, or help terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union? This possibility poses a clear challenge to our intelligence and law enforcement efforts against this threat. We cannot keep track of every cult and every disaffected group or individual. While we can and must improve our intelligence capabilities, this is one area in which an ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure. Job number one is to make sure the actual weapons materials are safe from diversion at the source. The cooperative threat reduction programs do just that, and we have just passed legislation to beef up our efforts to improve the security of Russian and FSU nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons materials. That legislation also included support for detection and interdiction of smuggling of these lethal materials, and increased penalties for those who are caught. Our intelligence and law enforcement efforts also benefit from international cooperation. We need to strengthen the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to make certain that nuclear materials can all be accounted for, and that suspicious nuclear programs are carefully scrutinized. The Chemical Weapons Convention is not a cure-all, but it is a step in the right direction and will provide additional technical and political barriers to deter and detect covert chemical weapons programs. As for those who cheat on their international commitments or shun the norms of international behavior, we must be willing to hold them accountable. Proliferation and terrorism are not new threats. Each will continue to be a threat in its own right and neither shows signs of disappearing any time soon. What is new is the degree of overlap between them. A new breed of terrorism appears willing to take even more extreme measures in pursuit of even more extreme objectives. a comprehensive strategy We need to address the threat posed by the convergence of proliferation and terrorism in a comprehensive way. Unfortunately, the task is even more difficult than negotiating with an ideologically hostile, aggressive, and nuclear-armed superpower. For certain religiously or ideologically driven terrorists, self-preservation may not even be a priority, as it was for the Soviets. The traditional tools of statecraft--the careful blending of force and diplomacy--may have little relevance where the goals of mass destruction and retribution, or supposed divine inspiration, are concerned. The explosive mix of age-old zealotry and new-age weaponry has brought instruments of unthinkable destructive power within the grasp of those willing to commit the unthinkable. A new strategy to combat the convergence of proliferation and terrorism should consist of several aspects adapted from our current defense posture. The three main components should be deterrence, interdiction and consequence mitigation. With respect to deterrence, our enemies should never doubt our willingness to respond to any attack, with overwhelming force, whether or not weapons of mass destruction are involved. At the same time, it should also be clear that the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States would guarantee a retaliation that would far exceed any attacker's ability to withstand. In light of our conventional weapons superiority, overwhelming retaliation can be carried out under most circumstances without resort to nuclear weapons, although nuclear deterrence should remain an option. For the present, ambiguity regarding our response may inspire caution in the minds of any potential attacker. The threat of overwhelming retaliation, however, is not effective against terrorists, unless they can be traced to a state sponsor. Terrorists typically hide among civilian populations, thus ruling out certain retaliatory options. Of course, military force can still be directed against terrorists where they hide, and we have the capability to conduct special operations, but law enforcement agencies will also be on the forefront of our counter-terrorism efforts. Nation that sponsor WMD terrorism should not feel safe from retaliation. Moreover, terrorists of all types should know with certainty that the United States will vigilantly track down and punish them for their criminal acts. In the case of WMD terrorism, the world will not be a big enough place to hide, and any person, group or state associated with such terrorists will be held equally responsible. Fortunately, there is broad consensus throughout the world on extradition and hot-pursuit of terrorists--that consensus is even more solid where WMD are concerned. Interdiction is the second part of the stragety--to detect and stop illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, both at our borders and those of cooperating countries. This task will require the accelerated development of improved detection technologies for chemical, biological, and radiological materials as well as training of foreign customs inspectors and law enforcement officials. We have taken some steps toward improving our interdiction capabilities and training foreign customs officials, but we have a long ways yet to go. I am confident that there are promising technologies and innovative methods out there if we are willing to properly fund and support them. My colleagues Dick Lugar and Pete Domenici, and I have called for a new Manhattan Project to solve this problem, and the national laboratories at Livemore, Los Alamos and elsewhere are doing some promising work in this area. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act which we sponsored provides $27 million to begin this effort. The third part of our strategy is preparedness to face the threat if prevention fails. We need to rethink and then rebuild our domestic preparedness and planning. Some important improvements have been made recently but, again, much remains to be done. Some agencies, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] have updated their Cold War mission. Others, like the Departments of Defense and Energy, possess specialized equipment and expertise that must be available if a WMD incident occurs. Managing these efforts during a crisis is the job of law enforcement, although their mission to apprehend suspects and collect evidence may sometimes have to take a back seat to public safety. This is just on the Federal level. We heard during our hearings the concerns of the first responders--the fire, medical, police, public works, and other local officials who would be the first on the scene in the event of a chemical, biological, or nuclear incident. We owe it to those public servants and the citizens they protect to make available the training, equipment, and expertise needed to prevent them from joining the ranks of the first victims of an attack. Our strategy must consolidate our scattershot efforts to focus on this problem. The legislation I sponsored with Senators Lugar and Domenici contained a key section on domestic preparedness. We provided the authority and funding to begin to establish special chemical and biological emergency response teams and to train local officials. We also included a provision to improve coordination of all the relevant agencies and departments by establishing a special coordinator at the White House. The Coordinator would oversee the Government's nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement activities that are directly relevant to this problem, but are spread far and wide throughout the various departments, and pull them together in a coherent policy. The change in the nature of the threat requires a change in the way we organize our resources to provide for our defense. We should be willing to rethink and reshape the cold war bureaucracy and adjust our institutions to respond dynamically to a dynamic threat. We will need new doctrine and innovative technologies, improved intelligence and law enforcement, and cooperation with foreign governments to address this threat. The three-pronged strategy I have described is within our reach and within our budget. Of course we will need to shift priorities and more funding will be required. But the threat of terrorist attack on American cities involving radiological, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons has reached a point where a new effort is required. We should not wait to take action in the wake of an incident. This is a clear and present danger that requires a timely response.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, technology has long been an instrument of power and change. From the invention of the printing press to the advent of the industrial revolution to the development of nuclear weapons, technological advances have profoundly altered our society and changed the course of our history. Today, we find ourselves in the midst of one of the most far-reaching technological developments of all--the information age.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the post-cold war era has been in existence for nearly 7 years. Like the period that followed the end of the Second World War, the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union required our Nation to think anew about our security. It has been a time of reorientation and uncertainty as we take stock of our situation and decide on a future course of action. We can no longer, however, afford to continue in a holding pattern that lacks a clear long-term national security strategy. We must put forth the contours of a strategic vision that will guide us through the post-cold war period and that will define and safeguard our vital interests. the road ahead The strategic landscape of the post-cold war era includes certain familiar features. One such feature is the resurgence of deeply rooted national, ethnic, and regional rivalries which were unfrozen by the end of the cold war. Amidst this background are other familiar landmarks. The United States stands as the world's lone superpower but due to their economic strength or vast potential, the other great powers, Russia, China, Japan and Europe, also remain in a class by themselves. Great power politics did not end with the cold war. In fact, the international relations of tomorrow may in some ways look more like the 19th century balance of power system than the cold war system that was dominated by two superpowers. We can hope but we should not assume that the semichaotic nature of the post-cold war period we now inhabit will soon transition to a more stable world order. In other words, this may be it. The end of the cold war brought an easing of the most ominous threat to our security--a Soviet nuclear missile attack on the United States. We are no longer compelled to contain Soviet aggression on a global scale. That struggle absorbed untold national resources; victory came at no small price in terms of blood and treasure. Without question, freedom is in greater supply around the world today thanks to the United States and our allies. The overall prospect for our security has improved. However, while the character of the threats to our security have been dramatically transformed, war and interstate conflict are not obsolete. The means of conflict may have changed, but the sources of human conflict and cruelty remain. We must, therefore, adapt our security posture to a world in which power, in all its forms, is far more dispersed than it was during the cold war. Technology is also more dispersed, raising the risk that countries or groups hostile to our Nation can more easily acquire the means to harm American interests. It was with a profound sense of irony that those who have devoted so much of their efforts to defeating communism came to the realization that the long-awaited collapse of the Soviet empire--and the easing of the nuclear confrontation between Washington and Moscow that was then possible--actually carried with it a new proliferation threat. The possible leakage of nuclear weapons and materials from the former Soviet Union compound the already complex proliferation threat during a time of rapid change and instability at cold war's end. We can not afford to wait until we have a clearer picture of the future before taking action. Some of the defining features of the strategic landscape are already clear enough. First and foremost we need to build consensus in support of a common understanding of America's national interests. During the cold war, there were disagreements about tactics, but the basic sense of mission was clear. This is no longer the case. Liberated from the burden of leading the free world against communism, public interest in foreign affairs has diminished, and consensus about foreign policy has evaporated. Nowhere is the lack of consensus more apparent than in the Congress. As we approach the millennium, we must begin to rebuild consensus with a focused discussion of our fundamental interests. defining our national interests after the cold war What are America's vital interests? A bipartisan commission, of which I was a member, recently issued a report brings needed clarity to the discussion of our national interests. The report, America's National Interests, distinguished between vital, extremely important, important, and secondary interests. These distinction are essential to the task of establishing national priorities and building public support for foreign and defense policy. And despite the common use of the term ``vital interests,'' to describe everything from soup to nuts, the report defines truly vital interests only those conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation. It should come as no surprise that preventing and deterring the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons attacks on the United States is at the top of the list of vital interests. According to the report, other vital interests are to prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia; to prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in control of the seas; to prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems (trade, financial markets, energy supplies, environment; and to ensure the survival of U.S. allies. Other objectives, such as preventing the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons outside our borders or countering proliferation are extremely important, but not vital interests. Similarly, combating terrorism and avoiding major conflicts in important geographic regions are extremely important, but do not directly threaten the American way of life. This hierarchy of interests does not diminish the desirability of other objectives, such as promoting democracy, human rights and open markets. It is in no way a betrayal of our values to acknowledge that our survival takes precedence over our hopes for a better world to come. But we shall have no peace, no prosperity, nor the ability to help others if our own security is threatened by successful attacks on our vital interests. In our complex post cold war world, we must begin to build a national consensus around the bedrock requirements of our security. proliferation of weapons of mass destruction The spread of weapons of mass destruction still clouds our security outlook. Possession of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by rogue nations or terrorist groups could pose a clear and present danger to our society. U.S. leadership will continue to be the driving force for maintaining norms against either acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction. The Aspen Strategy Group, which I co-chair along with Ken Dam, recently examined the post-cold war threats posed by WMD proliferation, and found that some significant progress has been made. The Aspen group found: Important progress has been achieved in restraining--and even rolling back--nuclear proliferation. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely. The nuclear weapons formerly controlled by Ukraine, Belarus and Kasakhstan have been consolidated in Russian hands. South Africa has voluntarily dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Brazil and Argentina terminated their nuclear efforts. Only India, Israel and Pakistan are holdouts on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While treaties and institutions are only one part of our nonproliferation efforts, they are important tools which can provide a legal and moral framework for practical mechanisms to deter and detect violations of international treaty commitments. The denuclearization of the former Soviet States other than Russia, the U.N. program to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and efforts to freeze and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program would have been vastly more difficult without the international consensus codified in the Non- Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. The Chemical Weapons Convention, while no panacea, can add a valuable barrier against the diversion of commercial chemicals to make weapons. Our security directly benefits from stronger safeguards on nuclear and chemical materials and from robust enforcement of those treaties. In addition to the direct threat that these weapons pose to our homeland, our abilities to project military force and to forge coalitions as was assembled in the gulf war could be seriously harmed by the possession of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by regional adversaries. Thus, our counter proliferation efforts are another important aspect of our overall nonproliferation policy. Much of our previous efforts to control the spread of these weapons also benefitted from the ability to deny access to the technology and materials required to make them. The effectiveness of those controls has eroded due to expanding commerce in technologies that can contribute to strategic weapons production and due to increasingly porous and unguarded borders. The materials and know-how for weapons of mass destruction are more available than ever to the highest bidder. A widening circle of States, non-state actors, and ideologically motivated groups may increasingly have the resources and capabilities to acquire the technology and materials necessary to create weapons of mass destruction. Such groups may not need to wield battlefield-ready military weapons to wreak mass destruction--crude bombs and low-tech delivery systems may suffice. Our new strategy must assume that proliferation, like war, is not a relic of the cold war headed for the dustbin of history. terrorism, fanaticism & lethal materials Unfortunately, these weapons of unthinkable destructive power already appear within the grasp of individuals and groups willing to do the unthinkable. While terrorism and fanaticism are hardly new, the medium of the terrorists' perverse message is expanding as lethal materials and technology become more readily available. The Unabomber demonstrated the terror one man can inspire, Oklahoma City, allegedly, illustrated the damage two can do, the World Trade Center showed the power of a small, well-organized group and the bombing of an American base in Saudi Arabia drove home the point that terrorists probe for vulnerabilities abroad and at home. Across the world, the Aum Shinrikyo provided a chilling precedent of a doomsday cult viewing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as their ticket to paradise. As a nation we have just begun to come to terms with the full scope of the terrorism threat. For many years, terrorists were mainly interested in making a political statement or drawing attention to a cause through discreet acts of violence such as an assassination, a taking of a hostage or some violent event of limited impact. These criminals were conscious of public relations and even viewed certain acts--such as use of chemical and biological weapons--as taboo. The 1990's, however, have seen terrorists acts that appear intended to create casualties of the highest order. These enemies are too often zealots filled with hate for civil society, and who believe their conduct is justified or divinely inspired. Despite the vivid memories of Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center, I am not sure Americans truly comprehend the devastating effect the use a weapon of mass destruction would have on a civilian population at home. The possibility of terrorist groups gaining access to former Soviet nuclear materials or know-how, and using them to attack the United States is not merely the stuff of paperback thrillers. A report released last summer by a Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] study group on nuclear smuggling concluded that the risk is no hoax. The Director of Central Intelligence at a 1996 hearing expressed his view on the risk of chemical and biological terrorism that ``we have been lucky so far.'' Mr. President, I do not believe we should base our security on luck. It was a little-noticed fact that the judge in the World Trade Center case stated at the defendant's sentencing hearing that he believed the terrorists attempted to augment the blast with the deadly nerve agent, cyanide. Incidents like these have heightened awareness to this threat. We have begun to take some steps required to meet the challenge of terrorism, such as the domestic preparedness provisions of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation included in the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization Act. We now have a very important foundation for this challenge. But I depart the Senate with a sense that this mission is just beginning, These are the known dangers that are now coming into focus. Unfortunately, we are a nation of soft targets. An effective response is possible, but it requires a willingness to think anew about our security and about the way our Government and our military are organized to defense against the threats of today. We should not assume that the bureaucratic structures of our foreign policy and national security apparatus, nor the force postures that were successful for waging the cold war, are the right ones for the threats we will face in the future. The New Challenge: Security in Cyberspace The information age has brought us unimaginable efficiency and productivity, in effect shrinking time and space. In military affairs the power of computers and networks have helped make our armed forces the most powerful in the history of the world. Our forces are able to achieve battlefield dominance through use of information systems that receive, collate, and analyze data in real time. Elsewhere in Government and in the private sector every aspect of our society is realizing the great advantages offered by the computer. Key components of our Nation's infrastructure--government, financial, transportation, power, communication--are becoming increasingly dependent upon information systems and networks. Every day new industries and services are going on-line. This process is fueled by advancing technologies that enhance the capability and power of computing, while simultaneously decreasing their cost. Yet we are only now beginning to comprehend that the same information networks that we are relying upon to run our society are vulnerable to disruption and penetration. The Defense Department estimates that their computers are probably subjected to as many as 250,000 computer attacks each year. When conducting vulnerability assessments of their own systems the Defense Department successfully hacks into its own system over 65 percent of the time. Already we have seen examples of hackers in foreign nations launching electronic info-war attacks on our Defense Department computers. Experts agree we are only detecting the least competent intruders. The loss of sensitive information is not the only result to fear. Much of our Nation's critical infrastructure could be disrupted by a hacker equipped with little more than bad intentions. Imagine the consequences of the northeast power grid being taken down-- if even for only a few days--in the middle of winter. Our communications, medical, transportation, and financial infrastructures are all at risk. Ironically, our dominance and sophistication creates weaknesses our adversaries can exploit, cheaply and with fear of little detection. In this regard, we are our own worst enemy. Most of the vulnerabilities of our information systems are based not simply upon technological defects, but human ones. Our intoxication with technological advantages has made us blind and deaf to information age vulnerabilities. If we fail to embed a culture of information security early in this revolution, we will create scenarios where info-war could become a great equalizer for our enemies. Thus, along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, has arrived a new method to cause mass disruption. How we police the borderless world of cyberspace is a question we have not yet begun to answer. intelligence and law enforcement Two essential elements of any successful national security strategy, our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, are both in the process of adjusting to the post-cold war situation. We can not afford a lapse in either. Yet the distinction between warfare and crime is becoming less clear every day, especially when such lethal materials and expertise are being smuggled across borders, when organized crime groups are involved in smuggling everything from weapons of mass destruction, to drugs, to illegal aliens, and when terrorists maintain sophisticated international financial networks. In light of the new realities, we face, it is imperative that our intelligence agencies work effectively with law enforcement to protect America from the threat posed by the convergence of these formerly distinct threats of proliferation, terrorism, and international organized crime. This intersection of foreign and domestic security has implications for our military and civilian institutions that share responsibilities in the rapidly changing security field. In the process of improving our defenses we must be mindful of our political traditions that separate civilian law enforcement from the military and limit government's intrusion into our lives, but these important sensitivities must not be allowed to paralyze us. cooperative threat reduction Perhaps the most urgent nuclear danger of the post-cold war era stems from the potential loss of control over the nuclear assets of the former Soviet Union, which opens a potential Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation nightmare scenarios. Set free with the disintegration of the Russian empire was a vast potential supermarket of thousands of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, materials and scientists with the know-how to create them. Our response to that threat, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] Program, has been aptly described by Secretary of Defense Bill Perry as defense by other means. Since it began in 1990, the CTR program has been instrumental in assuring central command and control over deployed weapons, preventing the emergence of new nuclear weapons states in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan, and locking up tons of nuclear materials to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands. History will record the prevention of four new nuclear weapons states from emerging out of the wreckage of the Soviet empire as one of the greatest achievements of the decade, and as laying an important foundation for a post-Soviet world. Yet the CTR program is still criticized as foreign aid. Viewed in an historical context, it is useful to ask how much would we have paid during the cold war to eliminate thousands of Soviet warheads. How much is it worth to prevent countries like Iraq and North Korea, or cults like the Aum Shinrikyo, from getting hold of foreign Soviet nuclear weapons? In my view, the nearly $2 billion spent on CTR is a bargain. At the recent Aspen Strategy Group meeting on the post-cold war era, the overwhelming consensus of this group of experts was that the Nunn-Lugar programs have opened the door to solutions to a wide range of urgent security problems, some of which threaten Russia itself. The group recommended continued strong support for CTR programs. the backbone of the strategic agenda: nato, russia, china, and nuclear arms control nato The pivotal issue of NATO enlargement has important ramifications for America, the Atlantic Alliance, the countries of central and eastern Europe, and for Russia and the other FSU countries. The decision to move ahead in the immediate future with NATO enlargement raises several questions that need to be addressed as part of our strategic agenda. First, how will NATO expansion affect our vital interests, especially our efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials from the FSU? Second, how can expansion be conducted without causing Russia to react by redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons and moving further toward a launch on warning hair trigger response. And third, how can the proposed inclusion of the Visegrad nations in NATO be accomplished without threatening the long term security of Ukraine and the Baltics? russia and the fsu With their vast territory, their diverse peoples and great military capabilities, the countries of the former Soviet Union can be either major contributors to global stability and peace or a major cause of instability and conflict. The challenge for the United States and its allies is to facilitate the former outcome. At the Aspen Strategy Group meeting, experts identified the short, medium and long term aspects of this challenge. In the short term, maintaining controls on nuclear assets remains our top priority. There is more that needs to be done to ensure the safety and security of the nuclear materials that we know are sought by Iran and other nuclear renegades. We must not lose sight of our medium and long term objectives. In the medium term, therefore, we must continue to craft our strategic relationship with Russia and the other FSU countries, including efforts to further reduce nuclear dangers. This effort should include arms control as well as efforts to convert Russia's massive weapons industries to peaceful purposes. In the long term, we should encourage new thinking about national security and foreign policy in the minds of Russian and FSU leaders. Our long term strategy should, therefore, include sustained efforts to expose FSU policy makers to the logic of cooperative measures such as strategic arms control, missile defense and the CTR programs, not just their technical implementation. The recent Aspen Strategy Group meeting discussed several proposals to deepen and expand cooperation on threat reduction, and nonproliferation by harnessing economic forces to move obsolete defense industries into productive and profitable civilian activities. Avoiding another cold war is a goal worth pursuing, where success or failure will affect our security for decades to come. china With the world's most rapidly growing economy and one fourth of its population, China has joined the ranks of the great powers. China's military modernization and arms policies are already having repercussions throughout Asia. Yet it is an open question whether China will accept the norms and standards that are adhered to by all but a few outlaw states, or will seek revolutionary changes in the existing world order. As important as it is for China to respect international standards for human rights and trade, the future strategic agenda-- including nonproliferation, arms control, and regional stability-- depends on China's adherence to existing agreements and regimes. Our strategic agenda must not overlook China's ability to make or break the norms and institutions that define the international system. A major obstacle to China's full incorporation into the international community is the incompleteness of the rule of law in China. With respect to human rights and arms proliferation, a fundamental aspect of our approach should be to encourage China to strengthen its rule of law. This approach would include our concern for human rights, but would also be provide a broader appeal to China's self-interest, because a nation governed by law is more predictable, more attractive to economic investment, and more likely to abide by its commitments. nuclear weapons and arms control The end of the cold war did not render deterrence obsolete. Iraq's non-use of its chemical and biological warheads during the Gulf War stands as an important reminder that even rogue states are not immune to the logic of overwhelming retaliation. The credibility of our deterrent forces must remain unquestioned. Yet, the period between the end of the cold war and early decades of the next century offers the United States a unique opportunity. Though the transformation of Russia and emergence of China as a global power could pose new security challenges by about 2010, in the interim, the United States faces no peer competitor and is unrivaled in conventional military superiority. I say this having devoted much of my career to the betterment of our Armed Forces. Our current situation offers a window of opportunity to build our qualitative edge in conventional weapons technology to strengthen deterrence for the future. At the same time, we can continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy--if such reductions are matched by the other nuclear powers. If reductions in our own arsenal can persuade others to make comparable cuts, or not develop nuclear weapons at all, we come out ahead. This is the logic of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the benefits of freezing the nuclear status quo outweigh the costs and leave us in a position of relative advantage. Similarly, our promising development of needed limited missile defenses should proceed with an awareness of the unintended consequences that could result if Russia and China respond by retaining, redeploying and building enough warheads and missiles to overwhelm any conceivable anti-missile system, as they have vowed to do. I have argued for years that it is possible to advance as rapidly as possible with missile defenses in a way that does not result in more nuclear weapons being pointed at us. Putting aside the issue of cost for a moment, a policy that leaves us facing more of the threat we were trying to defend against in the first place is the essence of bad strategy. The error is especially shortsighted if it is possible--as it is in this case--to have missile defense and reduce the numbers of missiles pointed at us. In my view, this can be accomplished by cooperation with Russia on limited defense for both nations and modest amendments to the ABM Treaty. I do not have any illusions about arms control; treaties are not cost-free and do not necessarily address the root causes of conflict. Some people may, as the critics warn, be lulled into a false sense of security by arms control. But I believe my record shows that I have not been one of them. Our Armed Forces today are second to none and will remain so for the foreseeable future. But to the critics of arms control I ask: What is the better alternative to agreements such as START II, which would eliminate the most destabilizing strategic weapons of all--Russia's land-based MIRVed missiles? Would we be better off without Cooperative Threat Reduction programs that keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists? Sound arms control agreements can and do enhance our security. These are critical determinants of our national security for the coming era: proliferation, terrorism, and relations among the great powers. Of course, many other important issues contribute to the overall security outlook--our bilateral relationships with key allies, regional developments in Asia and the Middle East, maintaining our technological lead, and various global issues such as trade, population, immigration, environment, human rights, economic development and the march of democracy. But, as the report on America's National Interests and the Aspen Strategy Group both remind us we must give priority to those core issues that are truly vital to our citizens. The material follows: Recommendations of the Minority Staff of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations--Hearings on Security in Cyberspace, June 5, 1996 The need to establish a comprehensive plan within which to address the vulnerabilities of our National Information Infrastructure (NII) is paramount. Whether through a White House-led Task Force or some similar mechanism, the interdisciplinary nature of this threat requires a government-wide response that also addresses the exposure of the private sector. The U.S. must formulate national policy to promote the security of its information infrastructure. Presently, agencies are greatly limited by pre-existing missions and jurisdictional assignments. Unfortunately, the threat ignores national boundaries and often remains a mystery until it is fully investigated. Based upon the multidimensional nature of the threat posed to our information infrastructure, there exists a need to establish a free standing entity that can conduct operational responses to computer attacks, and task different agencies within our government. The Staff recommends the creation of a National Information Infrastructure Threat Center that will include representatives from the law enforcement, intelligence and the Defense communities, as well as liaison with the private sector. This center should have ``real time'' 24 hour operational capabilities as well as serve as a clearing house for intrusion reports. No intelligence, counter-intelligence or law enforcement agency has yet produced an NII threat assessment. More importantly, the intelligence community is having difficulty collecting the data necessary to even prepare such an estimate. Collection of data must become a high priority within the intelligence community. The Staff recommends that the Director of Central Intelligence complete an NII threat estimate. The estimate should have an unclassified version that can be made available to private industry. The uneven response in the international community to the threat posed to information infrastructures has created difficulties enforcing anti-intrusion legislation. Only a handful of countries presently have meaningful computer crime investigative capability, and the absence of uniformity has given would-be attackers refuge from detection or prosecution. The Staff recommends that the U.S. promote the creation of an international computer crime bureau with emergency response capability. This Bureau may be assigned to Interpol and would provide education and awareness training to foreign law enforcement agencies in order to promote the creation of dedicated computer crime units or similar capability as well as uniform investigative and computer forensic practices. This Bureau would also have operational response, like a CERT, in support of computer crime incidents. The Bureau would also collect data on vulnerabilities and disseminate countermeasures as well as serve as an international clearinghouse for intrusion incidents. Our government must foster a security culture that appreciates the vulnerabilities of our National Information Infrastructure (NII). We need to maintain a better pool of security professionals and, generally, improve the security consciousness of our users and our managers. There are several specialties in the computer career field for government employees including computer operators, computer technicians, computer programmers and computer analysis. There is no specialty in the computer career fields for network administrators, computer security personnel, nor in the criminal investigative career field for computer crime investigators. In order to ensure that computer security positions are filled with personnel that possess the requisite experience and training the Staff recommends the creation of a Government Computer Security Specialist Career Field that will include potential for career progression and incorporate specialized computer security training. In order to promote a stable pool of information security managers within the U.S. government, the Staff recommends the creation of a Government Computer Systems Administrator Career Field that will include potential for career progression and incorporate specialized computer security training. In order to promote and improve our government's computer crime investigative potential, the Staff recommends the creation of a Government Computer Crime Investigators Career Field that will include the potential for career progression and specialized computer crime investigation training. Vulnerability testing and assessment of government and government interest computer systems is the best method of enhancing awareness of the vulnerabilities of our information infrastructure. Presently, only the Defense Department has an aggressive vulnerability program. The Staff recommends that the federal government promote regular vulnerability assessments, or ``red teaming,'' of government agencies, especially agencies outside of the Department of Defense. The Staff further recommends that an agency be designated to perform such vulnerability assessments in the same manner that the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) perform such assessments for the armed services. One of the most significant voids in computer security is the lack of reporting of attempted and even successful penetrations of government systems as well as other systems of national interest. Mandating the reporting of intrusions in government systems will foster a greater security culture with the NII. Further, it is important to give private industry a mechanism within which it can report intrusions without fear of inciting customer insecurity. The Staff recommends that the U.S. government mandate the reporting of intrusions and attempted intrusions in all government and government interest systems. The Staff further recommends that federal agencies develop protocols and procedures for reporting computer intrusions, and subsequent referral of same to proper criminal or other appropriate agencies like the proposed National Information Infrastructure Threat Center. The Staff further recommends that the federal government encourage private industry and the private sector to report intrusions into private information systems. The Staff would further recommend that the government promote private industry reporting through creation of anonymous clearinghouses or similar methods. Logon warning banners that advise users of government computers that there is no expectation of privacy, though recommended by the Department of Justice, are not mandatory on government computer networks. The logon banners put users on notice that they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on government systems and the use of the system constitutes consent to monitoring. Presently, when intrusions occur on government systems, lack of such a logon banner hampers investigative efforts and response. The Staff recommends logon warning banners become mandatory for all government and government interest systems.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, Senator Domenici and I believe we have a solution to the export problems created by our current Tax Code. The solution is the U.S.A. tax plan. We believe our proposal will make America much more competitive. The first thing the U.S.A. tax plan does to level the playing field is to make America's business tax--which replaces the corporate income tax--border-adjustable. We exclude from our domestic tax base any items made by American manufacturers for export, just as our major competitors do by rebating their value-added taxes when their goods are exported for sale here. Conversely, when a company, foreign or U.S. owned, manufactures abroad and sells in the U.S. market, the company is, through the operation of a new import tax, taxed essentially the same as if the factory were located in the United States. Again, we are trying to give imports and exports the same treatment our competitors do, rather than perpetuate the present system which favors companies that are located abroad selling to this country. Imports would be subject to an import tax that would equal the overall business tax levied in this country. The border adjustability feature of the U.S.A. plan is intended to favor and encourage production and employment here in the United States and to make American goods, services and know-how more competitive in foreign markets. Our current Tax Code does exactly the opposite. For example, in Georgia, Ford Motor Co. operates a very large manufacturing facility which produces thousands of Ford Tauruses and Mercury Sables every year. These vehicles are mid-sized, moderately priced automobiles. Many of these vehicles are exported. When a $20,000 Taurus is exported to Great Britain, it carries with it the burden of today's U.S. Tax Code--a 34-percent rate on corporate profits, the alternative minimum tax, and numerous other business levies. In addition when this Taurus is sold in Great Britain, a 17 percent Value Added Tax [VAT] is also imposed on it. This adds $3,400 to the price of the car. In essence, doubling the tax burden on this single car. Under this same scenario with the U.S.A. tax plan, when this Taurus is exported, no U.S. business income tax would be imposed. The car would still be subject to a VAT when it reaches Great Britain, but it would not be burdened with the cost of the U.S. Tax Code. Conversely, under today's Tax Code, when Rover--a British automobile manufacturer--exports a vehicle to the United States, the VAT it carries in Great Britain is rebated to Rover before it leaves British soil. When this Rover vehicle is sold in the United States, it carries no U.S. corporate income tax burden nor does it carry a VAT. With the U.S.A. tax system, an U.S. import tax would be levied on the Rover vehicle. This levy would be the equivalent of the U.S. corporate tax carried on the Taurus built and sold in the United States. In other words the playing field would be level on goods manufactured abroad and sold in the U.S. market compared to goods both manufactured and sold in the United States. The second, related feature of our business tax on imports and exports is that the U.S.A. tax is territorial. If a company located a plant in a foreign country in order to sell in that country's local markets, then under the U.S.A. tax plan we do not allow a deduction for those foreign costs, but neither do we include the proceeds of these foreign sales as part of our domestic tax base. Overseas sales would not be part of that company's U.S. corporate income tax calculations. This is what we mean by saying the U.S.A. tax is territorial. Businesses would not have to include overseas sales in their profits when computing their business taxes, nor would they deduct costs they incur purchasing goods and services overseas. I might add that this will have another huge benefit--it will greatly simplify the computation of U.S. tax liabilities for our international corporations. When I have highlighted this aspect of the U.S.A. tax plan to groups here in Washington and throughout the country, one of the first questions asked about this element of the U.S.A. tax plan is--is it GATT complaint? According to the many tax and trade experts, including officials at the Department of the Treasury, we have consulted, the weight of the legal argument is with the U.S.A. tax plan. Should the U.S.A. plan be enacted, we can expect a GATT challenge. In fact, a number of our allies' Ambassadors have raised this question with me. When I explain the essence of the U.S.A. tax plan to them and point out that their country's value added taxes [VAT's] do the same thing to U.S. products exported to their nations as the U.S.A. tax proposes to do to their exports, the answer I usually receive is a blank stare. It seems to me that what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Another question I receive is the question about the U.S.A. tax plan's omission of the deductibility of wages at the business level. Wages under the U.S.A. tax plan would not be deductible. The principle reasons why this deductibility is denied are twofold: first under GATT rules, our Nation can not provide wage deductions while also providing, in essence, an excise tax on imports and second to provide wage deductibility and still maintain revenue neutrality the business rates would have to be raised significantly from the 11 percent flat rate we propose. While this conclusion seems necessary, the wage nondeductibility issue is going to have to be thought through very carefully. Attaining a level playing field in international trade is a very important goal and to achieve it would be a sea change in U.S. tax policy. The same would be true to deny wage deductions to businesses. However, on this latter point, businesses need to keep in mind that the business rates proposed in the U.S.A. tax plan are much, much lower than today's business tax rates. In fact, they would be less than one-third of today's rates, yet these rates raise the same amount of revenue for the Federal Government as is raised today. It is also important to keep in mind that under our proposal, businesses would receive a credit for the employer share of Social Security taxes paid. So the effective business tax rate on wages paid up to the $62,000 Social Security tax wage limit would be 11 percent less 7.65 percent paid in FICA taxes, or just 3.35 percent. Mr. President, in conclusion, the U.S.A. tax plan would promote U.S. competitiveness and level the international playing field for American business by implementing a territorial and border adjustable business tax. All goods, whether produced here or abroad, sold in the United States will bear the same U.S. tax burden. And U.S. exports, which are generally subject to a value-added tax when they are sold in foreign markets, would no longer be subject to a U.S. corporate income tax on top of that. It's time we had a Tax Code that works for us, not against us, and the U.S.A. plan, for this and many other reasons, provides the answers.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, today I would like to again discuss tax reform and in particular an aspect of the unlimited savings allowance [USA] tax plan which I believe is very important to our Nation's future--the USA tax plan's tax treatment of exports. Before discussing this specific issue, I would like to refresh the memories of my colleagues about why the replacement of the current Tax Code with a superior alternative is so necessary for the health of the country and our economy. In my judgment, until we make this case to our fellow citizens on the economic merits of fundamental change, structural tax reform will not happen. Central to this case is the urgent need to raise the level of national savings. It is critical that we recognize the current bias in our Tax Code against the saving and investment that are the key to higher living standards, and take steps to correct that bias. Higher savings lead to more investment. More investment will, in turn, lead to increased productivity from American workers. The more productivity we have from our workers, the more competitive we are in the international arena. The more competitive we are in the international arena, the better jobs we have. The better jobs we have, the higher income we have as Americans. Our current saving rate is low by our historical standards and it is the lowest of all major industrialized nations. In the 1980's, our savings rate dropped to an average of 3.6 percent, half the level of the 1950's, 1960's, and into the early 1970's. In the first 5 years of this decade, 1990 to 1994, the U.S. savings rate has fallen almost 50 percent from the already low levels of the 1980,s, to just 2.1 percent, and reports show that our savings rate is continuing to erode. This is far below the comparable figures of 10 percent in Germany, 18 percent in Japan, and the even higher savers along much of the Pacific rim. Without adequate savings, our level of investment will continue to be correspondingly low. Low saving, in short, directly imperils our future standard of living. Behind the saving shortfall lurks a very serious abdication of our economic responsibility to the next generation of Americans. We seem to have forgotten the principle tenet of the American dream--that, like our forefathers did for our generation, we must improve and better prepare our country for the generations that follow. Every day we are bombarded with messages equating spending with the good life and a strong economy--in short, consumption as personal privilege and patriotic duty. Proponents of thrift have been made to appear self-punishing, antisocial, and scrooge like. Nothing could be further from the truth. Saving is simply the deferral of some consumption today so that we and our children can consume more in the future. Because our current level of national saving is so low, we cannot be assured of vigorous economic growth in the future. Politically, the failure of Americans to save for their future--one study estimates that the average American has about $7,000 in assets in retirement--means that entitlement programs such as Social Security have become economic life rafts that can not indefinitely support the load they are being asked to carry. Polls have shown that a majority of today's younger generation believe it is more likely that UFO's exist than believe the Social Security program will exist--in its present form--when they reach retirement age. As our former colleague Russell Long used to point out, leadership if often determining which direction the people are going and running like heck to get in front of them to lead them where they already are going. The American people have a better understanding of the problems we face as a Nation than our political leaders seem to acknowledge and it is incumbent on our Nation's leaders--the President and the Congress--to begin to exercise responsible leadership in developing long-term policies to address these shortcomings. As most of my colleagues acknowledge, the best thing we can do to improve national saving is to balance the Federal budget. Chronic budget deficits have in recent years siphoned away what meager private and business saving we have managed to amass. It has driven up the costs of acquiring this capital and it requires that we run massive trade deficits to finance our country's need for capital. But progress against the deficit isn't enough. We have an even more difficult task before us: Helping our fellow citizens to understand that thrift isn't counterproductive to the long-term health of the economy. This is a matter of leadership. But it is also a matter of policy. And that is where fundamental tax reform comes in. For it is inescapable that the current Tax Code, because of its bias against saving relative to consumption, subsidizes the present at the expense of the future. That is the core, intrinsic, systemic problem that requires fundamental correction. It is around this fact--that the government extracts revenues from the economy in a way that hinders the ability of people to provide for their futures and of companies to grow--that a lasting movement for change can be built. Certainly it was America's saving and investment crisis that motivated Senator Domenici and me to develop the USA tax system. Our proposal rests on a few central features designed to end the current code's bias against saving and investment. First, the USA individual tax treats all income alike regardless of source and it taxes that income once and only once. Second, the USA individual tax permits every taxpayer an up-front, overt, and unlimited deferral on that part of their annual income they use to add to their total saving. Third, the USA business tax allows the expensing of all real business investment. These three points are at the revolutionary heart of the USA tax. They constitute a revolution in the tax base--in what we tax and how we tax. That is where the revolution is needed and where, given public understanding, it can have its most lasting impact. The USA tax plan has other important features. It is more efficient then the current tax Code. According to the tax Foundation, the USA tax plan would cut by 76 percent the compliance costs now imposed by the individual and corporate income taxes. In terms of fairness and understandability, the USA tax treats all income alike. It treats all businesses, from corporations to partnerships to farmers to sole proprietors, alike. It retains the progressivity of the current code. It is designed to be revenue neutral. It is internally inconsistent to try to encourage private saving on the one hand and encourage public dissaving on the other. The USA tax maintains the proportion of the overall tax bill paid by individuals and businesses. There is no intention like the 1986 tax Reform Act to shift the tax burden from individuals to the corporate community. The USA tax also grants to employees and to employers a dollar for dollar tax credit for the deeply regressive FICA payroll taxes. I have addressed this very important feature of our proposal in separate remarks. Today, I would like to highlight another key feature of the USA plan, its treatment of imports and exports. With respect to competitiveness, the USA business tax levels the international playing field for American business by implementing a territorial and border adjustable tax. All goods, whether produced here or abroad, sold in the United States will bear the same US tax burden, while U.S. exports will not carry the cost of U.S. taxes when sold abroad. Mr. President, many times I have heard my colleagues say that we must have a level international playing field on trade issues. I can recount some of the numerous legislative initiatives, including the super section 301 provision, the Market Promotion Program, and the Export Enhancement Program, that have been enacted to provide this level playing field. I have supported many of these efforts. We recognize that we live and compete in a global economy. This economy is intensely competitive and it is increasingly important to our economy that the United States remain a global economic leader in this area. If anyone questions how important trade is to our economy, consider the following: Exports currently comprise 8 percent of the american gross domestic product [GDP] and 11 million jobs. If you include imports and cross-border investment with exports, trade-related components represent roughly one-third of the American economy. So we can and should continue to encourage U.S. exports. To do so, we must address the single largest impediment currently shackling U.S. industry in its efforts to compete in the global economy--the current Tax Code. As Salvatore Barone, the president of Harper Surface Finishing Systems, Inc., of Meriden, CT, and the chair of the International Trade Committee of the Association for Manufacturing Technology, pointed out in his July 18, 1996, testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee: . . . the present federal income tax in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is almost exactly opposite of what is needed to serve the best interests of the United States. Had one set out by design to create a tax system that works against us (and, therefore, in favor of our foreign competitors), it is hard to imagine a more successful job than the present federal income tax. It discourages saving and productive capital investment in the United States; it favors imports over exports; it makes it hard for U.S. companies to directly compete in foreign markets; and, if they do, it discourages them from bringing the money home for reinvestment in the United States. I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Barone. He has hit the nail on the head. At this point, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of Mr. Barone's testimony be printed in the Record. I would recommend to my colleagues this testimony's international competitiveness index which grades various tax proposals in the international trade arena.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I am left speechless after listening to my friend Robert Byrd. So I will reserve my time. Thank you.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suspect that all Senators, when we first come to this great institution we call the U.S. Senate, look around this Chamber for role models and mentors to help us become effective and productive Senators. I was privileged, after graduating law school at Emory University 1962, to come to Washington and work for Congressman Paul Vinson for nearly a year. I was privileged to follow in the footsteps of Senator Richard Russell. These were certainly two great Georgians who set an example of public service that I have sought to emulate. I was honored to have served with many Senators I have learned from, including Senator John Stennis and Senator Scoop Jackson, two legendary Senators who served in the Richard Russell tradition. I have also learned very much from a unique Senator, the Senator from West Virginia by the name of Robert Byrd. Before I leave the Senate which I love, I want to take a few moments to thank my colleague and my good friend, Senator Robert Byrd, for the encouragement and assistance he has given me during my entire career here in the Senate and for the example he has set for all of us who served here and who have observed his leadership and his personality. It has been said that great men are like eagles. They do not flock together. You find them one at a time, soaring alone, using their skill and their strengths to reach new heights and to seek new horizons. Such a man and such an eagle is Robert Byrd. Twenty-four years after I first came to the Senate, Senator Byrd continues to be a role model for me. His tremendous understanding and deep reverence for the role of the Senate in our democracy; his total commitment to serving the people of his beloved State of West Virginia and the people of this country; his life-long commitment to learning; his sense of honor and integrity; his commitment to high moral standards; and his tremendous work ethic represent the highest ideals of public service. Role of the Senate The ``Almanac of American Politics'' has what I think is a very appropriate description of Senator Byrd. ``Robert Byrd, senior senator from West Virginia,'' says the Almanac, ``may come closer to the kind of senator the Founding Fathers had in mind than any other.'' Mr. President, the ideals of the Founding Fathers and the role they envisioned for the Senate have always shaped Senator Byrd's performance of his duties. Robert Byrd reveres the Senate of the United States, not just because he serves in it, but because of his respect for its role in the history of our Nation and the world. Over the years, Senator Byrd has devoted an enormous amount of time and effort to the study of the Senate's role in our history and its duties under the Constitution. His four volumes of speeches on the history of the Senate mark Senator Byrd as the most knowledgeable person on the history of this body to ever serve in the Senate, and he is the leading expert on this subject in the country today. By the power of his intellect and the depth of his understanding of the Senate's history and rules, Senator Byrd is not just the Senate's institutional memory. He is also the custodian of the Senate ideals and values that go back to the Founding Fathers and even to ancient Rome-- as he reminded us in his extraordinary series of speeches on the Senate of the Roman Republic in 1993. I have heard Senator Byrd recall the words of Majorianus, a Roman Senator, who said that when he was crowned emperor in 457 A.D. that he still gloried in the name of Senator. ``That,'' Senator Byrd is fond of saying, ``is my bottom line.'' Like the authors of our Constitution, Senator Byrd views the legislative branch as closest to the people and the primary safeguard of their rights and liberties. In his speeches on the history of the U.S. Senate, Senator Byrd points out that the Senate is unique not only because its rules allow unlimited debate, and that, of course, attracts a lot of attention from time to time. Unlike some legislative bodies in the world, the Senate can originate legislation. In addition, Senator Byrd reminds us: The Senate not only has the power to legislate. It also has the power to investigate, to approve the ratification of treaties, to confirm nominations, and to try impeached persons. Thus, it has judicial, legislative, executive and investigative powers. This combination of powers makes the Senate unique. Senator Byrd's knowledge of the rules and procedures of the Senate has become legendary. Senator Byrd recalled that in 1967, when he was elected Secretary of the Senate Democratic Conference, ``I began to study the book of precedents and the book of rules, and soon came to know something about floor work. As a result, I became proficient in the use of the rules.'' Mr. President, saying that Robert Byrd is proficient in the use of the rules is like saying Rembrandt knew something about painting. I suspect there have been few Members of the Senate in the last 200 years who approached Senator Byrd's knowledge of the rules and precedents of the Senate. As a result of his exhaustive study of Senate procedure, Senator Byrd has had a major impact in shaping the rules and precedents under which the Senate operates today. Some of these precedents bear his name. The Byrd rule has become a household term for anyone who follows the progress of reconciliation bills in the Congress. That rule, of course, precludes consideration of provisions in reconciliation bills that are not related to the deficit reduction goals of the reconciliation process. In his farewell address earlier this year, the majority leader, another remarkable legislator, Senator Dole, paid an unusual tribute to Senator Byrd when he said, ``I have learned from a lot of people in this room. I have even gone to Senator Byrd when I was the majority leader to ask his advice on how to defeat him on an issue. If you know Robert Byrd as I do, he gave me the answer.'' That is high praise indeed from a man with Senator Dole's great skills as a legislator in this body, who was in the opposing party--actually going to Senator Byrd and asking him, ``What rule can I use to defeat you on this motion?'' That is about as high a compliment as an individual can be paid in this body. In his devotion to the U.S. Senate, Senator Byrd has always shown a personal concern for the people who serve in this institution--not just Senators but all those who are part of the Senate family. Despite his responsibilities in the Senate leadership or his duties as chairman or ranking Democratic member on the Appropriations Committee, he has never been too busy to ease the burdens, remember a birthday, or share in the joys and sorrows of a colleague or staff member with a note or a bit of poetry. I have never forgotten a dinner given in my honor by my friends in Dublin, GA, in February 1975. Senator Byrd came to Georgia for that dinner. He gave a speech and brought down the house when he played ``Going Up Cripple Creek'' on his fiddle, all for a junior member of his party who had only been in the Senate for 2 years. My friends from Georgia, needless to say, were very impressed. Over the years I have received tremendous support from Senator Byrd as a member and then chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Senator Byrd has always been a strong supporter of national defense and of our men and women in uniform. I am proud of the fact that the Armed Services Committee has passed a Defense authorization bill every year since I have served in the Senate. During my chairmanship, Senator Byrd's leadership as majority leader and his parliamentary skills were absolutely essential to completing Senate action on this national security legislation. I have also had the pleasure of participating in delegations to foreign countries headed by Senator Byrd. I remember two trips in particular. One was a trip to the People's Republic of China early in my Senate career in 1975, back when Chairman Mao and Chou En-Lai, President Chou En-Lai were still alive. We did not visit with them because they were very ill, but it was a crucial time, not only in Chinese history but in United States-Chinese relationship. The other was a trip to the Soviet Union in 1985 to meet with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Senator Byrd led the bipartisan Senate delegation on both of these trips. He was a very effective spokesman for U.S. interests, and he always managed to leave our foreign hosts with an understanding of the role of the Senate in U.S. foreign policy. Mr. President, from the day I came to the U.S. Senate in 1973, whether the issue was foreign policy, national security policy or Senate floor procedure, Senator Byrd has been my teacher and my colleague; in many cases, my legislative partner. And, most of all, my friend. Serving the People of West Virginia Senator Byrd's reverence for the U.S. Senate is matched only by his commitment to serving the people he represents in West Virginia. Senator Byrd was first elected by his fellow citizens of West Virginia 50 years ago to represent them in the State legislature. He has retained that trust and won every public office he has sought since then. Few people are ever accorded the honor and responsibility of being elected to represent their fellow citizens--a very high compliment. Robert Byrd has sought that honor and that responsibility 13 times and 13 times he has succeeded, starting with his election to the first of two terms in the West Virginia House, a term in the State Senate, three terms in the House of Representatives and seven terms in the U.S. Senate. This makes 50 years--5 decades--of public service to the people of West Virginia by this remarkable man. Senator Byrd has served in the Senate longer than any of the 29 other United States Senators who had been elected from West Virginia. Next year, he will become the fourth longest serving Senator in the history of our Nation. He is also only the third Senator to be elected to seven 6-year terms. Think of it, seven times he has been elected to 6-year terms, along with Senator Carl Hayden and another remarkable Senator, the President pro tempore, our colleague, Senator Strom Thurmond from South Carolina. This week, Senator Byrd cast his 14,577th rollcall vote--14,577 rollcall votes--more than any other Senator who has ever served in this body. In his seven elections to the U.S. Senate, Senator Byrd has won with an average of 72 percent of the popular vote--72 percent. Twice he has carried every single county in his State, the only person in the history of West Virginia to do so. For all the time he has spent in the Nation's Capital, Mr. President, Robert Byrd has never forgotten where he came from or why the people of West Virginia sent him here. His childhood during the Depression taught him about the plight of people who had a hard time in life, including the people who worked in the coal mines. His father moved the family from town to town looking for work, but despite these constant moves, Robert Byrd graduated first in his high school. He married his high school sweetheart, Erma James, after he graduated from high school and found a job--Robert Byrd, the son of a coal miner, marrying a coal miner's daughter. At a time when America is suffering from the breakdown of the family which causes so many more of our other problems, the 59-year marriage of Robert Byrd and Erma James Byrd and their dedication to their family should serve as an example to each and every one of us, not only in this body but in America. Senator Byrd had to save for 12 years before he could afford to attend college, even part time, but he made great use of his time. Working as a gas station attendant, a produce boy in a coal company store, a shipyard welder, and meat cutter, he learned about the lives and the hardships of ordinary people, and he learned about the hopes and the dreams of the citizens of West Virginia. Robert Byrd's legislative priorities have been shaped by the needs of his State--investment in highways and other infrastructure projects to stimulate economic development badly needed in West Virginia; adequate and affordable health care, particularly for the coal miners of his State; and education to improve the lives of young people, not only in West Virginia but across the Nation. Senator Byrd's diligence and approach to every challenge he undertakes is summed up in the passage from Ecclesiastes he is fond of quoting: Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might. Mr. President, everything Robert Byrd does he does with all of his might. He brings an intensity to his work that few of us could match and none of us could sustain. Watching Robert Byrd serve as majority leader and as leader of the Appropriations Committee, it is clear to everyone that when the going gets tough, Robert Byrd doubles his efforts and just works harder. So, Mr. President, from humble beginnings, Senator Byrd has made himself into something truly extraordinary in the history of our Nation. He was not born with wealth or connections. He certainly wasn't born with any power. He has made himself what he is today by working harder and studying harder than anyone else, and in doing so, he has become a wonderful example for the young people of this Nation of what can be achieved through the old-fashioned values of integrity, hard work, faith and perseverance. Life-long Commitment to Learning Mr. President, from the experience of his past, Senator Byrd has become a strong proponent of investing in our future, our people and our infrastructure in this country. Children are our most important resource, and he knows that there is nothing more important to the future of our children than education. But the Senator from West Virginia is living proof that education is not just for young people preparing for a career. He has given all of us an example that education is a lifetime experience. Robert Byrd has never stopped learning. He has never stopped trying to improve himself. He has never been satisfied that he knows everything he needs to know, and he never will be. That is the nature of this remarkable man. Like the senior Senator from New York, Senator Moynihan, the Senator from West Virginia is both a student and a teacher who constantly absorbs information, he soaks it in, and who shares his knowledge and his wisdom with his colleagues to the benefit of this entire institution and the Congress. Senator Byrd started his Senate career as a student, absorbing the lessons of history, its traditions and its rules, from men like Richard Russell and John Stennis. Over the years, the student Robert Byrd has become the teacher Robert Byrd, but also remains the student Robert Byrd--a remarkable combination. He has devoted his time and energy to formal education, earning a law degree while serving as a Member of Congress. Imagine that, all the duties of a Congressman and also getting a law degree, the only time in history that anyone has both begun and completed law school while serving in the Congress. But just as important, the Senator from West Virginia also studies for his own enjoyment because he loves to learn, he loves to study and he loves to go through self-improvement, and he does it every day. Robert Byrd's devotion to learning is reflected in his work. When Senator Byrd offers an amendment, manages a bill, or speaks on an issue, he knows what he is talking about, and all of us recognize that on both sides of the aisle. As chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Byrd's advice and counsel led to the system of discretionary spending caps we have been using for the last 6 years. These spending caps and the reductions in Federal discretionary spending they have enforced have made the most significant contribution to deficit reduction of any policy we have adopted in the last decade. If we in the Congress took the same kind of step on entitlement programs that we have done under Senator Byrd's leadership on discretionary programs, the fiscal outlook for our country and the future of our children and grandchildren would dramatically improve. Too often today, when important matters are being considered, the media and some politicians look to opinion polls first for guidance. The Senator from West Virginia is not one of those individuals. The Senator from West Virginia is much more likely to follow the advice of Winston Churchill who said: ``Study history, study history. In history lies all the secrets of statecraft.'' Mr. President, Senator Byrd's knowledge of history and the relevance of history to the issues we face today--it is not just knowledge of history, it is the parallel between what we should learn from history and the kind of challenges we face today--and his deep appreciation of the connection all Senators should feel to those who have gone before us are the hallmarks of his service and, indeed, I think the unique contribution he has made to this institution. When Senator Byrd speaks on issues like the line-item veto, for instance--and I agree with him that in the future the Senate will regret turning over this power to the executive branch. It has been done. We will see how it works, but I am one of those in the Robert Byrd school on the line-item veto. I do not think it will be used to bring down the deficit. I think it will be used by the President for whatever power he would like to display on whatever his priorities are at the moment, depending on the President. But when he speaks on issues like the line-item veto, Robert Byrd speaks with the knowledge born of long hours of study of the development of constitutional Government and of separated and shared powers in the history of England and ancient Rome as well as our own country. Historian Robert Byrd knows how long it took for the legislative branch to attain the power of the purse. He knows what it means to have the power of the purse. He knows what it means for the President to have the power of the purse, because that has been done more frequently in history than having the legislative body with that power. He also is keenly aware of what it means to lose the power of the purse. Robert Byrd understands and articulates better than any Member of this body the crucial role that an independent legislature plays in a democracy. You do not have a democracy without a legislative branch. The Senator from West Virginia knows that we cannot have democracy without an independent legislative branch. Mr. President, I could speak about the leadership and virtues of Robert Byrd for a long time. But let me wrap up my remarks by quoting the senior Senator from West Virginia in his history of the Senate, a magnificent quote in my view, summing up his view, and I hope increasingly all of our views, of the role of this great body. After two hundred years, [the Senate] is still the anchor of the Republic, the morning and evening star in the American constitutional constellation. It has had its giants and its little men, its Websters and its Bilbos, its Calhouns and its McCarthys. It has been the stage of high drama, of comedy and of tragedy, and its players have been the great and the near- great, those who think they are great, and those who will never be great. It has weathered the storms of adversity, withstood the barbs of cynics and the attacks of critics, and provided stability and strength to the nation during periods of civil strife and uncertainty, panics and depressions. In war and peace, it has been the sure refuge and protector of the rights of the states and of a political minority. And, today, the Senate still stands--the great forum of constitutional American liberty! Mr. President, the U.S. Senate still stands as a great forum of constitutional liberty, in large part because of the vision of our Founding Fathers and the genius and durability of our constitutional system of Government. The men and women who serve in the Senate have a solemn obligation to understand this history and to protect the combination of powers that make the Senate unique under the Constitution. Senator Byrd further reminds us of this solemn obligation in his addresses on the history of Roman constitutionalism when he said: For over two hundred years, from the beginning of the republic to this very hour, [the American constitutional system] has survived in unbroken continuity. We received it from our fathers. Let us surely pass it on to our sons and daughters Mr. President, it is my hope and prayer that our successors will study the words, study the life and emulate the deeds of Robert Byrd, U.S. Senator from West Virginia, as he has studied the words and emulated the deeds of our forefathers. If they do, the Senate of the United States will stand as a beacon of liberty, and the lamp of America's freedom will shine for the next 200 years. That will be the ultimate tribute to the service in the U.S. Senate of a remarkable individual--Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia. I thank the Chair. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss, again, another subject, the unlimited savings allowance tax legislation, USA tax, that Senators Domenici, Kerrey, Bennett, Dodd, and I have cosponsored. I note the Senator, one of the great cosponsors here, Senator Bennett, is in the chair today. In previous remarks to the Senate, I addressed the issue of broader tax reform, which I will not repeat today, and, in particular, the need to make a careful review on the various tax reform proposals on an apples-to-apples basis rather than what has been done so far, which is basically comparing apples to oranges. Today, I would like to address what I believe would be a critical component and what should be a critical component of any broad tax reform effort. That is integration of the income tax and the Social Security payroll tax. Mr. President, the USA tax plan contains the most comprehensive solution to this issue of any tax reform proposal on the table in the form of a payroll tax. I believe no matter what emerges in tax reform, which I hope will be next year, I believe this payroll tax credit should be a central feature of that proposal. Certainly, it is a central feature and one of the strongest points in the USA tax proposal. Mr. President, for individuals under the USA system, all income, regardless of source, forms the individual tax base. Unlike today's Income Tax Code, which is concerned about distinguishing the source of income, the USA tax proposal is more concerned about the use of that income. If your income is saved, your tax on that income is deferred. When your income is consumed, then it is taxed. In other words, you deduct your savings. From this broader income tax base, the USA tax proposal provides a limited number of deductions, including net new savings, a family living allowance, higher education expenses, home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and alimony. After these deductions are made from gross income, a taxpayer would determine the amount of tax by applying progressive graduated rates to his or her taxable income. Once this calculation is made, which determines the total Federal income tax liability, the taxpayer would then subtract dollar for dollar from the income tax the amount withheld from your salary for the employee share of the Social Security payroll, or FICA tax. In other words, the amount paid in by the employee to the FICA tax, Social Security tax, is credited against income tax. It is credited dollar for dollar. This payroll tax credit is an essential part of the USA tax system. It would reduce the regressive nature of the present payroll tax. It would reduce the disincentive to hire lower wage workers. This tax credit would be refundable so that if you had more withheld in payroll taxes than you owed in income taxes, as is the case for many people, the difference would be refunded to the taxpayer. I believe my colleague would find it interesting that roughly 80 percent of Americans today pay more in non-income taxes than they do in income taxes. Payroll taxes make up the vast majority of non-income taxes. We spend all of our time debating income tax. What that means is we hear from people in higher income groups, but the average American in today's society, 80 percent of Americans, pay more in non-income taxes than they do in income taxes. I hope that part of the debate will begin because it is long overdue. Therefore, people with earned income, under our proposal, can, in effect, subtract 7.65 percent--the amount of pay withheld for the employee share of the Social Security-Medicare payroll taxes--from the USA tax base before the rates are applied. Thus, a 20 percent tax rate under the USA system is, in effect, equal to a marginal rate of 12.35 percent under today's system after you take into account the payroll tax credit. Our proposal is often criticized because it has a 40 percent tax bracket. The first thing people ignore is that that is on assumed income. You have a right to deduct your savings before that rate is applied to a tax base. The second thing people overlook is you have to subtract the 7.65 percent from the 40 percent to get our effective tax rate because there is a credit back for the Social Security taxes paid. That is enormously important. If you are in a lower bracket, you would still subtract that. The payroll tax is a perfect example of why fundamental tax reform is needed. As my colleague from New York, the ranking member of the Finance Committee, Senator Moynihan, has so frequently and eloquently pointed out, the payroll tax is a very regressive tax. It discourages the hiring of additional workers, especially low-wage workers. Nobody designed the system that way, of course. The payroll tax started out at a low rate, but that rate has grown considerably over the years. In 1950, the payroll tax was 1.5 percent of wage income. By 1960, it had grown to 3 percent of wage income. In 1970, it had risen to 4.8 percent of wage income. By 1980, it was 6.13 percent. By 1990, it had risen to 7.65 percent, where it remains today. I repeat, Mr. President, 80 percent of the American people pay in non-income tax more than income tax. Of course, if you included the employer share, all of the percentages would be doubled. To state it another way, from 1960 to 1990, the Social Security tax has gone from 2 percent of our national income, or GNP, to 5 percent of our GNP. By comparison, receipts from individual income taxes have grown only slightly, from 8.1 percent to 8.5 percent over this same 30-year period. Part of the reason for the increase in the payroll tax is due to fewer workers supporting a growing number of retirees. Another reason is that during the late 1960s and early 1970s the payroll tax working people paid grew considerably to finance large cost of living increases for retirees that were enacted in years of high inflation. Then in the late 1970s and early 1980s, payroll taxes increased again, ostensibly to build up a surplus for the retirement of the baby boomers. Unfortunately, as Senator Moynihan has also pointed out, that is not what the surpluses are actually being used for. These surpluses are being used to finance Government spending and to mask the true size of the annual Federal deficit. So we now find ourselves with a combined employer-employee payroll tax rate of 15.3 percent--a very high rate that adds significantly to the cost of labor. We set up a system for one purpose--to provide income security in retirement--that is actually hurting working people in ways that I am sure were never intended. Our proposal does not abolish the payroll tax. It does not affect the operation of the Social Security System in any way. What it does attempt to do is to offset the negative, unintended, effects of the payroll tax by crediting the payroll tax against an individual or business's tax liability under the USA tax. Employees get a credit for their FICA tax against their individual income tax. Employers get a credit for their share against the business tax. So the same amount of revenue will continue to be deposited in the Social Security trust fund. But the payroll tax will now be integrated into the income tax in a way that offsets its regressive nature. I know many tax reform proponents are now agreeing with the underlying wisdom of our payroll tax credit. The Kemp Tax Commission, led by the small business elements, recognized this fact and called for a payroll tax deduction in its recommendations. This deduction is a step in the right direction, a tax credit is a far better solution. I am hopeful that as others begin looking at components of sustainable tax reform they will reach a similar conclusion about the necessity of payroll tax credits. Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to the floor today to speak in support of the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention as reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Unfortunately, consideration of the Convention by the Senate has been postponed until next year. I will no longer be here when this important matter is undertaken, in terms of voting on this matter, before this body. In the closing days of this Congress, I want to put on the record today my strong support for the ratification of this important agreement. Mr. President, now that the cold war is over, the single most important threat to our national security is the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Over the last year a series of hearings have been held in both the Foreign Relations Committee and in the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that have clearly documented the threat posed to the United States by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During these hearings, representatives of the intelligence and law enforcement communities, the Defense Department, private industry, State and local governments, academia, and foreign officials described a threat that we can not ignore, but for which we are unprepared. For one, CIA Director John Deutch candidly observed, ``We've been lucky so far.'' In July, the Commission on America's National Interests, co-chaired by Andrew Goodpaster, Robert Ellsworth, and Rita Hauser, released a study that concluded that the number one ``vital U.S. national interest'' today is to prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States. The report also identified containment of biological and chemical weapons proliferation as one of five ``cardinal challenges'' for the next U.S. President. Mr. President, I firmly believe, based on a wide variety of testimony and other presentations from credible academics, government officials, and others, that the threat posed by proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and materials is more dangerous even than that posed by the spread of nuclear materials. In the case of nuclear materials, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, has erected barriers to proliferation that have become effective over time. In part as a result of this strengthened NPT regime, and in part because chemical precursors are widely available for commercial purposes, chemical and biological weapons and materials are much easier to acquire, store, and deploy than nuclear weaponry--as demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo disaster in Japan several years ago. That cult conducted an enormous international effort to acquire, build, and deploy chemical weapons--without detection by any intelligence or law enforcement service--prior to releasing the deadly sarin gas in the Tokyo metro. Mr. President, the judge at the World Trade Center bombing case believed strongly that the culprits had attempted to use a chemical weapon in that terrorist attack. He found that had those chemicals not been consumed by the fire of the explosion, thousands of World Trade Center workers might have been killed, greatly compounding that tragic episode. Mr. President, Senator Lugar and Senator Domenici joined me this year in introducing legislation--the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act--that will provide over $150 million, starting next month, toward combating the threat posed to the United States by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This legislation passed unanimously in the Senate, and was virtually unchanged in conference with the House. It is part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 97, which has been sent to the President. I won't go into great detail here, but that legislation seeks to combat proliferation on essentially three fronts: enhance our domestic preparedness for dealing with an incident involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons or materials; improve our ability to detect and interdict these materials at our borders and before they can be deployed on our territory; and strengthen safeguards at facilities in the former Soviet Union that continue to store these materials to prevent their leakage onto the international grey markets and into the hands of proliferators, terrorists, and malcontents. Mr. President, although Senator Lugar, Senator Domenici, and I attempted to create a comprehensive program for addressing what we all believe is the No. 1 national security threat facing our Nation in the decades ahead, we also recognize that the enacted legislation is only a beginning, and that much more work needs to be done. We must combat this threat on all available fronts, and leave no available path untaken. Mr. President, ratification of the CWC is an important step in the process of controlling the proliferation of chemical weapons and the technologies for their manufacture. The CWC requires all parties to undertake the following: to destroy all existing chemical weapons and bulk agents; to destroy all production facilities for chemical weapons agents; to deny cooperation in technology or supplies to nations not party to the treaty; and to forswear even military preparations for a chemical weapons program. The Chemical Weapons Convention represents the culmination of some 15 years of negotiations supported by the last four Presidents of the United States. The agreement was concluded and signed by President George Bush near the end of his term. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support ratification. The major chemical manufacturer trade associations support ratification. The CWC has been open for signature and ratification since 1993. As of today, the CWC has enjoyed overwhelming worldwide support. It has been signed by 161 of the 184 member states of the United Nations, and 63 countries have already ratified the treaty. Those who have already ratified include all of our major industrial partners, and most of our NATO allies. The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the 65th country has ratified it. It will begin to enter into force after ratification by two additional countries, whether or not the United States chooses to ratify it. Now, Mr. President, after years of bipartisan support, after the CWC was successfully negotiated by two Republican Presidents, after lying before the Senate for inspection for 3 years, literally at the eleventh hour, a small group of Senators has set about to defeat the ratification of this treaty. They claim to have identified a number of fatal flaws that have gone undiscovered during the 3 years and numerous hearings before the Senate, fatal flaws that have gone unnoticed by 161 nations, including all our major industrialized allies. Those opposed to the CWC seem to view it through the same cold war lenses that have been applied to the consideration of numerous bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaties between the United States, and the Soviet Union, and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They insist that the kind of verification standard that we used to require in a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union must now be applied to a convention intended to move the world community away from the scourge of chemical weapons. Mr. President, this is not a reasonable standard to apply. We insisted on parity of limitations and drawdowns with the Soviet Union because asymmetries in strategic weaponry would have been dangerous to the strategic balance. But the cold war is over; the CWC is not a bilateral treaty, and is not about the strategic balance. In bilateral United States-Soviet arms reduction agreements, we were agreeing to reverse or forgo some weapons systems based on Soviet promises that they would undertake parallel actions. In the chemical weapons arena, we have already committed to do away with chemical weapons and this treaty's purpose is to get other nations to do likewise. Mr. President--to repeat, the cold war is over. The Soviet Union has dissolved. The world community now faces a serious threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a threat that arises at least in part because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the loss of tight controls which that breakup entailed. The Chemical Weapons Convention is a broad treaty among many nations, intended to begin to control chemical weapons proliferation, in much the same way that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, set about to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials and technology nearly three decades ago. When the NPT entered into force in 1970, barely 40 countries had ratified that treaty; today, well over 100 nations have joined, and the world community clearly serves to bring pressure to bear on both the non-adherent nations, and on countries like North Korea that have ratified but whose compliance is in very deep question. When the NPT was signed, a new inspection regime, under the International Atomic Energy Agency, was created to establish inspections to verify the compliance of those countries that had nuclear programs and activities. Does the NPT guarantee that no nation will develop a nuclear weapon? Is it perfect? Is it 100 percent verifiable? The answer to each of these questions is clearly no. There are no guarantees with NPT, nor are there guarantees with the Chemical Weapons Convention. On the other hand, does it help reduce nuclear proliferation and nuclear danger? The answer is clearly yes. The answer to those questions clearly is yes. The same will be true over a long period of time with the CWC. Mr. President, one of the major complaints by the critics of the Chemical Weapons Convention is that it is not adequately verifiable. Clearly, a modest program to produce chemical agents can be accomplished inconspicuously. You can almost do it in the basement of your home. It can be done in a very small physical space. The CWC will impose only modest constraints, at best, on small groups of people like terrorists making small quantities of chemical weapons. No treaty and, I might add, no domestic law, no law we could pass, could ever prevent a few people from making a small amount of chemical compounds. It could be very lethal in a small area when used in a terroristic way. However, the fact that 160 countries have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention is bound to increase the international consciousness about the threat posed by the proliferation of these horrible weapons and materials and is bound to also heighten national concern and international cooperation in dealing both with the national threat, nation-state threat, as well as the terrorist threat. So will it cure the problem? Will it stop terrorism? Will it eliminate chemical terrorism from being a potential threat? Absolutely not. Will it help? Yes, it will help. As drawn, however, the CWC was not intended to primarily address the chemical weapons threat from terrorists. It is intended to eliminate national-level chemical weapons programs and to put world pressure on those nations that refuse to comply. We need to recognize that the mere production of chemical agent is only the first step in a nation's military program to produce and have available militarily useful chemical weapons. To conduct all the subsequent steps to stockpiled, militarized weapons also in clandestine fashion is no easy feat. The critics seem to assume that every step is as concealable as a small lab required to produce some agent; this is certainly untrue. The CWC is intended to begin a regime of data collection on the production and use of those chemicals that can readily be used in chemical weapons programs. This will be combined with a program of inspections to verify those data submissions and a system of challenging inspections to resolve ambiguities and suspicions. This will also no doubt be supplemented by what we call national technical means of verification. We are going to have to do all this verification anyway. We do not solve any of our verification challenges in terms of terrorists, in terms of rogue nations, in terms of other nations; we do not solve a one of them by rejecting the CWC. If we are never a party to the CWC, we have all of these verification problems and challenges. Will the CWC solve them? No; it will not. Will it make it easier? Yes; it will. Will this CWC inspection regime be ironclad from day one? Of course not. But then neither was the inspection and verification for the NPT when it first entered into force. It still is not perfect. But over the last 25 years technology has provided many new ways of safeguarding nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear energy programs around the world. It has become much more difficult--but of course not impossible--to cheat on the NPT without running substantial risk of discovery. We should expect that the CWC will also develop more effective verification techniques once it is entered into force, techniques that one day might be more effective against the threat of terrorist use of chemical weapons and materials. But, Mr. President, if the United States does not ratify the CWC, we will not be allowed to participate in the development of the verification regime nor in the inspections themselves. CWC safeguards are more likely to become effective faster if the United States is a party to the CWC and can bring our advanced technology to bear than if we have excluded ourselves from the administration and implementation of the CWC as the critics of this convention propose. As former Secretary of State James Baker observed in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 12, 1996: . . .[W]hen you have a lot of countries that have signed onto a treaty to eliminate these weapons, you have a much stronger political mass that you can bring to the table in any forum, whatever it is, to talk about restraints and restrictions and sanctions. Moreover, Mr. President, to argue that we should refuse to ratify the CWC because it does not guarantee that Libya or North Korea or Iraq will be stripped of chemical weapons is to ensure that we will end up in the same category of nonparticipants with Libya, North Korea, and Iraq. Like those countries, if we do not ratify this convention, the United States will be a nonparty to the CWC. We will be subject to trade sanctions on chemical products and on technologies by all the other parties to CWC; trade sanctions, I might mention, that were proposed by our own Government under a Republican administration. Some of the senatorial critics suggest that the negotiators should start over, that we should not enter into any limitations unless all the rogue states have been compelled to join, and unless the agreement is absolutely verifiable. Mr. President, this is mission impossible. First, the CWC will enter into force whether the United States ratifies it or not, as I have said. It will take effect next year whether or not we are involved. Second, the CWC itself imposes no new limits on the policy of the United States toward chemical weapons programs. By law, the United States is already committed to the elimination of all unitary chemical weapons and all unitary agent stocks by the end of 2004. By law, we are already moving in that direction. By policy decision taken by President Bush in 1991, we have forsworn the use of chemical weapons even in retaliation for their use against U.S. forces. Our Joint Chiefs also agree with that policy. By a further policy decision by President Bush, we will eliminate our very small stockpile of binary chemical weapons as soon as the CWC enters into force, whether or not we are a party to the treaty. President Clinton has followed these same policies. Mr. President, back in the cold war days, you could stand on the floor and say, let us reject this treaty because the Soviet Union may not comply; we may not be able to verify. Those were arguments that had great legitimacy and were very seriously important arguments because we were agreeing to draw down our weapons based on their drawing down their weapons. That was the cold war. If we were not confident we could verify it, then, of course, we should reject that kind of treaty because we were depleting our military capability. Here in this case, we have already decided to get rid of our chemical weapons, and the only question is whether we are going to participate in a treaty that gets other countries to get rid of their chemical weapons. It is not the same decision as cold war treaties with the Soviet Union. It is vastly different. To view it through that prism, as I think some of our colleagues are doing--I am sure in good faith from their perspective--is a profound mistake. Mr. President, the bottom line is that the United States has already made a unilateral decision to eliminate all of its chemical weapons capabilities, whether or not we are party to the CWC. Our refusal to ratify this treaty does not help us one iota on verification. We still have all those verification challenges, and our refusal to ratify provides no bargaining leverage that I can identify against anyone whether it is Libya or North Korea or Russia, which still has large stocks of chemical weapons. They all know that we are out of that business. Defeating the ratification of the CWC in no way restores or preserves a U.S. chemical weapons capability. To again quote former Secretary of State James Baker: We knew at the time that there would be rogue countries that would not participate. * * * We have made a decision in this country that we're not going to have chemical weapons. We're getting rid of them. And we don't need them. We've made a policy decision that we don't need them in order to protect our national security interests. * * * Whether we are able to get all countries on board or not, I think we have a critical mass of countries and I think the treaty makes sense, recognizing up front all the problems of verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention. Finally, Mr. President, I have heard some of my colleagues argue that this treaty will pose an enormous burden and cost on U.S. industry. This argument is simply not true. If the costs and consequences to the American chemical and related industries were severe, as these critics suggest, why have the major chemical manufacturing associations not only endorsed, but also lobbied strongly in favor of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention? Why have 63 other nations, including most of our major industrial competitors, already ratified the CWC? Has this small group of CWC opponents discovered something that has been overlooked for the last 3 years by everyone else? Mr. President, the truth of the matter is that the cost of implementing this regime to the vast majority of U.S. business is either negligible or nonexistent. There are two categories of chemicals made and consumed by businesses in the United States that are covered by this treaty. No more than 35 firms in the United States, all of them large corporations, produce or consume the direct precursors of chemical weapons agents that are on the first category and are subject to the strictest CWC controls. The second category covers only large-volume producers of products that are in direct chemical weapon precursors. So no small businesses will be affected by the moderate requirements imposed by the CWC by this category. Contrary to the argument being made by the opponents of this treaty, downstream consumers of this category of chemicals are specifically exempted from reporting and inspection requirements. While it is true that some 2,000 firms, including some small and medium-sized businesses, will be required to fill out one form per year, both private industry and the Department of Commerce estimates indicate that it will take a very small and minimal amount of time to fill out. No proprietary information whatsoever is required, and the reporting requirements are essentially the same as those already required of these businesses by the Environmental Protection Agency or other regulatory bodies. In addition to the fact that only a small number of firms will actually be affected by the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Department of Commerce has worked very closely with the business community to develop a method of fulfilling both treaty requirements and industry requirements for protecting confidential business information. Again I would argue that if this were not the case, the American chemical manufacturing industry would not have endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Mr. President, I also point out that if the Senate continues to refuse to ratify the CWC--I am hoping the minds will be changed next year after the election is over--we are choosing to inflict international sanctions on foreign trade and one of our largest export industries, the $60 billion chemical industry. The CWC regime requires member states to impose trade sanctions against the chemical industries in nonmember states. While the entire $60 billion probably would not be immediately threatened, some $20 to $30 million would be threatened to begin with. Industry experts believe that over time U.S. interests would lose more and more business to foreign competitors who face no equivalent CWC trade sanctions from participating countries. Mr. President, the basic bottom line which each Senator must ask him- or herself is as follows: Is the United States more likely to reduce the dangers of the proliferation of chemical weapons by joining the 63 countries that have already ratified the CWC--and the many others that will join after the 65th ratification occurs, or is America's security better served by remaining on the outside, by joining rogue regimes like Libya and North Korea in ignoring this pathbreaking effort by 161 nations to bring these terrible weapons under some degree of control? Mr. President, I find this an easy question to answer. This is not a close question. This is not one of those questions that you can balance both sides and come out almost flipping a coin. We have many of those. This is an easy question to answer because no, it is not perfect, but yes, it does take steps in the right direction. We do enlist support from all the nations that will be signing, even those that we will have to watch very closely in terms of whether they comply. Therefore, I would have voted to ratify the CWC had it been brought to the floor during this session. If I were here next year, I would certainly vote to ratify. I urge all of my colleagues to pursue the ratification of the CWC when it is brought up in the 105th Congress. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is in our national security interests, Mr. President, and I hope the Senate will ratify this convention next year. I ask unanimous consent for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to pay tribute today to a remarkable man, a renaissance man for our times, Dr. David Allan Hamburg. I would also add that Dr. Hamburg has a wonderful wife, a remarkable and accomplished woman, Betty Hamburg. In her own right, she has been truly an outstanding leader in every field of endeavor she has entered, as she has stood side by side with David Hamburg all these years and helped him accomplish what he has accomplished in his own right. They have two wonderful children, very successful children, Peggy and Eric. Mr. President, I have come to know and admire David Hamburg through my long association with the Carnegie Corporation of New York, of which he has been president since 1983. In that position, he has combined his unparalleled knowledge of and experience in science, psychiatry, and international affairs to produce a record of remarkable accomplishment. A quick review of his past activities reveals a unique combination of intelligence and energy that has been applied unselfishly and with a remarkably positive effect to scholarship, to intellectual endeavors, and to public service. For example, Dr. Hamburg was professor and chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University; then the Reed-Hodgson Professor of Human Biology at Stanford. He served as president of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences. At Harvard University, he was the director of the Division of Health Policy Research and Education, as well as the John D. MacArthur Professor of Health Policy. He also has served as president and chairman of the board of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. His many memberships on governing boards of nonprofit organizations and his numerous honorary degrees demonstrate clearly that he has been widely recognized all over the country and, indeed, around the world for his experience, his wisdom, and his public-minded spirit. It has been my great honor and privilege to work closely with David Hamburg on three important projects in recent years. First, under his leadership, Carnegie sponsored, and David himself played an important role in, a project on nonproliferation in the early 1990's that provided much of the analytical basis for the original cooperative threat reduction legislation that became law in December of 1991. Shortly thereafter, he accompanied Senators Lugar, Warner, Bingaman, and myself on an extensive study mission to the former Soviet Union, and shared with us his wisdom regarding the troubled conflicts, the ethnic problems, and the potential for further problems in that part of the world, as well as his expertise and concern about the overall issue of nonproliferation. Second, in consultation with Senator Lugar and with me, David Hamburg's leadership and Carnegie's sponsorship with Dick Clark, former Senator Dick Clark's leadership, working under Carnegie and under David Hamburg, created a special exchange program involving Members of the United States Congress and the Russian Parliament. Senators Biden, Exon, Feingold, Graham of Florida, Hutchison, Jeffords, Johnston, Lautenberg, Roth, Sarbanes, and Simpson, plus numerous colleagues from the House, have joined me in this undertaking over the last several years. Thanks to the leadership of Dick Clark and the vision of David Hamburg, and the sponsorship of Carnegie, this program has proved most rewarding for the American side and I believe also for the Russian side, and has made a significant contribution to mutual understanding of United States-Russian relations, and also relationships with Eastern Europe, because the Carnegie Corporation, under David's leadership, and again with Dick Clark taking the helm, has sponsored numerous conferences over the last 7 or 8 years with our colleagues in the Parliaments of Eastern Europe, and that, too, has been very successful. Third, Dr. Hamburg, together with former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and a distinguished group of international leaders, again, sponsored by Carnegie, have formed an international commission to study and make policy recommendations regarding conflict situations that have plagued the post-cold-war world. This group has banded together with leaders from around the world to try to find ways and recommend methods and reform of certain institutions to help get out in front of and prevent deadly conflict throughout the globe. I have been honored to serve on the advisory board of this commission. Dr. Hamburg and Cy Vance and his commission colleagues have asked me to head a task force of this commission upon my retirement from the Senate. That will be one of the public policy issues I look forward to staying involved in. It is a very important part of America's foreign policy and national security considerations. I readily agreed to undertake this leadership under Dr. Hamburg and Cy Vance and am looking forward to continuing my close collaboration with Dr. Hamburg in that new capacity. Mr. President, I could go on and on about the accomplishments of David Hamburg. I have just outlined the parts of his overall activities that I have personally been involved in. He has been a leader in writing papers and books on children, on education, on research, on environmental matters. He is truly a Renaissance man. I have known people who had great breadth, and I have known people who have had great depth on many issues. I never knew anyone with the breadth and depth that David Hamburg has on so many issues important to our Nation and, indeed, to humanity. On September 9 of this year, David Hamburg will receive one of the highest honors our country can bestow: the Presidential Medal of Freedom. The citation that accompanies the award provides a fitting summary of this man's remarkable career to date. President Clinton presented that medal on September 9, and it reads as follows: As a physician, scientist, and educator, David Hamburg has devoted a boundless energy and deep intelligence to understanding human behavior, preventing violent conflict, and improving the health and well-being of our children. From Stanford to the Institute of Medicine and the Carnegie Corporation, he has worked to strengthen American families by teaching us about the challenges and difficulties of raising children in a rapidly transforming world. Known for emphasizing the importance of early childhood and early adolescence, he has stressed the need for families, schools and communities to work together in our children's interest. In a life of wisdom, courage and purpose, David Hamburg has exemplified the finest tradition of humane, social engagement. Mr. President, I am pleased and honored to pay tribute to David Allan Hamburg, a truly distinguished American.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, serving in the Senate has given me the opportunity to work on many important issues with many talented Members on both sides of the aisle. When I leave the Senate, I will miss the professional and personal associations I have had working with my colleagues in the Senate and the House, none more than my association with my friend Senator Carl Levin of Michigan. Carl Levin and I have served together on the same two committees for the past 18 years, the Armed Services Committee and the Governmental Affairs Committee. During those years I have gained a tremendous appreciation for his energy, his intelligence, his tenacity, his skill in the legislative process, and his total commitment to public service. I trust and hope the voters of Michigan will return him to the Senate next year where, depending on the makeup of the Congress, whether Republicans or Democrats control, he will be either the chairman or ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and he will certainly be a leader on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and perhaps chairman of that subcommittee or ranking minority member on that subcommittee, a position that I have held now since the late 1970's. Mr. President, one of the hallmarks that I associate with Carl Levin's service in the Senate is his passionate belief that Government should work and that it can work, and that Congress has a responsibility to the American people to make sure that it does work. On both the Armed Services Committee and Governmental Affairs Committee, I have watched with admiration as Carl Levin's tireless efforts developed into a substantial record of legislative accomplishments across a whole range of important issues. When Carl Levin came to the Senate in 1979, he asked to serve on the Governmental Affairs Committee. I remember how glad the committee was to have someone with his background, eager to serve on this important committee. In that year, the chairman of the committee, Senator Abe Ribicoff, created a new subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management. Oversight of Government Management. That is a subject that might strike some people as dry, and I assume that many days it was dry to Senator Levin, but it has been one of the passions of his Senate career. Senator Levin was appointed chairman of this new subcommittee in 1979, and my good friend and outstanding Senator from Maine, Senator Bill Cohen, was the ranking minority member. These two remarkable Senators have formed a partnership as chairman and ranking minority member of this subcommittee that has lasted through changes in the control of the Senate from Democrat to Republican to Democrat and Republican, and lasts to this day. In fact, Mr. President I would say that the relationship between Senator Levin and Senator Cohen on the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management serves as a textbook example of successful bipartisan cooperation in the pursuit of effective Government that other committees and subcommittees, indeed, other Senators and Congressmen, should look at very closely. When these two dedicated and outstanding leaders get together on an issue, good Government is almost always the result. Over the years, Carl Levin has carried out oversight investigations and hearings on a broad range of Federal programs in the Subcommittee on Oversight, including Social Security disability, Internal Revenue Service operation, the Customs Service, and inventory management in the Department of Defense. The objective of these investigations was to improve the operation of important Federal programs. The results in each case demonstrate that thoughtful, careful, and constructive congressional oversight of Federal programs can often lead to improvements in performance more readily than legislation. Carl Levin has also built an impressive legislative record on the Governmental Affairs Committee. He has been the driving force behind lobbying reform, the independent counsel legislation, whistle-blower protection, ethics reform, the Competition in Contracting Act, and the reform of the defense acquisition process. All of these initiatives have focused on a goal of making Government more open, more productive, and more effective. Since the death of our colleague and great U.S. Senator, Senator Scoop Jackson, in 1983, I have served as the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Governmental Affairs Committee. While Senator Jackson was still in the Senate serving, I was the vice chairman of that committee and while he was running for President of the United States, I was the acting chairman of that committee, so he and I worked together on that committee, for many years. Over the years this has been one of the premier investigative subcommittees of the Congress, and I cannot think of anyone more qualified, by temperament and by experience, to provide leadership on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations than Carl Levin. Senator John Glenn is also on that committee and provides superb leadership as either the ranking Democrat or the chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, depending, again, on which party controls the Senate. Senator Bill Roth and I have been partners on this subcommittee for many years, he serving sometimes as the ranking Republican when the Democrats are in control, sometimes as chairman, and he and I have reversed roles now, I believe, three times. So we have some outstanding members serving on that subcommittee with Senator Levin. Senator Levin has also been an extraordinarily active and energetic member of the Armed Services Committee during the years we served together. I remember when he first came on the Committee in 1979, and chairman Stennis asked him to chair the committee's hearings on the legislation implementing the Panama Canal Treaty. This was one of those detailed, complicated, and important jobs that everyone knew had to be done and hoped someone else would do. In what we came to realize was typical fashion, Carl Levin rolled up his sleeves and did an excellent job in carrying out the committee's responsibilities on this important issue. During our service together on the Armed Services Committee Senator Levin has served as the ranking minority member on the readiness Subcommittee and the chairman and ranking minority member on the Conventional Forces--now called the Airland Forces--Subcommittee. In that capacity he has made major contributions to maintaining the readiness of our forces and ensuring that they have the weapons and equipment they need to carry out their missions today and in the future. In reality, though, Mr. President, Senator Levin's impact on our national security has extended far beyond the subcommittees which he led. In fact, it is hard to think of a major issue that the Armed Services Committee has dealt with over the past two decades in which Carl Levin has not made an important contribution. He has been involved in our discussions on the size and makeup of our military force structure; on the modernization of our conventional capability; and on the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces. He has been a key player over the years in our oversight of ongoing military operations, including Somalia; the Persian Gulf conflict and its aftermath; and Bosnia. As I indicated earlier, he has been one of the drivers behind the enactment of the recent landmark legislation on defense acquisition reform, which of course has been a top priority of Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. As one of the most active members of the Senate's Arms Control Observer Group since its inception in 1985, Senator Levin has been heavily involved in keeping the Committee and the Senate informed on the progress of arms control negotiations. He has also made important contributions to the Senate's consideration of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; and the START I and Start II Treaties. I know he shares my regret that the Senate has not been able to act on the Conventional Weapons Convention during this session, and my hope that the Senate will act on this important Treaty early next year. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I have not agreed on every single issue in the Armed Services Committee over the years. Sometimes our positions differed, sometimes our philosophies differed. In those cases where we disagreed, my respect for his knowledge and his intelligence always caused me to double-check my own thinking. When we agreed--particularly on complicated issues like the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty--I was always grateful to have him standing shoulder-to-shoulder with me. All of us know Carl Levin's tenacity and talent for negotiating. Now that I am leaving the Senate in just a few days, I don't mind revealing that while I was chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I used Carl Levin as one of my secret weapons when we went into conference with the House on the annual Defense authorization bill. Whenever the Conference got bogged down over a particularly difficult issue, I knew that I could assign Carl Levin to go off and work with the House and have a pretty high level of confidence that the outcome would be closer to the Senate than to the House position. Carl is a superb negotiator. I have to confess that the House conferees got wise to my strategy, because after a while I only had to threaten to turn an issue over to Carl Levin to break a conference deadlock. They simply, many times, would rather concede than go off and know they were going to be subject to Carl's very tenacious negotiating capabilities. Serving in the U.S. Senate has been the greatest privilege of my career, the highlight of my professional life. I will miss the Senate, and I will miss my colleagues. I will leave, however, with a great deal of confidence that the energy and creativity in the Armed Services Committee--and its unwavering commitment to our Nation's security and to the men and women in uniform--will continue under the extraordinarily capable leadership on the Democratic side of my good friend, Senator Carl Levin, of Michigan.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I may proceed for up to a half-hour as if in morning business.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am pleased to speak today regarding a recent collaboration between AmeriCorps and Habitat for Humanity. Everyday on television and in newspapers we are reminded in some way of the problems of our Nation's distressed urban areas. I would like to draw the attention of my colleagues to one example of how community service is making a real difference in the area of affordable housing for hard-working families in cities across the country. On June 22, 1996, Habitat for Humanity sponsored the Home Stretch Build. Several hundred community volunteers and 75 Habitat AmeriCorps members from Americus and Savannah, GA; Miami, FL; Cleveland, OH and the District of Columbia built nine new homes in Southeast Washington, DC. That day Habitat for Humanity founder and president, Millard Fuller, said the following about the AmeriCorps Program: There are a bunch of good folks out here today, doing something very, very worthwhile. I'm particularly pleased with the AmeriCorps people here, over 75 of them, and I want to salute you . . . for the outstanding work that you do. This army of peaceful people, who are making good news happen all over this Nation. Twenty-five thousand of them. And I want you to know that we at Habitat for Humanity feel privileged and honored to have the AmeriCorps people with us, and we want more of them as time goes on. We love to be partners with you in this work, and I salute all the AmeriCorps people. Mr. President, this is another in the long list of examples of national service participants reaping the threefold benefit of national service--benefit to the community where the service is performed, benefit to the servers for serving their communities, and the benefit derived from the education of the servers in the future. I applaud the National Service Corporation for its ongoing efforts, and urge my colleagues to take note of the successes of these young people. I yield the floor.